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“If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences.” 
These famous words, coined by W.  I. Thomas (1928), the classical 
 Chicago School sociologist, have particular weight when mass violence 
and atrocities are at stake. Politicians, diplomats, military leaders, NGO 
activists, jurists, journalists, and citizens define such situations. Their 
definitions codetermine how the world responds to events such as those 
in Cambodia in the 1970s, in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia in the 
1990s, or in Darfur in the 2000s. It has often been argued for the case of 
Rwanda that the United Nations’ and the US government’s reluctance 
to call the 1994 mass killings genocidal prevented an appropriate re-
sponse and cost hundreds of thousands of additional lives. It thus mat-
ters whether we define mass violence as a form of genocide specifically, 
as criminal violence generally, or as something else altogether.
Definitions of mass violence as crime, some argue, have advanced 
fast in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, an era char-
acterized by a “justice cascade” according to some scholars (Sikkink 
2011). But actors may define mass violence differently, for example, 
as an insurgency or counterinsurgency, a civil war, or a complex hu-
manitarian emergency, and each of these definitions will support a dis-
tinct response. In the radical alternative, we may refuse to register the 
suffering and practice denial (Cohen 2001). In this book I explore the 
struggles over recognition and over competing definitions of the mass 
violence that befell the Darfur region of Sudan in the first decade of the 
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Questions, Theory, Darfur, Data
“Imagine . . .”
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twenty-first century (see figure 1). I focus on the fields of human rights 
and criminal law, humanitarianism, and diplomacy, as they generate at 
least partially competing representations of the mass violence, and on 
the journalistic field and its contribution to the diffusion of competing 
narratives to a wide public. I invite the reader to accompany me on this 
journey.
Imagine you enter the light-filled foyer and modern extension of 
 Germany’s foreign ministry in Berlin. You then cross an expansive 
courtyard and finally reach the massive Nazi-era building, survivor of 
the destructions of the final stages of World War II, and once home to 
Joseph Goebbels’s Ministry of Propaganda. There you learn from the 








































































figure 1. Darfur within Sudan and neighboring countries.
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in Germany, about this country’s diplomatic efforts toward advancing 
peace in Sudan. You listen to skeptical comments regarding the use of 
penal law, a tool deemed at least partially incompatible with diplo-
macy. Now envision a lecture room at Georgetown University’s Law 
School in Washington, DC, where you meet a young Amnesty Inter-
national activist. She tells you vivid tales about her and her organiza-
tion’s efforts to help bring those to (criminal) justice who bear primary 
responsibility for the suffering of the people of Darfur. Finally, imagine 
a small conference room in the Geneva operational center of Doctors 
Without Borders (MSF), where the interviewee, himself witness to hor-
rific suffering in many areas of mass violence, including Darfur, speaks 
eloquently about impediments that criminal justice interventions create 
for those who seek to alleviate the pain on the ground and to save lives. 
He is especially critical of the work of human rights activists and the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) with its interventions in Darfur.
You travel beyond Berlin, Washington, and Geneva to London, 
 Dublin, Paris, Frankfurt, Munich, Vienna, New York City, The Hague, 
and Bern, and finally arrange for a collaborator to visit Nairobi and 
 Johannesburg. You speak with foreign policy makers, workers for in-
ternational NGOs (INGOs)—both those with rights agendas and those 
with humanitarian aid orientations, and Africa correspondents of prom-
inent newspapers. You are impressed by many of your interviewees. 
Most have left the stability of their home countries to instead devote 
crucial chapters of their lives and careers to responding to catastrophic 
situations. They have traded comfort for danger and hardship. You en-
counter intense engagement, profound belief in the mission to which 
your conversation partners are devoted. And you are exposed to dis-
tinct narratives, representations, and knowledge repertoires about what 
occurred in Darfur. Suggestions of appropriate remedies are aligned 
with these narratives and they diverge just as profoundly. Significant 
differences also appear among respondents within the same sector but 
with different national backgrounds. How, then, do we make sense of 
the varieties of stories we hear about the same event, each presented 
with passion and conviction? This book seeks to answer that question.
Imagine further the reader of some 3,400 news reports and opin-
ion pieces about Darfur, all published by leading newspapers in eight 
 Western countries. That reader would encounter amalgams of the nar-
ratives we heard in interviews and conversations while traveling to 
the homes of governments, media organizations, and INGOs. But this 
reader wants to go further and identify patterns of reporting, hoping to 
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find out, for example, which newspapers (or papers from which coun-
tries) are how likely to report about the rapes in Darfur or to term the 
killings genocidal or to cite the ICC and apply a criminal justice frame 
to the  violence— as opposed to a civil war or humanitarian emergency 
frame. Our reader then convinces the National Science Foundation to 
support such effort and engages a team of PhD students to code the 
content of all of these articles along a systematic set of analytic dimen-
sions. Coders document the place and timing of each article, what it 
reports, and how.
This is in fact what I did. As I began to analyze the resulting Darfur 
media data set, fascinating patterns emerged. I realized, for example, 
that criminal justice actors and their supporters do affect how media 
report about the Darfur conflict. Applications of the crime frame to the 
violence in Darfur, as opposed to the civil war or humanitarian emer-
gency frames, have increased substantially in all eight countries at cru-
cial (but not all) intervention points. They did so, for example, after the 
International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, established by the UN 
Security Council, released its report on Darfur on January 25, 2005; 
when the ICC issued its first arrest  warrants— against Ahmed Harun, 
a Sudanese minister, and Ali Kushayb, a Janjawiid militia  leader— on 
April 27, 2007; and, eventually, when the prosecutor applied for and 
the court issued an arrest warrant against Omar al-Bashir, the presi-
dent of Sudan, charging him initially with war crimes and crimes against 
 humanity (March 4, 2009) and ultimately with genocide (July 12, 2010).
It would be a grave error to mistake such effects of court activity on 
the public representation of mass violence as trivial. First, much con-
structivist research has shown that media foci are not  necessarily— and 
at times not at  all— related to events (and institutional responses to 
them) in the real world. It is thus not to be taken for granted that media 
will pay attention to actions by the ICC, despite intense efforts by its 
press office. Second, the fact that categories of criminal law are being 
applied to the actions of political and military leaders and resulting 
mass violence is a revolutionary achievement of the twentieth century 
(Giesen 2004b). Third, variation across countries shows that the type of 
representation of mass violence is not a matter of course but something 
to be explained. For example, news media of different countries vary in 
their willingness to subscribe to the crime frame as an appropriate lens 
through which to interpret the events in Darfur.
The Darfur media data set similarly shows that media in the eight 
countries are not evenly willing to refer to the violence in Darfur as 
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genocidal. German news reporters are particularly reluctant to use the 
“G-word,” and Irish reports are generally cautious in the use of both 
the crime and genocide frames. Interviews in these countries show that 
such caution is not limited to news media. US papers, on the other hand, 
liberally refer to the violence as criminal and call genocidal the killings, 
rapes, destruction of livelihood and displacements in Darfur. American 
editorial writers go even further. They do not shy away from building 
rhetorical bridges between Darfur and the Holocaust. Nicholas Kristof 
stands out when he argues in the New York Times: “The Sudanese 
authorities, much like the Turks in 1915 and the Nazis in the 1930’s, 
apparently calculated that genocide offered considerable domestic 
 benefits— like the long-term stability to be achieved by a ‘final solution’ 
of conflicts between Arabs and non- Arabs— and that the world would 
not really care very much” (NYT 6/19/04, sec. A, p. 17). Elsewhere 
Kristof asserts: “As in Rwanda and even during the Holocaust, rac-
ist ideologies sometimes disguise greed, insecurity and other patholo-
gies. Indeed, one of the genocide’s aims is to drive away African tribes 
to achieve what Hitler called Lebensraum: ‘living space’ for nomadic 
Arabs and their camels” (NYT 3/14/06, sec. A, p. 27).
By now you have begun to ask: Why such differences? Why do we 
find an array of affinities, varying by societal field and country, toward 
applying the crime frame to Darfur and to calling the atrocities geno-
cide? Why do some actors instead prefer to describe the violence as a 
case of civil war or as a humanitarian emergency? And why do such 
preferences vary over time?
Answers to such questions matter in scholarly and in policy terms. 
We know that whether and how we acknowledge and name instances 
of mass violence, and whom we blame, has consequences for the will-
ingness of the international community to intervene, and to do so either 
with diplomatic, judicial, humanitarian, or military means. The history 
of Rwanda is a case in point. US president Bill Clinton later consid-
ered as a low point of his presidency his administration’s reluctance to 
name the Rwandan mass killings of 1994 “genocide” and to intervene 
accordingly.1
In the world of scholarship, comparativists, cultural sociologists, and 
globalization scholars will want to know why global or nationally distinct 
definitions of a situation of mass violence come to bear. Especially, why 
do national distinctions become manifest for a globally recognized prob-
lem such as Darfur, in which powerful international actors are engaged? 
Further, sociolegal scholars and criminologists are eager to learn how 
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nation- and field-specific leanings interact with the potential of legal pro-
ceedings to shape visions of the past and to thus prevent future violence. Fi-
nally, human rights scholars, as well as activists, ask what  enhances— and 
what  impedes— the unfolding of the “justice cascade,” the massive increase 
in individual criminal accountability for grave human rights offenses in the 
late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries (Sikkink 2011).
In the following chapters I introduce the reader to my discoveries 
about how global actors, national contexts, and distinct fields inter-
act to create at times conflicting social constructions of the reality of 
aggression and suffering in Darfur. To do so, I engage different inter-
related themes, all central to current scholarship and all implicated in 
these introductory paragraphs: (1) the criminalization of grave human 
rights violations; (2) the embeddedness of actors in competing fields of 
criminal justice, diplomacy, and humanitarian aid; (3) the role media 
play in communicating messages from these fields to a broad public; (4) 
tensions and interactions between global and national actors; and (5) 
consequences for the shape that knowledge about atrocities takes and 
potential effects on civil society and governmental responses. Through-
out, I provide much space to let the actors speak, aiming toward an 
interpretive understanding of their actions. Combining such under-
standing with an analysis of the conditions their respective fields im-
pose contributes to an explanation of unfolding responses to the mass 
violence. A few words on each of the central themes are followed by a 
brief reminder of what occurred in Darfur and by an exposition of the 
data and methods I put to work.
Justice cascade, fields, and representations 
between the global and the national
The first theme concerns the long journey from disregard, often denial 
(Cohen 2001), at times even glorification (Giesen 2004b) of mass violence 
toward, via cautious steps, its definition as criminal and what political 
scientist Kathryn Sikkink (2011) has recently called a “justice cascade,” 
a global fight against grave violations of human rights. This journey has 
been promoted by problem entrepreneurs whom I shall take seriously in 
this  book— together with their challengers. I thus link a prominent line of 
scholarship in constructivist criminology, including the by now classical 
scholarship of Turk (1969), Chambliss (1964), and Gusfield (1967) and 
more recent contributions (e.g., Jenness 2004), to a new line of work on 
the criminalization of human rights offenses (Keck and Sikkink 1998; 
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Sikkink 2011; Neier 2012). Activists invest great hopes in these trends, 
and some scholarship supports their hopes. Yet, to judge the potential 
of new legal strategies, we have to recognize the actors’ location within 
social fields and the challenges they face from competing fields.
The second theme is thus the embeddedness of actors in distinct so-
cial fields. I here initially focus on the fields of criminal law and jus-
tice (Hagan 2003), humanitarian aid (Krause 2014; Redfield 2013; 
Weissman 2011), and diplomacy (Power 2002; Scheffer 2012; K. Smith 
2010).2 As I examine conflicts within and between these fields for the 
case of Darfur, I use the concept of fields liberally, linking elements of 
field theory as developed by Pierre Bourdieu (1987, 1988, 1998) and 
his followers (Benson 1998, 2006, 2013; Hagan and Levi 2005) with 
notions of strategic action fields proposed by Neil Fligstein and his 
collaborators (Fligstein 2001; Fligstein and McAdam 2011). Despite 
important distinctions, both approaches share basic insights. They sen-
sitize us to the fact that fields are made up of real social actors. These 
actors pursue specific goals such as justice, humanitarianism, and peace 
while simultaneously seeking to strengthen their own position within 
their respective fields. They are also carriers of habitus, a set of rela-
tively fixed dispositions that reflect their trajectories and their position 
within the field. To achieve their distinct goals, actors have to incorpo-
rate into their habitus their field’s dominant institutional logic, a notion 
borrowed from Weberian ideas (Weber 1978) as specified in the work 
of Luhmann (2004). In criminal law, for example, this means a focus 
on specific individual actors (as opposed to social structures a sociolo-
gist might stress), on a binary logic of guilty versus not guilty (avoiding 
differentiations of social psychologists), and on those types of evidence 
that are compatible with procedural requirements of the law (not those 
deemed relevant by a historian).
To complicate things further, fields are often interlinked and their in-
habitants draw on diverse sources of habitus. Fields thus interpenetrate 
each other. One interviewee, for example, the director of an operational 
center of a major humanitarian aid agency in Europe, should not be in-
clined toward criminal justice responses. Yet, trained as a lawyer in the 
United States, he deviated from many of his humanitarian colleagues 
in this respect. His position in the organizational field, his educational 
background, and his national upbringing simultaneously contributed 
to his distinct knowledge and habitus. Biographical trajectory and field 
demands may thus not always harmonize. Instead, they often produce a 
tension that creates room for improvisation.
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Third, as I explore how competing fields and their definitions of real-
ity interact with civil society, I examine their impact on the journalistic 
field. Very few members of Western societies ever encounter mass vio-
lence in places such as Darfur directly. In contrast to other policy areas, 
most learn about such events only through media messages. Through 
them they become subject to distant suffering (Boltanski 1999). To the 
degree that policy decisions are informed by public perceptions of social 
issues, media thus become important social forces that affect whether 
and how governments will respond to mass violence in distant places. 
Recent Bourdieuian work on journalism (Bourdieu 1998; Benson 1998, 
2006, 2014; Benson and Neveu 2005), lines of research that explore the 
boundaries between the journalistic and the political fields (Mazzoleni 
and Schulz 1999; Revers 2014; Strömbeck and Esser 2014), and cultur-
ally inspired work on journalism (Hannerz 2004; Zelizer 1993) provide 
inspiration for this analysis. In addition, historical and sociological lit-
erature contributes theoretical ideas and empirical information on ways 
in which crime and genocide narratives created in the judicial field are 
processed in media reports (Pendas 2006; Jardim 2012; Savelsberg and 
King 2011).
Fourth, one of the complications of the fields we study is their lo-
cation in the intersection of the global and the local. A social move-
ment organization may be international, yet be composed of national 
sections. The International Criminal Court operates at the global 
level, but its governing body is the Assembly of States, in which 
those countries that have ratified the Rome Statute are represented. 
Its lawyers were trained in their home countries. Throughout I shall 
thus pay close attention to the simultaneous engagement of actors 
at global and national levels. Should we not expect globally unified 
representations of an event such as Darfur in which so many interna-
tional actors are engaged? Globalization theorists such as the World 
Polity School of John Meyer and his neo-institutionalist followers 
would suggest exactly that (e.g., Boyle and Meyer 1998; Frank, Hi-
ronaka, and Schofer 2000). But others insert a note of caution; some 
in fact thoroughly disagree. They highlight nation-specific social 
forces, carrier groups, interests, institutions, and cultural sensitivi-
ties, rooted in a country’s history, through which global themes, rep-
resentations, narratives, or norms are filtered (Bendix [1949] 1974; 
Gorski 2003; Roth 1987; Rueschemeyer 1973; Kalberg 1994, 2014; 
 Savelsberg and King 2005).3 And, indeed, empirical work shows 
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national particularities in the way Western governments (K. Smith 
2010; Power 2002) and NGO actors (Stroup 2012) respond to geno-
cide and mass atrocities. More recently, even work inspired by the 
World Polity School has examined nation-specific patterns in the 
promulgation (Halliday and Carruthers 2009) and implementation 
of law, including human rights law (Boyle 2002, on laws against fe-
male genital cutting). Yet other scholars write about cosmopolitan-
ism, especially in the realm of human rights (e.g., Levy and Sznaider 
2010). They take the nation level seriously, while insisting that in-
ternational and global concerns are increasingly incorporated into 
national ideas, memories, and practices.
Within this complex intersection of overlapping and conflicting fields 
there emerge cognitive and normative tools and policy responses to situ-
ations of mass violence. This book is thus linked to a fifth theme or 
intellectual tradition: the sociology of knowledge, rooted in classical 
works of Emile Durkheim and Karl Mannheim. Its tools further con-
tribute to our explorations of how our competing fields, at national 
and global levels, constitute distinct conditions and interact to produce 
patterns of collective representations (Durkheim [1912] 2001; P. Smith 
2008) that are selectively communicated by news media. As I examine 
such representations, I pay particular attention to four forms they may 
take: acknowledgment (Cohen 2001), framing (Goffman 1986; Benford 
and Snow 2000), arguments about causation, and bridging strategies 
(Alexander 2004). The last-named form links contemporary events, still 
diffuse in the public mind, to past ones for which a clear understanding 
has emerged. Collective representations then constitute a cultural reper-
toire of tools (Swidler 1986), from which creators of collective memory 
(Halbwachs 1992; Olick 1999; Osiel 1997; Savelsberg and King 2011) 
and cultural trauma (Alexander et al. 2004) will eventually be able to 
draw.
Understanding these patterns is a crucial precondition for making 
sense of, explaining, and predicting ways in which civil societies and 
governments respond to mass atrocities and grave violations of human 
rights. And such responses affect chances of breaking cycles of violence 
(Minow 1998, 2002) that have repeatedly tortured humanity through-
out its history. These responses will determine if, at the global level, 
a degree of pacification can be achieved that many societies have ar-
rived at in centuries of modern state formation (Elias 1978; Johnson 
and Monkkonen 1996).
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darfur: scholarly definitions  
of the situation
In addition to myriad activist and journalistic accounts, several aca-
demic books about the violent conflict in Darfur have been published 
(e.g., Flint and de Waal 2008; Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008; 
Mamdani 2009a; Prunier 2007). Reading these books reveals a schol-
arly consensus that massive violence unfolded, that many people lost 
their lives, and that two to three million Darfuris were displaced during 
the first decade of the twenty-first century.
Yet reading social scientific accounts of the mass violence in Dar-
fur quickly reveals fundamental differences and tensions as well. I here 
briefly describe agreements and disagreements for the example of three 
(sets of) authors who wrote remarkable books on Darfur. All three oc-
cupy distinct locations within the academic field, which should affect 
the knowledge they contribute. John Hagan and Wenona Rymond- 
Richmond wrote Darfur and the Crime of Genocide, published in 2008 
by Cambridge University Press. Julie Flint and Alex de Waal updated 
their Darfur: A New History of a Long War in a new edition published 
in 2008 by Zed Books in association with the International African In-
stitute, the Royal African Society, and the Social Science Research Coun-
cil. Finally, Mahmood Mamdani wrote Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, 
Politics, and the War on Terror, published in 2009 by Doubleday.
While Julie Flint is a journalist, the other authors are scholars. But 
all differ in sociologically significant ways. Hagan, a former president 
of the American Society of Criminology, is a professor of sociology 
and law at Northwestern University and codirector of the Center of 
Law and Globalization at the American Bar Foundation. Rymond-
Richmond, a former student of Hagan, is on the sociology faculty at 
the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. De Waal, educated as a so-
cial anthropologist, has worked in several prestigious multidisciplinary 
social science institutions and now teaches at the Fletcher School of 
 International  Affairs at Tufts University. One of his book’s photographs 
is of Sheik Hilal Mohamed Abdalla, taken in 1985 by the author him-
self and attesting to his long-term ethnographic familiarity with the re-
gion. The sheik, as those familiar with the history of Darfur know, is 
the father of Musa Hilal, one of the leading Janjawiid perpetrators. 
Finally, Mamdani, a political scientist and anthropologist, is a professor 
at Columbia University. The biographical blurb in his book describes 
him as “a third-generation East African of Indian descent [who] grew 
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up in Kampala, Uganda, and received his Ph.D. from Harvard in 1974” 
(Mamdani 2009a:399). Even these brief sketches reveal that our  authors 
occupy distinct places in the field of academia. There they compete for 
recognition, but they do so beyond the world of scholarship as well. 
The publication of two of the three books by at least partially com-
mercial presses attests to the latter. So does the engagement of de Waal 
in policy and consulting positions, for example, as a senior advisor to 
the African Union High Level Implementation Panel for Sudan, a role 
in which he served from 2009 to 2011. Not surprisingly, my interviews 
indicate that de Waal is by far the best known of these authors among 
journalists, policy makers, and NGO workers.
The position of these scholars in the academic field should affect 
which ideas they find acceptable or even thinkable, a link Pierre Bour-
dieu famously documented in his work Homo Academicus. Bourdieu 
(1988) also argues convincingly that not just the position of scholars 
in the academic field but also the relationship of an academic field to 
other societal fields affects knowledge. One of Bourdieu’s chapter head-
ings cites Kant’s reference to the “conflict of the faculties,” suggesting 
that closeness to the government places faculties on the right side of 
the political spectrum. But closeness to other institutional fields and 
movements also matters. The field of international criminal law and jus-
tice fares prominently in our case. Hagan and Rymond-Richmond are 
oriented toward it. So does the anti-postcolonialism movement, with 
which Mamdani is allied. And finally, de Waal is linked to the field of 
international governmental organizations, especially the African Union. 
Each of these fields entails specific sets of knowledge, and such knowl-
edge is likely to color the depiction of Darfur by those affiliated with it. 
I thus suggest that we briefly consider events in Darfur by taking into 
account the overlaps and tensions between these books, written from 
distinct locations and covering themes of suffering and victimhood, re-
sponsible actors, origins, causes, and frames through which the violence 
is interpreted and, finally, policy preferences are formed.
All three books agree that great suffering has befallen the people in 
the “land of the Fur,” to use the English translation of Darfur, that 
western part of Sudan, once a powerful Sultanate, incorporated into 
 Sudan under British colonial rule and divided into three states by the 
Sudanese government in 1994. Population was estimated at seven mil-
lion in the early stages of the mass violence in 2004. There is also little 
disagreement that violence dates back at least to the 1980s; that it ini-
tially peaked in the “First Arab-Fur War” of 1987–1989 (Flint and de 
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Waal 2008:277) and in the 1995–1999 Arab-Masalit conflict; but that 
the most destructive wave of violence occurred in 2003 and 2004. In this 
our three authors concur with almost all who have written about  Darfur. 
People have been killed, raped, and displaced, their livelihood destroyed. 
Yet differences appear when we examine the victim count and the details 
into which the authors go to depict the suffering in Darfur.
Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2008) base their account on an analy-
sis of the qualitative and quantitative materials entailed in the Atrocities 
Documentation Survey (ADS), a massive data collection initiated by the 
US Department of State under then–secretary of state Colin Powell. The 
survey was conducted in summer 2004 among more than one thousand 
Darfuris who had crossed the border into neighboring Chad to seek pro-
tection in newly established refugee camps. These authors pay minute at-
tention to the death toll and to the extent of other forms of victimization. 
They quote generously from qualitative interview materials, sharing with 
the reader horrendous stories that refugees told about their experience of 
mass killings, destruction, and rape campaigns: “First vehicles attacked 
the village. After one hour, planes came and bombed; after this military 
came on camels and horses and began shooting at random. They cut open 
the stomachs of pregnant women and split the throats of male fetuses. 
Bombs from airplanes killed a lot of animals and people. The military took 
women away. The village was burned and destroyed. They shot at anyone: 
man, woman, or child” (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008:7–8).4
Hagan and his collaborators also seek to establish numerical esti-
mates. Critiquing public health researchers who focus on mortality re-
sulting from malnutrition and disease in displaced-person and refugee 
camps, they add survey-based estimates of deaths that are directly at-
tributable to the violence. Hagan with Alberto Palloni, a past presi-
dent of the Population Association of America, estimates a death toll of 
350,000 (Hagan and Palloni 2005).5
Flint and de Waal (2008) do not engage in the accounting of vic-
timization à la Hagan and Rymond-Richmond. Yet they do cite social 
movements, such as Save Darfur, and these movements’ estimates of a 
death toll of 400,000 (Flint and de Waal 2008:186). Their text further 
takes pains to display the horrific violence, at times based on ICC ac-
counts of specific events:
Starting in August 2003, according to the ICC, Security [Forces] and militias 
worked hand-in-glove to clear a swath of Wadi Saleh. . . . A fertile area, long 
coveted by Arabs of Chadian origin, Wadi Saleh was now crowded with tens 
of thousands of displaced Fur and Masalit. By the end of the year, thirty-two 
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villages and hamlets along its tributary, Wadi Debarei, had been burned and 
displaced villagers had converged on the market town of Deleig. Over a peri-
od of weeks, army and Janjawiid captured and killed 172 people in the Deleig 
area. Some had their throats cut and their bodies thrown in the stagnant pool 
of a seasonal river just south of the town. (Flint and de Waal 2008:129–30)
The authors also describe in some detail the attacks on villages by An-
tonov planes of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), often followed by 
Janjawiid raids that completed the destruction and killings and drove 
away any remaining residents.
Mamdani’s account (2009a) of victimization differs substantially. He 
does not provide analyses of fatalities himself, and he abstains from 
confronting the reader with detailed descriptions of the brutalities com-
mitted on the ground. He also keeps his distance from any attempt to 
account for the number of victims. Instead he reviews, at times ironi-
cally, the “numbers debate” (Mamdani 2009a:25). He displays different 
and shifting death estimates that range from the tens of thousands up 
to a half million. He interprets the divergences as expressions of politi-
cal strategizing by “human rights entrepreneurs” (28), including John 
Hagan (“most authoritative” [28]); Eric Reeves, an English professor 
at Smith College and frequent commentator on Darfur (“most pro-
lific” [28]); and Nikolas Kristof from the New York Times (“another 
indefatigable crusader” [29]). While not providing his own estimate, 
he appears to sympathize with the doubts about high-end estimates ex-
pressed in a 2006 study by the US General Accounting Office. If indeed 
the struggle over numbers is part of a political game, as Mamdani sug-
gests, he certainly is one player in this game.
Just as the tales of victimization and suffering differ between the 
three (sets of) authors, placed in different locales within the aca-
demic space, so does their depiction of responsible actors. Hagan and 
 Rymond-Richmond (2008) see as aggressors the Sudanese government, 
the SAF, and the Janjawiid, the infamous Arab militias that received 
massive material and symbolic support from the Sudanese government. 
These two sociologist-criminologists go further, though. They recon-
struct the chain of command,  and— based on ADS  reports— identify 
specific individuals as responsible for the mass violence, including those 
who are now indicted by the ICC. Both Flint and de Waal (2008) and 
Mamdani (2009a) attribute responsibility differently. To be sure, they 
never exempt the SAF or the Janjawiid from charges of gross atroci-
ties. In fact, they attribute direct responsibility to some of the same 
actors identified in Hagan and Rymond-Richmond, such as the former 
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minister Ahmed Harun (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008:123, 
133) and Janjawiid leaders Ali Kushayb (130) and Musa Hilal (35ff., 
125). Yet the attribution of responsibility by Mamdani and Flint and 
de Waal is more diffuse. Flint and de Waal (2008) spell out atrocious 
attacks by rebel forces against Arab groups (135), and they examine 
the roles that outside actors such as Libya’s Gaddafi (47) and Chad’s 
Idriss Déby (27) played in the buildup of violence before it escalated to 
catastrophic levels in 2003. Mamdani (2009a) also does not deny the 
agency of the Sudanese state and the militias that drive what he labels 
“counter-insurgency” (5), but he highlights more clearly the violence 
committed by insurgents themselves. In fact, he attributes victim status 
to Arab tribes that are often defined as a crucial source of aggression. 
To him the rebels were recruited from “the tribes with land who sought 
to keep out landless or land-poor [“Arab”] tribes fleeing the advancing 
drought and desert” (4).
These and other differences between the three sets of authors are 
depicted in table 1. Clearly, distinct identifications of victimization and 
responsible actors correspond with further differences along a set of an-
alytic dimensions that prove crucial throughout this book: time frames, 
the attribution of causes, and the framing of the violence. We shall see 
how representations of the mass violence in Darfur shift along these 
dimensions depending on the sector in which they were produced and, 
over time, under the influence of judicial interventions.
Considering the time frames, always crucial in the interpretation of 
mass violence,6 Hagan and Rymond-Richmond decidedly focus on re-
cent events and actions. They apply to Darfur an “endogenous con-
flict theory” that sees ethnic violence as the product of shorter-term 
dynamics initiated by concrete state actors to whom societal groups 
responded. Flint and de Waal instead situate the violence in a longer-
term history of conflict among the groups populating Darfur. They 
inform the reader, for example, of troubles that government authori-
ties had with the “camel-herding Abbala Rizeigat” Arabs, back in “the 
time of the Sultans,” and of long-term desertification resulting from 
droughts and associated struggles for resources they caused already in 
the 1980s (Flint and de Waal 2008:40).7 Mamdani (2009a) also reaches 
far back into history, taking as his point of departure the colonial era, 
especially the British colonial administration’s effort at “retribalizing 
 Darfur” (152ff) and “marginalizing” (163ff) the region. He interprets 
both strategies as crucial sources of the violence that was to plague the 
region in subsequent decades and into the present.
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Consider, finally, differences the authors apply in their accounts of 
causes, interpretive frames, and associated policy conclusions. Hagan 
and Rymond-Richmond (2008) develop a “critical collective framing 
approach” in which collective action generates a “Sudanese genocidal 
state as an endogenous system” (163). Crucial in this process are 
“ethno-political entrepreneurs” who cultivate fear and disrespect, ma-
nipulate racial symbols and identities, and develop “crisis scripts” and 
apply them to conflicts. In this context, demonizing and supremacist 
ideologies intensify divisions between Arab and black African groups. 
They stimulate the use of racial epithets that create a sense of collective 
effervescence (Durkheim) and feed “collective fury.” The final out-
come is genocidal violence. The frame Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 
apply to interpret the violence in Darfur is one of crime, specifically 
genocide.8 It supports a criminal justice response to the violence in 
Darfur.
Flint and de Waal (2008) differ decisively from Hagan and  Rymond- 
 Richmond’s “endogenous” approach. Drawing on their cultural capital, 
table 1.  analytic dimensions of the darfur conflict and their use by 
holders of different positions in the academic field
  Authors
Analytic Hagan and Rymond- Flint and de  
Dimension Richmond (2008) Waal (2008) Mamdani (2009)
Suffering/ graphic accounts graphic accounts no depictions 
victimization high numbers high numbers ironizing “numbers  
   game”
Responsible GoS,* SAF, Janjawiid, GoS, SAF, Janjawiid, GoS, SAF, Janjawiid, 
actors specific individuals rebels, outside forces rebels (against
  (Libya, Chad) impoverished Arab
   groups)
Origins/time Short-term, Long-term, Long-term,
 2003– Drought of 1980s Colonialism
Causes Ethnopolitical Complex historical, History of
 entrepreneurs and cross-national colonialism
 processes
Frame Crime, genocide War (of total Neocolonial,
  destruction) counterinsurgency
Policy Criminal justice Negotiations Negotiations
conclusions
*Government of Sudan
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a deep familiarity with the history and ethnography of Darfur, they 
elaborate on complex historical and cross-national processes that con-
tributed to the events of 2003. Theirs is best characterized as a war 
frame, specified as “a war of total destruction, 2003–04” (116), to cite 
the title of one of their chapters. Policy conclusions cautiously point 
toward peace negotiations: “When the political alignments for a negoti-
ated peace  recur— which could be a few months’ hence or, more likely, 
many years into the  future— the players, the issues, the context, and the 
solutions could all be different” (388).
Mamdani (2009a) takes a distinct position regarding causes, frames, 
and policy conclusions. He argues that the roots of the violence in  Darfur 
lie in the history of colonialism and that reactions to the conflict are to 
be explained by the postcolonial interests of Northern powers. His focus 
is on “politics of violence, whose sources include both a state-connected 
counterinsurgency and an organized insurgency” (145).9 Mamdani thus 
applies an insurgency and counterinsurgency frame, which itself is em-
bedded in a neocolonial frame. His policy conclusions are guided by the 
insight that “anyone wanting to end the spiraling violence would have 
to bring about power sharing at the state level and resource sharing at 
the community level, land being the key resource” (146). Neither crimi-
nal law nor humanitarian intervention, in his view, can enhance these 
objectives. A settlement is to be achieved via negotiation.
Three (sets of) authors, each with specific locations in the aca-
demic field and in relation to other societal fields,  provide— despite 
 overlaps— quite distinct representations of the mass violence in Darfur 
along the dimensions of victimization and suffering, responsible actors, 
time frame, causes, interpretive frames, and policy conclusions.
in search of answers: collecting and 
analyzing data
If even scholarship defines the events of Darfur in conflicting ways, 
then disagreements across distinct societal fields are to be expected. 
The questions posed above reemerge with particular urgency: How and 
why does knowledge about Darfur vary across societal fields and over 
time? Why do we find affinities, varying not only by societal field but 
 also— overlapping with  fields— by country, toward applying the crime 
frame to Darfur and to calling the atrocities genocide? Why do some ac-
tors instead prefer to describe the violence as a case of civil war, insur-
gency and counterinsurgency, or as a humanitarian emergency? Again, 
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to answer these questions, I conducted systematic, semistructured in-
terviews, supplemented by many conversations and use of an observa-
tional method, and a large-scale content analysis of media reports from 
eight countries. Before addressing the nuts and bolts of my methods of 
data collection, one methodological clarification is in order.
Beyond “Methodological Nationalism,” “Cosmopolitanism,” and 
“Universalism”: Toward Empirical Investigation
I collected data at the levels of individual media reports, even state-
ments within reports; international organizations; national institutions 
such as foreign ministries; newspapers; and national sections of interna-
tional NGOs (INGOs). By prominently including national institutions 
as units of data collection, however, I do not subscribe to “methodolog-
ical nationalism” (Beck and Sznaider 2006). Instead, gathering data at 
the national level reveals information about the intersection of global, 
national, and local forces. An interview with the Africa correspondent 
of a German newspaper provides a telling example:
In Nairobi [one of the few central bases of most Western Africa correspon-
dents] things are rather informal. There is not a sense of competition. So 
you sit down with colleagues to learn from others who have just been to 
an area what things look like out there. There is quite a lively exchange of 
experiences and  information— and that certainly also leads to some kind of 
opinion formation. . . . Often that is not possible in Africa in any other way. 
As a single person one cannot . . . charter a plane. . . . The trip to North East 
Congo included journalists from the US, UK, Switzerland, and Germany. . . . 
[Also,] there was this foreign correspondents’ club. There I met Canadian 
colleagues, Zimbabwean colleges, etc. (author’s translation)
The interview from which this quotation is taken tells us how a 
 German journalist, working for a German paper in a specific locale in 
an African country, is simultaneously embedded in a global network of 
correspondents and NGO workers from diverse national contexts. It 
illustrates one way in which the national and the global are intimately 
intertwined in the representation of events, including mass violence.
What I find in the world of journalism applies in the political sphere 
and civil society as well. There, human rights, as a new principle of le-
gitimacy, have come to challenge the notion of national sovereignty and 
advanced a move toward  cosmopolitanism— that is, an incorporation of 
foreign and distant suffering (Boltanski 1999) into local and national 
 concerns— famously explored by Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider (2010) 
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and Alejandro Baer (2011). Three forces are at play. One is the weaken-
ing capacity of nation-states to shape representations of past and cur-
rent events; instead, local groups and competing affiliations promote 
a fragmentation of representations. A second is the growing weight of 
media and communication institutions as producers of representations: 
distant events create local resonance and identification through the glo-
balization of media images and communication technologies.10
A third force toward the emergence of cosmopolitanism, one that 
moves to center stage in the following chapters, is the law. Again I agree 
with Levy and Sznaider (2010) that “recent trials related to human 
rights abuses are an important locus for the production of cosmopolitan 
ideals and their criticism” (19). More specifically, the post–Cold War 
era advanced the cosmopolitanization of human rights regimes through 
a substantial number of domestic human rights trials and the incorpo-
ration of international law into domestic jurisdictions (internalization 
of human rights norms by states). Another indication is the creation of 
the International Criminal Court with its complementarity principle, 
securing states’ rights to prosecute human rights perpetrators as long 
as they are willing and able to do so. Global norms thereby become 
incorporated into national legal institutions.
I here tackle as an empirical question the debate between propo-
nents of methodological nationalism versus universalism versus cos-
mopolitanism. Based on quantitative and qualitative data on the case 
of  Darfur, I examine the degree to which different types of countries 
actually incorporate international human rights concerns into their le-
gitimacy basis; the degree to which global legal interventions produce 
narratives to lay the groundwork for collective memory across coun-
tries; and the degree to which these representations are filtered through 
a particular judicial logic and colored by political constraints under 
which law operates, especially international law. While broad state-
ments that sanctify the national, the global, or the cosmopolitan may 
neatly align with “invisible colleges,” I place myself between those posi-
tions. Again, through systematic collection of data, I examine degrees 
to which representations of ongoing atrocities are inspired by national 
forces, universal standards, and cosmopolitan sensitivities.
Why These Eight Western Countries?
Considered in this book are two North American and six European 
countries: Canada and the United States on the western side of the 
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Atlantic, and Austria, France, Germany, Ireland, the United Kingdom, 
and Switzerland on the eastern side. The focus on Western countries, all 
democracies with capitalist economies, warrants justification. Clearly, 
perceptions and representations from other parts of the world matter. 
Representations of Darfur in China, Russia, and Arab and African coun-
tries differ substantially from those in the West, and they have affected 
responses of the international community. And yet Western countries 
are a research subject in their own right. They are crucial players on the 
world stage. From a methodological point of view, limiting the argu-
ment to countries that are similar in basic respects (democracy, capital-
ism, and wealth) has a major analytic benefit: it reduces variation and 
thus allows for a controlled comparison along a set of crucial variables.
The set of countries selected for this study includes three permanent 
members of the UN Security Council (France, UK, US); large countries 
such as the United States and Germany and small ones such as Austria, 
Ireland, and Switzerland; countries with varying identities vis-à-vis mass 
atrocities and genocide, from that of a liberator (US) to that of a perpe-
trator nation (Germany); countries with colonial involvement in Sudan 
(UK) or in neighboring countries such as Chad (France), or a lack thereof; 
countries tightly woven into alliances (France, Germany) to ones that 
are relatively neutral (Austria and Switzerland); and finally countries in 
which one of three languages dominates: French, English, or German. It 
should not be denied that the researcher’s ability to read and speak these 
languages was a pragmatic consideration that supported this selection.
Sources of Data
Several key sources of data helped in the exploration of representations 
of Darfur and changes in them over time, especially in relation to ju-
dicial interventions: a set of systematic, semistructured interviews with 
central contributors to those representations; many individual conver-
sations and observations of meetings of key players; a detailed content 
analysis of news media; and an analysis of documents produced by, 
among others, foreign ministries and NGOs.
Interviews and Observational Method
Between November 2011 and November 2012 I traveled across North 
America and Europe to conduct semistructured interviews with Af-
rica correspondents, NGO specialists, and Sudan experts in foreign 
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ministries. I had selected one rights-oriented NGO, Amnesty Interna-
tional, and one humanitarian aid–oriented NGO, Médecins Sans Fron-
tières (MSF, or Doctors Without Borders). I also selected two prominent 
newspapers, one left-liberal, the other conservative or center-right, 
from each country. Most of the interviews lasted between sixty and 
eighty minutes, with a few as short as a half an hour or as long as 
two hours.11 I followed a positional sampling strategy as I attempted 
to include at least one Darfur specialist from each of the five organiza-
tions in each of the eight countries (thirty-eight country-organizations). 
I was able to secure forty-two interviews, covering seven foreign min-
istries, twelve newspapers, and thirteen national divisions of NGOs. 
Consent was secured from each interviewee in line with the approval 
by the Institutional Review Board of the University of Minnesota. The 
interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed. No interviewee is re-
ferred to by name in this book. Specific positions of interviewees are 
explicated only where an appropriate understanding necessitates doing 
so. In some cases, a respondent’s gender ascription may be changed to 
further disguise his or her identity. After I had collected these European 
and North American interviews, Wahutu Siguru, a doctoral advisee and 
collaborator, traveled to Nairobi, in his native Kenya, and to Johan-
nesburg, South Africa, and, following an identical methodology and 
guideline, conducted interviews with African journalists who had writ-
ten about Darfur.
Interviews with NGO specialists and Sudan experts in foreign min-
istries served to explore features of societal fields that contribute to the 
formation of knowledge about Darfur and with which journalists in-
teract. Interviews with Africa correspondents who contributed a sub-
stantial number of articles to the newspapers we analyzed allowed for 
triangulation: to examine whether positions expressed in specific media 
confirm or differ from positions their journalists take in interviews. The 
degree to which they differ tells us something about the independent 
impact of the media organization for which a journalist works, includ-
ing its editorial process. All interviews, finally, served to explore the 
actors’ habitus, shaped by their position in the field and their field’s 
position vis-à-vis other fields. Interviews also tell us about the actors’ 
biographic trajectories, their social and economic backgrounds, and the 
career through which they arrived at their respective  positions— factors 
that also contribute to shaping their habitus.
The structure of the interviews was closely aligned with my the-
matic concerns. After inquiring about the interviewees’ background 
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(education, relevant socialization experiences, career path, and work 
context), I asked about perceptions of victimization, actors responsible 
for the violence, and causes of the conflict; appropriate frames of inter-
pretation, policy goals, and strategies (and potential conflicts between 
them) and institutions to execute them (with a special emphasis on the 
pursuit of justice and the ICC); positions of the interviewees’ organiza-
tion and their nation’s government; the role of historical experience; 
and sources of information (see appendix B for interview guidelines).
In addition to the formal interviews, numerous informal conversa-
tions with a diverse array of actors provided insights into the represen-
tation of Darfur. I visited with conversation partners in their offices, in 
coffee shops, and in the context of two conferences. They included Eu-
ropean scholars specializing in Sudan; Sudanese informants, specifically 
anthropologists, journalists, and opposition politicians from Sudan; 
two US foreign policy makers (ambassadors); other journalists; law-
yers from the International Criminal Court; the director of a genocide 
memorial museum; and Darfur activists. The conferences included a 
January 2011 symposium titled “War Crimes Journalism” at the Vas-
sar Institute in The Hague, and a summer 2012 conference, “Discourses 
on Darfur,” at the Rockefeller Bellagio Center.12 I conducted two ad-
ditional formal interviews with a member of the governing board of one 
of the Darfur rebel movements and with a Sudan expert of the foreign 
ministry of a ninth country.
Newspaper Articles and Commentaries
A detailed international comparison of the changing representations of 
Darfur can be gained from a fine-grained analysis of news media re-
ports. Together with a group of graduate students, I conducted a con-
tent analysis of 3,387 newspaper articles, editorials, and op-ed pieces 
from the eight  countries— a massive undertaking. Following an intense 
week of training, six coders spent several months laboring individually 
while regularly joining in group sessions to assure continued agreement 
regarding the meaning of coding categories.
There are good reasons for such investment. News media, after all, 
continuously bring the reality of atrocities and grave human rights 
violations into the homes of people around the world. In fact, media 
are usually people’s only source of knowledge about ongoing atroci-
ties in distant lands. We may argue, with Bourdieu, that media power 
is “power to consecrate,” to name an event, person, or idea worthy 
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of further consideration (Benson 1998). Media reports affect ways in 
which societies think about events, especially those in distant lands, too 
remote for personal observation.
In addition, media are also indicators of collective knowledge reper-
toires and processes. Scholarship has documented, and my interviews 
with Africa correspondents confirm, that journalistic reports and com-
mentaries are the outcome of complex collective action among actors 
within and outside the media field. Media reports thus constitute collective 
 representations— supra-individual ideas, scripts, beliefs, values, or cogni-
tive and normative  images— to which Emile Durkheim ([1912] 2001) 
alerted us long ago in his work on the elementary forms of religious life.
Prominent newspapers are not the only media that communicate 
news from abroad. In France, for example, beginning in the 1960s and 
1970s, the dominant role that Le Monde and Le Figaro, the most presti-
gious liberal and conservative newspapers, respectively (and part of our 
sample), played in the formation of public and elite opinion has been 
passed on to the television (Bourdieu 1998). The same can be said for 
these newspapers’ equivalents in other countries. Simultaneously, how-
ever, the weight of television ensures that what appears prominently 
on TV will almost always make its way into prestigious newspapers. A 
newspaper analysis is thus unlikely to miss themes that are prominently 
displayed on television. The same can be said for electronic communica-
tion. My interviews reveal that journalists are very much attuned to the 
Internet and, in their work, draw on information it provides.
As newspaper analysis is thus generally a useful tool, it is especially 
advantageous to focus on prestigious papers in the current context.13 
Not only are these papers more likely than others to cover foreign news, 
but their content is hardly ignored by policy makers. Further, in coun-
tries such as the United States, the nationally most prominent papers 
reach far beyond their own readership. Regional and local newspapers 
across the country, lacking resources to investigate beyond the local or 
state levels, frequently reprint articles on foreign policy themes from 
papers such as the New York Times.
I therefore present a comparative and comprehensive exploration of 
representations of the mass violence in Darfur by examining reporting 
and commentary in the eight countries’ most prestigious daily newspa-
pers with national or supraregional distributions. In what follows, the 
selection of newspapers, the time periods covered, the sampling and 
coding strategies, the selection of coders, and issues of intercoder reli-
ability are addressed (see table 2).
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1. Selection of newspapers. One conservative-leaning and one center-
left–leaning newspaper from each of six of the eight countries was se-
lected for analysis, based on reputation and readership numbers. The 
exceptions are Ireland and Switzerland, where only one paper regularly 
covers international news. In total, fourteen papers were selected. Table 
2 lists the newspapers and details the total number of articles as well as 
the subset of opinion pieces coded for each.
2. Time periods. Articles from these papers, published between Janu-
ary 1, 2003 (the beginning of the period of massive violence), and May 
30, 2010 (the end of the bulk of our coding work), underwent content 
analysis. While tensions in the Darfur region developed over several de-
cades, most of the extreme violence occurred during this period. (For an 
account of the most recent intensifications of violence, see the postscript 
to this book.) To examine the effect of judicial and quasi-judicial in-
terventions on representations of the violence, I conceptualize the time 
frame as broken into nine periods. The eight dates below, following the 
February 2003 rebel attack and the subsequent massive repression by 
table 2.  number of media documents (articles and opinion pieces) 
coded, by newspaper and country
Number of media documents (and opinion pieces)
Countries Conservative Total Left-liberal Total
Country 
total
Austria Die Presse 137 (22)
Der  
Standard 103 (20) 240 (42)
Canada Toronto Sun 120 (22)
Globe & 
Mail 213 (36) 333 (58)
France Le Figaro 162 (19) Le Monde 341 (31) 503 (50)
Germany FAZ 326 (34) SZ 420 (68) 746 (102)
Ireland  Irish Times* 242 (35)




Times 197 (50) Guardian 215 (45) 412 (95)
United 
States WSJ 171 (43) NY Times 531 (107) 702 (150)
NOTE: WSJ = Wall Street Journal; FAZ = Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung; SZ = Süddeutsche Zeitung
*Not placed in the left-right typology as it is the only paper in this country with substantial foreign 
news reporting.
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the Sudanese military in conjunction with the Janjawiid, separate these 
periods:
September 18, 2004: UN Resolution 1564 establishes an Interna-
tional Commission of Inquiry on Darfur.
January 25, 2005: the commission delivers its report to General 
Secretary Kofi Annan.
March 31, 2005: the UN Security Council (UNSC) refers the Darfur 
case to the ICC.
February 27, 2007: the ICC prosecutor applies for an arrest war-
rant against two midlevel actors for crimes against humanity and 
war crimes.
April 27, 2007: the ICC issues a warrant for the arrest of both ac-
tors for war crimes and crimes against humanity (publicized on 
May 2, 2007).
July 14, 2008: the ICC prosecutor applies for an arrest warrant 
against Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir for crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, and genocide.
March 4, 2009: the ICC issues an arrest warrant against President 
al-Bashir for crimes against humanity and war crimes (to be 
supplemented, on July 12, 2010, with genocide charges).
May 18, 2009: Bahr Idriss Abu Garda, a rebel leader who had 
previously been summoned to appear before the ICC under seal, 
makes his initial appearance before the court.
3. Sampling strategy. Newspaper articles, editorials, and op-ed pieces 
from each of the fourteen papers were selected using a stratified random 
sampling strategy. When possible, we utilized the newspaper’s online 
archives of print articles. Online archives were made available by Der 
Standard, Die Presse, the Süddeutsche Zeitung, and the Toronto Sun. 
Where online archives of print articles were not available, searches were 
performed in both LexisNexis and ProQuest Newsstand. The Wall 
Street Journal was obtained from ProQuest Newsstand, as it was not 
available through LexisNexis; all other papers were accessed through 
Lexis Nexis.14 Only for the Neue Zürcher Zeitung did we have to rely 
on the online archive, not knowing whether all articles coded in fact ap-
peared in print. While there is little reason to believe that this difference 
significantly affects results for the Swiss paper, and while I triangulate 
these findings via an interview with its most senior correspondent, I 
cautiously interpret patterns for this paper.
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My coding team identified all articles in the fourteen papers written 
during the period of interest and containing the search term “Darfur.”15 
We included all articles and opinion pieces except letters to the editor. 
We excluded articles that mentioned Darfur but that, upon closer re-
view, did not pertain to the conflict in Darfur. From all relevant docu-
ments, we selected every other article for most time periods and every 
sixth article for two lengthy time periods that passed without judicial 
intervention. Overall, we analyzed a total sample of 3,387 articles.16
4. Coding Strategy. Although we coded at the level of the article, 
we treated each article as a collection of statements. All information, 
 including quotations and paraphrased information, was coded  if it 
spoke to the violence in Darfur. Often, a single article included  several 
viewpoints, and in such cases all were coded. Yet coders did  not 
 attribute rare sentences or viewpoints that the author clearly and 
 explicitly rejected.
Content analysis was conducted based on a coding scheme that com-
prised 179 variables of interest, organized into several major thematic 
categories (see appendix C). Given the detailed nature of the coding 
scheme, information on some variables was frequently missing. Yet 
missing information in this case is relevant in its own right. It tells us 
what aspects and details of the conflict are underexposed in journal-
istic depictions. The following themes encompassed the majority of 
variables:
 • Degrees and types of acknowledgment of victimization and 
suffering, such as killings, rapes, displacements, or torture. We 
coded forms of suffering that were mentioned; numbers of af-
fected Darfuris, where provided; and specific episodes that were 
displayed in detailed accounts. Such acknowledgment challenges 
states of denial, as explored by Stanley Cohen (2001).
 • Actors involved. Here I am interested in the degree to which reb-
el forces, Janjawiid militias, and government officials are named 
as actors. The coding scheme further distinguished between refer-
ences to individuals or collectivities and references to the rank of 
individuals within the hierarchy of their organizations.
 • Perceived causes. Causes may point to distant events and con-
flicts, to the colonial past, to natural events such as the deserti-
fication of the Sahel zone and struggles over increasingly scarce 
resources, or to conscious decisions and  strategies— such as the 
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push toward Islamization, the neglect of the periphery, or the 
stirring up of racial resentment by central players on the ground 
and in high government offices.
 • Frames or lenses through which the violence is interpreted. The 
coding scheme distinguishes between an insurgency frame, a civil 
war frame, a humanitarian emergency frame, a crime frame, and 
an aggressive-state frame that depicts the violence as dispropor-
tionately aggressive but not criminal. Frames can be diagnostic, 
identifying and attributing problems; prognostic, proposing 
solutions; or motivational, providing a rationale for engage-
ment (Benford and Snow 2000). For example, while a civil war 
diagnostic frame identifies violence as a civil war, its prognostic 
equivalent may suggest negotiation as the appropriate response. 
The motivational frame provides a rationale or goal such as (in 
the civil war case) the establishment of peace. The coding scheme 
took account of these distinctions. Yet, one single article could 
invoke various frames. In fact, articles frequently included state-
ments that fell in line with different frames in discussing violence 
in Darfur, for example, by characterizing it as both a civil war 
and a humanitarian emergency. Furthermore, articles at times 
included a statement that diagnosed the violence in a civil war 
frame while simultaneously offering a prognosis aligned with the 
humanitarian emergency frame. Such seeming contradictions typ-
ically result from journalists interviewing and citing, in the same 
article, different actors with distinct positions. In short, articles, 
with the exception of opinion pieces, are rarely characterized by 
a single frame.
 • References to past atrocities. Producers of narratives often make 
use of bridging strategies. They seek to shed light on a new and 
yet unknown situation, here Darfur, by linking it to a past event 
whose meaning is well established. Coders were thus asked to 
code whether past atrocities were mentioned in association with 
Darfur. Building on our previous work (Savelsberg and King 
2011:60–64), the instrument further asked coders to document 
the use of different types of bridging: that the violence in Darfur 
was similar to a past atrocity (mimetic bridging); that the context 
of the violence was similar to that of past violence (contextual 
bridging); that this violence will have a similar outcome as a past 
atrocity (predictive bridging); or that Darfur differs from a past 
atrocity (bridging challenge).
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 • Sources. When articles included quotations, sources were coded, 
especially organizational affiliations and, in some instances, 
names of individual informants.
5. Coders and Intercoder Reliability. Six coders, all PhD students in 
sociology, history, or political science, were chosen based on their lan-
guage abilities (English, German, or French) and their familiarity with 
content analysis and social scientific methodology. Coders received one 
week of training and met weekly to discuss any questions or issues that 
arose during coding. In addition, coders coded three of the same articles 
(from different newspapers and time periods) each week in order to as-
sess intercoder reliability; the principal investigator–author and Hollie 
Nyseth, lead research assistant, also periodically and randomly reviewed 
articles to assess each coder’s work. Coding was done by hand, and 
each variable was assigned a quantitative code. Results were compiled 
into a dataset and analyzed using the stata statistical analysis program.
Intercoder reliability was higher for some variables than for others. 
It was almost perfect where no interpretive judgment was needed, for 
example, to determine whether or not killings were mentioned. Iden-
tifying frames in an article demanded more interpretive work by cod-
ers, and reliability was lower for those variables. Yet even the lowest 
Cohen’s Kappa for variables used in the analyses on which this book is 
based demonstrated considerable agreement between coders. Intercoder 
reliability for all items present in this book was high (Cohen’s [2001] 
Kappa ranging from 0.72 to 1.00).17
Additional Sources of Data. Several additional data collection efforts sup-
plemented the interview and content analysis work. They include analy-
ses of multiple documents and press releases issued by the Inter national 
Criminal Court on the situation in Sudan during the period under study; 
related documents of the foreign ministry websites of the countries in-
cluded in this study; content analysis of 161 speeches, press releases, and 
reports from NGOs in the United States; and all press releases on Darfur 
from foreign ministries of seven of the countries under study.
roadmap: directions for traveling from here
Guided by the questions and theoretical tools laid out thus far, and 
with a wealth of data at hand, I invite the reader to accompany me 
on a journey through the following chapters. In Part I of the book, 
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“Justice versus Impunity,” chapters 1–3 explore the criminalization of 
the violence in Darfur in the context of the justice cascade. Chapter 1 
focuses on the UN Security Council, the International Commission of 
Inquiry on Darfur,  and— at the core of the justice  field— the Interna-
tional Criminal Court. I examine conditions of the justice cascade, their 
application to the case of Darfur, and associated hopes invested in the 
cultural potential of judicial intervention. Hopes are confronted with 
constraints inherent in the institutional logic of criminal law. Chapter 
2 examines INGOs dedicated to human rights issues by focusing on 
Amnesty International. I reconstruct Amnesty’s representation of the 
violence in  Darfur, adherence to rights discourses, and professional 
and national divergences. In chapter 3, I discuss the role of the United 
States, a country  that— despite its resistance against the  ICC— embraced 
a criminalizing discourse vis-à-vis Sudan more than other countries. I 
pay particular attention to the Save Darfur Campaign, to government 
positions and US media narratives as they contrast with those in other 
Western countries, and finally to Amnesty USA in the context of the 
broader American Darfur movement.
A primary potential challenge to the notion of justice and the jus-
tice sector’s representation of the mass violence in Darfur arises from 
the humanitarian aid field. I address this challenge in Part II, entitled 
“Aid versus Justice.” Chapter 4 examines INGOs that have a humani-
tarian aid focus, specifically Doctors Without Borders (MSF), and the 
representation of Darfur generated in this field. We shall see that this 
representation differs distinctly from that which arises from the justice 
cascade. Chapter 5 investigates the “humanitarian complex” through 
the case of Ireland, a country with a memory of suffering and a foreign 
policy orientated toward humanitarian and development aid. Insights 
from interviews with Irish foreign policy makers and journalists are 
linked with an analysis of specific patterns of Irish media reporting.
Part III, “Peace versus Justice,” engages the diplomatic field, a sec-
ond potential challenger to the criminalizing narrative. Chapter 6 draws 
on interviews with Darfur and Sudan specialists in foreign ministries. I 
challenge depictions of foreign policy makers as actors guided by ratio-
nal reasoning when they stay clear of genocide rhetoric so as to evade 
normative commitments to intervene, as suggested by Samantha Power 
(2002) for the United States and Karen Smith (2010) for Europe. In-
stead, dedramatizing rhetoric reflects the habitus of diplomats, culti-
vated in a field in which representatives of the perpetrating state are 
central players. Chapter 7 shows how the diplomatic field overlaps with 
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national conditions characterized by varying social forces such as Suda-
nese lobbying, past colonial rule, foreign policy foci on humanitarian-
ism or mediation, social movements, or collective memories. Each of 
these forces is more or less pronounced in each of the eight countries 
under analysis. Together they contribute to cross-national variation 
in the diplomatic field’s representation of the mass violence in Darfur. 
Some countries, such as Switzerland, that invest prominently in media-
tion efforts to resolve foreign policy crises produce a representation of 
mass violence in Darfur that approximates the ideal typical diplomatic 
representation.
In part IV, entitled “Mediating Competing Representations: The 
Journalistic Field,” I investigate the mediation of the justice narrative 
and its competitors from the humanitarian and diplomatic fields to a 
broad public in diverse countries. Chapter 8 explores the habitus of 
Africa correspondents, their career paths and the field in which they are 
embedded, the genres available to them, and the sources of information 
on which they depend as they report about Darfur. Chapter 9 traces 
the patterns of reporting based on the statistical analysis of the Darfur 
media data set. The chapter focuses especially on journalism’s relation-
ship with neighboring fields, including those discussed in the preceding 
chapters. How do political actors and market forces affect the intensity 
of reporting about Darfur? How do ICC interventions color the fram-
ing of the violence? What are the effects of the diplomatic and humani-
tarian fields? Chapter 9 also documents that the journalistic field is not 
homogeneous. Here, too, national distinctions color journalistic rep-
resentations of the mass violence in Darfur as do a paper’s ideological 
orientation and the gender of journalists.
Finally, chapter 10 summarizes lessons learned throughout the book 
and explores theoretical insights. How do field conditions shape repre-
sentations of mass violence? Can those forces that drive the justice cas-
cade successfully redefine responsible actors as criminal perpetrators? 
Do the humanitarian and diplomatic fields indeed hamper this effort? 
What is the role of the journalistic field in producing, reinforcing, and 
mediating to a world audience the competing definitions of mass vio-
lence? And how do global and national forces interact in the representa-
tion of mass violence? Answers to these questions matter as definitions 
of the situation become real in their consequences.
The postscript reflects on the most recent developments in Darfur 
and on international responses, especially among those institutions and 






How do responses to mass violence in Darfur square with theses about 
a justice cascade in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries? 
At issue is the massive increase in individual criminal accountability 
in cases of grave human rights violations. We know that the UNSC 
and the ICC intervened, supported by social movements, INGOs and 
national governments. These interventions are in line with notions of a 
justice cascade, its nature, and its conditions. In the following review of 
the judicial steps taken on Darfur and the conditions supporting them, I 
am also concerned with the consequences. Fighters for a justice cascade 
invest great hopes in deterrence through the threat of punishment, but 
also in the cultural effects of judicial interventions: their contribution 
to the construction of delegitimizing narratives about mass violence. It 
is these cultural effects that I am particularly concerned with. Judicial 
representations are, after all, based on years of investigation, on a vast 
variety of documents, and on witness testimony. I thus take the hopes of 
proponents of the justice cascade seriously but confront them with cau-
tionary notes. Even optimists will concede that judicial representations 
are constrained by the limiting institutional logic through which judicial 
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Justice cascade and the criminalization of 
human rights violations
Political and military leaders responsible for mass killings and atroci-
ties have, through much of human history and occasionally still today, 
been celebrated as heroes (Giesen 2004b). We do not have to go back 
as far as Homer’s Iliad, but the words of one of its “heroes,” the Greek 
prince Agamemnon of Mycenae, are especially telling. Speaking about 
the Trojans to his brother Menelaus, he proclaims: “We are not going 
to leave a single one of them alive, down to the babies in their mothers’ 
 wombs— not even they must live. The whole people must be wiped out 
of existence, and no one be left to think of them and shed a tear” (quot-
ed in Rummel 1994:45). Later, and less unambiguously celebrated, 
those responsible for mass violence  were— and still often  are— subject 
to denial and forgetting (Cohen 2001). Genocidal leaders have believed 
they can count on such forgetting, as Adolf Hitler’s often cited words il-
lustrate: “It was knowingly and wholeheartedly that Genghis Khan sent 
thousands of women and children to their deaths. History sees in him 
only the founder of a state. . . . The aim of war is not to reach definite 
lines, but annihilate the enemy physically. It is by this means that we 
shall obtain the vital living space that we need. Who today still speaks 
of the massacre of the Armenians?” (quoted in Power 2002:23).
Yet the twentieth century brought remarkable change. Legal scholar 
Martha Minow (1998) suggests that the century’s hallmark was not 
the horrendous atrocities committed in its course (too many past centu-
ries can compete), but humanity’s new inventiveness and efforts toward 
curbing human rights violations. This is in line with, albeit more broadly 
conceived than, Kathryn Sikkink’s (2011) argument that the late twen-
tieth and early twenty-first centuries are characterized by a “justice cas-
cade,” that is, a massive increase in individual criminal accountability 
for grave human rights violations. Leaders of human rights movements 
express similar optimism (Neier 2012). Supporting such optimism is a 
very different but long-standing school of thought on the criminalization 
of a wide range of human behaviors. Dating back to the almost classic 
works of scholars such as Bill Chambliss (1964), Joe Gusfield (1967), 
and Austin Turk (1969), this school has recently shifted its focus from 
status politics as a driving force toward criminalization to processes of 
globalization and institutionalization: “Many scholars now . . . suggest 
that criminalization is best viewed as a process of institutionalization 
that involves the diffusion of social forms and practices across polities 
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comprising an interstate system” (Jenness 2004:160). What, then, is the 
character of this institutionalization and diffusion across polities, this 
justice cascade, and how does Darfur fit into the picture?
Setting the Stage for Darfur: Shape and Conditions of the Justice 
Cascade
In 2011, political scientist Kathryn Sikkink published her remarkable, 
albeit much debated, book Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Pros-
ecutions Are Changing World Politics. The book, published by a com-
mercial house, was enthusiastically welcomed by some. The Robert F. 
Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights awarded it the 2012 
Robert Kennedy Book Award. Sikkink documents in this book how 
prosecutions against individual human rights perpetrators in domestic, 
foreign, and international courts increased almost exponentially in re-
cent decades. She counts by country the number of years in which pros-
ecutions were conducted. Values, in the single digits during much of the 
1980s, rose to about one hundred by the mid-1990s, to three hundred 
a decade later, and then approached 450 by 2009 (Sikkink 2011:21).
Domestic justice systems drive this increase, partly because a grow-
ing number of countries have adopted international human rights 
norms. Their willingness is enhanced by the complementarity principle 
of the Rome Statute: domestic courts have primary jurisdiction as long 
as they are able and willing to pursue cases (Article 17). As nation-states 
thus operate “in the shadow” of the ICC, they prosecute cases at times 
specifically to keep them under their own domestic jurisdiction. Con-
flicts between the ICC and postrevolution Libya over the extradition of 
members of the Gaddafi regime are but one illustration. The adoption 
of the Rome Statute in 1998 and the establishment of the ICC in 2002, 
on the heels of a series of ad hoc tribunals (for Yugoslavia, Rwanda, 
Sierra Leone, Cambodia, and East Timor), document the weight of the 
international level of the justice cascade in its own right. Indeed, in-
ternational and foreign prosecutions also increased substantially. ICC 
charges against those responsible for the mass violence in Darfur are the 
essential example in our context.
What were the sources of this remarkable development? Here, too, 
Sikkink (2011) provides at least preliminary answers. While not dis-
counting the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, orchestrated by the victori-
ous powers of World War II, she sets the stage with more challenging 
cases that did not result from military defeat. Her detailed studies of 
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Greece (1975), Portugal (1976), Spain (1975–1978), and Argentina 
(1985) show that regional opportunity structures had developed by the 
1970s that favored transitional justice proceedings. Examples of such 
structures include the creation of the European Court of Human Rights 
in 1959 and the foundation of Amnesty International in 1961, an orga-
nization that played a central role in the Darfur crisis and the details of 
which I turn to in chapter 2.
Soon after its founding, Amnesty International became actively en-
gaged in Greece. Its activism coincided with a supportive international 
legal environment, and this situation advanced the launching of trials. 
The 1975 “Torture Declaration” was prepared concurrently with the 
Greek torture trials and adopted by the UN General Assembly just a 
few months after their conclusion. Yet, at this time, trials occurred only 
after “ruptured” transitions from dictatorship to democracy (Greece, 
Portugal, Argentina) as opposed to “pacted” transitions (Spain). By the 
1990s, however, conditions had changed. Ruptured transitions were no 
longer a prerequisite for criminal trials against human rights violators, 
as the cases of Guatemala, Chile, and Uruguay illustrate. The institu-
tionalization of the human rights regime had progressed, and the fear of 
blowback had diminished in light of experiences from the 1970s.
Initial steps toward human rights prosecutions eventually resulted 
in a decentralized, interactive system of global accountability that 
challenged national sovereignty. Sikkink (2011:96–125) identifies two 
contributors, or “streams,” to use her metaphor. The first stream is con-
stituted by international prosecutions, from Nuremberg and Tokyo, to 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
and its Rwanda equivalent (ICTR), to the ICC with its jurisdiction over 
cases of aggression,1 war crimes, crimes against humanity, and geno-
cide. The second stream consists of domestic and foreign prosecutions 
such as those in Greece, Portugal, and Argentina in the mid-1970s and 
the Pinochet case of 1998–1999. In addition, a “hard law streambed” 
led from various compacts such as the Genocide Convention (1948), 
Geneva Convention (1949), Apartheid Convention (1980), and Torture 
Convention (1987), through the Inter-American Convention on Forced 
Disappearances (1996), to the Rome Statute (1998).
This spread of human rights initiatives, and their solidification in 
a system, was not simply the result of contagion. Instead, individuals, 
associations, transgovernmental networks penetrated by an epistemic 
community of criminal law experts, and NGOs such as Human Rights 
Watch (HRW) and Amnesty International achieved the progressive 
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institutionalization of individual criminal liability, that is, criminalization 
and individualization of international law. This focus on actors builds on 
earlier work in which Sikkink, in collaboration with Margaret Keck, ex-
amined advocacy in international politics. Their much cited book drew 
attention to transnational advocacy networks (TANs) and the engage-
ment of TANs in information politics that tie networks together, leverage 
politics that shame evildoers, and accountability politics that, to hold na-
tions accountable, “trick” them into commitments that they might enter 
into merely for symbolic and legitimatory reasons. The 1975 Helsinki 
Accord is only the most famous example (Keck and Sikkink 1998).
A tendency to privilege advocacy as a driving force of criminalization 
is, not surprisingly, shared by leaders of the human rights movement. 
Aryeh Neier, former executive director of HRW and later president 
of the Open Society Institute, confirms that even after the success of 
early truth commissions, “some in the international human rights 
movement continued to espouse prosecutions and criminal sanctions 
against those principally responsible for the most egregious offenses” 
(Neier 2012:264). Neier describes the role of the Italian organization 
No Peace Without Justice (NPWJ), but especially of Emma Bonino, an 
Italian politician and civil liberties campaign veteran, in the establish-
ment of the ICC: “In the period in which the ICC was being established, 
Bonino was a member of the European Commission, . . . and she took 
advantage of her post and her contacts with heads of state to ensure 
the participation of high-level officials from many countries in NPWJ’s 
conferences.  .  .  . The result was that by the time the conference took 
place in  Rome— Bonino’s  city— many governments were ready to sup-
port establishment of the ICC” (Neier 2012:270). Also, on the path 
to ratification, for which some countries had to go so far as to mod-
ify their constitutions, “[l]obbying by a number of nongovernmental 
 organizations— including the Coalition for an International Criminal 
 Court— played an important part” (270). Neier further highlights the 
role of Amnesty International (Neier 2012:55–56, 188).
Other analysts emphasize the weight of different types of actors in the 
establishment and spread of human rights norms. Hagan, for example, 
in his study of the ICTY, focuses on officials within judicial institutions, 
specifically successive chief prosecutors, each of whom brought a new 
form of “capital” to bear. All of them combined innovative strategies 
with established legal practices, from securing international support 
(Richard Goldstone), to sealed indictments and surprise arrests (Louise 
Arbour), to Carla del Ponte’s charges against former president Slobodan 
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Milošević. Innovative strategies eventually become “doxa,” Hagan 
argues: taken-for-granted legal standards in the emerging international 
criminal tribunal in The Hague.2 In contrast, David Scheffer, former US 
ambassador and right hand of US secretary of state Madeleine Albright, 
highlights diplomats as crucial contributors to the establishment of inter-
national judicial institutions, from the ICTY to the ICC (Scheffer 2012).
No matter the relative weight of each of these types of actors, their 
interactions contributed to the passing of the Rome Statute in 1998 and 
the establishment of the ICC. The ICC entered into force in 2002 when 
sixty countries had ratified the statute. By 2013 the number of ratify-
ing countries had more than doubled, and  many— though not  all— of 
those charged have made acquaintance with the imposing court build-
ing in The Hague (see figure 2). The continuation of this trajectory is, of 
course, not yet known and difficult to forecast.
Responding to Darfur in the Context of the Justice Cascade
In 2000, around the time of the formation of the ICC, disturbing events 
began to unfold in the Darfur region of Sudan. Activists against Sudan’s 
ruling elite had issued The Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth 
figure 2. The building housing the International Criminal Court in The Hague.  
Photograph © ICC-CPI.
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in Sudan. Distributed widely, especially in areas surrounding mosques 
after Friday prayers, the Black Book castigated the domination of Sudan 
by “only one Region (Northern Region) with just over 5% of Sudan’s 
population” (Seekers of Truth and Justice 2003:1). A March 22, 2004, 
translation, signed by “Translater,” informs us that “[a]s of last year 
(March 2003), some of the activists involved in the preparation of the 
Book took arms against the government” (Seekers of Truth and Justice 
2003:1). Indeed February and March 2003 saw the formation of the 
Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement 
(JEM), two organizations that led a violent rebellion against the govern-
ment of Sudan. Their armed actions were surprisingly effective. In April 
2003 rebel groups attacked the Sudanese military’s el Fasher air base, de-
stroyed numerous planes of the Sudanese air force, and killed almost one 
hundred soldiers. The government of Sudan and its military, supported 
by Janjawiid militias, responded with brute force. A first wave of mass 
killings unfolded between June and September 2003. Targets included 
not only armed rebels but primarily civilian villagers, including women, 
elderly men, and children. A cease-fire held only for a few months, and 
in December 2003 President al-Bashir vowed to “annihilate” the Darfur 
rebels. His vow provoked a second wave of mass killings, lasting from 
December 2003 through April 2004. Massive displacements of the civil-
ian population ensued. Tens of thousands of lives were extinguished as 
a direct result of the violence, and many more died during the Darfuris’ 
flight from the violence and because of problematic conditions in dis-
placed-person camps in Sudan and refugee camps in neighboring Chad.
Much of the Western world began to take note only after the first 
peak of killings (summer 2003) had subsided and when the second wave 
(winter 2003–2004) was under way. The first public pronouncement, 
a “genocide alert,” issued by the United States Holocaust Memorial 
Museum (USHMM) in January 2004, was followed by a series of op-ed 
pieces in prominent American print media; a speech before the UN Gen-
eral Assembly by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan on April 7, 2004, 
on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide; pas-
sage on September 18, 2004 of UNSC Resolution 1564, instituting an 
International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur; and the UNSC’s refer-
ral of the case of Darfur to the ICC on March 31, 2005. Parallel to UN 
interventions, a massive civil society movement evolved. In the United 
States, the Save Darfur movement gathered almost two hundred liberal 
and conservative organizations under its umbrella. The US Congress 
resolved that the violence in Darfur amounted to genocide. Secretary of 
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State Colin Powell initiated the famous “Atrocities Documentation Sur-
vey,” a survey of more than one thousand Darfuri refugees in the camps 
of Eastern Chad. Based on findings from this survey, he declared, at a 
hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 
9, 2004, that genocide was being committed. President George W. Bush 
followed suit a few weeks later.
Importantly in our context, soon after the UNSC referred the case 
of Darfur to the ICC on March 31, 2005, the court took action. After 
almost two years of investigation, on February 27, 2007, the ICC’s chief 
prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, applied for an arrest warrant against 
Ahmad Harun, then Sudan’s deputy minister for the interior, responsible 
for the “Darfur Security Desk,” and against Ali Kushayb, a Janjawiid 
leader. Both were charged with crimes against humanity and war crimes. 
On April 27, 2007, the court issued a warrant for the arrest of both ac-
tors for war crimes and crimes against humanity. It took another year 
until the prosecutor also applied for an arrest warrant against Sudanese 
president Omar al-Bashir, charging him with crimes against humanity, 
war crimes, and genocide (July 14, 2008). The judges did not initially 
follow this application in its entirety, but on March 4, 2009, they is-
sued a warrant against al-Bashir for crimes against humanity and war 
crimes (see figure 3). With more than a year’s delay and five years after 
the UNSC referral to the ICC, on July 12, 2010, the court followed up 
with a warrant against the president of Sudan for the crime of genocide.
The ICC thus places itself at the center of the judicial field and its en-
gagement with the mass violence in Darfur. Its interventions clearly seek 
to discredit potential denial of atrocities and, certainly, glorification of 
those responsible for their perpetration. Consider the following state-
ment from the initial charging document against President al-Bashir of 
March 4, 2009. After spelling out several conditions, the first warrant 
concludes as follows:
considering that, for the above reasons, there are reasonable grounds to 
believe, that Omar al Bashir is criminally responsible as an indirect perpe-
trator, or as an indirect co-perpetrator [footnote], under article 25(3)(a) of 
the Statute, for (i) intentionally directing attacks at a civilian population as 
such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities as a 
war crime . . . ; (ii) pillage as a war crime . . . ; (iii) murder as a crime against 
humanity; (iv) extermination as a crime against humanity . . . ; (v) forcible 
transfer as a crime against humanity . . . ; (vi) torture as a crime against hu-
manity . . . ; rape as a crime against humanity. . . .
considering that, under article 58(1) of the Statute, the arrest of Omar 
Al Bashir appears necessary at this stage to ensure (i) that he will appear 
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before the Court; (ii) that he will not obstruct or endanger the ongoing in-
vestigation into the crimes for which he is allegedly responsible under the 
Statute; and (iii) that he will not continue with the commission of the above-
mentioned crimes;
for these reasons [the court],
hereby issues:
a warrant of arrest for omar al bashir, a male, who is a national 
of the State of Sudan, born on 1 January 1944 in Hoshe Bannaga, Shendi 
figure 3. Title page of indictment of President Omar al-Bashir.
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Governorate, in the Sudan, member of the Jaáli tribe of Northern Sudan, 
President of the Republic of the Sudan since his appointment by the RCC-NS 
on 16 October 1993 and elected as such successively since 1 April 1996 and 
whose name is also spelt Omar al-Bashir, Omer Hassan Ahmed El Bashire, 
Omar al-Bashir, Omar al-Beshir, Omar el-Bashir, Omer Albasheer, Omar 
Elbashir and Omar Hassan Ahmad el-Béshir.
Done in English, Arabic and French, the English version being authoritative.3
Not only did the court issue this warrant, but through its press of-
fices, it also sought to disseminate it to a broad public.4 My analysis 
shows that media from across the globe, at least in the sample of coun-
tries included in our analysis, responded to the indictment and com-
municated its message to a world audience: the depiction of President 
al-Bashir as a criminal perpetrator. The chances that media would pres-
ent crime frames to display violence increased with several of the court’s 
interventions (see chapter 9; Savelsberg and Nyseth Brehm 2015).
In short, civil society, INGOs, TANs, national governments, the UN, 
and the ICC acted to criminalize the violence of Darfur and to initiate 
a legal case. Darfur thus took its rightful place in the context of the 
justice cascade. The driving forces were the same as those the literature 
has identified in other cases. But what were the consequences? What 
expectations were invested in the justice cascade, and how did they ma-
terialize in the case of Darfur?
consequences of the Justice cascade: between 
hope and cautionary notes
Scholars as well as movement actors and practitioners anticipate con-
sequences of the justice cascade with substantial optimism. Darfur pro-
vides one case with which to examine the foundation of this optimism. 
Sikkink (2011) herself draws hope from her Transitional Trial Data Set, 
an impressive collection of data on a large number of transitional jus-
tice situations. Her statistical analyses suggest, cautiously worded, that 
prosecutions of human rights perpetrators, including high-level actors, 
while achieving retribution, do not systematically produce counterpro-
ductive consequences as some critics have suggested. They may in fact 
advance later human rights and democracy records, especially in situa-
tions where trials are accompanied by truth commissions (Kim and Sik-
kink 2010).5 Observations by practitioners support such findings. Neier 
(2012), for example, notes, “The fact that international humanitarian 
law has now been enforced through criminal sanctions that the various 
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tribunals have imposed on hundreds of high-ranking military officials, 
guerilla leaders, civilian officials, and heads of government has contrib-
uted immensely to awareness of the rules for the conduct of warfare and 
for the seriousness with which they must be regarded” (132).
Others challenge such optimism (Goldsmith and Krasner 2003; Sny-
der and Vinjamuri 2003–2004; Pensky 2008). Most recently, Osiel 
(2014), while expressing sympathy with the idea of international crimi-
nal justice, declares that “international criminal law is unlikely to en-
dure as anything more than an intermittent occasion for staging splashy, 
eye-catching degradation rituals, feel-good spectacles of good will to-
ward men.” He points to the absence of the world’s largest powers from 
among the countries supporting the Rome Statute, power politics in the 
UNSC (consider Syria in the early 2010s), the risks of coups d’état when 
nations prosecute past ruling juntas or dictators, partisan case selections 
in posttransitional justice proceedings, and the risk of “victors’ justice.”6 
Others highlight the risk that one-sided memories of victimization and a 
competition for victim  status— both potential outcomes of flawed tran-
sitional  justice— may in fact propel cycles of violence (Barkan 2013).
It is easy to sympathize with both sides of the dispute. Both the 
criminalization of human rights offenses and the internationalization of 
criminal human rights law are in their infancy, and it is hard to forecast 
their future. But we can put theory and empirical work to use and apply 
to our scholarship Max Weber’s advice to those involved in politics: 
engage in the drilling of hard boards with passion and sound judgment. 
It is in this spirit that I examine the effect of criminal justice interven-
tion, specifically its cultural effects: the representations of mass violence 
in the case of Darfur.
From Broad Expectations to the Role of Collective  
Representations and Memories
The construction of delegitimizing representations of mass violence is 
one of two potential mechanisms through which criminal proceedings 
may contribute to improved human rights records. The other mecha-
nism, deterrence, combines a notion of political and military figures as 
rational actors with an understanding that an increase in the risk of pros-
ecution and punishment from zero to at least modest levels may reduce 
the inclination to commit future crimes. Support with regard less to the 
severity than to the likelihood of punishment comes from criminological 
research (e.g., McCarthy 2002; Matsueda, Kreager, and Huizinga 2006). 
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But even for deterrence to work, memories of past sanctions must be in-
grained in the minds of future cohorts of political and military actors. 
Past sanctions must become part of the collective memory they share.
The cultural argument may thus be more powerful: a socialization 
mechanism, not just as a precondition of deterrence but as a force in its 
own right. Building on a recent line of scholarship, this argument posits 
that collective memories created by criminal proceedings against human 
rights offenders potentially delegitimize grave violations, thus reducing 
the likelihood of their recurrence. Potential violations may no longer 
even appear on the decision tree of rational actors.
Expectations of criminal law’s delegitimizing functions are grounded 
in classic writings (Mead 1918) and supported by a new line of neo-
Durkheimian work in cultural sociology. Here criminal punishment is 
interpreted as a didactic exercise, a “speech act in which society talks to 
itself about its moral identity” (P. Smith 2008:16). The potential weight 
of this mechanism for our theme becomes clear if indeed the IMT in 
Nuremberg and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights initiated 
the extension of the Holocaust and psychological identification with 
its victims, as Jeffrey Alexander (2004a) argues for the memory of the 
Holocaust. Judicial events such as Nuremberg, the Eichmann trial in 
Jerusalem, or the Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial produced cultural trauma: 
members of a world audience were affected by an experience to which 
they themselves had not been exposed.
Empirical research by historians and sociologists shows that criminal 
trials have the capacity to color not just narratives of recent events but 
also the collective memory of a more distant past in the minds of sub-
sequent generations (Savelsberg and King 2011). Once generated, dele-
gitimizing  memories— in a positive feedback  loop— further promote 
human rights standards. This notion is consistent with Daniel Levy 
and Natan Sznaider insight that “[t]he global proliferation of human 
rights norms is driven by the public and frequently ritualistic attention 
to memories of their persistent violations” (Levy and Sznaider 2010:4).
Scholarly expectations are in line with hopes of those practitioners 
who, long before the take-off of the justice cascade, expected much 
from criminal tribunals against perpetrators of grave human rights 
crimes. Consider Justice Robert Jackson, the American chief prosecutor 
at the IMT in Nuremberg, who famously argued: “Unless we write the 
record of this movement with clarity and precision, we cannot blame 
the future if in days of peace it finds incredible the accusatory gen-
eralities uttered during the war. We must establish incredible events 
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by credible evidence” (quoted in Landsman 2005:6–7; my emphasis). 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt thought along similar lines. As his 
confidant Judge Samuel Rosenman noted: “[Roosevelt] was determined 
that the question of Hitler’s  guilt— and the guilt of his  gangsters— must 
not be left open to future debate. The whole nauseating matter should 
be spread out on a permanent record under oath by witnesses and with 
all the written documents” (in Landsman 2005:6). Here Justice Jack-
son and President Roosevelt add a history-writing or collective memory 
function to the common functions of criminal trials, a truly innovative 
step. While some of the authors cited above might support these practi-
tioners’ hopes, others raise doubts.
A Cautionary Note: Institutional Logic, Knowledge Construction, 
and Representations
Reasons to caution the optimists abound. Critics are right when they 
argue that power relations often matter more in the international com-
munity than legal norms. Suspected perpetrators continue to hold on 
to power. In the Darfur case, Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir is still 
in power in 2015, after having been indicted for genocide years ago. 
They even find signs of appeasement from the international community 
for a number of reasons. Al-Bashir, for example, initially appeared to 
hold the key for an agreement that was to end the long and bloody war 
between the North and the South of Sudan. One of my interviewees, re-
sponsible for the Sudan desk in the foreign ministry of a large European 
country, stated: “The essential key to peace in the region is the inclu-
sion of the regime in Khartoum in the peace process, its liberation from 
international isolation, combined with respective incentives, which then 
will have to be kept by the international community” (author’s transla-
tion). In addition, Western powers saw in al-Bashir an ally in the fight 
against terrorism (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008:85–93).
Al-Bashir’s NCP ally Ahmed Harun, himself indicted by the ICC for 
war crimes and crimes against humanity, was nominated and elected 
governor of South Kordofan, a conflicted state along the border of 
South Sudan. Building on his track record in Darfur, he there appears 
to be repeating some of the bloody practices against potential allies of 
South Sudan, no matter the death toll among civilians. While actors 
such as al-Bashir and Harun may no longer travel freely abroad, and 
while resulting restrictions may weaken their base in  Sudan— despite 
well-orchestrated demonstrations in support of al-Bashir, in response to 
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his  indictment— they have been holding on to power. The ICC prosecu-
tor can only hope to see them as defendants in court on some future day 
(see the postscript on the most recent developments).
But even if the constraints of power could be broken, the construc-
tion of a damning narrative in the global collective conscience faces 
restraints in its own right. They include divisions within the field of 
criminal law and justice, conflicts across fields, and tensions arising 
from the involvement of global versus national or local actors. All of 
these difficulties are discussed for the case of Darfur in following chap-
ters, but here I first turn to one crucial constraint: limitations imposed 
on historical narratives by the specific institutional logic of criminal 
law. I consider the arguments and illustrate them with documents from 
the pre-legal and legal process on Darfur.
History told by criminal proceedings, and the collective memories 
they shape, differs from those produced by actors in fields such as schol-
arship or journalism or by executive commissions.7 Criminal law, after 
all, is subject to a particular set of institutional rules. These rules become 
part of the habitus of practitioners in the field. They function as filters 
through which legal actors interpret the world: in order to function suc-
cessfully, actors have to incorporate into their habitus their field’s domi-
nant institutional logic. What, then, are the constraints of criminal law?
First, criminal law focuses on individuals. Social scientists, by con-
trast, would also consider social structure and broad cultural patterns as 
precursors of mass violence. Second, criminal  law— the most violent and 
intrusive among all types of  law— is rightly constrained by specific eviden-
tiary rules, at least under rule-of-law conditions. Evidence that historians 
or journalists might use would often be inadmissible in a criminal court. 
Third, criminal law is constrained by particular classifications of actors, 
offenses, and victimization. It may be blind, for example, to the role 
played by bystanders whom guardians of moral order would want to im-
plicate. Fourth, criminal law applies a binary logic. Defendants are found 
guilty or not guilty. Social psychologists would apply more differentiated 
categories, and philosophers, historians, and even some victims see “gray 
zones” among perpetrators and victims (Levi 1988; Barkan 2013).
Wise jurists are aware of the limits of criminal law as a place for 
the reconstruction of history. Such wisdom is reflected in the words of 
the judges of the Jerusalem court in its 1961 proceedings against Adolf 
Eichmann, key organizer of the Nazi annihilation machine:
The Court does not possess the facilities required for investigating general 
questions.  .  .  . For example, to describe the historical background of the 
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catastrophe, a great mass of documents and evidence has been submitted 
to us, collected most painstakingly and certainly out of a genuine desire to 
delineate as complete a picture as possible. Even so, all the material is but a 
tiny fraction of the existent sources on the subject. . . . As for questions of 
principle which are outside the realm of law, no one has made us judges of 
them and therefore our opinion on them carries no greater weight than that 
of any other person who has devoted study and thought to these questions. 
(quoted in Osiel 1997:80–81)8
Social theorists and empirical researchers confirm these concerns. In 
discussing cultural trauma, the collective memory of horrendous events, 
Alexander (2004b) spells out several preconditions for such trauma to 
emerge: claims-making by agents; carrier groups of the trauma process; 
speech acts, in which carrier groups address an audience in a specific sit-
uation, seeking to project the trauma claim to the audience; and cultural 
classifications regarding the nature of the pain, the nature of the victim, 
the relation of the trauma victim to the wider audience, and the attribu-
tion of responsibility. Alexander observes that linguistic action, through 
which the master narrative of social suffering is created, is mediated by 
the nature of institutional arenas that contribute to it. Clearly, some 
claims can be better expressed in legal proceedings than others, which 
will forever remain, adapting Franz Kafka’s famous words, before the 
law. Some carrier groups have easier access to law (on the privileged 
position of “repeat players,” see Galanter 1974). Further, some classifi-
cations of perpetrators, victims, and suffering are more compatible with 
those of the law than others. In its construction of the past, the kind of 
truth it speaks, the knowledge it produces, and the collective memory to 
which it contributes the law is thus always selective.
Empirical research confirms such selectivities of criminal law. The 
Limits of the Law is the subtitle of historian Devin Pendas’s famous 
book The Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial, 1963–65 (2006). Without los-
ing sight of the political context and extrajudicial forces at work in 
this trial against twenty-two former functionaries of the most murder-
ous annihilation camp, Pendas takes “law on the books” seriously even 
while studying “law in action.” He is right as the former may, directly 
or indirectly, affect the “social structure of the case” (Black 1993), pro-
viding the strategic frame within which actors apply tactics to advance 
their goals.
The Frankfurt trial, for example, faced several legal constraints. First, 
the German government had annulled the occupation (Control Coun-
cil) law in 1956 with its criminal categories such as “crimes against 
humanity” and its sentencing guidelines (including the death penalty). 
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Second, the German Basic Law, while acknowledging the supremacy of 
international law, prohibited ex post facto prosecutions. “Genocide” 
could be prosecuted only for future cases. Third, the Frankfurt court 
thus relied on standard German criminal law, created with crimes in 
mind that differed radically from those committed in the context of 
the organized annihilation machinery of Nazi Germany. This law was 
limited by its strict Kantian focus on subjective intent and its distinction 
between perpetrator and accomplice (the latter considered a tool rather 
than an autonomous actor in the execution of the crime). This type of 
law, Pendas shows, was ill suited for confronting the complex nature 
and organizational context of the crimes committed at Auschwitz, espe-
cially the systematic annihilation of millions. Instead, prosecution was 
successful in particular cases of especially atrocious actions, such as 
brutal acts of torture during interrogations, in which malicious intent 
could be documented and in which defendants could not present them-
selves as tools of the will of others. We might thus suggest that Pendas 
had referred, in his subtitle, to the limits of German criminal law, were 
it not for research by scholars such as Michael Marrus (2008), who 
documents similar limitations for the Nuremberg “Doctors’ Trial,” 
conducted by American authorities under occupation law. Here, too, 
particularly atrocious practices came more to light than did institution-
alized ideas of the medical profession or routine practices of physicians 
that provided the foundation for human “experiments.”
Legal constraints thus limited not only the Frankfurt trial’s repre-
sentational but also its juridical functions. They frustrated the peda-
gogical intent with which Fritz Bauer, prosecutor general of the state 
of Hessen, had advanced these collective proceedings. Inspired by the 
1961 Eichmann trial in Jerusalem, he sought a large, historical trial that 
would stir the collective conscience, increase awareness, and instill in 
Germans’ collective memory the horrific nature of the Nazi crimes. He 
partly succeeded, but only within the limits of the law, which directed 
attention to those lone actors who had engaged in particularly excessive 
cruelty beyond the directives under which they worked in Auschwitz. 
While Nazi crimes were thereby put on public and terrifying display, 
the trial did little harm to the “accomplices” who ran the machinery of 
mass killing. And it paradoxically helped Germans to distance them-
selves from the crimes of the Holocaust. Perpetration appeared, in the 
logic of the Auschwitz trial, either as the outgrowth of sick minds or as 
executed in the context of the machinery set up by the Nazi leadership, 
in which ordinary Germans acted without or even against their own 
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will. The German case thus illustrates with particular clarity what Ber-
nhard Giesen (2004b) elsewhere has called the “decoupling” function 
of criminal law.
In short, criminal law faces limits to its history writing and collective 
memory–forming missions. These limits result in part from its insti-
tutional logic: its focus on the behavior of individuals, consideration 
of only a limited set of behaviors, the constraints imposed by rules of 
evidence, and its binary logic and exclusionary intent. Each of these fea-
tures has consequences for narratives that result from legal procedures, 
and, through them, for the formation of collective memory. These con-
straints are visible in pre-legal and legal documents on Darfur. Later 
chapters examine how this logic of criminal law corresponds with that 
of news media, with which it shares a focus on individuals, dramatic 
events, and a tendency to distinguish starkly between good and evil. 
Consequences for the collective representation of mass violence are 
substantial.
Constructing the Darfur Narrative through the Lens of Criminal 
Law and Justice
Initial warnings regarding horrific events unfolding in Darfur were in-
cluded in a December 2003 confidential memo by Tom Eric Vraalsen, 
the UN special envoy for humanitarian affairs in Darfur, to Jan Egeland, 
the UN emergency relief coordinator. Vraalsen reported that “ ‘delivery 
of humanitarian assistance to populations in need is hampered mostly 
by systematically denied access. While [Khartoum’s] authorities claim 
unimpeded access, they greatly restrict access to the areas under their 
control, while imposing blanket denial to all rebel-held areas’—that 
is, areas overwhelmingly populated by the African Fur, Zaghawa, and 
Massalit peoples” (cited in Reeves 2013; emphasis in original).
Official pronouncements by the United Nations followed initial jour-
nalistic efforts in early 2004 by college professor Eric Reeves and New 
York Times op-ed writer Nicholas Kristof. They began with Secretary-
General Kofi Annan’s April 7, 2004, speech before the UN General As-
sembly, held on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan 
genocide. The “action plan” Annan called for demanded:
swift and decisive action when, despite all our efforts, we learn that geno-
cide is happening, or about to happen.  .  .  . In this connection, let me say 
here and now that I share the grave concern expressed last week by eight 
independent experts . . . at the scale of reported human rights abuses and at 
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the humanitarian crisis unfolding in Darfur, Sudan. Last Friday, the United 
Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator reported to the Security Council 
that “a sequence of deliberate actions has been observed that seem aimed 
at achieving a specific objective: the forcible and long-term displacement of 
the targeted communities, which may also be termed ‘ethnic cleansing.’ ” 
His assessment was based on reports from our international staff on the 
ground in Darfur, who have witnessed first-hand what is happening there, 
and from my own Special Envoy for Humanitarian Affairs in Sudan, Ambas-
sador Vraalsen, who has visited Darfur. (Annan 2004)
Annan’s speech, coinciding with the peak of the second wave of mass 
violence in Darfur, was followed by now well known UN actions. On 
September 18, 2004, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1564. This resolu-
tion threatened to sanction the Sudanese government should it fail to 
live up to its obligations on Darfur. It also established the International 
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (ICID) to investigate violations of 
human rights in Darfur and invoked, for the first time in history toward 
such purpose, the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention). The resolution, sponsored 
by Germany, Romania, the United Kingdom, and the United States, 
was adopted by eleven votes in favor, no objections to the resolution, 
and four abstentions (Algeria, China, Pakistan, and Russia). As nation-
states and their governments are the constituent members and thus the 
crucial actors of the organization, their economic and strategic interests 
and cultural sensitivities are important determinants of the path the 
UN follows. I discuss some of the countries cited here in greater detail 
throughout this book.
Soon after Resolution 1564 passed, in October 2004, Secretary- 
General Annan appointed commissioners to the ICID, which began its 
work on October 25, 2004. In line with the resolution, the commis-
sion was charged “ ‘to investigate reports of violations of international 
humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur by all parties’; ‘to 
determine also whether or not acts of genocide have occurred’; and ‘to 
identify the perpetrators of such violations’ ‘with a view to ensuring 
that those responsible are held accountable’ ” (ICID 2005:9). Clearly, 
the mandate was framed in the terms of criminal law, specifically in-
ternational humanitarian and human rights law. The selection of com-
mission members, in terms of their educational backgrounds, careers, 
and positions, further solidified the placement of the Darfur issue in the 
field of criminal law and justice. The ICID consisted of five members 
whose short bios, describing their positions at the time of appointment, 
appear in its report (ICID 2005:165–166). The commission chair was 
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the late Antonio Cassese from Italy. A renowned law professor, Cassese 
had published prominently on issues of international human rights law 
and international criminal law. Previously, he had served as the first 
president of the ICTY. Mohamed Fayek, from Egypt, is a former min-
ister in his country’s government and secretary-general of the Arab Or-
ganization for Human Rights, an NGO. Hina Jilani, from Pakistan, 
had served as a special representative of the UN secretary-general on 
human rights defenders and as secretary-general of the Human Rights 
Commission of Pakistan. She was then a member of the District Court 
and Supreme Court Bar Association in Egypt. Dumisa Ntsebeza, from 
South Africa, served as a commissioner on the Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission of his country. He led that commission’s Investigatory 
Unit and was head of its witness protection program. Ntsebeza was an 
Advocate of the High Court of South Africa and a member of the Cape 
Bar. Finally, Therese Striggner-Scott from Ghana was a barrister and 
principal partner with a legal consulting firm in Accra. She served on 
her country’s High Court, as an ambassador to France and Italy, and 
as a member of the “Goldstone Commission,” which had investigated 
public violence and intimidation in South Africa. In short, the ICID was 
dominated by members from the Global South with a background in 
law, especially international human rights law and international crimi-
nal law. Three of its five members were from the African continent.
The commission was supported by an investigative team that in-
cluded forensics experts, military analysts, and investigators with ex-
pertise in gender violence. It traveled to Sudan and the three Darfur 
states, met with the government of Sudan and with government offi-
cials at the state and local levels (for a mixed assessment of government 
cooperativeness, see ICID 2005:15–16), met with military and police, 
rebel forces and tribal leaders, displaced persons, victims and witnesses, 
and NGO and UN representatives, and it examined reports issued by 
governments, intergovernmental organizations, UN bodies, and NGOs 
(2–3). Many of these actors are identified above as the driving forces 
behind the justice cascade. Here they provide evidence in the examina-
tion of criminal wrongdoing in a specific case.
On January 25, 2005, three months after its constitution, the com-
mission delivered a 176-page single-spaced report to the UN secretary-
General (ICID 2005). Ten pages of the text are devoted to “the historical 
and social background” of the conflict (17–26). There we learn about 
those social forces we encounter elsewhere in much of the historical and 
social science literature on Darfur: demographics of Sudan and Darfur; 
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colonial rule, including the incorporation of the Sultanate of Darfur into 
Sudan during British rule; fluctuations between military regimes and 
democratic rule after independence; the 1989 coup by Omar al-Bashir; 
internal power struggles; the North-South war and the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA); the land tenure system and conflict over land; 
a history of intermarriage and socioeconomic interconnectedness be-
tween tribes, but an intensification of tribal identifications under con-
ditions of conflict; desertification and growing struggles for resources, 
especially between agriculturalists and nomadic groups; devaluation of 
traditional law, once a potent tool for settling land disputes; an influx of 
weapons from neighboring countries; the emergence of the Arab Gath-
ering, an alliance of Arabic tribes, and of the African Belt, composed of 
members of the Fur in the 1980s; the emergence of the Sudan Libera-
tion Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement 
(JEM), the former inspired by the new Sudan policy of the South Suda-
nese SLM/A, the latter by trends in political Islam; militant activities by 
these groups; the government’s shortage of military resources due to the 
civil war in the South, its resort to exploiting tensions between different 
tribal groups, and its equipping of mostly Arabic nomadic groups with 
ideological and material support, thus laying the foundation for the 
“Janjaweed” militias (named by “a traditional Darfurian term denoting 
an armed bandit or outlaw on horse or on camel” [ICID 2005:24]); and 
previous unsuccessful efforts at finding a peaceful solution.
Obviously, ten pages of text allow very little space to discuss each of 
these many factors. Correspondingly, all of these factors are irrelevant 
in light of the ICID’s mission, cast in terms of criminal law and justice 
and constituting part of the justice cascade. Indeed, throughout the re-
port, the commission strictly follows the legal logic. It categorizes ac-
tors (“1. Government Armed Forces”; “2. Government supported and/
or controlled  militias— The Janjaweed”; “3. Rebel movement groups” 
[ICID 2005:27–39]), spells out the legal rules binding on the govern-
ment of Sudan and on the rebel groups, identifies categories of interna-
tional crimes, and associates available and legally relevant evidence with 
those legal concepts (ICID 2005:40–107). In summarizing its findings, 
the ICID first speaks to the actus reus with regard to “[v]iolations of 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law:”
The Commission took as the starting point for its work two irrefutable 
facts regarding the situation in Darfur. Firstly, according to United Na-
tions estimates there are 1[.]65 million internally displaced persons in Dar-
fur, and more than 200,000 refugees from Darfur in neighbouring Chad. 
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Secondly, there has been large-scale destruction of villages throughout the 
three states of Darfur. The Commission conducted independent investiga-
tions to establish additional facts and gathered extensive information on 
multiple incidents of violations affecting villages, towns and other locations 
across North, South and West Darfur. The conclusions of the Commission 
are based on the evaluation of the facts gathered or verified through its 
 investigations. (3)
Having thus summarized the facts on the  ground— as established by 
multiple actors, including the UN, its suborganizations, and NGOs, and 
supplemented by the commission’s own  investigation— the report pro-
ceeds to link this evidence to the legal categories of the Rome Statute, 
and concludes:
Based on a thorough analysis of the information gathered in the course of its 
investigations, the Commission established that the Government of the Su-
dan and the Janjaweed are responsible for serious violations of international 
human rights and humanitarian law amounting to crimes under interna-
tional law. In particular, the Commission found that Government forces and 
militias conducted indiscriminate attacks, including killing of civilians, tor-
ture, enforced disappearances, destruction of villages, rape and other forms 
of sexual violence, pillaging and forced displacement, throughout Darfur. 
These acts were conducted on a widespread and systematic basis, and there-
fore may amount to crimes against humanity. The extensive destruction and 
displacement have resulted in a loss of livelihood and means of survival for 
countless women, men and children. In addition to the large scale attacks, 
many people have been arrested and detained, and many have been held in-
communicado for prolonged periods and tortured. The vast majority of the 
victims of all of these violations have been from the Fur, Zaghawa, Massalit, 
Jebel, Aranga and other so-called “African” tribes. (3)
By identifying the acts of violence as “widespread and systematic,” 
the ICID determines that they amount to crimes against humanity, as 
defined in the Rome Statute, and thus fall under the jurisdiction of the 
ICC. The ICID thereby lays the ground for its recommendation to the 
UNSC that the case be referred to that court.
Simultaneously, mindful that the violence in Darfur may be inter-
preted differently, the commission seeks to preempt potential challenges:
In their discussions with the Commission, Government of the Sudan officials 
stated that any attacks carried out by Government armed forces in Darfur 
were for counter-insurgency purposes and were conducted on the basis of 
military imperatives. However, it is clear from the Commission’s findings 
that most attacks were deliberately and indiscriminately directed against ci-
vilians. Moreover, even if rebels, or persons supporting rebels, were present 
in some of the  villages— which the Commission considers likely in only a 
54  |  Justice versus Impunity
very small number of  instances— the attackers did not take precautions to 
enable civilians to leave the villages or otherwise be shielded from attack. 
Even where rebels may have been present in villages, the impact of the at-
tacks on civilians shows that the use of military force was manifestly dispro-
portionate to any threat posed by the rebels. (3)
The Commission obviously seeks to challenge a counternarrative 
based on an insurgency and counterinsurgency frame and proposed by 
the government of Sudan. By not referencing early attacks by the SLA 
and the JEM against institutions of the Sudanese state, the commission 
plays down the insurgency part of the history of the unfolding violence. 
Yet the evidence to challenge the (counter)insurgency frame seems 
readily at hand: a counterinsurgency would have been directed against 
militants, whereas, according the commission’s evidence, civilians were 
the targets. Further, should militants or members of rebel groups have 
hidden among the civilian population, the military would have been 
obliged to protect civilians in the ensuing fighting.
The commission nevertheless follows its mandate to also assess the 
involvement of rebel groups: “While the Commission did not find a 
systematic or a widespread pattern to these violations, it found credible 
evidence that rebel forces, namely members of the SLA and JEM, also 
are responsible for serious violations of international human rights and 
humanitarian law which may amount to war crimes. In particular, these 
violations include cases of murder of civilians and pillage” (4).
The quotations offered here summarize the commission’s work. They 
reflect a report that spells out a series of behaviors by the Sudanese 
government and its associates and by rebels that constitute crimes based 
on norms of international criminal law and on the available, legally 
relevant evidence.
Finally, while major parts of the report refer to organizational ac-
tors such as the government of Sudan, militias, or rebel groups, the 
ICID eventually follows the logic of criminal law also by attributing 
responsibility to individuals. It does so in a later section of the report, 
“Identification of Perpetrators”:
Those identified as possibly responsible for the above-mentioned violations 
consist of individual perpetrators, including officials of the Government 
of Sudan, members of militia forces, members of rebel groups, and cer-
tain foreign army officers acting in their personal capacity. Some Govern-
ment officials, as well as members of militia forces, have also been named 
as possibly responsible for joint criminal enterprise to commit interna-
tional crimes. . . . The Commission also has identified a number of senior 
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Government officials and military commanders who may be responsible, 
under the notion of superior (or command) responsibility, for knowingly 
failing to prevent or repress the perpetration of crimes. Members of rebel 
groups are named as suspected of participating in a joint criminal enterprise 
to commit international crimes. (4–5)
Not only does this segment of the report follow the individualizing 
logic of criminal law, but the commission also employs legal concepts, 
developed and refined in the history of international criminal law, in 
order to establish the criminal responsibility of individuals who acted 
in complex organizational contexts. “Command responsibility” seeks 
to prevent those from washing their hands of guilt who delegate the 
dirty work to others, lower in the organizational hierarchy. Further, in 
an effort to identify individuals as potential criminal perpetrators who 
acted in the context of complex organizations, the report applies the no-
tion of joint criminal enterprise. This term, which appears twice in the 
report, developed out of the concept of conspiracy in American criminal 
law.9 First developed in the United States in the fight against organized 
crime, the concept mutated into “criminal organization” in the London 
Charter of 1943, on which the Nuremberg tribunal was based, and into 
“joint criminal enterprise” in the ICTY’s proceedings (Meierhenrich 
2006). In addition to illustrating the application of concepts from inter-
national criminal law, this excursus into legal history illustrates how the 
global is constituted from below, in this case from the law of the United 
States (see Fourcade and Savelsberg 2006).
One more section from the ICID report merits lengthy quotation as it 
speaks to legal rules of evidence and as it became the center of some of 
the fiercest debates in the narratives on Darfur. Consider the following 
passage on the question “Have acts of genocide occurred?”
The Commission concluded that the Government of the Sudan has not pur-
sued a policy of genocide. Arguably, two elements of genocide might be 
deduced from the gross violations of human rights perpetrated by Govern-
ment forces and the militias under their control. These two elements are, 
first, the actus reus consisting of killing, or causing serious bodily or mental 
harm, or deliberately inflicting conditions of life likely to bring about physi-
cal destruction; and, second, on the basis of a subjective standard, the exis-
tence of a protected group being targeted by the authors of criminal conduct. 
However, the crucial element of genocidal intent appears to be missing, at 
least as far as the central Government authorities are concerned. Generally 
speaking, the policy of attacking, killing and forcibly displacing members 
of some tribes does not evince a specific intent to annihilate, in whole or in 
part, a group distinguished on racial, ethnic, national or religious grounds. 
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Rather, it would seem that those who planned and organized attacks on vil-
lages pursued the intent to drive the victims from their homes, primarily for 
purposes of counter-insurgency warfare. (4)
It is noteworthy that the commission here applies the notion of coun-
terinsurgency that it rejects elsewhere in the report (see above). More 
important, the authors are torn when they apply, in this context, the cri-
teria of the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (Genocide Convention): “The Commission does recognise 
that in some instances individuals, including Government officials, may 
commit acts with genocidal intent. Whether this was the case in Darfur, 
however, is a determination that only a competent court can make on a 
case by case basis” (p. 4).
It is at least conceivable that, in the deliberation on the applicability 
of “genocide,” political concerns intruded upon the ICID’s strict appli-
cation of legal logic. Such intrusion is not uncommon when crimes of 
a highly political nature are concerned. But why does the commission 
show such caution regarding the symbolically highly loaded notion of 
genocide when its reference to “a competent court” that alone can make 
a final (legal) determination applies to statements about war crimes and 
crimes against humanity as well? The reason likely lies in the kinds of 
voices I cite above, and to which I return in detail below: statements 
by foreign policy makers that urged against potential provocations of 
the government of Sudan and its leadership at a time when diplomats 
hoped for their cooperation in the North-South peace process and in the 
referendum over the independence of South Sudan.
The same tension observed here for the ICID later plagued the 
ICC when the case of Darfur was added to its docket. Based on the 
ICID report, the UNSC referred the case of Darfur to the ICC on 
March 31, 2005. And the ICC acted, adding the case of Darfur to 
Sikkink’s “first stream” of the justice  cascade— namely, international 
 prosecutions— while simultaneously mobilizing what Sikkink calls the 
“streambed” of new judicial institutions, here specifically the Rome 
Statute. The court’s first chief prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, 
investigated the case and began his series of prosecutorial decisions 
against Ahmad Harun, Ali Kushayb, and President Omar al-Bashir, 
as described above.
In short, the ICC is now placed at the center of the judicial field in 
response to the mass violence in Darfur. In this case, and generally, the 
court is exposed to tensions well known from domestic criminal law, 
conflicts to which I turn next.
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Conflicts within International Criminal Law and Justice
As institutions of international criminal law involve different profession-
al groups, and as they are exposed to a highly political environment that 
they often cannot disregard, internal conflict is unavoidable. Within the 
ICC conflicting reasoning has been detected between lawyers and techno-
crats (Meierhenrich 2014; for other legal institutions, see Stryker 1989), 
reflecting the tension between a formal and a more substantive orienta-
tion of law that pervades international even more than domestic criminal 
law.10 On the one side of the dividing line is law’s formal rationality, 
oriented toward a system of legal criteria alone. Codifications such as the 
Rome Statute have indeed laid the groundwork for the pursuit of legal 
rationales, beginning to revolutionize a world in which foreign affairs 
were subject to political reasoning alone.11 Some legal philosophers in 
fact argue that international criminal justice and human rights law can 
secure legitimacy in the long run only through strict adherence to formal 
legal criteria and abstinence from political rationales (Fichtelberg 2005).
Yet the court has to work against strong contenders, as the space 
granted the law has not been fully conceded among foreign policy mak-
ers. The words of one of my interviewees illustrate this lack of accep-
tance. This respondent, from the foreign ministry of a major European 
country, who specialized on issues of the ICC within his ministry’s Divi-
sion of International Law and represented his country in the Assembly 
of States, expressed his frustration as follows:
As to my interlocutors in the [foreign ministry] .  .  . there were constantly 
conflicting perceptions. I do remember quite a number of quarrels I had with 
my colleagues in the political department. . . . And the reason is that we had 
two different approaches. Their approach was purely political. My approach 
was both political, but also legal and judicial. And that is extremely difficult 
to combine at times. Because, if you are only confined to making political as-
sessments, then it is difficult to evaluate the work of a court, to accept a court, 
to accept any independent legal institution. And that is really something new 
in the international field where people are trained to assess complex issues by 
political means only. And you can find that very, very tangibly when you talk 
to United Nations staff, because they have for decades been trained in hav-
ing an exclusively political view on issues. Now there is a new factor, a new 
player on the ground [the ICC], which does not make a political assessment, 
but which simply applies the law. That is a new phenomenon, and I think for 
those who have an exclusively political approach, that is difficult to accept.
Actors in foreign policy who fend for the autonomy of interna-
tional law obviously face contending forces within their own minis-
tries and within in the UN. In addition, the Rome Statute opens the 
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door to substantive, political concerns to intrude into the work of the 
ICC. The UNSC and its permanent and temporary  members— countries 
that are no strangers to the consideration of geopolitical and economic 
 interests— are authorized to refer cases to the ICC.12 This intrusion 
of political rationales is further supported by Article 16 of the Rome 
Statute, a window built into the edifice of the statute to keep politi-
cal considerations in plain view: “No investigation or prosecution may 
be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 
12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the 
Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under 
the same conditions.”13 Decision makers on the court will thus have 
to be mindful of the UNSC’s political reasoning if they hope to main-
tain control over their cases. The court’s vulnerability vis-à-vis political 
powers is further increased by the fact that many countries have not yet 
ratified the Rome Statute, including  ones— as is well  known— as power-
ful as the United States, the People’s Republic of China, and Russia.14
Finally, apart from external pressures, substantive outcomes of legal 
decision making also matter directly to jurists. Max Weber (1978), in 
his classic on the sociology of law, sees status interests of lawyers as a 
bulwark against the application of a purely formal rationality. Legal de-
cision makers resent, he argues, being reduced to automatons into which 
one drops facts and fees and out of which spew decisions (and opinions). 
Instead, lawyers seek discretion, enabling them to consider ethical max-
ims or practical concerns of politics, economics, or geopolitics in their 
legal decisions. The long history of criminal law speaks to this tension be-
tween formal and substantive rationality. Historically, the pendulum has 
swung to alternatingly privilege formal rational or substantive rational 
models. In international criminal law, substantive considerations have 
particular weight, as thousands of lives may be at stake if conditions on 
the ground and practical consequences of legal decisions are disregarded. 
Applied to the case of Darfur, many foreign policy makers, including 
several interviewees for this book, expressed concern that charges against 
President al-Bashir might threaten the North-South agreement and the 
referendum on the independence of South Sudan. It is hard to imagine 
that these concerns were not on the minds of decision makers at the ICC.
In short, despite its particular institutional logic, criminal law is no 
stranger to internal contradictions and conflicts. Conflicts between for-
mal legal criteria and substantive concerns, while dividing legal and 
political actors, also create ambivalences and internal tensions within 
the legal field. The ICC and the case of Darfur are no exceptions.
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conclusions: darfur in the Justice cascade
Responses to the Darfur conflict are part of what Kathryn Sikkink has 
called the justice cascade: mass violence and grave violations of human 
rights have led the UNSC, ICID, and ICC to pursue individual criminal 
accountability. This pursuit is driven by forces that advanced the justice 
cascade in the first place: international organizations and social move-
ment organizations, specifically INGOs with a human rights focus.
The case of Darfur thus provides insights into the strengths and limits 
of the justice cascade. Clearly, ICC charges are a victory for those who 
drive the justice cascade. Yet might this be a Pyrrhic victory? Realist 
critics who focus on the actual distribution of (hard) power point to the 
fact that none of the principal actors have thus far been apprehended 
and that powerful nations in fact have sought to appease the govern-
ment of Sudan and its leaders in the pursuit of political goals.
But despite such constraints, the judicial process produced represen-
tations of the Darfur conflict and its participants, and it has cast them 
in the frame of criminal violence, even before a case has gone to trial. 
The publication of the ICID report and the ICC’s indictments depicted 
powerful political actors as criminal perpetrators. This depiction was, 
as indicated in the introduction, and explored in greater detail below, 
communicated to a world audience. Supporters of the justice cascade 
consider this a success.
Simultaneously, however, the production of a judicial narrative of 
Darfur also illustrates the narrative constraints of criminal law. Analy-
sis of crucial segments of the ICID report shows that the commission 
was well aware of the social and political conditions of the conflict. Yet 
such insights are marginalized in a “background” section. They do not 
color the conclusions and recommendations. In the logic of criminal 
law, the mass violence is attributed to a very few, albeit powerful, indi-
viduals. Other contributors are omitted from the narrative. Structural 
conditions and the organizational context within which the accused 
acted are not reflected in the conclusions. Further, while the ICID nar-
rative avoids the simplification of social reality encountered in some 
social movement narratives, and while the report does acknowledge 
criminal violence by rebel groups, it divides the world of Darfur neatly 
into perpetrators and victims. And the commission’s and the ICC’s goal 
is justice, and the remedy is punishment, irrespective of concerns about 
competing actors.
The criminal law narrative obviously contradicts the accounts of 
historians and political scientists such as Alex de Waal and Mahmood 
60  |  Justice versus Impunity
Mamdani, encountered in the introduction. It is more compatible with 
the narrative provided by sociologist-criminologists John Hagan and 
Wenona Rymond-Richmond. Yet, different from this social scientific ex-
amination, and despite its reference to “command responsibility” and 
“joint criminal enterprise,” the commission report does not spell out the 
organizational mechanisms through which violent motivations were mo-
bilized and actors on the ground ideologically and materially equipped 
for perpetration. The report also does not engage in the fine-grained 
and statistically sophisticated analysis of data such as that found in the 
Atrocities Documentation Survey (already available when the ICID did 
its work). It was this analysis, however, that enabled Hagan and Ry-
mond-Richmond to document the role of racial motives in the atrocities. 
The statistical patterns they identified suggested to them, in contradis-
tinction to the commission’s report, that genocide had been committed.
This critical discussion, while highlighting the limits of criminal law 
narratives, is not to deny the capacity of criminal investigations, charges, 
or trials to contribute to the formation of collective representations and 
memories of mass atrocities. In fact, subsequent  chapters— especially 
chapter  9— demonstrate their representational effectiveness.15
In sum, social and political forces that drove the justice cascade also 
helped move the case of Darfur toward judicial intervention by exactly 
those institutions that they had helped build in the first place. While no 
Darfur case has reached the trial stage, court interventions have pro-
vided a criminal law and justice frame through which the events of 
Darfur can be interpreted. Media communicated this frame to a broad 
public in a diverse array of countries, through a process analyzed in 
chapters 8 and 9. Criminal law’s representation of Darfur thus provides 
a highly relevant definition of social reality, and the hopes of practitio-
ners such as Justice Jackson and President Roosevelt seem defensible. 
Yet the limitations of criminal law–inspired accounts, diagnosed in his-
torical and sociological literature, are also at work in the case of Dar-
fur. Law’s institutional logic produces a limited representation of mass 
violence that neglects central elements of social reality. 
The court does not act alone, of course, in building a criminal justice 
representation of the mass violence in Darfur. It is supported, and in 
fact preceded, by actors at the fringes of the judicial field, human rights 
INGOs and governments that spearheaded the definition of Darfur’s 
violence as criminal and even as genocidal. Their representations are the 
foci of chapters 2 and 3.
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International actors, including the ICC, do not work in isolation. Oth-
ers precede and contribute to their interventions and their rights-based 
representation of mass violence. Turning to those other contributors, 
located at the periphery of the legal field, this chapter focuses on civil 
society actors that advocate for human rights. How do they support 
a criminal law response to mass violence? How do they represent the 
events in Darfur? Specifically, what is their contribution to advancing a 
criminalizing frame for the interpretation of mass violence? I examine 
Amnesty International as a civil society case study. In my interview with 
her, the Darfur specialist in Amnesty’s International Secretariat at the 
time of the most intense violence confirmed the centrality of the Darfur 
issue. She also spoke to her organization’s focus on the rights perspec-
tive: “We are a human rights organization and we document, we try to 
document, human rights abuses, human rights violations. And we try 
to raise awareness, and we try to provide recommendations for all the 
actors who can have an influence to sort of change the situation.”
This chapter begins with an overview of literature that attests to 
the growing role of INGOs in the prosecution and representation of 
mass atrocities. Then I present an in-depth discussion of Amnesty 
International, spelling out organizational goals and strategies and how 
goals are perceived by Amnesty staff and what representations of Darfur 
they generate. The analysis shows that the institutional logic of the legal 
field colors Amnesty actors’ narratives about Darfur, the suffering of its 
chapter 2
 The Human Rights Field and 
Amnesty International
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people, responsible actors, and appropriate frames. An exclusive focus 
on features of the human rights field, however, would be misleading. 
The final section of this chapter shows how, even in an international 
and highly centralized organization such as Amnesty, national contexts 
of sections and workers interpenetrate with and at times weaken the 
logic of the legal field. Conclusions summarize insights gained in this 
chapter and anticipate chapter 3’s discussion of the role of the United 
States.
civil society’s human rights groups and the 
role of amnesty international
Generally, INGOs have been playing a growing role in the representa-
tion of mass violence to a global audience. Their number has grown 
substantially in recent decades (Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002), and 
their presence is associated with greater respect for human rights with-
in countries (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Tsutsui and Wotipka 
2004). INGOs draft human rights documents, promote human rights, 
document abuses, conduct research, condemn or praise states and other 
actors, mobilize public opinion and public action, lobby governments, 
and provide humanitarian relief. Most specialize, for example, along 
the lines of human rights protection or humanitarian aid delivery. No 
matter their specialization, in all of their actions INGOs acknowledge 
and interpret violence. They frame it in various ways, in line with their 
central mission, and disseminate their representations of violence to a 
broader public.
INGOs and other international organizations are often part of larger, 
nonhierarchical networks called transnational advocacy networks. As 
explored in chapter 1, TANs are bound together by shared values, a 
common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services. 
Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (1998), who pioneered the study 
of TANs, focused on the power of ideas and norms, often called soft 
power, rather than more traditional forms of power. Information and 
the ability to frame violence are key to the power that activists, NGOs, 
social movements, and other members of TANs mobilize in order to 
draw attention to and increase support for their cause.
On the occasion of violent conflicts, INGOs are among the first ac-
tors to respond. My interviews with Africa correspondents from lead-
ing European and North American newspapers suggest that journalists 
often rely on NGOs as one crucial source of information. Journalists 
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who reflect on their response to crises confirm that assessment (see the 
contributions in Thompson 2007). Such patterns of communication are 
to be expected given that major NGOs are represented in many parts of 
Africa, while even the most renowned newspapers typically have only 
one journalist on the ground, based in places such as Nairobi or Johan-
nesburg, to cover the entire continent. Ways in which NGOs frame 
events may thus directly influence how violence is reported in news 
media across the globe, a topic to which I return in detail in chapter 9.
The importance of INGOs in the dissemination of knowledge is high-
lighted in the scholarly literature. World polity theorists, for example, 
argue that INGOs reflect the expression of world society and operate as 
carriers of global models and ideas (Schofer et al. 2012). These scholars 
suggest that NGOs facilitate the global diffusion of a uniform narrative 
of events.
Critical theorists who write about INGOs agree with the reputed 
global character of NGO messages, but they strongly disagree with re-
gard to their content. They insist, instead, that rights-based INGO nar-
ratives are colored by neocolonial interests. To them notions of human 
rights are Western in origin, reflect narratives of linear progress, and 
disguise interests of the Global North (Kennedy 2004). When NGOs 
frame human rights abuses and atrocities by using a metaphor of vic-
tims, savages, and saviors, Western countries and organizations appear 
as “saviors” (Mutua 2002). Their stories of human rights abuses suggest 
clear dichotomies between virtue and evil, while ignoring the nuances 
and complexities of social situations. In the case of Darfur, scholars such 
as Mahmood Mamdani (2009b) reproach Western media for conduct-
ing a “moralistic discourse whose effect is both to obscure the politics 
of the violence and position the reader as a virtuous, not just as a con-
cerned, observer” (149). Mamdani has in mind a wide variety of West-
ern actors, from NGOs to writers such as Samantha Power, now US 
ambassador to the United Nations (see also Mamdani 2009a).
Constructivist traditions similarly embrace the importance of cul-
tural models and norms. However, constructivists point out that NGOs 
are not just passive conduits of norms and ideas, as some world pol-
ity and critical research traditions assume, but rather actors with their 
own interests and desires to shape behavior (Keck and Sikkink 1998), 
actors also who operate against the background of nation-states and 
their institutional environments, in which they originate and where they 
are headquartered (Stroup 2012). NGOs do not just disseminate global 
narratives about conflicts; they create, modify, and interpret them, and 
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they do so in line with their missions and foci. In the Darfur case, for 
example, humanitarian NGOs assess victimization and the role played 
by the Sudanese government more cautiously than rights-based NGOs, 
perhaps because they depend on the cooperation of the Sudanese gov-
ernment to deliver their aid (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008).
the case of amnesty international
Amnesty International, together with organizations such as Human 
Rights Watch, the International Crisis Group, and the Enough Project, 
played a crucial role among INGOs in mobilizing world opinion and 
government action on behalf of Darfur. Amnesty’s central role is not 
surprising in light of the organization’s well-known history and current 
standing. Founded in 1961 by British lawyer Peter Benenson, Amnesty 
today is the best-known and largest human rights NGO. London is the 
seat of its headquarters, the International Secretariat. Here the organi-
zation maintains its research office, whose primary mission was, early 
on, to identify and gather information on individual “prisoners of con-
science” and to distribute such knowledge worldwide, a mission that has 
since been broadened (on Amnesty’s history, see Neier 2012:186–203). 
Amnesty’s success was partly based on its strict political impartiality. It 
took on cases under right- and left-wing abusers alike. It refused to ac-
cept government funds, instead relying solely on donations from small 
private donors and members. Highly qualified researchers, writing re-
ports in its London office, strictly avoided sensationalism. The resulting 
moral authority contributed to a membership base of 160,000 in 107 
countries by the mid-1970, a number that grew further to more than 
500,000 in 160 countries after Amnesty was awarded the Nobel Peace 
Prize in 1977. Over the years, Amnesty expanded its reach beyond 
representing the interests of individual political prisoners. One central 
mission became the mobilization of public opinion and enactment of 
government policies when massive violations of human rights occurred 
anywhere around the globe. Darfur became one of those cases.
In 2013, for example, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of 
the mass killings in Darfur, Amnesty International issued a report to 
update the public. The following short excerpt highlights the organiza-
tion’s concern both with the massive violation of the local population’s 
human rights and with the impunity of leading political actors:
As the Darfur conflict marks its 10th anniversary, the human rights situation 
in the region remains dire. Civilians continue to face attacks by government 
forces, pro-government militias, and armed opposition groups. In the last 
Human Rights and Amnesty International  |  65
three months alone, 500 people were reportedly killed and roughly 100,000 
displaced in attacks against civilians that have involved members of gov-
ernment forces. The government in recent years has continued to carry out 
indiscriminate aerial bombardment and deliberate attacks against civilians. 
In addition, security services carry out torture and other ill-treatment against 
detainees and, alongside the police, use excessive force against peaceful 
protesters. And impunity reigns. Government officials, including President 
Bashir and a leader of the “janjaweed” pro-government militia Ali Kushayb, 
indicted by the International Criminal Court on counts of war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and genocide remain at large and there is little or no ac-
countability for these crimes.1
The online publication cited here lists seventeen previous reports 
Amnesty issued over the past decade on the violence in Darfur. The first 
alert cited was issued during the second peak of mass killings (“Sudan: 
Darfur: ‘Too Many People Killed for No Reason,’ ” February 3, 2004).2 
An early example of intense field research, conducted by experienced 
research staff, appeared five months later under the title “Sudan: 
Darfur: Rape as a Weapon of War: Sexual Violence and Its Conse-
quences.”3 Following the typical division of labor, a researcher visited 
the  field— specifically, the refugee camps in  Chad— to interview affected 
women, and her colleague in London, in this case the campaigner for 
Sudan and East Africa, wrote the report. In the words of the latter, one 
of my interviewees at the International Secretariat: “[The rape study] 
was done by Annette [Weber], who went to Chad to do this.  .  .  . I 
worked on the reports that came out of that.” Reports and statements 
cited here illustrate well Amnesty’s focus on the safeguarding of human 
rights. Means are not limited to criminal justice interventions, but they 
decidedly include them. Behaviors are referred to as crimes. Perpetra-
tors, identified as targets of ICC prosecution, are named, including Pres-
ident Omar al-Bashir. Some of the evidence gathered in Amnesty reports 
is in fact suited for use by the prosecutor. Images displayed on Amnesty 
websites support the organization’s messages (see figures 4 and 5).
Reports issued by Amnesty’s International Secretariat in London are 
delivered to the national sections. There, country and theme specialists 
on Amnesty’s staff use them to collaborate with volunteer groups on 
various campaigns in seeking to inform a broad public. They also pres-
sure policy makers to take notice and to act on behalf of human rights. 
The following statement from an interviewee at Amnesty-Germany in 
Berlin describes how such work is executed:
I am here responsible for the coordination of our political work, that is, to 
pass on and present Amnesty demands and recommendations to the federal 
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figure 4. Darfur village attacked and burned by the Janjawiid. This image appeared 
on Amnesty International’s website.
figure 5. Darfuri refugee women and children in Chad. This image appeared on 
Amnesty International’s website.
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administration and the legislature, and also to foreign embassies here in Berlin. 
A focus on which I really worked intensively is the impunity issue. That is 
not assigned to the country experts, but it’s one of the themes that are coor-
dinated by the secretariat general. These are the  areas— impunity, work on 
the United Nations, the Human Rights Council, those issues  thus— where 
country work coincides with institutional questions. And to decide, when we 
have a concern regarding Darfur, an arrest warrant against Bashir, for ex-
ample, do we direct this to the legal department or the country section in the 
foreign ministry? What resources might have to get involved? Are we going 
to do this alone or in collaboration with other NGOs? . . . I am responsible 
for these kinds of strategic questions. (author’s translation)
The respondent, trained as a political scientist and responsible for 
political work at Amnesty-Germany, rushed from the interview we con-
ducted in a fishbowl-like conference room to her office for a telephone 
conference with members of other NGOs. This conference’s purpose 
was to prepare for a meeting with the Africa representative of the for-
eign ministry, a previous ambassador to Kenya and until recently head 
of his ministry’s crisis staff. “The upcoming telephone conference,” she 
told me,
serves the coordination among the participating NGO colleagues. When 
we are ten, to enter into a conversation with the other side and have one 
hour available to us, we then have to coordinate a bit. Who says what? 
Who pursues what foci? Where do organizations have common concerns 
that could be presented by just one participant? [Participating organizations 
at the upcoming conference included] Medica Mondiale, for which sexual 
violence against women is a central theme. That is also an important topic 
for Amnesty, but here we say that this is something that should rather be 
presented by Medica Mondiale, and where we say that we support their 
position. Then the humanitarian organizations will participate: World Vi-
sion, Oxfam, the Ecumenical Network Central Africa [Ökumenisches Netz-
werk Zentralafrika], a very broad spectrum thus, also Human Rights Watch. 
(author’s translation)
Amnesty International is a formal, centralized organization, and its 
guiding philosophy and crucial case-specific information, passed down 
from the International Secretariat in London, is taken seriously at the 
grass roots. One interviewee, a specialist for issues of arms and im-
punity for Amnesty-France in Paris, sheds light on (and supports) the 
highly formal and centralized nature of his organization. When asked 
about those he works with in his daily pursuits, he answered:
In general we depend strongly on Amnesty Londres [French for London]. . . . 
For example, Amnesty Londres said [to] us all the sections have to work on 
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Sudan and Darfur and the arrest of Omar al-Bashir, because we have [a] 
strategic date in [a] couple of months to make pressure on [the] international 
community. So during six, seven months you have to concentrate . . . and . . . 
organize the pressure in France to push France in [the] UN Security Council 
to push Sudan to arrest Omar al-Bashir and render Omar al-Bashir to the 
ICC.  .  .  . [I]in general I am waiting for the strategy of Amnesty Londres. 
And with the strategy of Amnesty Londres I organize the work in Amnesty 
France. And with my volunteer team I say, so you have to write to the min-
istry, plan meetings; you can organize an event with a movie, for example, 
to [sensitize] people; you have to write press releases to push France and 
have interviews with journalists. . . . [W]e have sixty or seventy sections in 
the world: Asia, Africa, Americas. . . . In each country of the world Amnesty 
Londres has the capacity to mobilize volunteers to manage . . . a situation. If 
we have not this coordination, I think it will be very dangerous to work or 
inappropriate or inadequate. We will not be efficient. . . . And London has 
the capacity of research. In London you have all the researchers.
When asked about the most important source of information they 
rely on when seeking to understand a situation like that in Darfur, Am-
nesty staff and volunteers align closely with the above sentiments. All 
interviewees first refer to Amnesty’s own reports. Most mention other 
sources only upon being prompted. Again the reply by the respondent 
of Amnesty-France may serve as an illustration. Asked what sources of 
information are most important to him when familiarizing himself with 
a case like Darfur and the indictment against al-Bashir, he answered:
Amnesty information. The [strength] of Amnesty International is the fact 
[that] we have our own research.  .  .  . If I have information which is not 
checked by my researcher in  London— I have a problem. .  .  . [S]ometimes 
when I have a doubt . . . I call or write London to have a discussion, to dis-
cuss the reliability, credibility of the information. . . . We are unique in the 
world in this respect, because our research is reliable. It is serious. In terms 
of information, it is information from Amnesty thus that is most important 
to me. (partially translated by author)
Despite its centralization and the clear guiding definition of a human 
rights–based philosophy, Amnesty International is a living organization, 
composed of human actors of diverse nationalities, genders, and educa-
tional and occupational backgrounds who act in varied national environ-
ments. Thus, to learn about Amnesty’s involvement in the case of Darfur 
and about ways in which it narrated the events, I turn in greater detail 
to a set of ten interviews. Seven interviewees were staffers; the other 
three, volunteers. Staff respondents were placed at different levels of the 
organization’s hierarchy, ranging from the secretary-general of a na-
tional organization to theme or country specialists in national sections. 
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Four had academic backgrounds in political science and international 
relations; four in law, including international human rights and crimi-
nal law; one volunteer had an engineering background (with the tenth’s 
background unknown). Half had some additional educational degree, 
from anthropology to advertising. Most respondents had reached their 
current position via a variety of appointments. Yet none left any doubt 
about their identification with the pursuit of human rights as the orga-
nization’s central mission. I conducted nine of the ten interviews in per-
son, and one over the phone. Sites included the International Secretariat 
in London and national offices (staff) and homes (volunteers) in Paris, 
Washington, Berlin, Bielefeld, Vienna, and Bern.
Goals as Perceived by Amnesty Actors
Respondents at Amnesty International, like all other interviewees, were 
asked which goals should have primacy with regard to Sudan. I offered 
four options, but allowed for alternative suggestions: (1) seeking justice 
(by means of criminal law); (2) securing the survival of those affected 
by violence (through aid); (3) establishing peace (through negotiation); 
and (4) securing the sovereignty and integrity of the Sudanese state. The 
fourth option has obviously been a principle of international law since 
the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, which ended the Thirty Years War 
and which was negotiated with the hope that principles of noninter-
vention would secure international peace. Respondents spoke to all of 
these goals. Some merged the second (survival) and third (peace) to add 
a fifth: helping those affected through military peacekeeping missions.
Amnesty interviewees did not support all goals equally. In line with 
expectations, they most strongly backed the achievement of justice or, 
in other terms, the prevention of impunity. Every respondent subscribed 
to this goal. Three in fact identified justice as the only objective or de-
clared that other goals (e.g., lasting peace) could be achieved only if 
justice was served. These three were lawyers, leaving only the fourth 
lawyer with a more varied portfolio of purposes. Four respondents 
wanted the pursuit of justice to be combined with the goal of help-
ing the affected population survive. One of these declared that survival 
was one side-effect of the pursuit of justice. Seven pleaded for peace or 
peacekeeping as goals in addition to the pursuit of justice; one of these 
cautioned, however, that the establishment of peace must not occur 
at the expense of justice. One respondent expected that justice served 
would lead to peace. And only one saw a dilemma between the goals 
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of achieving peace and justice simultaneously. Securing sovereignty, fi-
nally, was supported by only one respondent, a volunteer with an en-
gineering background. In the Amnesty context, international rule on 
behalf of human rights clearly trumps national sovereignty.
One interviewee, responsible for political communication at her 
country’s section office, spoke clearly to the primacy of the justice goal. 
When asked about potential conflicts between justice and aid delivery, 
she responded:
When we, in the case of Sudan, negotiate with the foreign ministry, jointly 
with colleagues from other NGOs, then that [the topic of cooperation with 
the government in Khartoum on humanitarian aid] will pop up. That, how-
ever, is not a point of contention within Amnesty, as we simply have a very 
clear position in favor of prosecution. Amnesty continues to be part of the 
grand coalition in favor of the ICC, and that can be summarized in the words 
“no peace without justice.” There our position is very clear. Two years ago, 
on the occasion of the indictment against al-Bashir, we had a rather intense 
confrontation with Doctors Without Borders, for example, which took a 
very different position. We also had an exchange, not conducted in public, 
to communicate our positions to each other. Yes, this is an important point, 
but not a conflict within Amnesty. (author’s translation)
Many interviewee statements could be added to illustrate this posi-
tion, but I limit myself here to just one more, by an Amnesty-France 
interviewee. While the German respondent above draws a boundary 
between Amnesty’s rights- versus humanitarian aid–inspired stances, 
this French respondent speaks to the distinction between a diplomatic 
position and that of Amnesty:
Justice is not negotiable. . . . No one has ever proven that the arrest warrant 
against Omar al-Bashir impeded the peace process. For how many years 
has the peace process been going on!? For how many years has the govern-
ment of France organized the conference in Doha, with the different rebel 
groups, with the government of North Sudan!? For how many years has 
one discussed!? For how many years!? . . . And the arrest warrant has never 
kept these negotiations from proceeding, never. That is thus a false problem 
[faux problème]. And how can one have peace, how reconstruct a country 
with the victims, if there was no reparation, no truth? That is not possible, 
not possible. The case of South Africa is emblematic. They had a Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission. Now, one can critique that commission, 
one can critique their work and how they went about it, but all Africans 
recognized that that commission played a central role in the reconciliation 
between black and white at the end of Apartheid. . . . Today, how do you 
want to construct peace at the expense of justice and have trust in those who 
have massacred their population? . . . It is thus that we never juxtapose jus-
tice and peace. For us they are intimately related. And one knows that justice 
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has a deterrent effect. Milošević participated in the Dayton  Accords— and 
that was followed by a process which contributed to his arrest because there 
was an international tribunal. And the Bosniac forces contributed to his ar-
rest and extradition to the tribunal because the tribunal also had the capacity 
to dissuade those who had endured the violence from taking violent revenge, 
but rather to favor the arrest of that person. Justice has a deterrent effect, 
extremely strong. (author’s translation)
Elsewhere in the interview, the same respondent stressed that Am-
nesty staff are not uninterested in sociological and political conditions 
of conflict, but that these concerns are subordinate to the rationales of 
the justice perspective:
One denounces, and one does not cease to denounce, for example, the death 
penalty. But one does not tell the  Chinese— or China—“adopt a US type re-
gime, for example, adopt a Chinese democracy.” No. One simply denounces 
all they inflict upon their population. Here you go. And I believe that this is 
one of the strengths of Amnesty, to have that distance to the international 
political system or to political situations at the national level, such as in 
Sudan, in order to report nothing but the voice of the victims. . . . A right 
constitutes obligations. Obligations, responsibilities, pursuit of justice. . . . 
[Asked if sociological or political causes are thus irrelevant to Amnesty, he 
adds in English:] Yes. But we are not stupid and we need to understand per-
sonally the situation. So maybe we go to a conference to meet specialists on 
the question, to have a view, a general view of the situation and understand 
ethnic problems, energy problems, political problems. But it is to facilitate 
our work; it is not a condition of our work. (partially translated by author)
In short, these statements illustrate that not just official proclama-
tions and declarations by the International Secretariat in London, but 
also goal setting as articulated by my interviewees from Amnesty from 
a diverse group of countries, place the organization unmistakably in 
the justice field, albeit at its periphery. Respondents’ identification with 
Amnesty’s institutional logic is especially pronounced where organiza-
tional membership coincides with legal training.
Interviews do not reveal if this identification of justice, or the avoidance 
of impunity, as a goal results from selective recruitment or socialization 
into the organization’s culture. Socialization through organization and 
communication does seem crucial, though, as indicated by participants’ 
almost unanimous orientation toward the International Secretariat as the 
best source of information. Be that as it may, membership in Amnesty, 
for volunteers, but especially for staff, appears to color the habitus of its 
members, as well as their identification with an institutional logic that 
corresponds with the pursuit of justice by means of criminal law.
72  |  Justice versus Impunity
Representations of Darfur by Amnesty Activists
How does this identification with the organizational goal of human 
rights and justice translate into Amnesty workers’ representation of the 
Darfur conflict? How similar is their narrative to those encountered in 
legal documents (chapter 1) or to the account of criminologists such as 
John Hagan and Wenona Rymond-Richmond (introduction)? The nar-
rative or representation of the Darfur conflict, as presented by Amnesty 
interviewees can best be explored along the dimensions of suffering and 
victimhood; origins of the conflict, time dimension, and causes; identity 
of actor-perpetrators; and frames applied. Seven out of ten Amnesty 
interviewees, representing the International Secretariat in London and 
five individual countries (United States, France, Germany, Austria, and 
Switzerland), provided substantive answers to most of the themes cov-
ered here.
In response to questions about suffering and victimhood, seven inter-
viewees spoke about victimhood and the suffering of the Darfur popula-
tion; one additional respondent (Ireland) referred me to related accounts 
in an Amnesty report. Specifically, six interviewees spoke about killings 
and death, and one about executions and disappearances. Six addressed 
rape (including “mass rapes” and “mass rape as an instrument of ethnic 
cleansing”), and six referred to displacements (including those termed 
“irreversible”). Torture, looting, destruction, and violations of human 
rights are also mentioned. Obviously, suffering and victimhood are 
foremost in the minds of Amnesty interviewees, and they are primarily 
described in the language of criminal law.
When asked about causes and origins, Amnesty interviewees, while 
also speaking to long-standing conflicts in the region of Darfur, especially 
old conflicts between ethnic groups and between pastoralists and farm-
ers, focused on present-day conditions. A major concern was with gov-
ernment policies that “discriminate” and “marginalize.” Respondents 
thereby attributed responsibility to the government of Sudan for creating 
background conditions that foster conflict. But they went further by also 
identifying government action as a direct cause of the violence. They 
spoke to the “politicization of old conflicts” or the “instrumentaliza-
tion” of tensions in the region by the al-Bashir government and to the 
government supplying “Arabs” with weapons. Such a focus on the pres-
ent is in line with the criminological representation of the Darfur conflict 
by Hagan and Rymond-Richmond. It approximates judicial narratives.
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Interviewees were more specific yet. Seven of them named actors 
whom they deemed responsible for the suffering of the people of Darfur. 
All but one mentioned the government of Sudan; five referred explic-
itly to al-Bashir, the “Bashir regime,” or government actors “up to the 
Presidential level.” Four mentioned the Janjawiid or “Arabs, supplied 
with weapons”; and (only) two see “rebels” or “opposition groups” as 
responsible for the violence.
One interviewee came closest to representing the violence in Darfur 
in almost ideal-typical terms of criminal law and justice. This is not 
surprising, as here we encounter a young lawyer, the head of Amnesty-
Germany’s volunteer group on issues of impunity, a former intern at 
the ICC’s prosecutor’s office who had also spent time with the tribunal 
in East Timor and who was earning her living as a prosecutor in Berlin. 
She spoke about causes, suffering, and perpetration of crimes in Darfur 
in these terms:
I would say it is a conflict that originates in ethnic tensions and that has been 
instrumentalized by the central government in Khartoum, to document its 
territorial claims in Darfur. The causes of the conflict lie in the differences be-
tween the ethnic groups in Sudan, but also in their ways of life and in a will 
of those groups living in Darfur to continue to conduct their self-determined 
lives and to distance themselves from the central government, an attempt 
that the central government does not necessarily support. The execution of 
the conflict is yet another question.  .  .  . The government sent out [horse/
camel-]riding groups, collaborated with the Janjawiid militias thus, which it 
instrumentalized, and that helped their country’s army, to show their domi-
nance, as it were. In the course of this, hundreds of thousands have been 
driven from their homes and killed. Rapes were a strong characteristic of 
this conflict, and it is one of the cruelest conflicts of the past years. . . . And 
it was planned and purposefully conducted. Different from descriptions by 
many, it was not simply a clash between ethnic groups that conducted a civil 
war. That, I would say, it was exactly not. But what precisely occurred, and 
how it is to be evaluated judicially, there we have to wait for word from 
the  ICC— when one day proceedings will finally be under way. (author’s 
translation)
Not only is this narrative in line with the logic of criminal law and 
justice, explicating the actus reus, naming offenders, and declaring their 
intent, but it is also partially subservient to the juridical proceedings. 
The final story can be told, in the mind of this respondent, only once the 
court has done its work. I found the same deference, the same hesitancy 
to label the crimes without the court having spoken, in a number of 
interviews with lawyers, not just at Amnesty.
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Finally, inquiring about the appropriate frame through which the 
Darfur conflict should be interpreted, I again offered interviewees 
four options: a rebellion or insurrection frame (understanding govern-
ment action as counterinsurgency); a civil war frame; a humanitarian 
emergency frame; and a state crime frame. In their responses, only one 
respondent supported the insurgency frame (engineer-volunteer), one 
rejected it explicitly (general secretary, lawyer), and three subscribed 
to it either with hesitation or by stressing that the insurgency by rebel 
groups was a response to government action. Only one respondent 
accepted the civil war frame, three rejected it explicitly, and one ac-
cepted it only under the condition that civil war in Darfur be seen as a 
consequence of previous criminal state action. Almost all respondents 
accepted the label of humanitarian catastrophe, though one of these 
insisted that it should be considered as such only if one recognizes that 
the crisis resulted from criminal aggression by the state. One respondent 
hesitated using the label humanitarian catastrophe as, in his opinion, it 
omitted the situation’s human-made character (general secretary, law-
yer). Yet, in line with the narrative described here along four analytic 
dimensions, all of the respondents but one wholeheartedly embraced 
the state crime frame.
In short, interviewees among Amnesty’s staff and volunteers were 
largely in line with the guidance provided by the International Secretar-
iat in London. They were determined that the pursuit of human rights 
is of the utmost importance, that criminal law and justice should play 
the central role in response to mass violence, and that impunity must be 
avoided by all means. Some also insisted that pursuing justice will even-
tually serve other goals such as the survival of those affected and the 
establishment of peace. Potential goal conflicts were thus neutralized.
Despite such unanimity, I observed patterns of distinction even within 
our small sample of interviewees. The lawyer-versus–political scientist 
distinction appears to carry particular weight, with lawyers defining 
goals and presenting narratives in ways even more clearly in line with 
the ideal type of criminal law and justice than those of other Amnesty 
members, staff, or volunteers. This pattern resembles those identified 
elsewhere in political administration (Stryker 1989) and within the ICC 
(Meierhenrich 2014). But I have to pour more water into the wine of a 
pure criminal justice perspective. Another pattern I observed demands 
that we modify the notion of a universal and globalized representation 
of mass violence by an international rights-oriented organization. I refer 
to national distinctions, to which I turn now.
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national contexts of ngo work and the case 
of amnesty
International NGOs are, by definition, border-crossing organizations. 
Their emergence and influence is in line with theoretical arguments from 
the world polity, neoinstitutional, and constructivist schools. Yet a spe-
cific branch of neo-Weberian work in comparative sociology and recent 
insights particularly regarding INGOs have stressed the considerable 
weight of national context in the definition of situations. Most INGOs 
continue to be headquartered in the countries where they were founded, 
and they continue to receive a substantial portion of their funding from 
within these “home” countries. Developing this point through an em-
pirical examination, Sarah Stroup (2012:3) argues convincingly: “While 
many NGOs are increasingly active in international arenas, I find 
that actual organizational structures and strategies are deeply tied to 
national environments.” Her detailed analyses confirm that this pattern 
applies especially for humanitarian, but also for human rights INGOs. 
Stroup focuses on regulatory frameworks, political opportunity struc-
tures, availability of resources, and social networks as features to which 
INGOs are exposed and that vary by country. She shows how such con-
textual conditions color INGOs’ professionalization and management, 
fund-raising, advocacy and research, and issue selection. My point here 
is that they also color the representation of human rights violations.
The rights-based INGOs that Stroup examines include United 
Kingdom–based Amnesty International and, by contrast, Human 
Rights Watch, based in the United States, along with the Fédération 
Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme (FIDH), based in 
France. Compared to the latter two, and owing to donation patterns in 
the United Kingdom, Amnesty depends more on fund-raising from mul-
tiple individual donors. Levels of professionalization also differ. HRW, 
for example, depends on a high level of professionalization, a functional 
necessity because of its dependence on large foundation donors. Con-
sequently, HRW also relies more on insider strategies (e.g., links to the 
US government), compared to a preference for grassroots mobilization 
within Amnesty and, even stronger, in FIDH. In terms of issue selec-
tion, both HRW and Amnesty have been much more reluctant to ad-
dress social, economic, and cultural rights issues than the French FIDH. 
Stroup attributes this caution to the American and British constituen-
cies’ greater attunement to free market and individual rights principles 
than their French counterparts exhibit.
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But Stroup goes further. Beyond identifying differences across dis-
tinct human rights organizations, she also explores distinctions of 
national sections within INGOs. For Amnesty, for example, despite 
its high degree of centralization and the concentration of more than 
a quarter of its $200 million budget in the International Secretariat in 
London, she finds significant national particularities. Among the eighty 
national sections, Amnesty-USA depends more than the others on large 
financial donations of less involved supporters, a funding pattern simi-
lar (albeit not as pronounced) to that of HRW. National donation prac-
tices thus matter at the level of sections, as well. Further, while research 
at Amnesty is “in some ways a valuable end in itself,” the US section 
sets somewhat different priorities. As one staffer indicated, “We in the 
US think in terms of timeliness and impact, but they [the International 
Secretariat] think in a way that is unhurried, more thorough, and these 
are cultural differences. . . . To me, it sometimes feels like a group of 
people in universities in London, developing long, detailed documents” 
(cited in Stroup 2012:160).
Country-specific opportunity structures that affect organizations and 
sections within organizations spelled out by Stroup are supplemented 
by others, including nation-specific carrier groups, historical experi-
ences, and the distinct cultural sensitivities these evoke. Collective mem-
ories and cultural  trauma— for example, those pertaining to war and 
mass  violence— and associated national identities take country-specific 
shape (Savelsberg and King 2005, 2011). In addition, civil society is 
more easily mobilized in some countries such as the United States, with 
its strong tradition of associational life and prominence of single-issue 
groups, but slower to move to action in others with more neocorporat-
ist arrangements (Kalberg 2014). Also the organization of news media 
varies. Market-driven media, as compared to publically funded ones, 
are more receptive to societal sentiments and prone to sensationalist 
reporting (Benson 2013), for which the United States provides a good 
example. In addition, government institutions are more or less open to 
civil society input. And here too the boundary between civil society and 
the state is more porous in the United States than in other Western de-
mocracies, as a long line of sociological work has shown (Bendix [1949] 
1974; Roth 1987; Rueschemeyer 1973; Kalberg 1994, 2014; Savelsberg 
and King 2005).
Interviewees at Amnesty were clearly sensitive to the state- and 
society-based contexts within which their sections have to operate, 
despite their frequent deference to the International Secretariat. They 
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know, for example, that their governments are more receptive if the 
issue at hand concerns a former colony, especially if the country hosts 
refugees and expatriate organizations from those former colonies. In 
the words of a respondent at the International Secretariat in London, an 
energetic person of French descent (from an overseas French province) 
who had earned a degree in political science and international relations 
at Science Po in Paris and in anthropology at the renowned School of 
Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) at the University of London:
I  think— obviously, because we are based  here— you know, we do have more 
regular access to UK diplomats, but I think I am also maybe more aware 
of the role that the UK plays on Sudan, on Darfur, because they played a 
very important role in the North-South peace process, [because] they are the 
former colonial power, and because of their seat at the Security Council. . . . 
[Y]ou will hear a lot more talking about Sudan and former British colonies 
in the UK. And if you are in France you will hear a lot more about Algeria, 
Morocco, Tunisia, etc., etc. . . . I think it is often because there is a lot of 
Sudanese refugees in the UK, there is a lot of refugees and migrants from 
North Africa in France. . . . [W]e have to try to take advantage of all this 
attention to try to push for our human rights agenda.
Two French Amnesty interviewees strongly confirmed the weight 
that status as a former colony has for their national government, and 
they drew conclusions for their strategizing. In the words of one:
The French section works a lot on African countries, and the old colonies 
of  France— because we know that France has the capacity again to influ-
ence these countries, because of the history of France and Africa and these 
countries. So, yes, we have a particular focus on francophone African 
countries. . . . [I]n Amnesty-France we have two researchers, who are based 
on the second floor, and they are specialists on western Africa.
Another country-specific feature Amnesty workers have to be mind-
ful of if they hope to communicate effectively with their governments, is 
the history and status of the country’s neutrality. Asked whether Swit-
zerland’s position vis-à-vis the Darfur conflict differs from that of other 
countries, an Amnesty staffer in Bern argued: “I think it barely does 
with regard to the evaluation of the Darfur conflict. In terms of prac-
tice, I’d say “yes,” first because Switzerland almost never, as a matter of 
principle, participates in UN peacekeeping missions. [JJS: No humani-
tarian interventions?] No, or if ever, just as an alibi, two, three officers 
or such” (author’s translation).
In addition to being sensitive to their government’s position when 
they launch campaigns, Amnesty respondents appear to be especially 
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attuned to their constituents’ sensitivities and motivational forces. A 
sense of historical obligation, for example, resulting from their country’s 
execution of the Holocaust, resonated from my interviews with German 
Amnesty staffers and volunteers alike. One volunteer, head of Amnesty-
Germany’s impunity group, illustrated this historically grounded sense 
of commitment well. She simultaneously indicated, though, that such 
commitment may be associated more with a leaning toward humanitar-
ian than toward penal responses to mass atrocities:
The churches are very much engaged in this respect, partially out of humani-
tarian concerns, but also with a view toward our own past, and the churches 
do have substantial influence in  Germany— still. This group I would name. 
And they just have strong roots in the bourgeois [bürgerliche] middle class-
es. . . . It’s more motivated by humanitarianism in Germany. Many people 
are engaged in humanitarian charities. I would always look at things from a 
criminal law perspective, but only few do so. Most see this as a humanitarian 
catastrophe with immense consequences. (author’s translation)
This statement suggests that carrier groups and the strong position of 
churches in Germany’s neocorporatist makeup influence the reception 
of the Darfur issue in that country. Another factor appears to be the in-
stitutionalization of the theme of genocide in German school curricula. 
The same interviewee spoke to the resulting responsiveness of the public 
to genocide issues by drawing on her own experiences:
I think many Germans easily understand, as genocide and our history are be-
ing taught in school. One is able to draw parallels quickly when one begins 
to engage with the conflict. I certainly experienced that with Rwanda. I was 
still young back then, but both Rwanda and Yugoslavia were prominently 
reported in the news media. . . . That was 1994 and I was fifteen years old, 
in tenth grade, so this was a topic [in school], also at home, and these two 
conflicts had a strong influence on me. (author’s translation)
Again, historical experiences and their processing into collective 
memory create public sensitivities that sections of INGOs such as Am-
nesty have to take seriously in order to act effectively toward their do-
mestic constituents. The foregoing interview segment illustrates further 
that it matters which organizations and carriers dominate in the pro-
cessing of history and in its application to current situations of mass 
violence. Needless to say, the respondent’s perception is not based on 
social science analysis. But what matters here is the perception of an 
Amnesty member and its potential to color her organization’s represen-
tation of the Darfur conflict.
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Related historical legacies create additional country-specific sensitivi-
ties that INGOs have to take seriously if they want to function effec-
tively in a given country. These include devastating experiences with 
aggressive militarism and their subsequent processing. Interviews with 
Amnesty staff in both Germany and Austria indicated that such experi-
ences have generated pacifist leanings, especially within those popula-
tion segments attracted to joining human rights organizations. And such 
leanings affect the discursive range available to their respective sections. 
A German Amnesty volunteer, head of the Sudan group, spoke to this 
point: “In 2006 we had the big issue here at Amnesty when the UN 
was supposed to receive a stronger mandate. . . . Then we had a major 
debate, especially here in Germany, because we have many Amnesty 
members from the peace movement, who rejected that, when the word 
intervention was articulated and intervention is always associated with 
the use of military force in the back of one’s mind” (author’s translation).
Another domestic force made itself known in my interviews, particu-
larly in my conversation with the secretary-general of Amnesty-Austria: 
the entanglement of a country’s industry in mass violence abroad, and 
the response that the discovery of such involvement evokes. In the Aus-
trian case it became a motivating factor, in the absence of which the 
section, small and thus selective by necessity, may not have addressed 
the Darfur conflict. The story began with an American journalist who 
found a brand-new Glock pistol, made by the renowned Austrian fire-
arms producer, in the hands of a Darfur rebel. The journalist noted the 
weapon’s serial number, and when Amnesty was informed, it began 
to question Glock and the Austrian government, “How can that get 
there?” the secretary-general recounted.
Darfur is a weapons embargo zone, for both the UN and the EU. There are 
of course millions of old weapons, hundreds of thousands of old weapons, 
but a recognizably brand new Glock pistol, for which you can still trace 
how the embargo was broken . . . That was a very tricky question, initially, 
and weapons’ trade is maddeningly difficult, it’s a very untransparent realm, 
where there is little transparency on the side of states: .  .  . “Dear Glock 
company, dear state of Austria, please explain to us how that got there. To 
whom did you sell this first, how did it move on from there, has it been sto-
len, sold on the back market?” (author’s translation)
Glock responded, irrationally in the judgment of my interviewee, 
by suing Amnesty as an organization and its secretary-general person-
ally. The criminal court process for defamation before the district court 
(Landgericht) was accompanied by a suit in trade court (Handelsgericht) 
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for damages amounting to 200,000–300,000 Euros. The trials, which 
the company eventually lost, lasted three years and attracted much pub-
licity. “And Glock tried all the time to insist that that is not possible,” 
the secretary-general continued,
because this pistol was exported to Kuwait and surely did not move on from 
there. Because they put so much pressure on us, we invested a lot of investi-
gatory energy and were thus able to prove that there is a hunting weapons, 
that is, a hunting safari, business in Kuwait, with a branch in Sudan, because 
Sudan is such an attractive hunting ground, and that safari participants were 
equipped with weapons, and that weapons can also be smuggled along this 
path. Having been put under such pressure, we thus invested much energy 
to trace the path and identified one of the, of course, thousands of weap-
ons trade and smuggling routes, where Glock certainly was not the smug-
gler, but knew full well why that little weapons trader in Kuwait was so 
interested in such large amounts. There was thus a purely accidental but 
intensive interest . . . in the human rights situation in Darfur. . . . Research, 
legal background, . . . also public issue raising, always more under the angle 
of weapons trade, but also to explain, of course, why this embargo is so 
important, because the human rights situation in Darfur is so catastrophic. 
(author’s translation)
In short, national sections of INGOs have to be mindful, first, of 
their domestic government’s priorities if they seek to affect govern-
ment policies and, second, of public sentiments if they hope to mobi-
lize followers and secure donations. While strongly oriented toward the 
International Secretariat, staff and volunteers at Amnesty’s national sec-
tions were mindful of specific domestic opportunities and constraints: 
the government’s power position in the international community (e.g., 
representation on the UNSC); colonial history and the representation 
of expatriate communities (e.g., the United Kingdom and Sudan); the 
section’s size (number and selectivity of issues addressed); links between 
local forces, such as industries, and actors in the conflict zone (e.g., the 
Austrian Glock story); collective memories and a resulting sense of obli-
gation (e.g., memories of the Holocaust and militarism in Germany and 
Austria); and dominant carrier groups (e.g., churches and humanitarian 
aid organizations in Germany). Amnesty-USA faces yet a different set of 
conditions, to which I turn shortly.
conclusions
The core of the justice field, especially the ICC, does not fend for it-
self in the pursuit of criminal justice. Establishing a criminalizing frame 
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through which to interpret the mass violence in Darfur is propelled by 
a variety of global and national forces in support of the justice cascade 
(Sikkink 2011). Prominent among global actors are INGOs (Keck and 
Sikkink 1998). My in-depth analysis of Amnesty International concern-
ing the case of Darfur illustrates this organization’s fight to end impu-
nity. Its narrative resembles that of actors in the criminal law and justice 
field. While Amnesty members also highlight goals such as the establish-
ment of peace and the survival of victims, interviews show how activ-
ists rationalize away potential conflicts between the latter goals and the 
pursuit of justice. They insist that justice, once achieved, will help reach 
other goals, or even that other goals cannot be reached if justice is not 
served. Such relative unanimity among my interviewees, despite distinct 
national backgrounds, supports the recent scholarly focus on global-
izing forces in the formation of norms and scripts and their potential 
effect on local and national practices, for example in research by the 
World Polity School (e.g., Meyer, Ramirez, and Soysal 1992; Frank, 
Hironaka, and Schofer 2000; Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2002).
Yet caution is warranted. Unanimity is only relative. The case of 
Amnesty shows  that— despite its hierarchical  organization— conditions 
within which national sections operate also matter. This finding is 
in line with recent literature about national contexts of INGO work 
(Stroup 2012), as well as a long tradition of neo-Weberian scholarship 
that focuses on nation-specific carrier groups and institutional arrange-
ments (Bendix [1949] 1974; Gorski 2003; Roth 1987; Rueschemeyer 
1973; Kalberg 1994, 2014; Savelsberg and King 2005). It is, finally, 
congruent with recent scholarship that shows how the spread of global 
norms is filtered through cultural specifics at the local level and through 
a country’s power position within the international community (Boyle 
2002; Halliday and Carruthers 2010). Interviews make clear that Am-
nesty workers within national sections are aware of their government’s 
traditions, interests, and policy foci when they seek to influence govern-
ment policies. They are also mindful of nation-specific cultural sensi-
tivities and business interests (as in the Austrian Glock case) when they 
mobilize volunteers and the public and raise funds. Such mindfulness in 
fact is a precondition for effective work at the local and national levels, 
even among international NGOs.
My interview with an American Amnesty activist about her orga-
nization’s functioning in the context of the Save Darfur campaign es-
pecially illustrates how Amnesty volunteers, despite the organization’s 
centralized organization, adapt to national environments through 
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organizational and linguistic strategies. This adaptability may be con-
sidered a strength or a weakness. In the case of Amnesty it certainly did 
not weaken the INGO’s unifying message as represented in official out-
lets such as Amnesty-USA websites. These observations should in any 
case direct our attention to ways in which national sections of INGOs 
are embedded in and interact with other civil society and government 
actors in specific national contexts. The United States provides an excel-
lent example in the context of the justice field, as it eventually became 
a strong supporter of a rights-oriented criminal justice response to the 
violence in Darfur, despite its objections to the ICC. How did this seem-
ing paradox become possible? The following chapter seeks to provide 
an answer.
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In addition to civil society groups, and often tightly interwoven with 
them, state actors contributed to raising awareness of the mass violence 
in Darfur and contributed to its representation as human rights crimes. 
One interviewee from a large European country had worked for his 
foreign ministry’s human rights division and represented his country on 
the ICC’s Assembly of States during the period when the UN Security 
Council referred the Darfur situation to the court. A lawyer by train-
ing, he strongly stressed the primacy of human rights concerns ahead of 
other goals: “You need to give them justice, and once they have the feel 
that justice, more or less, is taken care of, then I think you can create 
within such a society a willingness to overcome postconflict and enter a 
new phase of peace building.”
This chapter, on state actors and their linkages to civil society in 
the human rights field, highlights the case of the United  States— among 
the countries considered here, the most pronounced supporter of a 
criminalizing response and a strong proponent of the application of the 
genocide label. After a brief review of the US Save Darfur campaign, 
a massive mobilization of civil society organizations, I look at Ameri-
can media representations (outliers in international comparison) and 
discuss government responses. Those responses show how a state–civil 
society amalgam emerged and made itself unmistakably heard with its 
intense pursuit of criminalizing definitions of the violence in Darfur. 
chapter 3
 American Mobilization and the 
Justice Cascade
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The American story is particularly interesting as the United States has 
never ratified the Rome Statute and generally keeps a critical distance 
from the ICC. William Schabas (2004) in fact writes about “United 
States hostility to the International Criminal Court” (see also Deitelhoff 
2009). Specifically with regard to Darfur, the United States initially dis-
played considerable resistance against a referral of the Darfur situation 
to the ICC. Yet, in a surprising and quite radical turn, it eventually 
embraced a criminalizing strategy and abstained from the UNSC vote 
on Resolution 1593, thereby allowing the case of Darfur to be referred 
to the ICC. According to the Security Council minutes:
anne woods patterson (United States) said her country strongly support-
ed bringing to justice those responsible for the crimes and atrocities that had 
occurred in Darfur and ending the climate of impunity there. Violators of 
international humanitarian law and human rights law must be held account-
able. Justice must be served in Darfur. By adopting today’s resolution, the 
international community had established an accountability mechanism for 
the perpetrators of crimes and atrocities in Darfur. The resolution would 
refer the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for 
investigation and prosecution. While the United States believed that a better 
mechanism would have been a hybrid tribunal in Africa, it was important 
that the international community spoke with one voice in order to help pro-
mote effective accountability.1
I ask why the US government eventually aligned with a strong civil 
society movement, despite its refusal to ratify the Rome Statute. In the 
end, civil society, the federal government, and media alike were interna-
tional outliers in their determination to articulate the story of Darfur as 
one of  criminal— in fact,  genocidal— violence. A closer look at represen-
tations that emerged from these American discourses sheds additional 
light on the nation-specific conditions that color representations of mass 
atrocities. They include the peculiarities of US civil society, the organi-
zation of government in the United States, and its media market. Based 
on interviews and media data, we shall also see, as we did in chapter 2, 
that the institutional logic of law still colors representations of mass 
violence at the periphery of the legal field, albeit in a weakened form 
compared to that applied at the center. Toward the end of this chapter, 
in a brief excursus, I examine how the US section of an international 
rights–based NGO, again Amnesty International, maneuvers within a 
highly mobilized civil society environment, dominated by Save Darfur, 
with which it disagreed on a number of positions. What organizational 
and linguistic strategies did it use to act effectively in this context?
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the save darfur movement in the united states
The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum took the lead in the 
American civil society movement when, in January 2004, it issued a 
genocide alert on the situation in Darfur. The first, widely publicized 
media pronouncements articulating the plight of the people of Darfur 
for a broad public soon followed. Eric Reeves, an English professor 
at Smith College and one of the leading individual problem entrepre-
neurs on Darfur, had his famous, trendsetting op-ed published in the 
Washington Post on February 24, 2004, following rejections of previ-
ous submissions. One month later, on March 24, the New York Times 
followed with an op-ed by Nicholas Kristof, the first in a series of his 
contributions on Darfur. A wave of other opinion pieces followed. 
Deborah Murphy (2007), in counting editorial responses to Darfur by 
select (prominent) US media in 2004, identifies twelve in April, eight 
in May, nine in June, sixteen in July, fifteen in August, and nineteen in 
September.
Following the USHMM’s January 2004 genocide alert, the first 
op-ed pieces, and UN secretary-general Kofi Annan’s April 2004 speech 
on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, a 
massive wave of civil society activism unfolded in the United States. It 
partly preceded, but also accompanied and followed, formal interven-
tions by the UN and the ICC. Most noteworthy, the period between 
June 2004 and July 2005 witnessed the founding of the Save Darfur 
Coalition, which eventually brought together almost two hundred or-
ganizational members under its umbrella. Prominent among the great 
variety of groups were Christian evangelical groups, including Christian 
Solidarity International (CSI), that represented an important constitu-
ent bloc for then-president George W. Bush. These conservative groups 
and churches formed a rare coalition with liberal organizations such 
as the American Jewish World Service (AJWS); various specialized or-
ganizations, including the USHMM and Africa Action, a Washington, 
DC–based NGO; and mainstream human rights organizations such as 
Amnesty-USA.
Preceding and advancing the constitution of the Save Darfur coalition, 
the USHMM organized a July 2004 conference at the City University 
of New York. There Holocaust survivor and Nobel Peace Prize laure-
ate Eli Wiesel delivered a forceful speech in which he linked the violence 
in Darfur to the Rwandan genocide. The wave of activism was further 
spurred by the release of the film Hotel Rwanda in September 2004, 
86  |  Justice versus Impunity
which by depicting the Rwandan genocide in Hollywood fashion, 
helped explicate it for a broad public. About one year after the sec-
ond peak of the violence in Darfur, in April 2005, Harvard’s John F. 
Kennedy School of Public Policy hosted a largely student-led event on 
divestment from Sudan. One year later some fifty thousand people 
gathered on the National Mall in Washington, DC, for an impressive 
demonstration under the title “Save Darfur: Rally to Stop Genocide.” 
Speakers included Barack Obama, Elie Wiesel, Nancy Pelosi, and celeb-
rities such as George Clooney. Speakers and demonstrators demanded 
a UN peacekeeping force, better humanitarian access to refugees, adhe-
sion to existing treaties and cease-fire agreements, and a commitment 
to a lasting peace agreement in the Abuja peace talks. Importantly, they 
also called for justice to be delivered (see figures 6 and 7). Along the 
way, activists sought to exert direct influence on the political process, 
as when Save Darfur leaders met with Deputy Secretary of State Robert 
Zoellick and organized a “National Call-in Day” on Darfur. And civil 
society organizations found strong resonance, and reinforcement, in the 
way American media covered Darfur.
figure 6. Save Darfur demonstration in Washington, DC.
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darfur in us media
The New York Times and the Wall Street Journal are among America’s 
most prestigious print media; both are mainstream, though the for-
mer occupies the left-liberal and the latter the conservative end of the 
political spectrum. Neither the presidential administration nor Con-
gress would be ignorant of positions taken by these papers. While 
a more detailed analysis of media is presented in chapters 8 and 9, 
I here highlight patterns that speak to the special role that US media 
played, in comparison to media elsewhere in the world, to generate 
a criminalizing account of the situation in Darfur. Numerous arti-
cles and commentaries appeared between 2003 and 2010 in both the 
New York Times and the Wall Street Journal. They acknowledged 
the suffering in Darfur, contributed to framing the violence, and built 
bridges to past mass atrocities (for details on analytic strategies see the 
introduction).
Acknowledgment
American media are more likely than those in the other seven countries 
in the comparison group to acknowledge most forms of victimization. 
figure 7. Save Darfur demonstration in Washington, DC.
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This applies to all media documents, somewhat to news articles or 
reports, and decidedly to opinion pieces.2 Consider the reporting of kill-
ings (analyzed separately from natural deaths), of rapes, and of dis-
placements in Darfur. Figure 8 (A–C) shows that the likelihood that 
American media reports informed readers of killings and, especially, 
rapes was substantially higher than that for media reports from outside 
the United States. The same applies, even more strongly, to opinion 
pieces. Only for displacements do we find only minor differences, par-
tially even a reversal of the pattern observed for the other types of vic-
timization. This should not be surprising as addressing displacements is 
more in line with a humanitarian emergency and aid frame, as I show 
in detail in chapter 5.3
Framing
Framing, more than acknowledgment, is an interpretive endeavor. 
Where we find substantial variation in terms of acknowledgment of vic-
timization and suffering, we might expect a wider range in the framing 
of violence. As in the interviews I conducted, the coding scheme for the 
analysis of media reports asked about different frames, the presence or 
absence of which in the articles were to be noted. Frames included re-
bellion or insurgency, humanitarian emergency, civil war, and criminal 
violence. Here I report only on the last-named frame as I am concerned 
with the criminalizing discourse on Darfur.
Figure 9.A shows that US media used the crime frame more often 
than those of other countries. Yet the difference is remarkable only for 
opinion pieces. There, where normative and value-based statements are 
expected, almost 60 percent of editorialists in all papers used the crime 
frame, whereas about three-quarters of opinion pieces in American 
media did so. The difference becomes more pronounced for the use 
of the genocide frame (figure 9.B). While US news reports cited the 
genocide frame more frequently, the difference more than doubled for 
opinion pieces.4
Bridging
In addition to frame selection, another way of making sense of news 
events that we otherwise cannot yet interpret is the strategy of bridging. 
Journalists cite past occurrences on which interpretive clarity has been 
reached and use them to shed light on current-day events. In the context 
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figure 8. Percentage of US media documents that address killings, rapes, and displace-
ments, compared to all other media documents.
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figure 9. Percentage of US media documents citing the crime frame, using the geno-
cide label, and bridging to the Holocaust, compared to all other media documents.
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of genocide, the most powerful reference is to the Holocaust. Figure 9.C 
shows the percentage of news articles that built analogical bridges from 
the Holocaust to the violence in Darfur. The introduction offers an espe-
cially powerful example from the op-ed pieces of renowned New York 
Times journalist Nicholas Kristof, who used terms such as Lebensraum 
and final solution. The numbers presented here show that the likelihood 
that journalists would cite or make such comparisons was more than 
one-third higher in American news reports than in those from other 
countries and more than twice as high in opinion pieces.5 Here we see 
a strong affinity between frames chosen by American movements fo-
cused on Darfur and representations in American media. This linkage 
between civil society movements and media representations is likely to 
be enhanced by the relative competitiveness of the US media market 
(Benson 2013). Under such conditions media organizations keep their 
eyes on and ears attuned to sentiments of those publics they target as 
customers. Irrespective of such causal issues, however, data show that 
American civil society and media were major promoters within the 
 international community of criminalizing the violence in Darfur.
united states government
Given the strength of the Save Darfur movement in the United States, 
and the substantial support social movements received from media re-
porting, the US government found itself in a peculiar position within 
the international community. On the one hand, it had declined to ratify 
the Rome Statute and in fact fought the creation of the ICC; to this 
extent, its position to enhance criminal justice intervention against Dar-
furi actors was weakened. On the other hand, the United States tends 
to embrace criminalizing frames, domestically and in cases of foreign 
atrocities, and it was under massive civil society pressure to do so. How 
did it respond?
Different branches of the US government were certainly receptive to 
the Darfur-focused movement, which included groups in American so-
ciety ranging from very conservative to very liberal. The movement was 
predominantly white, but included passionate involvement of African 
Americans who identified with those seen as victims of the violence: 
black Africans. It was thus no surprise when, on June 24, 2004, Repre-
sentative Donald Payne, Democrat and leading member of the Congres-
sional Black Caucus, joined forces with conservative Republican senator 
Sam Brownback to introduce a resolution into their respective chambers 
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of Congress. Barely a month later, on July 22, 2004, the House and 
Senate simultaneously passed a resolution declaring that genocide was 
occurring in Darfur. In the meantime, on June 30, 2004, Secretary of 
State Colin Powell returned to Washington from Khartoum, declaring 
the he did not have the information needed to decide whether the vio-
lence constituted genocide. Simultaneously, however, he commissioned 
a survey to be conducted among Darfuri refugees in camps in Chad, just 
beyond the border of Sudan and Darfur, to gather appropriate informa-
tion. A basic analysis of this “Atrocities Documentation Survey,” with 
1,136 respondents, helped change Powell’s position. In a famous hearing 
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on September 9, 2004, 
he declared that responses to the survey indicated:
first, a consistent and widespread pattern of atrocities: killings, rapes, burn-
ing of villages committed by Jingaweit [sic] and government forces against 
non-Arab villagers; second, three-fourths of those interviewed reported that 
the Sudanese military forces were involved in the attacks; third, villages 
often experienced multiple attacks over a prolonged period before they were 
destroyed by burning, shelling or bombing, making it impossible for the vil-
lagers to return to their villages. This was a coordinated effort, not just ran-
dom violence. When we reviewed the evidence, . . . I concluded that genocide 
has been committed in Darfur and that the Government of Sudan and the 
Jingaweit bear responsibility. . . . We believe the evidence corroborates the 
specific intent of the perpetrators to destroy ‘a group in whole and in part,’ 
the words of the [Genocide] Convention.6
A few weeks after Secretary Powell’s testimony, President Bush himself 
declared, in a speech to the UN General Assembly, that genocide was 
part of the pattern of violence in Darfur.
The US government’s rhetoric both followed and promoted the 
American movement that pushed for intervention in Darfur, for label-
ing the violence genocide, and for criminal prosecution of those respon-
sible. It thus became a player in the field that placed Darfur in the justice 
cascade. Again, this is remarkable given the US stance regarding the 
Rome Statute, on which the ICC is based, the very court to which the 
UNSC referred the Darfur case. The United States allowed the referral 
to go forward, despite its objections to the ICC, by abstaining from the 
vote (together with Algeria, Brazil, and China). Actions of the US gov-
ernment were considerably more cautious, however, than its rhetoric. 
They included, at the UN, sponsorship of the resolution that created the 
Commission of Inquiry; support, on August 31, 2006, for a new UN 
peacekeeping force for Darfur;  and— domestically—President Bush’s 
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signing into law the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act on 
December 31, 2007. This law authorizes local and state governments to 
divest from Sudan, and excludes companies from federal contracts that 
operate in Sudan’s military, minerals, and oil sectors.7
Among the countries I examined, the society-government amalgam 
in the United States turns out, in cross-national comparison, to have 
been the strongest force for promoting a crime-focused representation 
of the Darfur conflict. Specifically, the American narrative privileged 
the most dramatic depiction of the violence, and its characterization as 
genocidal, much more than civil societies or governments did in other 
countries. Three questions arise. Why this forceful amalgam in the case 
of the United States? Why such as strong movement specifically con-
cerning Darfur? And why did strong representation not translate, in 
this case, into similarly forceful government action? While I return to 
country-specific patterns of foreign policy and diplomacy in detail in 
chapter 7, a brief paragraph on each of these questions is in order here.
First, reasons for the close correspondence between civil society and 
government rhetoric lie in the nature of American institutions. The 
boundary between state and society is particularly porous in the United 
States (Bendix [1949] 1974; Gorski 2003; Roth 1987; Rueschemeyer 
1973; Kalberg 2014; Savelsberg and King 2005). Candidates for legisla-
tive office are selected via popular vote in primary elections; the head of 
the executive branch is elected in a general election; and even many of-
ficeholders in the judiciary branch are elected. As a consequence, wher-
ever strong mobilization occurs among civil society groups, especially 
among constituents of the current administration, the administration 
and the Congress are likely to be attentive to their demands. And ex-
actly this situation occurred in the case in Darfur. Also the role of media 
(as a branch of civil society) in the United States is exceptional. Journal-
ism scholarship applies the term media-politics complex to the US, al-
luding to especially close ties between media and politics; these scholars 
stress that “the experiences of other countries have been significantly 
different from the experience of the United States” (Mazzoleni and 
Schulz 1999:258). In addition, news media are driven more strongly 
by competitive pressures in the US than elsewhere (Benson 2013). Con-
sequently, they seek alignment with market forces and target groups. 
A strong civil society movement, encompassing several sectors of soci-
ety and including a diverse ideological spectrum, is thus likely to leave 
its traces in media  reporting— and especially media  commentary— and 
government actors better listen up or pay a political price.
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Second, the strong American mobilization specifically in the Darfur 
case is remarkable. Such a response can never be taken for granted when 
genocide or other mass atrocities occur (Power 2002). In this particular 
case, however, it resulted from a combination of forces. First among 
them was the strong representation issuing from specific carrier groups, 
the crucial contributors to national patterns of knowledge formation to 
which Max Weber (2009) and Karl Mannheim (1952) alert us in their 
classic works (see also Kalberg 1994). In the American Darfur mobili-
zation, influential carrier groups included, first, conservative evangeli-
cal Christians, a highly mobilized and well-represented constituency for 
President Bush. Evangelicals had been most active in missionary work 
in the southern part of Sudan (today South Sudan) when they learned 
about mass violence in Darfur. When the violence was initially mis-
represented as perpetrated by Arabs against Christians, these religious 
groups spoke up, and the Bush administration listened. Second, once 
the specter of genocide was raised, Jewish groups became engaged in 
the cause of Darfur. The USHMM and the AJWS played crucial roles. 
Further, once victims of the conflict were identified as black, African 
Americans and the Congressional Black Caucus mobilized. Finally, as 
public representations now depicted “Arabs” or “Muslims” as perpe-
trators, it was easy for broad segments of post–September 11 American 
society having anti-Arab or anti-Muslim sentiments to sympathize with 
the message of the Save Darfur movement. Such mobilization of carrier 
groups on behalf of Darfur interacted with particular cultural features 
of US society: a preference for black-and-white depictions of conflicts 
and an associated punitive orientation toward perpetrators (Whitman 
2005), a savior identity in world affairs (Savelsberg and King 2011), 
and a dominant progressive narrative (Alexander 2004a). Thus, the 
availability of mobilized, well-organized carrier groups and a conglom-
erate of cultural features (explored in previous scholarship) help explain 
the amalgam of forceful state-society representations of mass violence 
in the case of Darfur as we observed it for the United States.
Third, there were multiple reasons why the US government, despite 
intense American rhetoric, did not more aggressively pursue the case of 
Darfur in its actions. These factors include, first, the growing skepticism 
toward military engagement abroad that began to grow among the Amer-
ican public after the costly and much debated interventions in Afghani-
stan and especially Iraq. Government actors were also concerned with the 
country’s increasingly thin-stretched military capacities. In addition, the 
US government sought cooperation from the Sudanese government in its 
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fight against al Qaida terrorism. To secure such cooperation, it was even 
willing to temporarily downgrade its rhetoric and lower its estimates of 
the death toll in Darfur as Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2008) show. 
The American administration had also been a strong force in the Com-
prehensive Peace Agreement between North and South Sudan, and many 
diplomats likely saw cooperation on the part of the al-Bashir regime as 
a necessary condition for its implementation. Finally, social movements 
can at times be easily pacified by symbolic government actions, such as 
those the US administration and Congress delivered.
excursus: amnesty and save  darfur— strategies 
of global actors in national contexts
Within the massive Save Darfur movement, Amnesty-USA had to find 
its place without disconnecting from the principles of the international 
organization, its many other national sections, and its headquarters in 
London. My interview with an American Amnesty activist, volunteer, 
and coordinator of the US Darfur campaign, revealed organizational 
and linguistic strategies that helped the national section navigate be-
tween its international obligations and its domestic environment:
Amnesty International wanted a Darfur coordinator. . . . I volunteered to do 
this, but I recognized that there was a lot more with this than report to the 
group what Amnesty was doing and have them sign letters. I saw what the 
interests were of the group members. Somebody was very interested in vio-
lence against women, so I connected that [Darfur] to violence against women 
in armed conflict. . . . I created a yearlong panel series on violence against 
women in armed conflicts. . . . And it was very successful. I got funding from 
Amnesty. This was all as a volunteer.
In addition to strategies to broaden the campaign and bring it in 
line with diverse strains of American civil society engagement, Amnesty 
activists had to manage divergences between Save Darfur and Amnesty-
USA strategies. One example is Save Darfur’s demands for divestment, 
a method Amnesty did not support. One interviewee described organi-
zational strategies to circumvent such conflict: “I saw an opportunity 
to marry two strains of activism, to keep Amnesty current and to bring 
people into the fold that wanted to work with Amnesty but couldn’t 
because they supported divestment and Amnesty didn’t. So I created an 
economic activism campaign, centered on the oil industry. So that way, 
people who wanted to do Amnesty, and who were interested in divest-
ment . . . could do stock- and stakeholder engagement. It gave them a 
way to try to impact the oil industry.”
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Such organizational inventiveness, a skilled effort to maneuver be-
tween American activism and international, centralized Amnesty, is 
supplemented by linguistic strategies. Again, a conflict had to be re-
solved, in this case conflict over language. The Save Darfur movement 
insisted on calling the violence in Darfur genocide, a position Amnesty 
rejected. In the words of the volunteer interviewee: “I had to work with 
a lot of people who thought we should . . . call it a genocide. I spoke to 
a lot of groups, gave a lot of talks. And I would always say, whether you 
call it genocide or crimes against humanity, we know there were mass 
atrocities, and that the government is targeting its own civilians. And 
whatever we want to call it, the response is the same.”
Working in the context of the larger US movement, Amnesty ac-
tivists thus became organizationally and linguistically innovative. This 
allowed them to operate effectively in the United  States— another illus-
tration of the fact that national conditions matter even within INGOs, 
and an observation in support of Stroup’s (2012) findings about the 
weight of national contexts in INGO work.8 But these adaptive strate-
gies also show that contradictions between international and national 
positions can be managed. It also matters, of course, that Amnesty-
USA is Amnesty’s largest national section. Activists are aware of the 
fact that Amnesty-USA’s size provides them with strength within the 
larger organization despite the formal leadership of the International 
Secretariat. “Well, the US section is the largest,” one respondent said. 
“I was in Amsterdam for a meeting of different sections that were work-
ing on Sudan. And I was learning that European sections were coming 
to the US website and using our materials. . . . The reason I bring this 
up is that the US section was driving more of the Darfur campaign. We 
wanted more. We wanted to be doing more. We wanted to push the en-
velope. [JJS: “More than the International Secretariat?”] Yeah. Yeah.” 
This comment is significant as it illustrates how activists within a na-
tional section do not just have to engage in organizational and linguistic 
maneuvers between contending forces in their home country, vis-à-vis 
the discipline demanded by their international headquarters. To bridge 
the gap, they may actually seek to pull the INGO over to their national 
campaign strategy, at least when representing a powerful country such 
as the United States. And yet the effect of such strategies is limited. 
National sections continue to be bound by the organization’s agenda as 
defined, in the case of Amnesty, by the International Secretariat.
Interested in the effects this tug-of-war between national movements 
and INGOs has on the representation of Darfur, I worked with two stu-
dents at the University of Minnesota, Meghan Zacher and Hollie Nyseth 
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Brehm, to analyze the websites of Save Darfur and Amnesty-USA.9 
Methodological and substantive details of this study are reported else-
where (Zacher, Nyseth Brehm, and Savelsberg 2014; see also note 4);10 
a summary of findings suffices here. Our analysis of websites shows 
that representations of the Darfur conflict, as part of a broad-based 
American civil society campaign, did differ between Amnesty-USA and 
Save Darfur. Amnesty’s website engaged in a more detailed depiction 
of different types of victimization. The pages displayed rapes much 
more frequently than Save Darfur and, somewhat more often, killings 
and the destruction of livelihood through looting, burning villages and 
crops, and poisoning water sources. Amnesty webpages also referred 
more often to categories of international criminal law, depicting the 
violence as a violation of international humanitarian law and human 
rights. Save Darfur web entries, on the other hand, used simpler and 
more dramatic vocabulary. Instead of specifying types of crimes, they 
more often simply referred to what had occurred as “criminal violence” 
(85% compared to Amnesty’s 31%). Most important, while Amnesty-
USA web entries almost completely avoid reference to genocide, in line 
with the international organization’s policy, Save Darfur  sites— in line 
with the central message of the  campaign— insist on calling the violence 
just that: genocide (more than 70% of all Save Darfur entries).
In one respect, however, Amnesty-USA (in line with the International 
Secretariat’s policy) and Save Darfur agree. Both urge interventions by 
the ICC. Even if such support is explicated somewhat more frequently 
on Save Darfur sites (35%), it certainly appears prominently on Am-
nesty-USA sites as well (25%). On February 1, 2005, after the delivery 
of the Commission of Inquiry report to the UN Security Council, ex-
ecutive director of Amnesty-USA Dr. William F. Schulz was quoted as 
saying: “Given the scale and sheer horror of the human rights abuses 
in Darfur, anything less than immediate action on the report’s find-
ings would be a travesty for the people of Darfur. The International 
Criminal Court should be given jurisdiction to prosecute war crimes 
and crimes against humanity that have taken place in Sudan.”11 In the 
United States such a demand is backed by Save Darfur, the movement 
within which Amnesty-USA was one among almost two hundred con-
stituent organizations. For instance, in an article written on April 27, 
2007, the day on which an arrest warrant was issued against Ahmed 
Harun and Ali Kushayb, two leading perpetrators in Darfur, Save 
Darfur’s executive director stated, “We welcome the ICC’s continued 
efforts to ensure accountability for the genocide in Darfur. This im-
portant step by the court sends yet another message to the government 
98  |  Justice versus Impunity
figure 10. Naomi Natale’s artistic rendering of genocidal violence, mounted by the 
One Million Bones project in Washington, DC, June 2013. This photo appeared on Save 
Darfur’s website.
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of Sudan that the international community will bring to justice those 
responsible for these horrendous crimes.”12 Clear statements were 
accompanied by massive demonstrations and demands for justice. They 
also spurred artistic depictions, which appeared on the websites of 
movement organizations (see figure 10).
In short, while interview statements illustrate how activists of na-
tional sections of INGOs (here Amnesty-USA) seek to build organi-
zational and linguistic bridges to domestic political movements (Save 
Darfur in our case), public representations of massive violence as dis-
played on websites of the national section remain distinct from national 
contexts and in line with the INGO’s central policies. With regard to 
the perceived necessity of ICC interventions, however, both organiza-
tions agree: they strongly advocate criminal justice intervention by the 
International Criminal Court against those responsible for the mass 
violence in Darfur. In their general assessment of the  situation— as a 
campaign of criminal, indeed genocidal, violence or as war crimes and 
crimes against humanity  respectively— and in the conclusions drawn for 
judicial intervention, NGOs in the United States aligned closely with 
other segments of American civil society, as our media analysis docu-
mented. And they shaped the rhetoric of the US government.
conclusions regarding the periphery of the 
Justice field
Clearly, in the United States, civil society and government stood out 
in international comparison as both sought to advance a criminaliz-
ing frame for Darfur and a definition of the violence as genocide. This 
does not mean, as we have seen, that rhetoric necessarily translates into 
action. Obviously the Clinton administration was mistaken when it 
refused to identify the 1994 violence in Rwanda as genocide, fearing 
that such a label would necessarily prompt military intervention. The 
George W. Bush administration proved this assumption wrong in the 
case of Darfur. It spoke loudly about genocide but refused to intervene 
decisively. Further, despite the rather forceful mobilization and rhetoric 
in the Darfur case, the world cannot always rely on the United States 
and American civil society when mass atrocities are being committed. 
As discussed above, the American response to Darfur was character-
ized by a particular constellation of societal and cultural conditions. 
It contrasts with the silence shown in many other cases, such as the 
long-lasting lack of public and governmental attention to the long and 
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painful history of the Democratic Republic of Congo with its fractured 
lines of conflict. More extreme are cases, such as those in Guatemala, 
in which American civil society long failed to react to massive human 
rights violations and genocidal violence abroad despite the US govern-
ment’s own contributions to their execution.
Despite noting gaps between rhetoric and practice, and even instances 
of massive cynicism, this chapter shares one essential finding with the 
preceding ones. It shows how the entire justice field, both core and 
periphery, including international judicial institutions, rights-oriented 
INGOs, civil society movements, and supportive governments, contrib-
utes to a representation of the mass violence of Darfur that deviates 
radically from those of comparable situations in past centuries and mil-
lennia. The emerging narrative depicts those responsible for mass vio-
lence as criminal perpetrators and their actions as crimes. This narrative 
has moved us far from eras in which leaders of violent campaigns were 
celebrated as heroes (Giesen 2004b). In addition, this new narrative and 
its construction across national boundaries opens the eyes of the public 
to the suffering of victims. It supports Jenness’s (2004:160) contention 
that criminalization processes in late modernity reflect an “institution-
alization that involves the diffusion of social forms and practices across 
polities comprising an interstate system.” In Darfur and in other cases 
like it, global actors, here especially the UNSC and the ICC, play a cen-
tral role in this diffusion process.
Finally, the justice narrative has at least the potential of ingraining 
in the global collective conscience the notion of mass violence as evil, 
through a process described in recent work on collective memory (Bass 
2000; Osiel 1997; Levy and Sznaider 2010) and its classical predeces-
sors (Durkheim [1912] 2001; Halbwachs 1992). That representations 
of mass violence adapt to national context may be considered a dis-
advantage by some; others may regard it as advantageous, as global 
movements always concretize in local contexts, succeeding only if they 
adjust to local conditions. The story of Amnesty International in the US 
context is a case in point. An earlier word of caution bears repeating, 
though. By creating criminalizing narratives, the justice field buys into 
the limits imposed by the institutional logic of the criminal law. The 
resulting account, neglecting structural conditions and historical roots, 
may be too limited a foundation for long-term policies that can prevent 
mass violence and genocide. Then again, the criminal justice field is 
not the only representational force. Its narrative faces other, conflicting 






The human rights field is not alone when it takes positions on mass 
violence. Other, often more powerful actors have vested interests in 
situations and places in which such violence occurs. Among them are 
national governments with geostrategic ambitions and corporations 
seeking profit. Since 2013, the blockade by at least one permanent 
member of the UN Security Council against decisive intervention in the 
Assad regime’s horrendous violence in Syria has provided a particu-
larly striking, but not at all uncommon, example. Accordingly, narra-
tives generated by governments and corporations frequently clash with 
human rights representations. At other times, these actors may use human 
rights rhetoric to disguise their pursuit of altogether different agendas.
In this and the following chapter I focus on just one potential com-
petitor the human rights field has to contend with in its struggle for 
binding representations of mass violence: humanitarian aid. This field 
has grown immensely in recent decades as budgets for humanitar-
ian relief, at US$2.1 billion in 1990 rose to US$12.9 billion in 2012 
(Krause 2014:3). I ask what representations this field contributes to the 
world’s understanding of Darfur, and how those representations relate 
to actions and representations proposed by the human rights sector. 
In Darfur, aid-oriented NGOs such as CARE (Cooperative for Assis-
tance and Relief Everywhere) and Oxfam (Oxford Committee for Fam-
ine Relief) were well represented. In the perhaps hyperbolic words of 
one interviewee, staff of a humanitarian aid INGO, Darfur is the story 
chapter 4
The Humanitarian Aid Field and 
Doctors Without Borders
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of the “largest-scale humanitarian intervention that the world has ever 
seen. . . . There were like ten thousand aid workers, like a thousand in-
ternational aid workers, which is unheard  of— in the Sudanese context, 
at least.”
In this chapter I provide an in-depth analysis of the role of one par-
ticular aid-oriented INGO, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF, or Doc-
tors Without Borders), in the representation of Darfur. In the following 
chapter, I examine the role of one country that shows great affinities 
with the humanitarian narrative. Just as the United States took that 
place in the context of the human rights narrative, Ireland played a com-
parable role with regard to humanitarian aid-colored representations.1
Humanitarian aid INGOs share all the features discussed regarding 
NGOs in chapter 2. They too are part of a global civil society, members 
of the transnational activist networks (TAN) that Keck and Sikkink 
(1998) discussed in their pathbreaking work, and contributors to global 
scripts, in the terms of the World Polity School (e.g., Meyer, Ramirez, 
and Soysal 1992; Frank, Hironaka, and Schofer 2000). And their con-
tributions reflect organizational interests, to which the constructivist 
tradition alerts us, just as they operate within national contexts, the 
impact of which Stroup (2012) spells out.
Yet, despite such commonalities with rights INGOs, humanitarian 
aid organizations occupy a distinct field. This field is engaged in a proj-
ect in which agencies provide relief for a market where donors are the 
consumers and the beneficiaries become “part of a commodity” (Krause 
2014:4). Simultaneously, the humanitarian field is exposed to a body 
of international law that rules humanitarian action and for which the 
Geneva Convention is but one example. The field is further governed 
by a set of nonlegal norms, among which impartiality toward the con-
flicting parties and commitment to the delivery of aid to civilians stand 
out. In terms of social actors, this field includes a range of humanitarian 
organizations that coordinate the distribution of  aid— and that do not 
typically interact with human rights NGOs. The social field of humani-
tarian NGOs almost always includes government actors from the very 
countries in which mass violence unfolds. These governments, their 
rulers, and front-line agents may in fact be accused by human rights 
NGOs for grave human rights violations and charged by international 
courts with human rights crimes. In the words of one of my interview-
ees who spoke about his work in Sudan: “I then was head of missions 
.  .  . in Sudan, based in Khartoum, which means more of the overall 
management of the humanitarian  projects— and their representation, 
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negotiation with the government and other actors. . . . You negotiate 
with representatives of the government in order to secure the delivery 
of services, to have permission to have international staff in Darfur, and 
for the particular services as well.”
In light of such particularities of the aid-oriented NGO field, and in 
line with Pierre Bourdieu’s arguments about the impact of the structure 
of fields on the knowledge of its participant actors, we should expect 
representations of mass violence to differ markedly between humani-
tarian aid and human rights INGOs. In particular, we should expect 
different definitions of the situation in Darfur, distinct narratives of the 
mass violence. We should also expect conflicts over appropriate repre-
sentations within the world of INGOs and within the TANs in which 
they are embedded.
Conflicts are likely aggravated by the distinct professional and oc-
cupational groups that dominate in human rights versus humanitarian 
aid fields. The dominant position of lawyers in the former and of physi-
cians and other aid workers in the latter will almost certainly intensify 
divergent perspectives.2 This expectation is supported by John Hagan, 
Heather Schoenfeld, and Alberto Palloni (2006) in their work on mor-
tality estimates in Darfur. They find massive differences in estimated 
mortality rates between public health researchers on the one hand and 
scholars representing a criminological perspective on the other. Esti-
mates by the latter are substantially higher, as they are not limited to 
deaths from problematic health conditions in refugee and displaced- 
person camps, but decidedly incorporate the number of deaths that 
directly result from violent acts in towns, villages, and the countryside. 
More generally, actors in the aid field are reluctant to use the crime 
frame and instead apply a language of “complex humanitarian emergen-
cies.” This assessment by Hagan, Schoenfeld, and Palloni is supported 
by patterns Alex de Waal (1997) identified in his  description— for 
 Africa— of a complex of humanitarian NGOs and relief agencies that 
often engage in a consequential “strategic embrace” with the very states 
that commit human rights crimes.
The following sections first provide a brief overview of the history 
and organization of MSF, an aid-oriented NGO, but one that distin-
guishes itself somewhat from other aid organizations by including in its 
mission the duty to bear witness. Both its commonality with other aid 
NGOs and its distinctiveness are reflected in the organization’s goals, 
the tensions within MSF, and especially, conflicts between MSF and 
other organizations. And both commonalities and distinctiveness color 
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the particular types of representations that emerge, the depiction of 
which constitutes the core of this chapter. I finally offer a brief compari-
son of representations by MSF-USA with those by two rights-oriented 
American NGOs, thus controlling for national context. Addressing the 
weight of national contexts more generally leads in chapter 5 to an 
analysis of Ireland, the most decidedly aid-oriented country among the 
eight countries under investigation.
the case of msf: principles, engagement in 
darfur, and representations
In 1971 a group of French physicians responded to the long-standing 
policy of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) not to 
publicize government abuses of civilian populations in order to secure 
access to the field and to allow for the delivery of aid. Providing aid had, 
after all, been the ICRC’s primary purpose for a century, and with its 
policies the Red Cross paid its dues to a field in which violent regimes 
always had to be accounted for. In this the ICRC, up to the present, 
resembles most closely the ideal type of aid-oriented NGO. The price to 
be paid for such neutrality became painfully clear on several occasions. 
One low point in the ICRC’s history was its 1944 visit and “inspection” 
of the Nazi concentration camp of Terezin in today’s Czech Republic, 
then in German-occupied Czechoslovakia. Instead of investigating the 
concentration camp system as a whole and publically displaying the 
inhumanity of the Nazi system, the ICRC allowed itself to be instru-
mentalized by the SS for legitimatory purposes. The ICRC visit at Ter-
ezin provided the Nazis with the opportunity to stage a model ghetto, 
carefully prepared for the occasion with clean facilities, cultural events, 
and cheering crowds at soccer matches. After World War II, the Red 
Cross stuck to its definition of neutrality by insisting on the delivery 
of medical and aid services to suffering populations, even if that meant 
keeping quiet about the horrors governments imposed on peoples under 
their rule.3
It was during the murderous 1967–1970 civil war in Biafra in south-
eastern Nigeria that resistance against the dominant policy of silence 
emerged from within the ICRC. A small group of young French physi-
cians, clinicians, and nurses, many of them leftist activists of the 1960s, 
had signed up to conduct medical work in this war-torn region of Nige-
ria. Resenting the ICRC’s restrictions on publicizing atrocities and its in-
sistence on maintaining neutrality, they joined together with journalists 
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to work toward an alternative form of organizing and engaging in aid 
delivery. According to MSF’s self-presentation of its origins:
[Max] Recamier and [Bernard] Kouchner [members of the French group of 
physicians in Biafra] believed the world needed to know about the events 
they were witnessing: civilians being murdered and starved by blockading 
forces. They openly criticized the Nigerian government and the Red Cross 
for their seemingly complicit behavior. In the following three years, oth-
er doctors began to speak up. These doctors, or “Biafrans,” as they were 
known, began to lay the foundations for a new and questioning form of 
humanitarianism that would ignore political or religious boundaries and pri-
oritize the welfare of those suffering.4
Consequently, in December 1971 this group of physicians founded 
a new organization, Médecins Sans Frontières. MSF initially consisted 
of a rather loosely organized group of some three hundred volunteers, 
doctors, nurses, and other staff who were willing to simultaneously risk 
their lives in dangerous settings in order to provide medical help and 
bear witness to the horrors they observed. In subsequent years the orga-
nization became increasingly professionalized, especially after a formal 
decision to do so in 1979.5 For twelve years after this fateful decision, 
MSF continued to grow under the presidency of Rony Brauman. Ac-
cording to its 2014 website, since 1980 it has opened “offices in 28 
countries and employs more than 30,000 people across the world. Since 
its founding, MSF has treated over a hundred million  patients— with 8.3 
million outpatient consultations carried out in 2012 alone.”6 In 1999 
the organization was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Clearly, MSF had 
grown to become one of the world’s most prominent humanitarian aid 
NGOs.
Internationalization accompanied formalization and professionaliza-
tion. MSF grew beyond its country of origin to mutate into an INGO. 
Returning MSF volunteers began opening chapters in their home coun-
tries, specifically in Belgium, Holland, Spain, and Switzerland. While 
these (operational) sections today run programs around the globe, sec-
tions in many other countries engage in the recruitment of volunteers 
and in fund-raising.7 An international secretariat, MSF International, 
links these sections and coordinates their activity. And, while each sec-
tion enjoys a substantial degree of autonomy, Stroup (2012), in her 
study on borders among activists, nevertheless finds that the entire or-
ganization is shaped by organizational principles that reflect its origins. 
Like other French NGOs, MSF is almost entirely funded by private do-
nations (about half from France). It maintains a relatively low degree 
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of professionalization, despite the changes of the 1980s and follow-
ing decades, compared to other humanitarian NGOs such as CARE or 
Oxfam. Volunteers provide much of the work in section offices and in 
the field alike. And MSF displays a preference for outsider advocacy 
(movement protest strategies), rather than direct communication with 
government officials. The national origin of the founding organization 
thus continues to matter after its mutation into an INGO.
Guiding Principles, Goals, and Conflicts
Members of all MSF sections subscribe to the organization’s guiding 
principles, enunciated on its website:
Médecins Sans Frontières provides assistance to populations in distress, to 
victims of natural or man-made disasters and to victims of armed conflict. 
They do so irrespective of race, religion, creed or political convictions. Mé-
decins Sans Frontières observes neutrality and impartiality in the name of 
universal medical ethics and the right to humanitarian assistance and claims 
full and unhindered freedom in the exercise of its functions. Members un-
dertake to respect their professional code of ethics and to maintain complete 
independence from all political, economic, or religious powers.8
Clearly, the delivery of aid is the primary mission of MSF. Yet the 
organization distinguishes itself from other aid NGOs as its neutrality 
does not require silence. James Orbinsky, then president of the MSF 
International Council, expressed the difference in his 1999 speech ac-
cepting the Nobel Peace Prize on the organization’s behalf: “Silence has 
long been confused with neutrality, and has been presented as a neces-
sary condition for humanitarian action. From its beginning, MSF was 
created in opposition to this assumption. . . . We are not sure that words 
can always save lives, but we know that silence can certainly kill.” The 
French word for the program of bearing witness is témoignage. This 
form of witnessing is closely linked with humanitarian work in the field.
And this is the distinguishing feature of MSF among aid-oriented 
INGOs: the simultaneous pursuit of the goals of delivering aid and bear-
ing witness. Such simultaneity, not surprisingly, generates conflict within 
the organization, and in the course of its history the pendulum has swung 
several times between the aid pole and the witnessing pole. In addition, 
conflict has plagued MSF over the purposes that bearing witness should 
serve. Should it encourage or legitimize “humanitarian intervention” by 
military means for the protection of civilian populations, criminal pros-
ecution of perpetrators of violence, or something altogether different?
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Fabrice Weissman (2011) of MSF-France provides a minute insider’s 
view of these tensions between and shifts in MSF’s positions. A brief 
journey through this tormented history sets the stage for a detailed anal-
ysis of MSF’s place vis-à-vis the Darfur conflict.
By the late 1970s, MSF, not quite a decade old, had fully commit-
ted itself to speaking out. MSF’s director announced in 1978 that staff 
would be “reporting human rights violations and unacceptable events 
they witnessed to the bureau. . . . The bureau will then make an execu-
tive decision on whether to inform the public, in cases in which MSF 
was the sole witness” (cited in Weissman 2011:178). In 1979 and 1980 
MSF leadership organized and actively participated in demonstrations 
at the Thai-Cambodian border against inhumane policies of the pro-
Vietnamese Cambodian government. The demonstrators sought to 
publically display the Cambodian government’s opposition to the inde-
pendent distribution of food and aid in its country. In the 1980s, in a 
broader shift toward taking political positions, MSF leaders (especially 
the French section) demanded a redoubling of efforts among liberal de-
mocracies against human rights abuses in Communist countries. Else-
where MSF spoke out when it witnessed humanitarian aid contributing 
to criminal governmental violence and found food distribution centers 
becoming traps for help seekers. Ethiopia during the great famine of 
1985 was a case in point when the government distributed help ex-
clusively to those willing to be resettled, thereby isolating rebels in the 
north of the country. MSF was expelled from the country following this 
campaign of témoignage.
The 1990s saw the need for aid shift from refugee camps to conflict 
zones. Large-scale projects that required the consent of several belliger-
ents became more common generally and in the work of MSF specifi-
cally. Somalia and Liberia are examples, while countries such as Iraq, 
Myanmar, and Sudan were generally opposed to interventions by west-
ern NGOs. As the UN, in this new context, increasingly authorized 
the use of military force to secure aid operations, MSF critiqued the 
international community’s limiting the use of such forces to humanitar-
ian purposes. The terms band aids for victims and humanitarian alibi 
were first uttered in 1991 in response to “Operation Provide Comfort” 
in Iraq, where an international military intervention by US and French 
forces provided several dozen NGOs, including MSF, an opportunity to 
participate in the repatriation and aid programs for displaced Shiite and 
Kurdish populations. Later, in the Bosnian civil war, MSF conducted 
surveys among war refugees and eventually joined “neo-conservatives 
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and liberal internationalists” to demand “that western governments 
conduct war against oppressive regimes rather than protect relief 
operations” (Weissman 2011:186).
But the world in which MSF functioned changed, especially in the 
years after the Rwandan genocide. The number of international mili-
tary interventions grew, including those in Kosovo, East Timor, and 
Sierra Leone, followed by US attacks in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq 
in 2003. UN forces became the second largest army operating in for-
eign countries. UN secretary-general Kofi Annan was among many who 
strongly supported both a new doctrine of intervention (“responsibility 
to protect,” or R2P) and new international institutions of criminal jus-
tice, especially the ICC. This altered environment created new concerns 
within MSF. The organization declared neutrality as its guiding prin-
ciple in situations in which international forces were involved, and it 
challenged the notion of “humanitarian war.” MSF was now concerned 
that its contributions to “exposing war crimes and misappropriations 
or obstruction of humanitarian assistance . . . may have been encour-
aging the use of international military or legal measures against the 
perpetrators” (Weissman 2011:192). Specifically with regard to inter-
national criminal justice interventions, important factions within MSF 
feared that ICC policies would convince perpetrators of war crimes, hu-
manitarian crimes, and genocide to remove humanitarian organizations 
from areas of violent conflict—“especially since the [ICC] prosecutor 
and the NGOs supporting his actions called explicitly for humanitar-
ian organizations to provide information to help him determine the ap-
propriateness of launching an investigation and prepare the cases. And 
coupled with this controversy was a fierce debate on the political virtues 
of the international criminal justice system” (Weissman 2011:192). A 
conflict between MSF, primarily a humanitarian aid INGO despite its 
mission of bearing witness, and the human rights and judicial fields was 
thus programmed, and it was to play itself out in the context of Darfur 
by affecting MSF’s representations of the mass violence.
Aid Delivery and Témoignage in Darfur: Between Principles and 
Pragmatism
Early in 2004, at the peak of the second major wave of mass atrocities, 
MSF had only a dozen workers on the ground in Darfur, providing 
basic assistance to some sixty-five thousand people. This was not even 
1 percent of the population the UN estimated to be in great need of help 
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at that point. MSF thus decided to speak out in order to increase inter-
national awareness of the suffering. The organization added its voice 
to a growing wave of international pressure exerted on the government 
of Sudan by NGOs, the UN, and various other governments. Specifi-
cally, MSF-France became engaged, producing a retrospective mortal-
ity survey in the internally displaced person (IDP) camps. The authors 
concluded that several thousand people, or 4 to 5 percent of the original 
population of attacked villages, had been killed during massacres. MSF 
thus became the first INGO to challenge the government of Sudan’s 
insistence that no massacres had been committed.
The joint pressure on the Sudan government by a multitude of or-
ganizations was in fact followed by a substantial decline in violence by 
the summer of 2004. By the winter of 2004 some 13,000 humanitar-
ian workers, 900 of them international, were deployed by INGOs and 
UN agencies. Out of these, some 200 MSF expatriate volunteers served 
about 600,000 people in twenty-five projects. These efforts yielded sub-
stantial success. By early 2005 the mortality and malnutrition rate in the 
IDP camps was below the emergency threshold (Weissman 2011:193).
Despite this success inner tension within MSF continued. On the one 
hand, MSF rejected the notion that genocide had occurred. MSF-France 
president Jean-Hervé Bradol even used the words “propagandistic dis-
tortions” (quoted in Weissman 2011:195). On the other hand, other 
sections, especially MSF-Holland, were not opposed to dramatizing the 
situation. Its operations director declared his dissatisfaction with the 
aid-only approach, and Nicholas Kristof, picking up on his critique, 
castigated the aid-only approach in the New York Times as an “aid ef-
fort [that] is sustaining victims so they can be killed with full stomachs” 
(quoted in Weissman 2011:195). In March 2005, the Dutch section 
published a report that documented some five hundred cases of rape 
committed in the context of “ethnic cleansing” campaigns and that de-
manded an end to impunity. This report preceded by just a few weeks 
the UNSC’s decision to refer the case of Darfur to the ICC. But MSF 
had a price to pay, especially after the report was cited by Kofi Annan 
before the UN General Assembly. In the words of one interlocutor: 
“This report [“Crushing Burden of Rape”] probably would not have 
attracted any attention had Kofi Annan not quoted from it on World 
Women’s Day, March 9, 2005,  .  .  . in a speech before the General 
Assembly. Through that the report immediately found widespread at-
tention. Our head of mission and deputy head of mission were arrested 
shortly thereafter and interrogated by the Sudanese authorities. They 
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were then locked up for several days because of this report” (author’s 
translation).
The price to be paid by MSF was to increase in 2009 when the French 
and Dutch sections were expelled from Sudan just after President al-
Bashir was indicted by the ICC. The government of Sudan accused them 
of breaking the principle of neutrality and collaborating with the ICC 
and in fact providing it with evidence. Later the Swiss section withdrew 
from Darfur.
Fabrice Weissman summarizes MSF’s compromise position and the 
lessons drawn from the Darfur experience:
Afraid of being seen as a stake-holder in legal or military processes, and 
thus compromise its access to conflict zones, it [MSF] tends to let other 
international actors speak for it, hoping to distinguish itself as the language 
police by tracking down misuses of humanitarian semantics. . . . If it wants 
to offer impartial, effective aid, MSF must distance itself equally from the 
liberal imperialism of the societies of its origins and the despotism of many 
of the countries where it intervenes. Experience has shown that it can only 
succeed with the support of political and diplomatic coalitions of conve-
nience, rallied through an engagement in the public space, without which 
humanitarianism is only a passive instrument in the service of power (Weiss-
man 2011:196–197).
Clearly, MSF takes a particular position in the humanitarian field. 
Different from organizations such as CARE, it insists on independence 
from states and avoids what Bourdieu would call, in the tradition of 
Durkheimian sociology, pollution of its very principles. It also keeps 
a distance from religious fields, unlike the Irish aid organizations dis-
cussed in the following chapter. Its témoignage principle helps it main-
tain independence from host countries such as Sudan, but it moves the 
organization closer to nonstate political actors, potentially exposing it 
to “movement pollution” (Krause 2014:112–113). Conflicts between 
témoignage and functional pressures of aid delivery result in internal 
struggles and occasional shifts in emphasis. Cultural anthropologist 
Peter Redfield (2013), after extensive field research with MSF, indeed 
finds “an internal culture of reflection, debate and critique” (36; see 
also Bortolotti 2010). MSF’s position as a player in the humanitarian 
aid field and its particularities within that field should be reflected in the 
minds of its actors when they speak about Darfur, and it should color 
their narratives of the violence. I expect greater caution than among 
human rights NGOs, but more outspokenness than found in narratives 
of other aid NGOs.
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views from the field: interviews and data
How, then, are the statements of purpose cited above and the conflicts 
between témoignage and delivering aid reflected in the minds of MSF 
workers? What strategies do they find useful in dealing with them? 
Finally, what representations of the Darfur conflict grow out of this 
field? How do they reflect the habitus of those who occupy it?
During my travels across Europe and North America I conducted 
interviews with eight MSF staff members in five countries, supplement-
ing the statistical analysis of the MSF-USA website and those of other 
American NGOs. I approached the different sections and inquired 
about staff with particular expertise on Darfur. In some cases I con-
tacted specific individuals who had been recommended by staff in other 
sections. A noticeable caution among MSF workers was associated with 
a relatively high rejection rate in response to requests for interviews, 
higher, for example, than among Amnesty activists. Several who de-
clined interview requests referenced the sensitive situation in Darfur.9 
This is not surprising given the history of arrests and kidnappings of 
MSF workers in Sudan, the expulsion and withdrawal of three of MSF’s 
five operational sections, and the continuing work of two sections in the 
field of Darfur.
Those who did agree to be interviewed were of diverse professional 
background: two staff with medical degrees and one with some medical 
training; one lawyer who specializes in international law, with degrees 
also in philosophy and development; one activist who had abandoned 
legal training and switched to political science with a focus on African 
studies; one political scientist with a degree in history; one staff mem-
ber with journalism training; and one with an engineering degree and 
some training in management and journalism. The interviewees’ posi-
tions within MSF also differed. Most respondents had experienced a 
variety of placements in the course of their MSF careers: a former long-
term president of his section, now a researcher and consultant; an MSF 
project coordinator, previously a field coordinator in Khartoum; one 
project manager in an operational center; a previous head of mission in 
Sudan, now a project supervisor; one general director of a national sec-
tion; one program manager; one head of personnel affairs in his section; 
and one manager for medical and humanitarian communication who 
had previously served as a press officer. All but two had experienced 
deployments in Sudan. In terms of national affiliation, three interview-
ees were located in the Paris office, one in Geneva, one each in London 
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and Vienna, and two in the US office in New York City. In three cases 
the interviewee’s nationality differed from that of the section for which 
she or he worked.
goals and goal conflicts as experienced at 
the front lines
Not surprisingly, all MSF respondents, when asked about four poten-
tially competing goals to be pursued in Darfur (i.e., aid, justice, peace, 
state sovereignty),  highlighted— or at least  included— the delivery of aid 
or humanitarian assistance; or they used some other wording to de-
scribe this central mission of an aid-oriented NGO. One interviewee 
urged “modesty”: “Our priorities were clearly to be able to provide, 
to respond to those needs, to do so in a relevant, evidently independent 
way, with the goal of alleviating some of the suffering.” Another re-
spondent also focused on alleviating suffering but stressed that this goal 
may be reached through aid delivery and also through bearing witness: 
“For me the goal would be first and foremost to help the largest part of 
the population to survive the war. This means humanitarian assistance, 
but this also means pressure on the government not to unleash its army 
or its militias as it did in 2003 and 2004.” To this respondent the mis-
sions to exert pressure by bearing witness and to secure survival did not 
appear contradictory. Pressure on governments, for example, by pub-
licizing atrocities, may in fact be a precondition for the delivery of aid. 
Another interviewee who acknowledged the tension between diverse 
goals argued that securing survival may be a precondition for justice at 
some later point:
As a humanitarian organization we are not pacifists. And we sort of take for 
granted that wars will erupt. But that people should not pay with their lives. 
Civilians and non-combatants should not pay with their lives when there is a 
breakdown in the political process that leads to war. So we try to maximize 
our operational space to see how much aid we can deliver to people, to re-
store them to their capacity for choice. And then it is their choice what they 
want to do in terms of pursuing justice.
Simultaneously, the notion of conflict between the delivery of aid 
and international criminal justice is deeply ingrained in the minds of my 
interviewees. The eviction of two MSF sections from Darfur, follow-
ing the issuing of the 2009 arrest warrant against President al-Bashir 
and the arrest and interrogations of two MSF leaders in Sudan after 
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the release of the 2005 rape report, in all likelihood contributed to this 
sense of antagonism. One project manager, a learned physician, de-
scribed the conflict as follows:
In March 2009, with the ICC decision, I think it had a big impact on the 
conflict and on many issues. You know of course that it resulted in the ex-
pulsion of many NGOs immediately from Darfur. And not only that, but 
it really was the beginning or at least the visible beginning of the attempt 
by the Sudanese government of domesticating the Darfur  crisis— a deliber-
ate strategic policy to reclaim ownership over Darfur, [to] try to remove 
international influence in Darfur. It was the straw that broke the camel’s 
back. . . . I think for many years the Khartoum government has been trou-
bled by international influence on what they see as their affairs. I have talked 
with ministers, with the Sudanese ambassador to the US; . . . they said very 
clearly these things. Another word they use is “Sudanization,” the Sudaniza-
tion of humanitarian aid. . . . That’s a term that people in the government 
in Khartoum use, “Sudanization of aid.” It’s coming from Bashir. .  .  . It’s 
not just expulsion from the country; it’s also the restriction of work in Dar-
fur. . . . One of our MSF teams was kidnapped,  early— I think it was two 
weeks after the ICC decision.
MSF workers who highlight the conflict between MSF and the ICC 
also tend to cast more general doubt on the ICC. I encountered this 
(conscious or unconscious) strategy of rationalizing the MSF position 
toward the ICC in several interviews. One respondent, for example, 
spoke to the uneven risk countries run of seeing their leaders indicted 
by the ICC. He pointed to the many nation-states, including some of the 
most powerful, that have not ratified the Rome Statute and concluded: 
“It is not an even playing field to begin with. I understand completely: 
a lot of people would disagree with me. But it’s not just my opinion. 
In MSF there is an article that you can get online by Fabrice Weissman 
on the ICC; it is called ‘grounds for divorce,’ between MSF and ICC.”
Indeed, the general skepticism of some MSF actors against the ICC 
is articulated on the MSF website, and its message appears to resonate 
with many in the organization. Another interviewee became more con-
crete while expressing similar skepticism:
As a citizen I am skeptical that it [ICC] is just going to be a tool that the 
wealthy, powerful countries use to bludgeon whatever enemy they determine 
of that day. I mean I won’t believe in the ICC until Henry Kissinger is in the 
dock. I mean if you are going to talk about a breach of international conven-
tions and war crimes etc., I mean, Henry Kissinger should be at the top of 
anyone’s list. Or John Yoo, for example; I mean, how do you write a torture 
memo like that?
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In addition to casting doubts on the equal treatment of different 
countries before the ICC, one other MSF interviewee challenged the no-
tion of justice in the international realm in principle: “I have a problem 
with international justice due to the fact that I think justice, I mean judi-
cial justice, so to speak, is not a proper way to judge mass crimes. . . . Of 
course, justice, I mean a trial, can bring more knowledge. It is obvious. 
But factual knowledge is not the overall understanding of a criminal 
or a violent process that is going on. . . . I think it is misleading, it is a 
misleading device.” This respondent supplemented his general critique 
of international criminal justice with that of particular personnel, espe-
cially the ICC chief prosecutor at the time, Luis Moreno-Ocampo. He 
also stressed, though, that his critique reflected his personal philosophy 
(albeit one influential within MSF), and that MSF, for good reason, had 
no official position on the ICC.
Despite such broad skepticism, MSF actors on the ground contribute 
through their practice to the potential for criminal justice intervention, 
and they may be mindful of that contribution. The interviewee cited 
above as having intense skepticism concerning the ICC’s equal treat-
ment of different countries spoke about strategies for providing proof 
for future criminal justice proceedings:
I don’t think it is a binary opposition [between aid and justice] person-
ally. . . . You know, victims of sexual violence are able to receive a [medical] 
certificate, in case they want to bring some judicial proceedings against the 
perpetrators of that sexual violence. They have used that. . . . [In Congo] the 
judiciary had just started to function in a kind of independent fashion. And 
lo and behold, . . . like fifty women in this same rural Congo village came 
and testified against the police officers that had raped them.
Another respondent, who had listed aid delivery as the organiza-
tion’s primary aim, nevertheless offered an additional  strategy— linking 
the delivery of medical assistance to measures that may contribute to 
others’ responses in the pursuit of peace or justice. It is worth quoting 
at length from his discussion:
One is always on the safe side if one does not repeat things others have told, 
but testifies directly. If I have someone, and there were such cases, where 
shooting wounds run parallel to the body’s axis, . . . [and the patients say,] 
“I was shot at from a helicopter,” then there is a clear link. We cannot say 
in our communications, . . . “These people were shot at from a helicopter.” 
Then one would be at risk of abandoning the principle of neutrality. But if 
one says one has treated so many people with gunshots along their bodies’ 
axes, then everyone with some knowledge of such conflicts can conclude: 
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“They’ve been shot at from above.” And who has helicopters in this area? 
Then one can establish a link. (author’s translation)
The same interviewee told a similar story about discreet ways in 
which medical aid work can interact, and divide labor, with human 
rights organizations:
We want to save lives and ameliorate suffering. . . . It would be ideal, then, 
if Human Rights Watch or similar organizations were to take over this po-
litical mandate by documenting these things. And we have done that, for 
example, in 2008 in Abyei . . . [when] we had many gunshot wounds in the 
backs, because they all had to flee. These stories, for example, I told [to] 
Human Rights Watch representatives. They came to me and inquired about 
this. Among them was a former MSF worker, and then I said: “Will this 
report be linked to my name or to MSF?” And she told me that she knew 
full well that that would be quite disadvantageous for us here and for our 
project, for the people. She just needed two or three independent confirma-
tions, and then she could report about it. (author’s translation)
This example of a division of labor between humanitarian aid and 
human rights organizations illustrates well that it is problematic to 
think of aid delivery on the one hand and justice seeking on the other as 
a zero-sum conflict, even though the respondent was concerned about 
the potential detriment to MSF programs in the region of bearing wit-
ness. This same interviewee expressed strong personal support for the 
ICC, unlike some of the statements cited above. He even attested to 
potential positive impact of ICC work on humanitarian workers on the 
ground: “If there is not justice, when will it end? I personally see the 
international court as something important. Because I also noticed in 
Darfur that . . . people are afraid of it” (author’s translation). This same 
respondent also distinguished between himself and his convictions as an 
individual and citizen, on the one hand, and the organization for which 
he works, on the other:
Somewhere we are also individuals. And, of course, I also try to act within 
our principles and our charter, as I do act accordingly. When I talk, as head 
of mission or project leader, with a journalist from [name of local paper], or 
when you interview me, or when I speak with a representative of the Suda-
nese authorities, of course. But should I be asked to testify as a citizen, then 
it is my duty to provide truthful answers. . . . I have to follow the laws. If it 
is international law, then I have to obey international law, and that also ap-
plies to me as a citizen of my country. (author’s translation)
These statements provide two insights. First, besides principled 
personal opposition to the ICC, some MSF staff and sections support 
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judicial intervention generally and in particular welcome, in open or 
subtle ways, international criminal justice intervention. Second, they 
also find ways of bearing witness that, through cautious wording, con-
tribute to the message of human rights NGOs and judicial interventions.
One other MSF interviewee expressed support for legal intervention 
generally. It is not by chance that this respondent is a US citizen (albeit 
working for a European section) who was trained in international law 
at a prestigious American university. Remember that among Amnesty 
International interviewees those with law degrees showed much more 
unambiguous support for the ICC. Remember also that the United 
States was immersed in movements that favored the full range of crimi-
nal justice interventions, including genocide charges against Omar al-
Bashir. The director-general of a national section, this interviewee is not 
without influence, and a close look at his position is in order. He first 
unambiguously confessed to the mandate of témoignage: “You provide 
pills, blankets, food, medical treatment. But that is essentially a Band-
Aid. And underneath is something else going on and causing it. Chil-
dren don’t naturally have scrap-metal wounds. You try to change the 
situation by exposing it, confronting perpetrators with their actions. . . . 
We see rising levels of malnutrition and we go and confront WFP [the 
World Food Program] with that. That is the basic idea behind bearing 
witness.” And not just UN agencies should be supplied with informa-
tion about suffering, according to this interviewee, but also journalists: 
“If people are coming in and they are starving and .  .  . they tell you 
the rains did not come, that is one thing. If they tell you the soldiers 
have been stealing  it— that is another. And very often it is the latter. . . . 
There was a steady flow of MSF press releases, like from other organi-
zations. And that is part of the attempt behind that. It is not promotion 
of ourselves; it is to try to expose the situation.”
This lawyer interviewee indeed went further. His support for bearing 
witness extended to open support for legal intervention, albeit broadly 
understood and explicitly including the model of the South African Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (for which another MSF interviewee 
also expressed great sympathy). He also spoke about peace as a potential 
consequence of the pursuit of justice: “No justice, no peace.” While he 
cited the situation of Charles Taylor and his refusal to bargain in light of 
the risk of arrest, he said: “I take the side of the victims at some point. 
That is not an excuse for not pursuing something like justice.”
Yet even this American-trained lawyer expressed concerns about po-
tential backlash. Decisions to go public with information about grave 
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human rights abuses  should— in his mind  too— depend on the circum-
stances. He refers to the example of “Burma, where we’ve got lots to 
say and we just don’t, because 90 percent of the HIV-AIDS patients 
receiving anti-retroviral therapy in Burma get it from us. . . . We can’t 
afford to be tossed out of that country. There are no other actors to take 
our place. In Darfur, you know, it is quite apparent that there are other 
actors.” And, beyond this particular situation and despite his relatively 
open attitude toward justice responses, in the end this MSF interviewee, 
too, identified with the principle of aid delivery and showed skepticism 
toward the ICC:
We don’t publicize with the goal or objective of attaining justice. But many 
would, and then use the same facts and figures to do that. And that is a 
problem now for the aid agencies. It is a problem in fact and it is a problem 
in perception. If governments or bad actors anywhere perceive you as an 
agent or [as] anyway related to the pursuit of justice, that creates a bar-
rier, an obstacle to access to populations. And whereas MSF has always 
pointed its finger at people too, they haven’t pointed their finger at individu-
als. They have pointed their finger at, you know, a government’s health care 
system. . . . It is a lot less threatening than an individual believing that you 
are going to point a finger at him or her directly with evidence for criminal 
prosecution. . . . We have had a real discussion in the organization about our 
relationship to the ICC. In 1999, when accepting the Nobel Peace Prize, we 
called for the ratification [of the ICC], and we’ve since backed away quite 
considerably from it. . . . Bashir is able to justify the expulsion on the ground 
that these agencies cooperated with the ICC investigation. They are not there 
to do humanitarian work. They are there to spy on us. Ocampo doesn’t help 
by saying things like “We used data from humanitarian aid agencies to do 
this.” . . . We really needed to distance ourselves.
While the goals of delivering aid and securing the affected popula-
tion’s survival and its relationship with the principle of justice domi-
nated the responses of my MSF interviewees, several interlocutors also 
recognized peace as an important goal. One interviewee, however, 
perceived a conflict between the pursuit of peace and aid delivery. He 
referred to the situation in Liberia, where MSF sought to bring relief 
goods into an area controlled by Charles Taylor, at the same time that 
the UN sought to build a blockade around Taylor’s National Patriotic 
Front: “There was a real clash between peacemaking, peace enforcing, 
which was a priority of the United Nations, and providing  relief— to the 
point that, in fact, UN-chartered, or at least UN-sponsored, jet fighters, 
attacked relief convoys.” The same respondent, a person with particu-
lar prestige in the organization, was also the lone MSF respondent who 
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saw merit in the principle of national sovereignty: “Well, securing the 
Sudanese state is, I think, an issue as well. Although I am a doctor with-
out borders, I do believe that states and borders matter. . . . Borders are 
something that protects a given people, a given society, from imperial 
strikes.”
In short, MSF is an organization dedicated to the delivery of hu-
manitarian, especially medical, aid. It differs from other aid NGOs in 
that it also engages in témoignage, in bearing witness. Both missions are 
reflected in our analysis of websites and in my interviews. They are also 
on display in images I found on MSF websites (see figures 11 and 12). 
But the weight of témoignage has fluctuated over time, and it is more pro-
nounced in some sections than in others. Some respondents perceived 
bearing witness to be in conflict with the primary goal of securing sur-
vival. On the ground, however, some sections or staff had discovered 
“under the radar” methods of collecting and distributing information 
on grave violations of human rights so that affected victims or human 
rights NGOs could use it.
In general there is no doubt that MSF is, despite several modifica-
tions, a humanitarian aid organization, embedded in a field with specific 
figure 11. This image from MSF’s website shows displaced Darfuris and their  
“housing.”
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norms and surrounded by a particular set of actors that includes rep-
resentatives of the perpetrating state, with whom aid NGOs have to 
collaborate to get their assistance to the affected people. How, then, 
does this position in the field of humanitarian aid affect MSF workers’ 
narratives about the Darfur conflict?
representations of darfur
Two sources of evidence speak to the ways in which MSF defined the 
situation in Darfur during the first decade of the twenty-first century. 
The first is a comparative analysis of documents, press releases, reports 
from the field, interview transcripts, and position statements, published 
on websites of the American section of MSF and their Amnesty Inter-
national and Save Darfur equivalents (for methodological details, see 
chapter 2 and Zacher, Nyseth Brehm, and Savelsberg 2014). The second 
source of data consists of my interviews with MSF staff and volunteers. 
Interview responses take us backstage and provide insights that go into 
greater depth and are at least partly freed from constraints of official 
representations. They come closer to reflecting the genuine mindset of 
humanitarian aid actors, most of whom have actually experienced the 
violence and its consequences on the ground in Darfur and interacted 
figure 12. Darfuri women and children at an MSF medical service site, in a photo 
from MSF’s website.
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with agents of the Sudanese state. Not to be mistaken for public pro-
nouncements, they do feed into the conflicted discourses within the or-
ganization, and they shine through as communication that, while not 
formally sanctified, still reaches beyond the organization’s boundaries, 
as we shall see. I organize the MSF representation of Darfur along the 
same set of dimensions used in the analysis of three academic books 
(Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008; Mamdani 2009a; Flint and de 
Waal 2008) and of the human rights field: suffering and victimhood; 
causes and origins of the conflict; actors; and framing.
Interview accounts of suffering and victimhood show substantial over-
lap with those we encountered in the human rights field. Several inter-
viewees spoke about deaths and enhanced mortality (even mass murder), 
rape, destroyed villages, lost homes and livelihood, displacement, inju-
ries (specifically scrap-metal wounds), and (in one case) psychological 
trauma. Our quantitative analysis of the American NGO sections’ web-
sites, however, shows noteworthy differences regarding the frequency 
with which different sorts of suffering are publicized. Compared to 
Amnesty, MSF Web documents refer to killings and rapes less fre-
quently, but to displacement and destruction of livelihood somewhat 
more often and to disease and shortages dramatically more frequently. 
We thus find highlighted, in publicized documents, exactly those types 
of suffering that call for intervention by humanitarian aid organizations.
Suffering may result from many different causes; and different causal 
explanations attribute different meanings to suffering. To what degree 
do MSF actors interpret it as a result of human action, specifically crim-
inal action? Even more precisely, do they refer to criminal actions as 
constituting human rights crimes, war crimes, crimes against human-
ity, or genocide? Remarkably, the content analysis of websites shows 
almost no statements that refer to even one of the types of crimes for 
which the ICC has jurisdiction. We did, however, find references to be-
haviors commonly understood as criminal, including murder and rape 
(Zacher, Nyseth Brehm, and Savelsberg 2014). These are actually men-
tioned slightly more frequently on the MSF-USA site than on Amnesty-
USA’s site. Yet, beyond referring to specific crimes, rarely does the MSF 
site explicitly categorize the violence as criminal violence,  and— again—
it strictly avoids reference to those types of crime that would fall within 
the jurisdiction of the ICC. In interviews, too, I find great caution with 
regard to the use of such terms. As one respondent explained:
In practice, what they [Global South actors] see now in the Western world 
is [how] .  .  . these sorts of statements that a government has committed 
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violence against its people are so instrumental and are [so] politicized that 
you just end up looking like a Western actor beating up on [a Global South 
government]—you know, the double standard–based Western discourse that 
uses human rights, in some ways, to subordinate the developing world. And 
you get caught up in the discourse to some extent. So, you know, they believe 
we really need to distance ourselves from it. And it is very hard, then, to say: 
“Well but actually the government is committing violence against people.”
While humanitarian aid websites and interviewees thus speak freely 
about the suffering of the people of Darfur, the cautionary note about the 
use of crime labels is reflected in MSF interviewees’ stress of those causes 
and frames that apply to the conflict but do not invoke the volition of 
specific actors. The statistical analysis also shows that MSF web docu-
ments rarely name offenders. They differ from both Amnesty and Save 
Darfur particularly in their hesitancy to refer to the Sudanese state as a 
criminal perpetrator (Zacher, Nyseth Brehm, and Savelsberg 2014:42). 
To be sure, MSF interviewees are not uncritical of the Sudanese state. 
Instead, almost all stressed the center-periphery conflict and the neglect 
of the periphery by the government in Khartoum as central causes of the 
conflict. This charge is much in line with the grievances, documented in 
the famous Black Book (Seekers of Truth and Justice 2004), that played 
a crucial role in the foundation of the Darfur rebel organizations. One 
MSF respondent actually cited the Black Book when speaking to the 
center-periphery conflict in Sudan. But interviewees also emphasized that 
the current government of Sudan inherited this center-periphery tension 
from old times, reaching back to the colonial period. “Taking over from 
the colonial period in the early 1950s,” one respondent reflected, “it is a 
very centralized government where power is held by a very small group 
of people. There was never really an established modernized, modern 
country. . . . All the peripheries feel that they are neglected by their gov-
ernment in terms of resources, in terms of representation mainly.”
In addition to the neglect of the periphery by the center as the basic 
source of the Darfur conflict, half of MSF respondents also highlighted 
a series of secondary conditions for which the government of Sudan 
is not responsible, among them  desertification— the extension of the 
Sahara Desert southward and the resulting intensified competition for 
natural resources between herder-nomads and agriculturalists, a com-
petition that breeds violence in combination with other external factors. 
One interviewee described the situation:
You have issues of local conflict dating back decades if not centuries.  .  .  . 
More or less it is the nomadic population, competing for grass, for water 
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access, with the agricultural group. And this has been the case, tensions and 
conflicts, traditionally for longer than it is probably written in history. And 
that desertification, . . . the change of the climate within Darfur has been a 
 factor— plus increasing population  pressures— means there has been more 
competition for land and water, more tensions. The introduction of weapons 
in Darfur meant that these local conflicts have become more serious, more 
complicated, and very difficult to resolve with the traditional peacemaking 
mechanisms. . . . You know what happened with the flow of small arms in 
Darfur, [which is] . . . one of the factors as well. . . . So you have . . . layers 
of conflict. You have local conflict and then the national-level conflict of 
the Darfur rebels versus Khartoum. Then you have a regionalization of the 
conflict as  well— Chad, Sudan, Libya. . . . Darfur was and still is a regional 
conflict, or at least complicated by regional issues. . . . It’s a complicated pic-
ture, but if you go back to what I said in the beginning: you wouldn’t have 
this type of conflict or the scale of conflict or the disaster you saw in Darfur 
if there wasn’t this problem between the periphery and the center.
While the government of Sudan does appear, in statements such as 
these, as a contributor to the very background conditions underlying 
the violence of Darfur, it is also presented as the heir of imperfect state 
formation that reaches back to colonial days. Further, in the twelve 
hours of interview material with MSF staff, the government is rarely 
depicted as contributing to the foreground conditions of criminal vio-
lence. Instead, respondents pointed to a series of other complicating 
factors. One interviewee spoke about the mobilization of Janjawiid mi-
litias. While he argued that the government used promises of money 
and land to lure them into supporting the military, he also stressed 
that the Janjawiid violence eventually developed an autodynamic and 
became independent of the government. In this description the govern-
ment no longer appears as a perpetrator, but as the sorcerer’s appren-
tice who lost control of a process he had initiated: “I think that they 
[the Janjawiid] just became uncontrollable, that they developed an in-
dependent dynamic, that the militias split up into ever smaller groups 
with distinct interests. The whole process could, in the end, no longer 
be controlled by the government” (author’s translation). Another re-
spondent similarly described a process that ended with “much more 
localized, fractured violence between all communities.” He compared 
the use of the Janjawiid to a “Pandora’s box” that the government had 
opened but was not able to close again. The American-trained lawyer 
who among the MSF respondents showed the greatest openness toward 
justice-focused responses argued similarly. On the one hand, he used 
categories of international criminal law (“there were crimes against hu-
manity and there were war crimes committed”). On the other hand, he 
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challenged the narratives we typically encounter in the human rights 
field, especially depictions of a clear divide between one group as good 
and the other as an evil force. Instead this MSF interviewee, like others, 
stressed patterns of fractionalization and pointed to problematic side-
effects of good-versus-evil narratives: “The simplifications that some 
social movement actors have engaged in are in part a reinforcement of 
things that the government of Sudan has done, as it has contributed to 
creating, it seems to me, those clear ethnic boundaries.”
Other interviewees attributed responsibility more squarely to the 
government of Sudan. Simultaneously, however, they provided expla-
nations, albeit not necessarily justifications, for the actions of the Jan-
jawiid. One respondent questioned the common image of the Janjawiid 
as a cruel and disorganized horde of killers:
I spoke with a sheik in Kerenik, who told me everything, how that [the vio-
lence] unfolded . . . that one was flown to Khartoum, lavishly treated and 
lured into the [government’s] agenda. He really told me: “I allowed them to 
put me to use, more or less, but what was the effect? I lost almost half of my 
men here, and now I have to take care of their families. The money never 
arrived. The promises were not kept. We were simply instrumentalized. And 
now one sees that the abyss is deep.” And then he chose his words carefully 
and said: “Really we do have the same grandmother.” (author’s translation)
Another respondent similarly spoke to the oppressive conditions of 
those groups from which militias were recruited. He referred to the 
government’s use of a “counterinsurgency campaign, relying on . . . the 
poor, the poorest against the poor, on mobilized marginal populations 
of Darfur to fight local insurgencies.” The same interviewee simulta-
neously attributed greater responsibility to rebel groups than is com-
mon among human rights activists. And he combined this attribution 
of agency to rebel groups with a reference to what he considered a 
problematic approach to the North-South conflict in Sudan and the role 
played by international diplomacy: “The North-South process has been 
a trigger. . . . By only taking into consideration the South, it gives the 
message [that] the only way for all peripheries to be considered was to 
take up arms and to deal with it in their own terms.” Again, the agency 
of rebel groups as violent actors is underscored, this time as actors who 
drew inspiration from the North-South negotiations.
Such narratives concerning causes of the conflict complicate, and 
compete with, the common human rights account of the violence in 
Darfur. To be sure, MSF respondents in oral communication high-
light the same actors as crucial contributors to the violence as we find 
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referred to in human rights accounts. References to the “government of 
Sudan,” “political leadership,” “Bashir,” “the president,” the “business 
and military apparatus,” the “army,” and the “security apparatus” are 
frequent throughout the interviews. Also “Arab militias” or “militias 
equipped by the army” are named. But the role of these actors appears 
in a different light than it does in human rights narratives. Also, website 
statements typically avoid reference to any perpetrators, especially the 
government of Sudan, as responsible for the violence.
One interviewee’s reference to “bystanders,” the majority of Suda-
nese who live their lives as though mass killings never took place, sheds 
an interesting light on the larger domestic context within which NGOs 
and the Sudanese government operate:
[Nyala in South Darfur] was basically a place where middle-class Sudanese 
would go for their weekend away from Khartoum, from the big city. And it 
used to be dotted with all of these cute little B-and-B hotels. . . . You would 
not know there was a crisis unless you actually went to the camps. Nyala 
itself is a bustling city of hundreds of thousands of people. It was really 
bizarre. A similar dynamic is in Khartoum. . . . I was reading the press all 
the time, reading the newspapers, talking to the relatively educated elite, lo-
cal reporters, etc.: very little indication that there was a war going on. For 
me that spoke to the disconnect between the populus and the actions of the 
government.
A look at framing strategies sheds further light on the interpreta-
tion of the events in Darfur by MSF respondents. In my interviews, I 
again offered four options: a rebellion or insurrection frame (under-
standing government action as counterinsurgency); a civil war frame; 
a humanitarian emergency frame; and a state crime frame. Whereas 
only one Amnesty interviewee clearly supported the insurgency frame, 
almost all MSF interviewees found this an acceptable interpretation of 
the violence. Only one rejected it outright, and another expressed skep-
ticism. The civil war frame was more strongly favored by MSF respon-
dents than by their Amnesty counterparts. Astonishingly, though, while 
almost all Amnesty respondents found the humanitarian catastrophe 
frame acceptable (much in line with expectations), half of the MSF in-
terviewees expressed caution. For example: “It is the term which I don’t 
like, because it does not say much. I prefer to describe facts. I prefer to 
say massacres, famine. . . . Humanitarian catastrophe is a label which 
does not tell us very much, except that people are suffering.” Another 
MSF interviewee, like the previously quoted speaker, also from MSF-
France, argued similarly:
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Humanitarian disaster is a tag I never use, because I don’t know what it 
means. . . . Is a massacre a humanitarian disaster? Is an earthquake a humani-
tarian disaster? Is Fukushima a humanitarian disaster? Is Iraq a humanitar-
ian disaster? What is a humanitarian disaster? . . . It is a catchphrase that I 
never use because it is so vague. . . . I think it is misleading. . . . It is a very 
recent formulation. As far as I know, that concept or the syntax of the hu-
manitarian crisis was used for the first time in the June ’94 resolution of the 
Security Council, the genocide in Rwanda [resolution]. And the idea was 
that the word genocide shouldn’t be used. So, in order to turn the problem 
around, they decided that it was a humanitarian crisis. . . . It was instrumen-
tal to the decision of the White House not to use the G-word. So the G-word 
was a humanitarian crisis. It was a lie.
Not surprisingly, though, MSF interviewees did not find the state 
crime frame appropriate for an interpretation of the violence in Darfur. 
In fact, while all Amnesty respondents wholeheartedly embraced this 
frame, I found great skepticism among MSF staff. Only two respondents 
were somewhat supportive, but even one of these stressed that this was 
his personal opinion: “That is always what we are asked to avoid as 
employees of Doctors Without Borders: to position ourselves and to say 
this is state crime or this is genocide. We talk about a humanitarian ca-
tastrophe [but see interview statements above]. Where that comes from 
and what its causes are, on that we may have our personal opinions, but 
those will not be released to the public. I personally can say about that 
[definition as crime]: ‘yes’ ” (author’s translation).
One other interviewee rejected the notion of state crime and drew a 
distinction:
I think it is a state that uses violence, commits crimes, but .  .  . what state 
doesn’t? And I think the Sudanese state has committed more of them, but 
I don’t think it is a useful way of understanding the state. I think it is cer-
tainly a way of understanding certain actors in the state. . . . Partly because 
the state is fairly enormous here. The ministry of health isn’t criminal. The 
ministry of agriculture isn’t criminal. [When challenged with the fact that 
the Nazi state, too, included government agencies not directly involved in 
the commission of crimes, he responded:] I don’t think here [in Sudan] the 
strategic objectives were criminal. I believe the methods and tactics they used 
were quite criminal.
One MSF respondent did not reject the notion that crimes were com-
mitted, but he insisted that the state crime frame does not adequately 
capture the events in Darfur: “It is much more than state crimes. . . . It is 
a rebellion. It is a political movement. It carries a social and political dy-
namic. . . . All this belongs to the concept of rebellion, civil war, political 
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movement.” What is at stake here is a perceived contrast between a 
criminalizing frame and an interpretation of the conflict as political.
Another MSF interviewee rejected the state crime frame outright. 
Much in line with the foregoing statement, he deferred to lawyers’ and 
courts’ decisions about the criminal nature of the violence. To my ques-
tion whether he would also “negotiate with the devil” to get humanitar-
ian aid on the ground, he replied:
What is the devil? Good and  bad— we don’t necessarily see the world in that 
way. As a person coming from a different background you have your per-
sonal opinions on those sorts of things. But as an organization we don’t, and 
that is something we defend very strongly. On Iraq, I did a round of meetings 
with the State Department, with the Pentagon, .  .  . and I challenged them 
with that. I said, “Do you have a problem with us having communication 
and links with terrorist organizations, Al Qaida, insurgent groups in Iraq, 
and so forth?” . . . We need it [communication], because to be present in an 
area you need acceptance by the groups.
The foregoing statement brings us full circle to the notion of the hu-
manitarian aid field and the ways in which this field structures knowledge 
and basic categories of thought. To be sure, things are not clear-cut, es-
pecially for a humanitarian aid NGO such as MSF with its dedication to 
bearing witness. MSF actors surely do not downplay the suffering of the 
Darfuri population. To the contrary, they  produce— through medical ex-
amination and published records and  reports— evidence of such suffering, 
evidence that may later be put to use in criminal court proceedings and 
that is feared by representatives of the Sudanese state. Interviewees also 
named all the actors involved in the violence. Their narrative does not 
differ substantially, in this respect, from that of human rights campaigns.
Yet the representation assembled from my interviews with MSF staff 
and our content analysis of the MSF-USA website suggests that the 
identification of causes and the framing of the violence differ substan-
tially between human rights and humanitarian aid organizations and 
their agents. Again, responses from the latter interviewees emphasize 
natural conditions more strongly than do human rights narratives. And, 
while they surely hold militia groups responsible for atrocities, MSF 
respondents also interpret them as victims of resource shortage, neglect, 
and the Sudanese state’s false promises. Rebel groups instead are con-
sidered in a somewhat more critical light than is common in the context 
of human rights campaigns.
Both human rights and humanitarian actors blame the state, but the 
attribution is much more indirect among MSF personnel. The latter see 
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the state more as a contributor to long-standing background factors, 
as opposed to highlighting contemporary state strategies as foreground 
factors and direct causes of violence. Further, they break the state up 
into components, only some of which bear responsibility. Finally, the 
crime frame is generally not regarded as satisfactory, and judgments on 
criminal responsibility are left to lawyers and the courts. This is in line 
with our comparative quantitative analysis of framing strategies used 
by the American section of MSF. Here too the explicit crime frame is 
rarely used, the state is almost never referred to as a perpetrator, and 
support for international prosecution is missing altogether (Zacher, 
Nyseth Brehm, and Savelsberg 2014:42). In short,  MSF— a prominent 
example of an INGO in the humanitarian aid field, in which the Suda-
nese state is a crucial  player— is an important producer of representa-
tions of the Darfur conflict and contributes significantly to the definition 
of the situation. Its representation differs substantially from the one we 
encountered in our examination of the center and the periphery of the 
human rights field.
communicating representations
Representations of mass violence that grow out of humanitarian aid–
oriented NGOs matter, not least because they can contribute to shaping 
public opinion and to challenging human rights narratives in the public 
sphere. This applies to official pronouncements and NGO reports as 
well as to opinion formation among NGO staff and volunteers. My 
interviews with journalists indicate that NGOs are crucial sources of 
information, a theme to which I return in greater detail below. Inter-
views with MSF staff confirm this notion. Specifically, they spell out 
at least four pathways by which humanitarian NGO narratives may 
reach those who report about the conflict to broad audiences across 
the globe.
First, not surprisingly, communication is used strategically by MSF 
sections of different countries. One interviewee, a “manager of medical 
and humanitarian communications,” described these efforts: “We want 
to make sure it [public communication] is in line with our medical and 
operational priorities. . . . We really want our public events to have a 
strategic element; that means targeting better audiences, whether they 
are medical or academic or diplomatic or NGO communities.”
Second, diffusion of MSF representations also occurs in the field. A 
“crisis communications manager” who was serving MSF in Khartoum 
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in the summer of 2004 described the issuing of a press release entitled 
“No Relief in Sight.”10 The release was based on a retrospective mortal-
ity survey and accompanied by an epidemiological report. It was ready 
for posting at the exact time when UN secretary-general Kofi Annan 
und US secretary of state Colin Powell came to Khartoum. “I was in 
West Darfur, and there was a big scramble to get me back to Khartoum 
because there was going to be the entire press corps, following Colin 
Powell. And I remember coming into the press room, just walking from 
one person to the other and handing out our press release, the ‘No Re-
lief in Sight.’ And I believe it was quoted a lot in those initial stories.” 
Chapter 9 offers a detailed analysis of the actual effects of this particular 
initiative on media reporting.
Third, communication with journalists arises within opportunity 
structures in the field. Speaking about Nicholas Kristof of the New 
York Times, one interviewee reported: “He visited with a lot of MSF 
teams in Darfur and we helped arrange that. We helped arrange brief-
ings for him in the early days.” Also, “Christiane Amanpour [of CNN] 
stayed in our compound because there was nowhere else to stay. So she 
threw down her sleeping bag inside of our compound and during the 
day would go out and do reports.” These partially accidental contacts 
in the field are nevertheless structured.
Fourth, spontaneous encounters are supplemented by planned inter-
actions with the media. One respondent reported that MSF held edito-
rial board meetings on the subject of Darfur with the New York Times, 
first in 2004 and again in 2006 or 2008.
Cautionary notes are in order, though. First, while humanitarian 
NGOs obviously have several channels of communication to the media 
(and to actors from other sectors in public life), as illustrated here for 
MSF, their capability to impress on journalists the humanitarian aid 
definition of the situation is limited. I have already cited Kristof and the 
New York Times with their embrace of the genocide frame for Darfur, 
as well as Kristof’s generous use of Holocaust analogies to shed light 
on the situation in Darfur. Humanitarian aid NGOs may thus feed in-
formation to journalists, but the media put this information to use ac-
cording to their own rules. The degree to, and the ways through, which 
NGO representations translate into media reports warrants further em-
pirical examination, which I offer in later chapters.
Second, if we encounter nation-specific discourses even in a rather 
centralized rights-oriented NGO such as Amnesty, a more decentral-
ized humanitarian NGO will have to face inner conflict in its attempt 
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to define a situation. Competing representations may thus reach the 
public, as should be obvious in the account provided thus far.
Finally and crucially, however, even as humanitarian aid INGOs 
such as MSF release information about the suffering of the local popu-
lation in conflict zones, they will always be mindful of the government 
as an essential actor in the field in which they have to operate. In the 
words of one interviewee: “We try to be transparent. We provide the 
government with our press releases, or at least inform them that we are 
going to communicate publically on an issue.”11 Such considerateness 
should not come as a surprise given the organization’s dependency on 
permits and cooperation by the state. As we have seen, this policy of 
restraint does not keep the aid NGO from displaying the suffering, but 
suggests causal interpretations and a frame that advances interpreta-
tions of violence of a very different nature from those emanating from 
the human rights field.
conclusions
The humanitarian aid field and the INGOs within it, here examined for 
the case of MSF, obviously take a different shape from the human rights 
field. The government of the aid-receiving country is a major player in 
the aid field. In our case this is the government of Sudan, leading repre-
sentatives of which have been charged with the gravest of crimes by the 
ICC. INGOs have to deal directly with the government of the receiving 
 country— even MSF with its insistence on independence from govern-
ments at home and abroad.
In line with our expectations about the relationship between the 
characteristics of fields on the one hand and the knowledge repertoires 
generated by them on the other, we also see that the representation 
of the Darfur conflict takes distinctive shape in the humanitarian aid 
world. To be sure, this is not a world in which suffering is denied. To 
the contrary, the population’s pain and deprivation in areas of conflict 
is not just acknowledged but also documented, at times dramatized, 
and communicated to a world audience, in both words and images. 
Those aspects of the suffering, however, that can be addressed by hu-
manitarian aid programs are the ones most likely to being highlighted. 
That observation would apply to displacements and to deprivations in 
IDP or refugee camps more than to the mass killings by military and mi-
litia or rebel groups. Starker than this difference are those of representa-
tions of actors and the framing of the violence. Generally, aid narratives 
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treat the government of Sudan with greater caution. Long-term poli-
cies that contributed to laying the groundwork for the current violence, 
especially the neglect of the country’s periphery, are most certainly 
highlighted, while short-term actions that more directly caused the vio-
lence are more commonly downplayed. Respondents typically attribute 
causal primacy for the outbreak of violence to the rebel  groups— even 
if government responses are termed disproportionate and escalating. In 
line with such caution, actors in the aid field are reluctant to choose the 
state crime frame. Most stress instead the supremacy of the humanitar-
ian catastrophe frame. Responses to questions about the insurgency and 
civil war frame are ambiguous. Actors in the humanitarian aid field are 
especially reluctant to apply the term genocide to the conflict, a label 
that so much dominated the criminal justice–oriented discourse, par-
ticularly in the United States.
Clearly, what we diagnose as an elective affinity between the hu-
manitarian aid field and the representation of the violence by aid actors 
involves causal ties. Depending on the cooperation of the Sudanese state 
in the granting of visas and permits to travel and deliver aid, humanitar-
ian actors apply caution with regard to the government of Sudan.
Why, then, do we not find in the aid field a pure ideal-typical de-
piction of a humanitarian catastrophe? Note that MSF, the aid INGO 
selected for this in-depth study, is also dedicated to bearing witness. In 
that sense I made a conservative choice when seeking to demonstrate 
the emergence of an aid-oriented representation. Other aid INGOs 
should display a narrative even closer to an ideal type of humanitarian 
representation. In addition, fields are never pure. They overlap, or in-
terpenetrate, with other fields, as when lawyers are being recruited into 
leading positions within the humanitarian aid field, especially lawyers 
socialized in a country with a strong criminal justice tradition such as 
the United States. Remember that even within the human rights field, 
lawyers embraced the logic of the justice cascade more unambiguously 
than members of other professions.
The empirical analysis also speaks to the ability of international in-
stitutions to create a global representation of mass violence, a theme 
that relates to debates between the World Polity School, with its focus 
on global scripts, versus its challengers that highlight national contexts 
and organization-specific constructions of knowledge. In support of the 
World Polity School we witnessed the emergence of a global under-
standing of the conflict in Darfur within the humanitarian aid field. 
Yet, just as we observed national specifics in sections of INGOs in the 
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human rights field, the humanitarian aid INGO examined here, less 
centralized in its organizations, shows even greater discrepancies across 
national sections.
Finally, linking insights from this chapter with observations from the 
preceding ones, we see competition between two distinct  scripts— those 
emerging from the human rights field and others generated by the hu-
manitarian aid field. Clearly, we observe an intense competition over the 
representation of the Darfur conflict across fields. At times, however, 
this competition gives way to a division of labor, whereby a humani-
tarian organization produces evidence of suffering that may be used 
by human rights organizations to draw conclusions regarding criminal 
responsibility for the suffering. The competition between the two fields 
should thus not be misunderstood as a zero-sum conflict.
In addition to humanitarian INGOs, states may also focus on hu-
manitarian aid delivery, often in close interaction with NGOs. Ireland 
is a fascinating case in point. I address this example in the following 
chapter, where I call the close networks of humanitarian NGOs, gov-
ernment institutions, and other actors a “humanitarian complex” and 




The Humanitarian Complex and 
Challenges to the Justice Cascade
The Case of Ireland
Aid organizations such as Médecins Sans Frontières are not the only 
entities devoted to the delivery of humanitarian aid. Countries and 
their governments may also focus on humanitarian aid policies, often 
in the context of development programs. Such governments may find 
themselves in a position similar to that of aid NGOs’: they too have to 
take account of the government of the receiving country. In addition, 
donor governments often have strong organizational ties with domestic 
aid-oriented NGOs that may have deep roots in and a strong cultural 
resonance with the local population. Important for our purposes here, 
such constellations should affect how a donor country defines the situa-
tion in the receiving country, including the potential involvement of the 
receiving country’s government in mass violence. Ireland, more than the 
other countries in our sample, approximates the ideal type of a humani-
tarian and development aid–oriented country. Among the eight coun-
tries included in this study, Ireland’s aid budget is by far the highest as 
a percentage of the country’s gross national income.1 While Ireland is 
embedded in international organizations, especially the EU and the UN, 
and in important ways aligned with their policies, we should see the 
government’s position in the aid field reflected in Irish representations 
of the mass violence in Darfur.
My description of Ireland is informed by two sources of data. The 
first is a content analysis of 242 articles, including 35 opinion pieces, 
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published in the Irish Times, the dominant Irish paper on issues of for-
eign affairs. I supplemented this set of quantitative data by correspon-
dence with this paper’s foreign correspondent and by an interview with 
a prominent Irish journalist of RTÉ, Ireland’s public radio and televi-
sion station who had reported from Darfur on several occasions.2
The second source of data is a set of interviews I conducted in Ire-
land’s Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). One respondent repre-
sented Irish Aid, the humanitarian and development aid branch of the 
foreign ministry.3 An energetic woman profoundly dedicated to her 
mission, she had entered the foreign service some fifteen years earlier 
after earning a degree in political science. She had worked on Northern 
Ireland issues, served as her government’s humanitarian contact point 
to the UN in Geneva, and begun working on aid issues in the Dublin 
headquarters in 2004. She had visited Darfur in April 2005.
Two interview partners were located in the DFA’s Political Division. 
The first, the head of the Africa desk, had had a long and distinguished 
career with the DFA. He had worked on EU external relations and 
served in the UN permanent mission in New York, among other assign-
ments. He had degrees in English literature and economics and a mas-
ter’s in international public policy from a renowned private American 
university on the East Coast. The second interviewee, also from the Po-
litical Division, had been assigned to the Irish embassies of both Vienna 
and Tokyo and had been involved in the Northern Ireland talks. At the 
time of the interview, he was responsible for coordinating Ireland’s role 
in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European 
Union, with a special focus on Sudan and the Horn of Africa. His PhD 
thesis had focused on the history of Irish foreign policy.
irish foreign policy and humanitarian and 
development aid
Irish foreign policy makers express a pronounced orientation toward 
humanitarian and development aid. Not surprisingly, the respondent 
from Irish Aid articulated this stance most clearly. She reported that the 
Irish development and humanitarian aid program has a long history, 
dating back to religious missionaries “who would have gone to Africa 
and Asia in the nineteenth century.” She also highlighted the “outward 
looking” nature of Ireland resulting from its emigration history. Despite 
Ireland’s small size, such “strong roots” provide Irish policy makers 
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with “confidence of a lot of history behind the program.” Speaking of 
the current day and of Sudan in particular, she said:
A lot of our focus on Sudan was humanitarian. It doesn’t matter that you 
are a small donor when you have a humanitarian focus. You can play quite 
a large policy role or you can have quite a large profile if you are an honest 
 broker— because we are neutral. . . . There would still be about two thousand 
missionaries whom we fund for their development work. There would also 
be NGOs whose roots would have been in the Catholic  missions— Trócaire, 
for example; it means “mercy.” And they would be one of the big three Irish 
NGOs, and they would come from a Catholic ethos background.
In addition to Trócaire, described on its website as “the official de-
velopment agency of the Catholic Church in Ireland,”4 the interviewee 
referred to two other major Irish NGOs, Concern Worldwide5 and 
GOAL.6 Both are characterized as more secular, but, according to my 
interviewee, “GOAL would have done a lot of work over the years, 
again with the missionaries.”7
In line with this focus on aid policy, the interviewee’s response to my 
question about priorities in foreign policy goals is not surprising. Again, 
I offered four options: securing the survival of the affected, establishing 
peace, serving justice, and securing state sovereignty. While she saw 
these goals as lying on a “spectrum,” she insisted on the “humanitarian 
goal essentially as the first intervention. . . . If you assist people who are 
suffering, . . . that’s your sticking plaster.”
This position may not be surprising coming from a representative 
of the aid branch of the foreign ministry. Yet the aid mission was also 
mentioned frequently in my interview with the two officials from the 
Political Division. While seeing the four as a cluster of goals that would 
be reached successively, one respondent viewed the survival of the af-
fected as an “immediate imperative for us, coming from the develop-
ment and humanitarian perspective. But we recognize that you have 
to perceive that in tandem with securing peace and you cannot have 
peace in the absence of justice.” I return to the specific understanding of 
justice in greater detail below. Suffice it to say here that members of the 
Political Division, too, perceive the humanitarian goal as an immediate 
imperative.
The weight of the aid mission was further highlighted when I raised 
the issue of the peculiar status of Ireland’s foreign policy. While both of 
the Political Division representatives hastened to stress the Irish align-
ment in foreign affairs with positions taken by the European Union, 
they also insisted that they “would bring to discussions on Darfur a 
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particular humanitarian focus.  .  .  . It would always be something we 
would raise, both the humanitarian needs of the population and the im-
portance of maintaining humanitarian space for aid delivery. . . . That 
is because we have a particularly developed [humanitarian] policy com-
pared to some other EU member states.”
collective memory: cultural support for aid 
policy
Policy makers are mindful of the cultural traditions and historical expe-
riences in which current Irish foreign policy is rooted. We have shown 
elsewhere elective affinities between collective memories and current-
day policies, legislation, and implementation of laws (Savelsberg and 
King 2005, 2007). There we spelled out distinct mechanisms through 
which even a causal relationship may be established that leads from 
memories to legal forms. These mechanisms include analogical refer-
ences to the past, historical consciousness that invites receptivity to 
commemorations of past events (King 2005; Olick and Levy 1997), and 
carrier groups that transport notions of the past while simultaneously 
speaking to contemporary issues (Weber 1978; Kalberg 1994, 2014). 
This argument builds on earlier work that recognizes how symbolic 
depictions of the past provide a cognitive and moral framework that 
can impel current policy. Symbols, after all, stand for larger ideas. They 
“evoke an attitude, a set of impressions, or a pattern of events associ-
ated . . . with the symbol” (Edelman 1985:6; see also Geertz 1973).
Ireland seems a prime example of the memory-policy link. Certainly 
an elective affinity can be found between Irish memories and the human-
itarian orientation of Irish foreign policy. All interviewees are mindful 
of this affinity; indeed some believe in a causal relationship. In a first 
step, interviewees from the Political Division of the DFA highlighted 
relevant historical experiences that have been processed and incorpo-
rated into the collective memory. An extended segment of the interview, 
as it unfolded between the interviewer (JJS) and the two interviewees, 
A and B, is revealing:
A: I could hand you our aid report; it always recounts the missionaries 
that were first in Africa.
B: And missionaries in Africa experienced a famine in Ireland in the 
nineteenth century, and the population collapsed.
A: We identify with this kind of hardship strongly in Ireland.
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JJS: Do you think this is just rhetoric, or is there a real base?
A: No, I think it can be quite visceral at times.
JJS: We see all over the city memorials for the famine.
B: Yep.
A: Exactly. I think the people have a memory of themselves as one that 
went through and died of the famine. . . . Many have relatives in 
the US etc. who are there as a consequence of the kind of depriva-
tion that occurred in and after the famine. So it is quite a real his-
torical memory in Ireland. It certainly would be a reason, amongst 
others, that you would support the development program.
B: Yep.
A: And even in our very severe economic straits—
B: Yeah. I was going to say that.
A: it has survived reasonably intact.
B: Local, not general, calls for cuts.
A: You will  get— I mean, this is  democracy— people who say the first 
thing we should be cutting is aid to others in dire straits. But it 
actually does not resonate very well.
B: It has strong popular support.
One of the interviewees concluded that the humanitarian aid focus 
of Irish foreign policy is not simply a choice made by a small group 
of officials, but that it finds support in Irish popular understanding of 
African conflicts: “It is firstly the humanitarian aspect, the extent to 
which people are actually being forced into dire poverty or facing death 
or insecurity.” Not only do such statements express the belief of policy 
makers in the Irish public’s memories and the resulting popular support 
for aid policy, but the very dynamic of this exchange also indicates the 
interviewees’ own identification with Irish collective memory and their 
sense that such memory motivates and legitimizes policies oriented to-
ward humanitarian and developmental aid.
The same Irish collective memory was highlighted by my interviewee 
from Irish Aid, who sees the Irish humanitarian emphasis as supported by 
“the vulnerability that we trace back to our famine in the mid-nineteenth 
century, not specific to Sudan, I suppose, but any situation where food 
security is threatened, any situation where even the manifestation around 
the humanitarian crisis is around access to food and famine.”
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A second, and related, aspect of Irish collective memory that re-
spondents linked to foreign policy preferences is the nation’s memory 
of British rule over Ireland, a point raised by the respondents in the 
Political Division: “Many Irish people would say we were the subject 
of colonization. . . . This is an important aspect of Irish identity to this 
day. . . . It would be very present in their [the Irish people’s] sense of 
who they are.” Accordingly, in one respondent’s view, the Irish pub-
lic strongly supported the decolonization movement of the 1950s and 
1960s. The Irish public and policy makers also understood, in light of 
their country’s history, that decolonization can be effective only if ac-
companied by economic development. Development, in fact, was seen 
as a prerequisite for peace and security.
While interviewees conceded that Ireland is not alone in its view that 
peace and security have to be coupled with aid programs, they insisted 
that this emphasis is especially strong in Irish foreign policy. It was in 
this spirit, they argued, that the foreign ministry established the aid and 
development program in the early 1970s as part of the Department 
of Foreign Affairs. “That has stayed as part of the way we have ap-
proached foreign policy in the last thirty years or so,” one respondent 
said. “So it is intrinsic to our foreign policy approach.”
figure 13. The Famine Memorial in Dublin, Ireland.
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structural support for memories and policies: 
the humanitarian complex
Policy practices, guiding ideas, and associated collective memories co-
exist in symbiosis with a field of supporting social and organizational 
relationships. Actors in this field include the government of Ireland, 
here specifically the DFA; the major Irish aid NGOs, in part associated 
with the Irish Catholic Church; Ireland’s national news media, espe-
cially RTÉ; and the government of Sudan. In addition, the government 
of Ireland is embedded in a network of international relations, includ-
ing relations with international organizations, especially the EU, the 
UN and its aid organizations, and the African Union (AU). I call this 
network of relationships the humanitarian complex and I now briefly 
sketch its structure as revealed in my interviews.
The first and perhaps central component of this network is a tri-
angle consisting of the government of Ireland, Irish  NGOs— partly in 
conjunction with the Irish Catholic  Church— and the government of 
Sudan. The interviewee from Irish Aid spoke about NGOs whose roots 
are in the Catholic missions. As cited above, she highlighted Trócaire 
as the leading example, but she also points at Concern Worldwide and 
GOAL, the other two major Irish aid NGOs. While both are secular, 
GOAL also has a long tradition of working in close collaboration with 
Catholic missionaries. All three major Irish NGOs execute aid programs 
supported by the Irish DFA.
The tie between NGOs and the Irish government is further strength-
ened by regular consultations. One interviewee spoke about conferences: 
“We would generally bring in all of our Irish NGOs, our minister, and 
talk through a lot of the issues with them. . . . It works very, very well, 
and I think Darfur was probably one of the initial testing grounds for 
that type of approach.” While this interviewee recognized the NGOs’ 
interest in independence from the government, she insisted that they 
accept substantial ties nevertheless. An interviewee in the Political Divi-
sion, when asked about sources of information about Darfur, replied: 
“Often we will hear, through an Irish NGO, the views of the Anglican 
bishops or the Catholic Church in Sudan.”
The government-NGO tie intensifies whenever the Irish government 
helps NGOs gain access to regions of need. Regarding Darfur, the Irish 
Aid interviewee explained: “They [NGOs] might also have discovered 
that we can be of some assistance.  .  .  . In Darfur the issue was often 
around access, visas, and bureaucratic problems with the government 
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[of Sudan]. And we managed to solve a few of those problems over the 
years.” This ability to smooth the path for aid organizations depends 
of course on the relationship between the governments of the donating 
and receiving countries. The link between these countries thus consti-
tutes the second tie in the initial triadic relationship within the humani-
tarian aid complex. It is strengthened, but also constrained, by Ireland’s 
focus on humanitarian aid. The Irish Aid interviewee explains how a 
humanitarian focus, in combination with an “honest broker role” and 
a sense of “neutrality,” substantially strengthens her country’s policy 
role vis-à-vis countries such as Sudan. In addition, government actors 
see reason for treading cautiously in light of Irish NGOs’ engagement in 
the conflict zone. Speaking about the much more restrained wording the 
Irish government used in its critique of Sudan, especially as compared to 
US rhetoric, the RTÉ journalist stated that the Irish government “was 
also tempered by the fact that there were so many Irish people down on 
the ground, working away, and a sense that organizations like GOAL 
were achieving a lot. So that wild political rhetoric might be one thing. 
But if you are looking after 180,000 people and you are looking after 
sixteen hospitals and medical centers around Khartoum, then you are 
doing something important.” He adds that, while Ireland cooperated 
with the EU to pursue peace and justice, the Irish foreign minister’s 
visits to Sudan were “more about providing support on the ground to 
the aid agencies, to enable them to afford as much help to the people 
who are in the difficulty. That would have been the focus.  .  .  . You 
know, postindictment [of al-Bashir], GOAL, for example, was the only 
aid agency that was allowed to stay in North Darfur. Why was that? 
Because it had been there for thirty years and because it had not been 
seen as being overtly political.”
The humanitarian aid complex, the structural context in which ideas 
and policy programs are developed and memories regenerated, also in-
cludes Irish media, as indicated by the foregoing statement from a RTÉ 
journalist who had reported from Darfur. This interviewee highlights 
links between RTÉ on the one hand and Irish NGOs and the Irish gov-
ernment on the other:
Our team covered incidences in southern Sudan and the difficulties there, 
and Darfur had been off our radar. There was a report from a man called 
Walt Kilroy who was a former correspondent with RTÉ, who worked for an 
Irish aid agency called Trócaire. . . . He did a broadcast back to say “What’s 
happening here is incredible.” And that was one of the first sort of ringing 
the bell in the Irish context. . . . And then, by 2004, the Irish government 
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was beginning to make sense of it, primarily because we had agencies like 
GOAL. . . . It had a base in North Darfur. And then we had another orga-
nization called Concern Worldwide, and it had a base in [Darfur]. So there 
was a junior government minister, Tom Kitt, and he decided to go out and 
see what was going on. We had been trying to secure visas from the Sudanese 
government, but they were not in a position to give any guarantees of get-
ting a filming license to travel to Darfur. So we jumped in the plane with the 
minister. That would have been in May 2004. And we flew into Khartoum, 
spent a couple of nights there, got an update from Mike McDonagh, who 
was of the UNOCHA [UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs], and then we traveled to [several places throughout Darfur, includ-
ing Al-Jenina, Nyala, Fashir, and the GOAL center in North Darfur]. So we 
were sending reports back for radio and television. . .  . For him [Minister 
Tom Kitt] there was an awful lot of Irish aid agency involvement; there was 
a lot of Irish aid agency staff; there was a lot of Irish aid agency money. And I 
think it was probably . . . a combination of the minister’s interest and NGOs 
wanting to have the political influence that goes with having the minister 
come in and sitting down with people and saying, “This is very important 
and can you afford protection to our people.”
Pieces of information gained from interviews with the journalist 
and with DFA policy makers thus reinforce each other. They equally 
reveal network ties between the government of Ireland, Irish NGOs, 
Irish media, and the government of Sudan.
I should make clear, Irish foreign policy is not oriented toward the 
humanitarian aid field alone. Ireland is also firmly embedded in a net-
work of international organizations. One central tie is with the Euro-
pean Union, and Irish foreign policy makers insist that their policies 
are aligned with EU policies. But EU institutions also allow Irish policy 
makers to focus on their chief concerns. Interviewees spoke of their en-
gagement in the European Commission’s aid-related institutions. They 
pointed, for example, to a formal humanitarian aid working group that 
met every four weeks. Instituted only after the height of the Darfur 
conflict, it was, however, preceded by regular information meetings that 
also addressed issues of aid to Darfur during the peak of the conflict. In 
this institutional context, EU special representative Rosalind Marsden 
was a regular addressee of Irish pleas that the EU keep its eyes on the 
suffering in Darfur.
Ireland’s involvement in humanitarian aid issues also colors the ties 
it has with UN suborganizations. Respondents referred to Mike Mc-
Donagh, an Irish citizen working for the UN Office for the Coordina-
tion of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), specifically for the office in 
Sudan, who was appointed its head in 2007. McDonagh had moved 
Challenges to the Justice Cascade  |  143
into this position after working for Concern Worldwide, the Irish NGO 
cited above, for thirty years. In addition to linking the Irish NGO tradi-
tion with UN work on Darfur, he also provided information for Irish 
journalists. The RTÉ interviewee characterized him as someone with 
“a wide experience of disaster conflict and the impact it has on people 
involved. So, he was a core [source of information].”
Irish foreign policy, finally, also maintains a mission to the African 
Union in Addis Ababa, as does the EU, and foreign policy interviewees 
in Dublin recognized and paid tribute to the AU’s increasing weight on 
the African continent.
In short, even a brief look at the field of Irish foreign relations reveals 
a network of actors that clusters around humanitarian and develop-
ment aid and that includes members of the Political and Aid Divisions 
of the Department of Foreign Affairs, major Irish NGOs, the Catholic 
Church (with which one of these NGOs is closely affiliated), and Ire-
land’s public media. By necessity, members of this network who are 
responsible for organizing aid need to maintain working relationships 
with the government of Sudan or at least with some of its agencies. Just 
like aid NGOs, these actors depend on that government for visas, ac-
cess to the region, and permits to operate in different regions of Sudan, 
including Darfur. And again, while Ireland is incorporated into various 
international organizations whose members bring diverse policy foci to 
the table, and while Ireland cannot be reduced to an aid perspective, 
its structural position, cultural orientation, and policy practices most 
closely approximate the ideal type of an aid-oriented country. Irish for-
eign policy is enabled and constrained by the institutional logic of the 
aid field, and the habitus of its actors reflects their identification with 
the aid mission.
In short, I found an elective affinity between Ireland’s policy orienta-
tion toward humanitarian and development aid; the collective memo-
ries that nourish that orientation and that are reproduced by it; and 
the structure of the Irish foreign policy field. This ensemble of social, 
cultural, and political forces is likely to color Ireland’s collective repre-
sentation of the Darfur conflict, to which I now turn.
irish representations of darfur
One of the interviewees in the Irish foreign ministry expressed a perspec-
tive that resembles Bourdieuian ideas about the knowledge-generating 
force of fields: “Perhaps it is an unusual situation that much of our 
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engagement in Africa is a development engagement. And that is a prism 
we see many African issues through.” To portray the Irish representa-
tion of the Darfur conflict, I again organize findings along the same 
set of dimensions used in the analysis of US news articles in chapter 3: 
suffering and victimhood; causes and origins of the conflict; actors; and 
framing. Here I draw on my interviews with Irish foreign policy mak-
ers and on the systematic content analysis of reporting on Darfur in the 
Irish Times, part of our Darfur media data set from eight countries. 
These data allow a comparative analysis of the particularities of Irish 
media reporting.
Suffering and Victimhood
As in the depictions of suffering encountered in documents and among 
interviewees from the aid NGO Doctors Without Borders, Ireland’s ori-
entation toward humanitarianism in no way diminishes the acknowl-
edgment of suffering. The Irish Aid interviewee cited the “one and a 
half million” people who were deprived of “basic human needs” such 
as “shelter, clean water, protection, food.” Despite her aversion to a 
deeper discussion of the causes of the conflict, she did add that this de-
privation occurred in a context in which “insecurity was also overlaid 
on top of the deprivation of basic needs.  .  .  . People were also living 
in an atmosphere of uncertainty and violence.” Yet she contrasted her 
organization’s efforts to “report dispassionately” with the “sensational-
ized” nature of media coverage. And, again, while she referred to Jan-
jawiid “attacks on IDP camps and . . . attacks, if I recall correctly, in 
the first instance on villages,” she is reluctant to go into greater depth: 
“My focus was [more] on alleviating the suffering than necessarily on 
needing an entirely complete analysis of the perpetrators. Identifying 
the victim was certainly important; identifying who was suffering was 
very important, and targeting the needs of the population. In a complex 
emergency like that a lot of my focus would have been on that rather 
than saying the rights or wrongs of the situation.”
When asked about the number of victims, she cited the numbers typi-
cally published by the UN (200,000 dead). She added, though: “I’ve 
never seen any UN official report to say that all deaths were from at-
tacks by either side. They were deaths because people were deprived of 
basic needs and services.” This focus on the causes of death associated 
with deprivation in IDP camps aligns with her humanitarian perspective. 
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Also, when commenting on the rape of women, she highlighted those 
incidents in which women left IDP camps to gather firewood, and she 
stressed the need for protection of these humanitarian aid settings. My 
questions regarding the degree and types of suffering, when directed 
at the interviewees from the Political Division, yielded little additional 
information.
Unlike the DFA interviewees, the RTÉ respondent spoke more di-
rectly to the violence in Darfur. While he insisted that journalists must 
report each actor’s view of the situation, including the Sudan govern-
ment’s, he added that journalistic investigation would provide evidence 
that allowed the viewer or listener to form an independent judgment on 
the events:
In 2004 we were able to go to some of the villages that had been burnt 
down. . . . We were able to get people’s firsthand accounts of how they spoke 
first about the bombings that happened from the air. Bombings from the air 
happen only one  way— that is, through government support. And after that, 
men on horseback or camels or trucks came through.  .  .  . They rounded 
up the men, raped the women. People were herded out. Everyone who was 
deemed to have been a problem was killed, and the place was erased to the 
ground.
This journalistic account demonstrates that media involvement in the 
network of the humanitarian aid field does not eliminate journalistic 
independence. The sentiment we encounter in this statement is certainly 
not cast in diplomatic or humanitarian caution. This interview find-
ing is confirmed by our quantitative analysis. News reporting in Ire-
land generally did not downplay the suffering of the victims of Darfur. 
Figure 14.A shows that the Irish Times addressed killings in Darfur at 
about the same rate as the major newspapers in seven other Western 
countries. Rapes were reported even more frequently than elsewhere 
(figure 14.B). Putting this observation in perspective, I should add that 
rape was reported in the English-speaking countries at about double the 
rate in the French- and German-speaking ones. The overrepresentation 
of rape reports is actually less pronounced for Ireland than it is for the 
average reports of the United Kingdom, the United States, or Canada. 
Finally, and importantly, displacements were reported more often in the 
Irish Times, especially in opinion pieces, than in papers from the other 
seven countries (Figure 14.C).8 This is in line with the attention that 
humanitarian aid organizations directed at the very people who sought 
refuge in IDP or refugee camps.
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figure 14. Percentage of Irish media documents that address killings, rapes, and 
displacements, compared to all other media documents.
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Causes, Actors, and Frames
While Irish representations acknowledge the suffering in Darfur, the 
narrative related by the interviewee from Irish Aid already indicated 
some caution about implicating the Sudanese state as a perpetrator of 
violence. Differences between the aid policy depiction and the human 
rights representation become starker when we consider accounts about 
causes, responsible actors, and the framing of the violence.
One of the Political Division interviewees, when asked about the 
origins of the conflict and responsible actors, first spoke to the neglect 
of Sudan’s periphery by its center. His colleague confirmed the cen-
ter-periphery conflict and also commented on the destabilizing role of 
surrounding countries such as Chad, the rebel groups (JEM), and the 
Janjawiid, “supported by the Sudanese government.” That latter com-
ment notwithstanding, the interviewer implicated Khartoum less di-
rectly than the human rights narrative did: “At the earlier stages it was a 
highly complex conflict in which a variety of  forces— be they supported 
from Khartoum, be they semi-resident in Chad, be they part of the Dar-
furi community  itself— all were struggling to gain an advantage, keep 
territory, and undermine others. And within that there was no space 
for protecting citizens.” When asked about responsible actors, the in-
terviewees in the Political Division uttered neither names nor positions. 
Regarding the government of Sudan, one reasoned that it “arrived at a 
point where it has effectively either ungoverned or misgoverned spaces 
in its own country.” The same respondent did, however, commend the 
ICC for having “done a good job in identifying those who carried out 
and supported certain atrocities.” As in other instances of diplomatic 
speech, wherein institutions or individuals refuse to name names, refer-
ring to court decisions appears to be one acceptable way of indirectly 
hinting at responsible actors.
The Irish Aid interviewee responded with similar caution to my ques-
tions about causes and responsible actors. She referred to tribal conflict, 
“land degradation issues and climate issues that occurred over a fairly 
long period of time.” Taking a shorter-term perspective, she said that 
the “SLA [Sudan Liberation Army, a rebel group] basically lost patience 
and . . . they felt that their side was being pushed around in terms of 
access to resources,  and— at the rebel  level— they decided that they were 
going to take up arms. You will see in anything you read about Darfur 
that the violence certainly emanated initially from the rebel side, but 
that it was the scale of the reaction by Khartoum that exacerbated the 
148  |  Aid versus Justice
whole situation.” While the respondent did not deny the escalating role 
of government actions, she focused on the rebels and their violent ac-
tions against the government as the initiators of the conflict. This line of 
argument is consistent with humanitarian programs’ need to maintain 
constructive relationships with the government of the receiving country.
Even the RTÉ journalist, who had used rather blunt words when 
asked about the victimization of the local population, expressed more 
caution in his responses to questions about the causes of the conflict and 
responsible actors. He too referred to “increasing desertification,” issues 
between “farmers and nomadic people,” the center-periphery conflict in 
Sudan, Chadian destabilization, and the inspiration rebels received from 
the apparent success of the southern rebellion in achieving an independent 
state. He supplemented such cautious speech, however, by pointing to the 
Janjawiid, who either worked “hand in glove with the government” or 
were “a response to armed actions by the SLA.” But, then again, he in-
sisted that “the situation is so much more complex and the conflict lines 
are so much less clearly drawn than it is sometimes presented.” He spoke 
of the “splintering of the armed opposition groups in Darfur,” mixed in 
with “banditry.” Talk about complexity is likely to reduce responsibil-
ity assigned leading state actors, and this interviewee made that point 
explicit in one additional statement: “You are either of the view that 
the president controls absolutely everything and if he wanted it [snaps 
fingers], it would happen right then. Or you are of the view that this is an 
area of disintegration, and that would be more my view.”
When asked about appropriate ways to frame the conflict, all respon-
dents emphasized humanitarian catastrophe. Least surprisingly, the 
Irish Aid interviewee found the humanitarian perspective a “point of 
view that’s the most relevant. It’s an impact lens rather than a causality 
lens.” Also the interviewees in the Political Division and the journalist 
interviewee accepted this frame unambiguously. I received more mixed 
responses, on the other hand, when inquiring about the insurrection 
and civil war frames.
Responses to my inquiry about the appropriateness of applying a 
state crime frame to the violence in Darfur are of special interest, as I 
contrast the humanitarian with the human rights narrative. The inter-
viewee from Irish Aid provided a somewhat meandering answer worth 
quoting:
I’m not a lawyer, and that has always troubled me a bit in terms of the likes 
of the ICC and how one attributes responsibility. I often feel people are very 
quick to judge a situation and draw conclusions. . . . There certainly seemed 
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to be plenty of anecdotal evidence, the likes of the media reportage around 
those burned villages. It could be said that there was a level of evidence of 
state involvement. . . . I suppose I prefer my focus to come across as being 
that my predominant interest in the situation was on the humanitarian port-
folio and that, as a result, I am doing 99 percent of my work without need-
ing to attribute responsibility. . . . It certainly did not escape my attention 
that it was not a clear-cut situation, because nothing in Sudan is. It is a very 
complex, opaque construct.
This response leads us from a reference to lawyers and the ICC as 
concerned with identifying responsible actors, to a cautious accusation 
of the Sudanese state, and finally back again to an insistence that iden-
tifying responsible actors is outside the jurisdiction of the Irish DFA, es-
pecially Irish Aid. Respondents in the Political Division are more openly 
critical of the Sudanese state, but they, too, express caution about the 
crime frame:
Clearly Sudan is not a failed or failing state, but for large parts of its ter-
ritory it’s at best a negligent state. .  .  . But, you know,  criminal— some of 
the acts of the Sudanese government one could classify as criminal in terms 
of the use of violence against the population. But before it was criminal, it 
was negligent. But negligent is almost too benign because I think it’s active 
negligence.  .  .  . There is certainly a degradation of all facilities and rights 
and organization of the state that citizens would have some right to expect. 
And that, then, leads to the degree of not policing, allowing impunity, for 
example. At that point the law has virtually no meaning. It becomes a matter 
of interchange between tribes, and so that is what was allowed to develop, 
even going beyond “allowed to develop,” it was participated in by the Khar-
toum government.
This statement betrays much uncertainty as it refers to the Sudanese 
state alternatingly as a negligent state, an actively negligent state, and a 
state that engages in some acts that could be considered criminal.
Only the RTÉ journalist unambiguously embraced the state crime 
frame: “Absolutely. You cannot bomb villages and send troops through, 
or at least be aware of that happening, and not take steps to prevent that 
from happening.” He simultaneously rejects the notion of genocide: “In 
my reporting I never gave an opinion. . . . I wouldn’t feel legally savvy 
enough. . . . That really is a matter for the courts.”
Our quantitative data, based on content analysis of reports about the 
Darfur conflict published in the Irish Times, reflects the sentiments that 
prevailed in the interviews. While the acknowledgement of suffering and 
victimization of the Darfuri population does not lag in Irish interviews 
and media reports, media messages are more cautious about citing the 
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crime frame. To be sure, as Figure 15.A shows, media reports do not shy 
away from referring to the violence as criminal. Yet they do so more cau-
tiously than media from the seven other countries under examination. 
As in previous analyses, differences are more pronounced in opinion 
pieces than in news articles. The same pattern applies to media reports 
referring to the violence as a case of genocide (see figure 15.B).9 This 
again is not surprising, as genocide is generally treated with particular 
caution among those who seek not to dramatize the violence in Darfur.10
Skepticism about Criminal Justice
Irish reluctance to apply a state crime frame to the violence in Dar-
fur suggests that support for a legal response, especially a criminal jus-
tice response, will be weak, at best. Given the experience with MSF 
interviewees, we should expect caution to be especially pronounced in 
interview statements by the respondent from Irish Aid. And, indeed, 
her responses do reflect considerable reservations about criminal pro-
ceedings in Irish foreign policy. While she did express some openness 
toward transitional justice in the broader sense of the term, she was 
skeptical about any role for criminal courts in the Darfur conflict:
I don’t think Sudan would be alone if an impunity road was chosen. . . . I am 
not even sure you characterize it exclusively as impunity, do you? You’ve got 
your truth commissions, you got your amnesties. There are different posi-
tions taken by countries coming out of conflict. In the north of Ireland there 
is consensus on whether a truth and reconciliation commission is the right 
approach. There was effectively an amnesty in 1998, I think, for prisoners, 
for people who were already in prison for terrorist offenses. So that’s not 
impunity per se. . . . You’ve seen lots of very interesting transitional justice 
processes in Africa, the likes of the gacaca in Rwanda, and you’ve had your 
truth and reconciliation commissions. And Sudan is so huge; it’s not a mono-
lith, it’s not a homogeneous context. . . . [A pure criminal justice approach] 
would be a strong component if you can bring absolutely everybody who is 
responsible for anything to justice. But in the context where it is not quite so 
clear and where you look at how development is to be allowed to take place, 
I think you need a certain amount of creativity in terms of how you respond 
to peoples’ justifiable need for some redress. But if the quality of their lives is 
not going to improve because you have made the issue two-sided again, . . . 
there is no likelihood that development gains will happen, because the situa-
tion is so polarized. It defeats the purpose of redress.
Respondents in the Political Division were more open to legal re-
sponses, but they too expressed some degree of doubt and prefer a 
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figure 15. Percentage of Irish media documents citing the crime frame and using the 
genocide label, compared to all other media documents.
cautious approach. After having stated that development depends on 
peace and that there cannot be secure peace without justice, one in-
terviewee continued: “The pursuit of justice in South Africa is a good 
example here. Justice needs to be part of the peace process and not al-
lowed to become used as an obstacle to participation.” His colleague 
added that “the isolated pursuit of justice is possible, but it is likely 
to have considerable limitations in its effect if it is not accompanied 
by other aspects.” To be sure, the criminal justice process, especially 
ICC interventions, were not seen in an entirely negative light. Both in-
terviewees in the Political Division agreed that ICC prosecution might 
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push President al-Bashir into a more conciliatory approach, that he may 
“recognize that a more responsive and a more responsible policy in rela-
tion to the South may mitigate the way he may be handled in the future 
or, who knows, he may hope it gets him off the hook entirely.”
The skepticism we encounter here toward a criminal justice response 
to Darfur is in line with the tension observed throughout this chapter 
between an aid approach and penal strategies. In addition, the Irish in-
terviews reveal traces of collective memory that nourish such skepticism. 
This more recent memory to which my interviewees referred concerns 
the Northern Ireland conflict and the above lengthy statement of the 
Irish Aid interviewee speaks to that. Not accidentally, she had previ-
ously worked on Northern Ireland issues in the foreign ministry. She 
remembered that the situation was dealt with as a “terrorist situation” 
and that one “could have taken a very strong approach, which was done 
up until 1994.  .  .  . And eventually everybody came to the conclusion 
that . . . neither side would win.” This memory of the Northern Ireland 
conflict is not free-floating, and it is not fully explained with a refer-
ence to carrier groups. Instead it is institutionalized within the political 
administration. Interview respondents in the DFA told me about a unit 
within the Political Division, set up with the goal of drawing lessons 
from the Northern Ireland experience and applying such lessons to con-
flicts globally. I encountered confidence that such lessons will become a 
major part of DFA humanitarian and development aid programming.
conclusions: the humanitarian complex and 
its representations of mass violence
This study of Ireland, a country with a strong humanitarian aid ori-
entation, confirms and adds to insights from the previous chapter 
on humanitarian NGOs. For aid-oriented government actors, as for 
humanitarian aid organizations, the government of the receiving coun-
try is a major player in attempts to deliver assistance to suffering popu-
lations. This is also true when leaders of that government are charged 
with grave crimes by the ICC or any other court. In fact, the situation 
for countries with aid-oriented foreign policies is more complex than 
that for INGOs. In the case of Ireland, the government itself is tied into 
a field I have termed a humanitarian aid complex. It involves major 
NGOs, partly affiliated with the Catholic Church; the governments of 
the donating and receiving countries; and even media organizations of 
the donating country.
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And, as in the case of MSF, the representation of the mass violence in 
Darfur takes a particular shape, quite distinct from that of the human 
rights field. Again, there is no denial of suffering. In the humanitarian 
complex, too, the pain and deprivation of the population in areas of 
conflict are documented and communicated to a world audience. Yet 
here, as in the case of INGOs, those aspects of suffering are stressed 
that can be addressed by humanitarian aid programs. The depiction 
of displacements and the deprivation suffered in IDP or refugee camps 
trumps that of mass killings by the military and their affiliated militias. 
And again, critique of the government of Sudan is more muted than 
that encountered in the human rights field. In line with such caution, 
the humanitarian emergency frame is privileged over the state crime 
frame.
The elective affinity identified between the humanitarian aid field and 
the specific representation of the violence by aid actors clearly involves 
causal ties. As they depend on the cooperation of the Sudanese state to 
grant visas and permits to travel and deliver aid, humanitarian actors 
exercise caution with regard to the government of Sudan. This argu-
ment is further strengthened when actors in this field include religious 
organizations such as the Catholic Church in Ireland. Amnesty inter-
viewees in Germany likewise indicated that the public understanding 
of the Darfur conflict was inspired by the country’s major churches and 
was oriented more toward a humanitarian catastrophe than toward a 
criminal accountability model.
The Irish case of the humanitarian complex, like that of MSF, thus 
approximates an ideal-typical depiction of a humanitarian catastrophe 
in the aid field. But the lesson is broader. Elsewhere, using advanced 
statistical analysis, we confirmed that the patterns identified for Ireland 
apply across countries with varying foci on humanitarianism (Savels-
berg and Nyseth Brehm 2015). In other words, the more a country is 
invested in humanitarian aid, the more likely will its media subscribe 
to a narrative dominated by humanitarian concerns. Note further that 
Ireland only approximates a humanitarian ideal type. Even here, the 
country’s aid-oriented focus is partly neutralized by its membership 
in international organizations that represent a wider range of policy 
preferences. Global and international scripts, too, matter to Irish policy 
makers, in line with the World Polity School. Yet the stress, common in 
historicizing branches of neo-Weberianism, on national carrier groups 
and cultural sensitivities finds especially strong support in the case of 
Ireland.
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How, then, are humanitarian representations communicated to 
global society? Before turning to this question, part III examines an-
other field whose representation of mass violence may conflict with that 
generated in the context of the justice cascade: diplomacy and foreign 






“If you want to make peace in Darfur through negotiations, you have to 
deal with the Sudanese government and you have to deal with the peo-
ple who hold the power in the Sudanese government, and that includes 
Omar al-Bashir. If you want to achieve justice through the International 
Criminal Court, well, then you should stigmatize someone who is in-
dicted. You shouldn’t talk to Omar al-Bashir. Right?”
One of my interviewees from the world of foreign policy and di-
plomacy thus succinctly addressed a key difference between the justice 
field and that of foreign policy, where diplomacy is a central tool. Ac-
tors in the latter seek to include players in the field, no matter their 
responsibility for immense suffering; actors in the former seek to ex-
clude certain players. Foreign policy is not identical with diplomacy, of 
course. Threats of military intervention and the potential of economic 
sanctions, positive and negative, are among its tools. And so are hints 
at judicial consequences for human rights offenses. Diplomats may use 
such threats (and rewards) as they engage with leaders and agents of 
foreign governments. But engage with them they do, and they thus de-
pend on maintaining network  ties— diplomatic capital. Diplomacy dif-
fers from the justice field in another essential way: it is oriented toward 
substantive outcomes, in stark contrast to the procedural orientation of 
criminal proceedings. What are the consequences of these differences 
for representations of the Darfur conflict in the diplomatic field?
chapter 6
Diplomatic Representations  
of Mass Violence
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Previous scholarship has identified the cautious rhetoric of govern-
ments regarding the term genocide. Samantha Power (2002), now the 
US ambassador to the United Nations, argued in her Pulitzer Prize– 
winning book, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide, 
in the case of the United States: “The U.S. Government not only abstains 
from sending its troops, but it takes very few steps along a continuum 
of intervention to deter genocide. U.S. officials .  .  . render the blood-
shed two-sided and inevitable, not genocidal. . . . They avoid use of the 
term ‘genocide’ ” (xviii). Political scientist Karen Smith (2010) identi-
fies similar patterns for France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, for 
post–World War II history generally and for these countries’ specific 
responses to mass violence in Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, and Darfur: 
“[Q]uite a few European governments were hostile to the Genocide 
Convention, and some took decades to ratify it. Furthermore, European 
governments are not keen on using the term to describe atrocities” (2).
Power (2002) and K. Smith (2010) do not just describe but also seek to 
explain the cautious rhetoric of governments. Their argument is based on 
the assumption that rational foreign policy actors seek to avoid pressure 
toward intervention, possibly by military means, given that such inter-
vention is almost always unpopular among their countries’ populations.1 
This explanation is meaningful but seems incomplete. My data suggest 
that it needs to be complemented by a theory that takes seriously condi-
tions in the diplomatic field and the habitus it generates. The government 
of the perpetrating country is a player in that field, and diplomats depend 
on active cooperation by its agents to pursue their negotiations toward 
substantive outcomes. It is this field condition that prompts their caution 
about using exclusionary rhetoric, a hallmark of the institutional logic of 
criminal law, as well as their caution against the use of direct language, 
even when rational thought about the political consequences of inter-
ventions has not been activated. In short, governments are reluctant to 
use strong means, especially military intervention, in cases of genocide or 
mass atrocities in distant lands. This reluctance is reinforced by the incli-
nation of actors in the diplomatic field to capitalize on past social ties in 
international relations, a disposition that has become part of the habitus 
of diplomats. Avoiding strong language and strategies that would force a 
breakdown of communication appears natural to them.
Just as field theory helps explain differences and competition between 
narratives about mass violence generated in the criminal justice versus hu-
manitarian aid fields, it suggests that we should expect yet another distinc-
tive representation in the field of diplomacy with its unique constellation 
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of actors. My interviews with diplomats and the documents I gathered 
from foreign ministries show, not surprisingly, that many participants in 
the foreign policy and diplomacy fields, just like their counterparts in the 
humanitarian aid field, are cautious to hostile in their views regarding 
the notion of individual criminal liability for grave human rights viola-
tions. They resent the heart of the justice cascade. In fact, their accounts 
often challenge the idea that responsibility can be attributed to specific 
individuals or that doing so, even where possible, would be “helpful.”2
While the display of a common denominator, or master narrative, 
in diplomatic accounts of the Darfur conflict is in line with field the-
ory, I nevertheless expect foreign policy and its narratives to vary in 
cross-national  comparison— a topic I address in the following chapter. 
In addition to a common denominator and cross-national variation in 
responses to Darfur, I further anticipate variation within countries. For-
eign policy makers differ in terms of educational background, career 
paths within the foreign service, and especially the specific organiza-
tional units within departments of foreign affairs in which they formu-
late their positions on mass atrocities. While my interviewees paid at 
least lip service to the mission of the International Criminal Court, only 
some clearly identified with its mission.  Others— even within the same 
 country— displayed skepticism, in principle or in practice.
This chapter begins with a brief overview of relevant data. I then 
show how the field of diplomacy presents itself in the case of Darfur. 
What goals do diplomats identify with? Which actors matter in this 
pursuit? What sources of information do diplomats draw from? How 
does their habitus correspond with the field, and what traces from dia-
chronically (education) and synchronically (nation, organizational unit) 
overlapping fields do we find? Next, I sketch, based on my interviews, 
a diplomatic narrative of the Darfur conflict. As in previous chapters, I 
consider causes of the conflict, central actors who bear responsibility for 
the violence, victimization, and suffering, as well as the frame deemed 
appropriate for an interpretation of the violence. I indeed identify a dip-
lomatic master narrative, approximating an ideal type, a narrative that 
starkly contrasts with criminal justice representations of the same event.
interviews, foreign ministry websites, and the 
media data set
I conducted a total of twelve semistructured interviews with thirteen 
Darfur experts in foreign ministries, each lasting between one and two 
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hours and yielding some five hundred pages of transcript. Interviewees 
included actors from all six European countries considered through-
out this  study— Austria, France, Germany, Ireland, the United King-
dom, and Switzerland, as well as a seventh, the Netherlands. A small 
conference on representations of the Darfur conflict held at the Rock-
efeller Bellagio Center included US diplomats from the Bill Clinton and 
George W. Bush administrations and provided opportunities for formal 
and informal communication on the issues addressed in my question-
naire. These American diplomats and two European interviewees also 
supplied me with publications they had authored on the Darfur conflict.
Diplomat interviewees were all engaged in work on Sudan generally, 
Darfur specifically, issues of international law and the ICC, or some 
combination of these. Eight were placed in their ministry’s political divi-
sions, where treaties are negotiated, arbitration is organized, and com-
munication is cultivated with other governments, including hostile ones. 
Two worked in legal divisions, with responsibilities for international 
justice institutions, and one in her ministry’s development and humani-
tarian aid division. Two respondents were at the periphery of the field, 
in research institutions with consulting and support functions for their 
respective foreign ministries.
Interviewees had various educational backgrounds. Five held law 
degrees (two with specializations in international law, one in combina-
tion with political science); four held degrees in political science; and 
one, a degree in international public policy (supplemented by econom-
ics and English literature degrees). While law and political science thus 
dominated, there were exceptions: one respondent had earned his PhD 
with a thesis on the history of his country’s foreign policy; another held 
degrees in history and geography with a focus on Africa; and yet an-
other had a background in natural science. Not surprisingly, two of 
the respondents with law degrees were placed in legal divisions of their 
foreign ministries. In line with insights from earlier chapters we should 
expect the lawyers in legal divisions of foreign ministries to produce a 
Darfur narrative that most clearly deviates from the ideal-typical rep-
resentation of the diplomacy field, one that may well show an affinity 
with the justice narrative.
Many interviewees, even among the younger cohorts, had substantial 
foreign experience. Three had done part of their studies abroad, and 
two of these had earned advanced degrees at foreign universities (both 
in the United States). Eight had spent substantial portions of their for-
eign service careers abroad. Some had visited Sudan, including Darfur, 
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and three had worked for extensive periods in their countries’ missions 
in Khartoum. There they had regularly interacted with representatives 
of the Sudanese state. Within the world of diplomacy, these three actors 
are structurally closest to that part of the diplomatic field that encom-
passes the Sudanese state. Their account of the conflict should most 
evidently be in line with the diplomatic master narrative on Darfur and 
most distinct from the criminal justice narrative.
Supplementing the interview data is a content analysis of websites of 
the foreign ministries, specifically foreign ministry press releases found 
thereon for seven of our eight countries.3 I also draw on findings from 
the Darfur media data set to compare diplomatic sentiments across 
countries with patterns from the societies in which they are embedded.
the field of diplomacy and the habitus  
of its actors
Interacting with the Sudanese State
When I conducted my interviews, between December 2010 and July 
2011, two major diplomatic efforts were under way. The first was the 
implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005, 
intended to settle the devastating Second Sudanese Civil War between 
the country’s North and South, with its estimated two million dead. 
The second was the most recent major attempt to bring peace to Darfur: 
the Doha peace negotiations, following the ill-fated Abuja Peace Agree-
ment of 2006. These Doha negotiations were finalized in the spring of 
2011, after two and a half years of diplomatic labor. Both processes 
loomed large in the minds of the diplomats I interviewed, and colored 
their reading of the conflict.
The CPA is also known as the Naivasha Agreement, named after 
the Kenyan town where most of its components were negotiated be-
tween 2002 and 2004 and where the final comprehensive agreement 
was signed on January 9, 2005. The contracting parties were the 
government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement 
(SPLM). The process was advanced by the Intergovernmental Author-
ity for Development (IGAD), a trading group of East African countries, 
and the IGAD Partners, a consortium of donors that included three of 
the countries considered in this analysis (i.e., the Netherlands, United 
Kingdom, and United States). The CPA resulted in the formation of the 
shaky Government of National Unity for Sudan after 2005 and in the 
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withdrawal of northern Sudanese troops from South Sudan in January 
2008. As part of the CPA, a referendum was held in January 2011 in 
which the population of southern Sudan almost unanimously voted to 
separate from the North. We know today that the establishment of the 
new country, enthusiastically celebrated by the South Sudanese popula-
tion at the time, but accompanied by cautious commentary from politi-
cal analysts and informed journalists, resulted in a state at risk of failing 
and in a new, brutal civil war between military factions organized 
around fiefs, partly on the basis of ethnicity (with the Nuer and Dinka 
as the dominant groups), within the South. Since late 2013, the death 
toll has climbed with frightening speed. Yet in 2011 the implementation 
of the CPA appeared as a major triumph of diplomacy. After all, a long 
and bloody civil war had been settled by diplomatic means. The ques-
tion on the minds of many interviewees was whether the government of 
Sudan would cooperate until the very end and whether it would indeed 
allow independence to take place and would permit control over mas-
sive oil fields to shift to its new neighbor. Simultaneously, would the 
Sudan government continue the Doha peace process on Darfur, then 
approaching a conclusion? Or would Khartoum at the last moment de-
stroy the fruit of hard diplomatic labor that was expected to replace a 
legacy of mass violence with enduring peace?
A diplomat from the political division of the foreign ministry of a 
large European country who had previously spent years in his country’s 
embassy in Khartoum spoke about diplomatic efforts focused on Sudan. 
His words illustrate well a diplomatic strategy vis-à-vis the CPA process 
and the role attributed to the government of Sudan: “Our first priority 
is securing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and to accompany it 
all the way through [to] its, ideally complete, implementation. That is 
especially, right now, that the referendum on the independence of South 
Sudan will be held, and then the, in all likelihood, subsequent indepen-
dence of South Sudan [will take effect] in July 2011. That is the first 
pillar” (author’s translation).
The interviewee then addressed the risk of South Sudan becoming 
a “pre-failed state,” an outcome “the international community cannot 
afford.” Contributing to a functioning infrastructure in South Sudan 
was thus considered the second component of his country’s policy. The 
third pillar linked the CPA to the Doha negotiations on Darfur: “Of 
course there will be no peace in the region if the Darfur problem does 
not get resolved. That means we have to accompany the Doha peace 
process and promote it in a way that it will result, over [the] short 
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or long [term], in a sustainable peace solution for Darfur, and that 
then also the UNAMID mission of the United Nations will become a 
success” (author’s translation).
This interviewee, himself head of an interdepartmental task force on 
Darfur, reported with pride that units within his ministry had come to 
an agreement regarding their Sudan policy: the most important pursuit 
vis-à-vis Sudan for 2010–2011 would be to help the peace negotiations 
in Doha succeed, with all parties to the conflict included.
The final pillar of this country’s policy consequently addresses the 
role of the Sudan government in this process:
And the fourth pillar is the inclusion of northern Sudan into this peace so-
lution and, of course, the stabilization of this region. Because, upon close 
inspection of the last five years of the implementation of the CPA and the 
Darfur War, there was always one evildoer, and this evildoer has then, 
for pure survival reasons or simply in opposition to international pressure 
against him, torpedoed all peace  solutions— or could torpedo all peace solu-
tions. He has done it, too, in the past. The proper key to a peace in the region 
is thus the inclusion of the regime in Khartoum in the peace solution and 
its liberation from international isolation, in combination with appropri-
ate incentives to which the international community will then have to stick. 
(author’s translation)
This explanation illustrates well the premium placed on diplomatic 
efforts and on the inclusion of the government of Sudan in the pro-
cess of settling the conflict, not just between Sudan and South Sudan 
but also within Darfur. The same interviewee insisted that appropri-
ate methods include bracketing the ICC charges against al-Bashir (“gar 
nicht darüber reden”) and providing the government with incentives, 
though with an undertone of potential sanctions should the incentives 
not work (“wir können auch anders”). This interview segment illus-
trates that the government of Sudan plays an even more powerful role 
in the field of diplomacy than it does in the field of humanitarian aid. 
At issue in diplomacy is active cooperation and compromising at the 
country’s leadership level; in humanitarianism, the issue is toleration 
(and possibly cooperation) at lower levels of state administration, and 
in exchange for resources provided and services delivered by NGOs and 
international agencies.
The statements cited above are characteristic of sentiments I encoun-
tered in the world of diplomacy generally. One interviewee from another 
large European country expressed similar hopes and caution regarding 
the government of Sudan: “There was obviously a lot of work being put 
164  |  Peace versus Justice
in, internationally, into the North-South agreement.  .  .  . After twenty 
years, two million people killed, there was such desire to bring that to 
a conclusion and get the CPA signed that people said: ‘Look at Darfur, 
it is terrible, but we can’t rock the boat, we can’t jeopardize the CPA 
negotiations.’ ” Again, the argument goes, the government of Sudan 
must be kept in the game, treated with respect, even offered incentives, 
so as to capitalize on the diplomatic investments of previous years. One 
interviewee spoke with pride about his (relatively small) country’s status 
as a formal witness of the CPA and its chairing of one of three working 
groups of the Assessment and Evaluation Commission, the international 
body set up to observe the implementation of the CPA.
Diplomats also report many less visible activities. One of the small 
European countries with substantial expertise in the banking sector, 
for example, advised the government of Sudan on issues of debt relief 
should the North have to shoulder, as a consequence of the CPA, the 
debt of the entire country. The same country provided the South with 
expertise on writing a federal constitution for a multiethnic country, 
a feature both provider and recipient shared. This country had hosted 
numerous delegations from Sudan, including ministers, legislators, 
and financiers from the North and South, for seminars on constitution 
building, currency, and finance.
Within the world of diplomacy, clear rationales seem to drive most 
diplomatic efforts. Yet actors in the diplomatic field also identify 
strongly with their role. In fact, their habitus is shaped by their posi-
tion in the diplomatic field. They have internalized the field’s doxa, its 
matter-of-course assumptions. Diplomats intuitively know what politi-
cal science research confirms: that as mediators they can succeed only 
if they strongly relate to the issue at stake, take a moderate position, 
and abstain from bias toward any one side in the conflict (Kydd 2006).4 
One interviewee, from a smaller European country with a special repu-
tation for its expertise in mediation, reported on his ministry’s chief 
negotiators:
We had two mediators in the Darfur conflict, both with substantial expe-
rience and expert knowledge in the areas of mediation, conflict analysis, 
constitutional law, peace and conflict research, regional analysis [on] Sudan 
and [the] Horn of Africa. . . . They were able to play a significant role in the 
course of the peace processes, one in Abuja; the other spent over three years 
in Khartoum and was especially involved in the Doha negotiations in sup-
port of chief mediator Jibril Basole. Both experts also work as coaches and 
university instructors. They thus connect theory and praxis in many ways. 
[Commenting on demanding travel schedules and the resulting hardship for 
Diplomatic Representations of Mass Violence   |  165
personal and family life:] People who devoted their hearts and souls to these 
processes [mit Herzblut in diesen Prozessen waren], who probably devel-
oped a sense: “I can make a difference; I can motivate these people so that 
they will finally agree to peace.” (author’s translation)
In short, diplomats engaged in negotiation and consulting activities 
in a field in which the government of Sudan and its agents played a 
key role. Their efforts, with which interviewees strongly identified, are 
directed at the achievement of peace. Some invested heavily in these ef-
forts, at the price of enduring demanding travel schedules and frequent 
and long-term absences from home and family, reflecting a strong iden-
tification with their mission.
Hierarchies of  Goals— And the Status of Justice among Them
Settling conflict and establishing peace is obviously a central foreign 
policy goal in the context of Darfur policies. But how does this goal re-
late to the others I inquired about in my interviews: the integrity of the 
sovereign state, the survival of affected populations,  and— of special in-
terest  here— the pursuit of justice? How do diplomats rank these goals 
relative to each other? Where do they perceive conflicts between them? 
Do they see ways of resolving potential contradictions?
Segments from an interview I conducted with a diplomat from one of 
the large European countries, quoted above, strongly reflect diplomatic 
reasoning. They highlight as the primary goal replacing war and violent 
figure 16. Ambassador Tomas Ulicny, head of the EU delegation to Sudan, and  
Dr. Hassan El Turabi, head of the Popular Congress Party, engage in peace negotiations, 
Khartoum, February 3, 2015.
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conflict with peace by means of diplomatic negotiations. The goal of 
justice ought to be bracketed and, if pursued at all, used as a bargaining 
chip. Four of the diplomats I  interviewed— all from the political divi-
sions of their  ministries— clearly followed this line of reasoning. Espe-
cially telling are the words of one respondent from the sub-Sahara unit 
of the foreign ministry of a smaller European country, a diplomat with 
years of experience in his country’s mission in Khartoum. Arguing for 
the primacy of the peace mission, he also commented on the role of 
justice and the ICC in relation to that primary goal:
First, we should come to some kind of peace agreement. And then you 
should work on reconciliation and transitional justice. . . . The underlying 
problem is not the question of cooperation with the ICC, but is the culture 
of impunity which prevails until now in Sudan. . . . I think one should put 
emphasis on strengthening the national legal system in Sudan. The ICC has 
a very limited role or mandate, and it has not the capacity to investigate all 
cases of crimes that have been committed in Darfur. So you need to come 
to strengthening the legal system. I think the African Union panel on Darfur 
. . . made recommendations on the issue of peace, reconciliation and justice 
for Darfur. Without going into a competition with the ICC, they managed 
to keep these on two separate tracks. And I think these recommendations 
were welcomed by the Sudanese government. And I personally would put 
more emphasis on trying to convince the Sudanese to implement all of these 
recommendations instead of repeating every time that they should cooperate 
with the ICC, because it doesn’t bring anyone any further. [Colleagues in 
the fragile-states unit] agree, and also the colleagues at the embassy in Khar-
toum, since they are working on a daily basis on the peace process. . . . You 
cannot expect to have an international trial against the president who is at 
the same moment an important player in the peace process.
This interviewee called his own position “pragmatic.” While he 
insisted that the ICC indictments complicated the peace process, he 
conceded that they “could also pressure in a positive way.” Instead of 
opposing the goal of justice, he wanted it pursued later and by means 
other than the ICC. He thus tempered his general skepticism toward the 
ICC with a call for developing the justice system in Sudan and a plea to 
put an end to the “culture of impunity.”
Other interviewees from political divisions also had reservations 
about the ICC, even if they do not reject transitional justice per se. One 
suggested that justice should not be pursued “right away,” and that 
there are various alternatives to the ICC. Another expressed principled 
support for the ICC as an institution, acknowledging its potential for 
a long-term civilizing effect, but insisted that it should be placed on a 
back burner in the Darfur case. A somewhat different argument was 
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presented by a diplomat who believed that justice is a precondition of 
peace, but who  called— in vague  terms— for a different kind of justice 
than what the ICC has to offer. Some interviewees articulated general 
skepticism about the ICC; others objected to the way then–chief prose-
cutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo handled the proceedings. Moreno-Ocampo 
of course had achieved substantial fame earlier in his career when he 
courageously prosecuted members of the military junta in his native 
Argentina. Yet, in the Darfur case, critics challenged Moreno-Ocampo’s 
decisions to specifically charge President al-Bashir and to include the 
crime of genocide in the indictment. One respondent referred to the 
prosecutor’s “bulldog style” as possibly helpful in the Argentinean 
cases, but detrimental in the complicated international world in which 
the new and fragile institution of the ICC is embedded. For this world, 
and also in the prosecutor’s office, he and other diplomats argued, a 
more diplomatic approach was warranted.
Perceptions of conflict between peace and justice were most pro-
nounced in political divisions and among diplomats with substantial ex-
perience in foreign missions. Indeed, those at the core of the diplomatic 
field are most dedicated to the goal of peace and most skeptical toward 
the pursuit of justice. Skepticism is further intensified among diplomats 
who had intense exposure to that part of the diplomatic field in which 
the government of Sudan was a key participant; for example, through 
work in their respective country’s embassy in Khartoum.
The primacy of the peace mission, however, is not uniform in the 
world of diplomacy. Chapter 5 discusses Irish diplomats  who— in line 
with their country’s foreign policy emphasis on development and hu-
manitarian  aid— declared the survival of the affected population to be 
their first priority, placing peace second and expressing considerable 
skepticism for the justice mission. Such prioritizing was not surprising in 
Dublin’s aid division, but it was at least echoed in the Political Division 
as well. The Irish case thus illustrates how both national context and the 
humanitarianism field affect priorities and strategies in the diplomatic 
field. Those who emphasize aid share with those who prioritize peace 
skepticism concerning the goal of  justice— or at least concerning the pri-
macy of justice and its pursuit by the ICC in a conflict’s early stages.
Another branch in the foreign policy field, however, decisively sup-
ports the goal of justice and the ICC. Even Irish diplomats alerted me 
to the strong emphasis on the justice mission in their ministry’s human 
rights division. Interviewees in political divisions elsewhere also stressed 
that their own focus on the peace mission was not necessarily shared 
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by their colleagues in law divisions. One of them expected his human 
rights colleagues, as well as his minister, to take an approach more “le-
galistic” than his own.
Such expectations are confirmed in my interviews with two foreign 
ministry employees, both lawyers by training, who served in law divi-
sions. Both insisted that the path to peace presupposes the realization 
of justice. One foreign ministry employee in a small country was placed 
in a unit on international criminal law where issues relating to Nazi-era 
compensation claims also fell under his jurisdiction. The other inter-
viewee had served, until shortly before the interview, as head of an 
office that handled ICC issues within a division of international law. 
In that role he also represented his ministry on the ICC’s Assembly of 
States. He is from the same country as the coordinator of a Sudan task 
force and long-term employee of his country’s embassy in Khartoum 
whom we encountered near the beginning of this chapter. Recall that 
that interviewee focused most strongly on the goal of peace by means of 
diplomacy. In line with my expectations regarding the weight of organi-
zational placement within the diplomatic field, the position taken by his 
colleague in the international law division differs markedly:
There is a tendency from a political perspective to say, well, in certain cir-
cumstances we should have peace prevail over justice. Which means, we 
should . . . postpone a judicial prosecution or any legal proceeding against 
somebody, because we need that guy to have peace. And my lesson is: that 
is not true. Because what you consider as peace . . . would not be a sustain-
able peace, because when I look at hundreds of thousands of victims and I 
accept that the injustice done against them is not taken into account, that 
their stories remain untold, then I cannot see how a traumatized postconflict 
society like this can really make sustainable peace. It is simply not possible. 
You need to go through that process. You need to give them justice. And 
once they have the feel that justice, more or less, is done or taken care of, 
then I think you can create within such a society a willingness to overcome 
postconflict and enter a new phase of peace building. . . . And the political 
point I am making is: you don’t have to do all the political work yourself, 
you politicians. Rely on certain aspects that can be dealt with through jus-
tice. And simply take the fruits of it. And they can be helpful for the course 
of your political endeavors and efforts. And that can move things forward. 
And you can really make a difference.
This interviewee strongly supports prosecution in the ICC, “at least 
for those who bear the greatest responsibility.” But he also speaks 
about the International Center for Transitional Justice in New York 
and about alternative transitional justice mechanisms such as truth 
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commissions and “local law” for actors such as those in low levels of 
the military hierarchy or “a child soldier” who “may be considered a 
victim himself.” He cites “civil society people” who “really work at the 
grassroots level in Africa” and who “are reporting that things start to 
change . . . that people at this [high] level start to realize, look, I mean, 
there is somebody out there who ultimately could go after me. . . . We 
cannot accept impunity because we need something to prevent future 
atrocities.”
I also inquired about the goals of ensuring survival and preserving 
the integrity of the state of Sudan. Responses show that these goals ap-
peared much less prominently in the diplomatic field. The intensity of 
the goal of ensuring survival of the affected exhibited in the Irish De-
partment of Foreign Affairs remains unique. One interviewee explicitly 
stated that “survival is not enough.” Finally, most respondents sup-
ported division of Sudan and had given up on the notion of national 
integrity.
In short, the tension between the goals of peace and justice domi-
nated responses from interviewees in foreign ministries. These goals 
were not necessarily seen as mutually exclusive, but the diplomatic field 
produces a set of clear priorities that strongly challenges the logic of the 
justice cascade. An unambiguous preference for peace over justice ap-
plies at least to those actors in the field who are associated with political 
divisions and engaged in day-to-day diplomatic work.
Sources of Information
In addition to the Sudan government’s weight in the diplomatic field 
and the goals of its practitioners, sources of information should also 
influence how diplomats perceive the Darfur conflict. I thus asked inter-
viewees what sources they consult to gain an appropriate understanding 
of the situation in Darfur. I did not ask them to rank their responses, 
but those mentioned first and spontaneously appeared especially impor-
tant. All but one respondent mentioned between four and nine sources.
Several diplomats referred to their country’s embassies (n = 6)—and 
those who did, did so  spontaneously— as one of their first three options. 
In the words of one interviewee: “The first source is the embassy report, 
which is steered by our interests [dann also entsprechend sogar gesteuert 
wird]. So they receive concrete questions and are asked to answer them” 
(author’s translation). Many diplomats pointed to international organi-
zations, specifically the UN (n = 9; plus UNAMID [3]), the EU (5), and 
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the AU (2). While formal reports of IOs are often considered too neutral 
to be valuable, personal and professional contacts within these organi-
zations are highly valued.
Note that one-third of the sources (25 out of 70–80) cited were 
 diplomatic. And they were among the first that interviewees mentioned 
spontaneously when asked. The diplomatic world is thus in part a self-
referential system that produces the information it consumes. Yet this 
judgment would oversimplify reality if taken too far. The other two-
thirds of sources include NGOs (9), especially humanitarian NGOs on 
the ground in Sudan; think tanks and academics (7), even though fol-
low-ups yielded few book titles or names of academics, with the excep-
tion of Alex de Waal (see the introduction); media, including Sudanese 
opposition media such as the Sudan Tribune and Radio Dabanga (6); 
and communication with Sudanese people, locally on the occasion of 
visits to Sudan, in the diaspora, or virtually over the Internet (5). Finally, 
and importantly here, only one respondent referred to court evidence. 
This is the same lawyer-interviewee who had served as a member of the 
ICC’s Assembly of States and whom I cited as making a strong plea for 
justice.
In short, the world of diplomacy draws much of its information from 
national and international organizations, primarily diplomatic ones, 
but from other sources as well, including NGOs, media, think tanks, 
and Sudanese informants.
representations of darfur in the  
diplomatic field
What representation of Darfur is then generated in a field where the 
government of Sudan has substantial weight, where peacemaking 
trumps other goals, and where information from governments and in-
ternational organizations is dominant? How do diplomats interpret the 
causes of the conflict? Whom do they identify as responsible actors? 
What kinds of suffering do they acknowledge? And what do diplomats 
perceive to be the appropriate frame through which to interpret the 
violence in Sudan?
Causes of Conflict
Ten interviewees from foreign ministries spoke explicitly about the 
causes of the mass violence in Darfur. Two referred me to writings, 
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specifically texts by Alex de Waal and by a mediator from the respon-
dent’s own ministry. Out of more than thirty arguments articulated in 
the relevant interview segments, those dominate that deflected respon-
sibility from actors who were charged by the ICC. Instead, diplomats 
mentioned most frequently factors associated with natural or structur-
al-political conditions. First is the process of desertification, the drought 
that is moving the Sahara ever further into the Sahel, and the resulting 
resource  scarcity— an argument also common among environmentalism 
branches of the UN (see Smith and Howe 2015: ch. 8). Diplomats often 
combine this argument with references to intergroup conflicts caused by 
these natural conditions, specifically conflicts between “tribes,” “ethnic 
groups,” or “nomads” and “pastoralists.” Also the center-periphery 
conflict shows prominently as a long-term feature of the Sudanese state 
that eventually provoked rebellion. This argument dominates, not sur-
prisingly, among actors with a political science education. As discussed 
above regarding the human rights and humanitarian fields, educational 
socialization colors representations in the diplomacy field. It affects 
habitus and doxa, taken-for-granted assumptions about reality. Diplo-
mats further point at neighboring countries or at rebels from southern 
Sudan who supplied Darfur rebels with weapons to destabilize Sudan 
and its government.
Rarely did the aforementioned causes appear in isolation, of course. 
Interviewees linked them together, and their cognitive maps entail in-
tricate causal relationships between diverse factors. Statements by the 
Sudan expert in the foreign ministry of a large European country illus-
trate such a map:
There are three main reasons why I think the crisis started. The first one is 
. . . that the Sahara Desert was going south, so all the nomadic tribes had to 
go further south. There was a bigger competition for water and for wells. . . . 
So the old system of interaction between agriculture and nomads . .  . was 
challenged by that. You started to have local fighting between the different 
tribes. But that’s what started in the mid-eighties and went on for quite a 
long time without becoming the big Darfur crisis we have seen. What trig-
gered the conflict really were the two other main reasons. The first one, being 
a political reason, is not really specific for Darfur. It is the marginalization 
of all the peripheries in Sudan, compared to the center in Khartoum. Darfur 
used to be a kingdom before being integrated into Sudan. There is a strong 
memory of that in the mind of the Darfuri people. And after independence 
they were quite marginalized. They were completely marginalized if you 
look at the universities, hospitals, schools. . . . And they were voicing their 
concerns and what they wanted, but purely politically. And that is where the 
third part comes in. When the Darfur crisis started, North and South were 
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discussing, were starting negotiations, and at that time the mediator said: 
Well, if you want to negotiate, we will take only the people who have guns 
around the table. . . . So, these Darfuri people who had more or less the same 
concerns as the southerners realized that . . . the only solution they had to 
show that they existed was to take up arms and to start a rebellion.
Through such cognitive maps, the central causal factors mentioned by 
diplomat  interviewees— namely, desertification, intergroup and center-
periphery conflict, and (as some diplomats argue elsewhere in the inter-
views) conflicts with southern Sudan, Libya, and  Chad— interacted in 
the minds of diplomats. In at least three interviews the basic logic of the 
narrative, the stringing together of causal factors, was almost identical 
with that quoted above.
Implied in many arguments, and at times stated explicitly, is the 
long-term nature of the violence in Darfur. One respondent actually 
saw this violence as an element of the natural history of state forma-
tion: “The wars that Sudan now conducts, for example, Europeans 
conducted in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: wars of nation 
building [der nationalen Identitätsfindung], wars to settle or eliminate 
religious differences, ethnic wars” (author’s translation). Diplomatic 
positions thus starkly contrast with Hagan and Rymond-Richmond’s 
criminological “endogenous conflict theory” (2008), which explains 
the violence as the product of shorter-term dynamics initiated by con-
crete state actors to whom societal groups responded. The diplomatic 
explanations are congenial instead with positions taken by Alex de 
Waal. This homology may help explain why de Waal is the main aca-
demic reference point when diplomats refer to scholarship as a source 
of information.
But the focus on long-term causes does not mean that diplomat inter-
viewees fully neglect the agency of the Sudanese state. One respondent 
told how the government of Sudan “armed the one side, the nomadic 
tribes in Darfur, to put down the rebellion.” Another insisted that the 
violence “certainly emanated initially from the rebel side,” but, he con-
tinued, “it was the scale of the reaction by Khartoum that exacerbated 
the entire situation.” Yet another interviewee reported that the pat-
terns in Darfur were typical strategies of the Sudanese government: “It 
happened in the South before; it happened in Blue Nile and Southern 
Kordofan as well. They consider their army isn’t strong enough to fight 
against the rebellion, so they use proxies to support the army, and what 
they did learn was to use Arab tribes, tribes that consider themselves as 
Arab, which is mainly nomadic tribes, telling them: ‘Well, we’ll give you 
Diplomatic Representations of Mass Violence   |  173
weapons. You fight against those other tribes . . . and you take whatever 
you want.’ ”
While references to the Sudanese state are thus not absent when dip-
lomats discuss causes of the violence, they appear less prominently than 
do ecological and structural forces. In addition, diplomats tend to avoid 
naming specific actors. They certainly remain more general than posi-
tion holders in the criminal justice system or in human rights–based 
NGOs. But would they maintain their reluctance if asked not generally 
about causes, but specifically about responsible actors?
Asking about Actors
Ten interviewees from the world of diplomacy commented on actors 
with potential responsibility for the mass violence in Darfur. While they 
mostly spoke about the government of Sudan, the Janjawiid, and rebel 
organizations as collective actors, some referred occasionally to Presi-
dent al-Bashir and Ahmed Harun as individuals. Respondents certainly 
never expressed doubt that the government of Sudan bore responsibil-
ity. But, not accidentally, a respondent, educated as a lawyer and from 
the law division of a large European country’s foreign ministry, argued 
most clearly:
It is obvious to me that the most serious crimes have been committed. It is 
obvious to me that government institutions, in one way or the other, have 
to be held responsible. They share certainly some responsibility with regard 
to those crimes. And I will also say that if things like that remain without a 
judicial response, then . . . [perpetrators] get the message you can do all those 
things and . . . nothing happens. This is impunity. Impunity prevails. And I 
think the ICC is about the message to say impunity is over.
Yet even this interviewee also adds, somewhat diluting the previous 
point:
There is too much focus on the perpetrators. We should much more focus 
on the victims, and in doing so, I think we get much closer to what actually 
needs to be done to remedy the situation. But, apparently when you operate 
in a media-dominated environment, it is of course sexier to have some kind 
of rogue guy sitting on the bench before the court than possibly having em-
barrassing interviews with faceless victims.
Other diplomats also spoke to the responsibility of the government 
of Sudan. “It was a series of the gravest offenses against human rights,” 
one said, “for  which— as we know  today— the government was respon-
sible” (author’s translation). Focusing on the violence committed by 
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the Janjawiid, another respondent added: “Obviously, in terms of re-
sponsibility, you also do have to look at the government.” A colleague 
confirmed: “I am convinced that the northern government was involved 
in the violence perpetrated by those groups who initiated it” (author’s 
translation). Yet another diplomat insisted: “The government in Khar-
toum has a lot of experience in using proxies, in the South as well, . . . 
in using tribes or groups of people.” While the responsibility of the 
government of Sudan was thus highlighted, most respondents avoided 
casting it explicitly in terms of criminal liability. Some interpreted the 
government’s responsibility explicitly as political responsibility: “I think 
it remains not an ICC matter, but it remains an issue to be brought to 
the account of the Khartoum government, for having arrived at a point 
where it has effectively either ungoverned or misgoverned spaces in its 
own country. . . . It is a political charge against the Khartoum govern-
ment as much as a charge in relation to direct accountability.”
In short, respondents almost unanimously held the government 
of Sudan accountable for the violence. Some specified organizational 
units such as the military and the Popular Defense Forces. But diplo-
mats simultaneously urged against focusing on the perpetrators and on 
criminal responsibility alone, but attending instead to the victims and 
broadly conceived political responsibility. They rarely named specific 
government actors. When mentioning al-Bashir directly, interviewees 
combined such mention with partly exculpating statements. One inter-
viewee reported on conversations he had had with President al-Bashir, 
describing him as a man “who realizes today that he was fooled in many 
things . . . by his own people” (author’s translation). Another respon-
dent supported this sentiment: “In how far Bashir was informed about 
everything, I cannot really tell you.” The interviewee then drew paral-
lels with North Korea’s Kim Il Sung: “He [Kim] was so cut off from the 
world that he just did not have any direct experience any more. . . . I 
think in the case of Bashir that he must have understood what kinds of 
decisions he supported and consented to. But I do not dare to say if he 
really knew about the real scale, but I personally have to say truthfully: 
I doubt it. I have met him three times thus far; I cannot easily be misled 
in these things” (author’s translation).
Diplomats also occasionally named Ahmed Harun, until 2009 the 
Sudanese minister for humanitarian affairs, as a responsible, albeit in-
strumentalized, actor. One respondent considered Harun “one of the 
main tools used by the government to put in place these policies of 
proxy militias, recruiting the militias and using the local population, 
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fueling the conflict, to make sure the army was not too much involved. 
[JJS: And used by whom?] Well, that is the big question as well”—a 
question, though, for which the respondent did not provide an answer.
In addition to the government, broadly conceived, and two specific 
government actors, the Janjawiid appear prominently in the interviews 
as responsible actors. But this attribution too was relativized in nu-
merous ways. One respondent referred to Janjawiid militias as accom-
plices (“Erfüllungsgehilfen”). In the eyes of another diplomat they were 
“being armed by the government, paid for by the government.” A third 
interviewee went into greater detail, deciphering the conditions of the 
nomadic groups from which the militias were recruited. His narrative 
challenges notions of the Janjawiid common in the criminal justice field:
I don’t like the term Janjawiid very much, because it suggests a sort of ul-
timate evil, and it’s not very helpful in terms of gaining a differentiated un-
derstanding of the conflict. . . . So, on the surface of  things— and this is very 
much how the conflict has been  portrayed— you have Arabs, so the Arab-
based Sudanese government and Arab tribes forming these militias, being 
the perpetrators. And you have non-Arabs being the victims.  .  .  . Now, if 
you take a step back, . . . you can reverse the image because, as it stands, the 
Arabs, the nomad Arabs in Darfur, are in many ways the most marginalized 
group in Darfur. Because they are nomads, they don’t have any homeland, 
and as the desert is advancing, they lose their livelihoods. They are camel 
breeders, and you can’t have camels in the desert. Right. So they lost their 
livelihoods. They have no lands to go to. . . . They lost their identity as well, 
which was very much tied to camels, camel trade, and took [up] arms very 
much in an attempt to defend themselves. Right. So you could look at them 
as victims as well.
Simultaneously, the same respondent attributed greater responsibil-
ity to rebels than we typically encounter in social movements such as 
Save Darfur or in the criminal justice or human rights NGO narrative, 
even with some charges having been filed against lower-ranking rebels:
If you look at the history of the conflict, the rebellion comes from non-Arab 
tribes. They started this whole thing. And rebels are called rebels because 
they hold guns and they kill people. Right. So they are perpetrators as well. 
And so, while the distinction between victims and perpetrators appears obvi-
ous in Darfur, I would suggest that it actually isn’t, and it is much more com-
plicated. And by even using the labels victims and perpetrators, we conflate 
things, and we contribute to an understanding of this conflict which really 
isn’t very helpful if you want to resolve it.
Another interviewee also cast the rebels in a highly problematic light: 
“That the JEM is primarily interested in justice and equality, that I do 
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not quite believe. No, those are criminals [Verbrecher].  .  .  . One of 
them plays a central role. He sits in Paris and always says ‘no.’ So he 
does not really want a solution and impedes the Doha talks” (author’s 
translation).
In short, when explicitly asked about actors with responsibility for 
the mass violence in Darfur, diplomats do not shy away from attribut-
ing responsibility to the government of Sudan. Yet they tend to frame 
it as broad political responsibility. They name individuals only rarely 
 and— when they  do— tend to cast doubt on their criminal liability. Sev-
eral interviewees attribute responsibility to the Janjawiid, but they too 
relativize. Some respondents divert responsibility away from the mili-
tias and toward rebel groups, thus countering the dominant narrative of 
pro–criminal justice actors such as the Save Darfur movement and the 
ICC itself. Clearly, the responsibility narratives of diplomats reflect the 
strong role of the Sudanese state in the field in which diplomats act and 
the substantive, outcome-oriented goals of diplomatic work.
Suffering
Nine diplomats responded to my inquiry about the Darfuri popula-
tion’s victimization and suffering, but only four specified forms of suf-
fering. One respondent from a small European country spoke about 
people “forced to leave their homes and villages, and their villages have 
been burned down; their number is estimated at two million.” An in-
terviewee from another small country referred to “all these displace-
ments, . . . in many different directions; there have been refugee camps” 
(author’s translation). A diplomat from a large European country ad-
dressed suffering in the context of the relative success of international 
interventions: “I think [UNAMID] has had an effect; the fighting and 
the displacement is less than it was at the height of it in 2005, but it is 
still ongoing. And the government is still bombing civilians. The reb-
els are still fighting.” Only two diplomats elaborated on the suffering 
in greater detail. One, the interviewee from Irish Aid within Ireland’s 
Department of Foreign Affairs, described compassionately the displace-
ment of (her numbers) 1.5 million people; lack of shelter, water, food, 
and protection; the deaths of 200,000; and systematic rape campaigns. 
At the same time, however, she cautioned that “if you look at the 
media coverage of those years, it was quite sensationalized.” The other 
respondent who detailed the suffering and victimization in Darfur was 
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a diplomat from a large European nation’s foreign ministry, a specialist 
with responsibility for Sudan:
The interesting thing in Darfur is that most of the people who died didn’t die 
from bullet wounds. . . . They lead them to camps so that they could control 
them easily. And whenever people were getting outside, you could see the 
women getting raped and all of that. . . . They were fighting a psychologi-
cal war against the local population, using terror against this population. 
So I think that is . . . one of the things people suffer the most from. After 
the very first . . . period of military operations, that didn’t last very  long— it 
lasted one year, a bit more than a  year— but once everyone was in camps or 
refugees outside in Chad, the way that the army and these Popular Defense 
Forces, the Janjawiid who were fighting against the rebels, was to try to use 
terror against the population, so that they would denounce and try to build 
a gap between the population and the rebels. Death was another form of 
suffering, what happened inside the camps because of unsanitary conditions 
and so on, and rape as a systematic strategy of spreading terror.
While diplomats spoke sparingly about suffering, several interview-
ees explicitly challenged the victimization numbers that appear often 
in human rights discourses. One interviewee from the legal division of 
his foreign ministry deferred to the Africa Department because, from 
a legal perspective, the precise number of victims was irrelevant. He 
elaborated that a trial always focuses on just the few cases for which 
evidence is strong. Another respondent found it “very hard to have ac-
cess to objective information, very hard to say something about those 
figures.” A diplomat from a large European country explicitly critiqued 
numerical estimates. This interviewee attributed the prominence of cer-
tain numbers in public discourses to media reports, but their origins to 
NGOs: “[Mass media] publish the first numbers. . . . The high commis-
sioner for refugees or such, he does not count himself; he lets others 
count and says: ‘Care, Oxfam, Deutsche Welthungerhilfe, Red Cross, 
how many do you have, roughly?’ And those, in the middle of a crisis, 
completely overworked, their hands full, look around; ‘well this must 
be 150,000 now, plus-minus.’ And that is how these numbers are con-
structed. And that then solidifies” (author’s translation).5
Another senior diplomat from a small European  country— a long-
term advisor on international affairs to a leading head of state who, 
during his lifetime, had enjoyed extraordinary respect in much of the 
Global  South— expressed the same skepticism. Indeed he developed the 
critique further, claiming that NGOs have a vested interest in exagger-
ating numbers: “The NGOs have a completely understandable interest 
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rather to dramatize because that also improves their financial basis, so 
to speak. They can secure financial donations much more easily with a 
dramatizing report than without it” (author’s translation). The same 
interviewee was highly critical of some  countries— especially the United 
 States— that, in his perception, advanced dramatizing accounts. “The 
former foreign minister of Congo,” he said, “who then became special 
envoy for Darfur to the AU and the UN, who one day declared, ‘Well, 
really, the issue of Darfur is now taken care of, things have largely 
settled down,’ he subsequently lost his job. The UN then said: ‘Who 
do you think was behind that?’ Well, the Americans who said: ‘We do 
not have use for someone like that at the current moment’ ” (author’s 
translation).
This interviewee attributed “exaggerations” to national conditions 
and political interests, somewhat in line with social scientific argu-
ments. Specifically for the US government, he referred to the activation 
of civil society and the government’s responsiveness. He highlighted 
Christian fundamentalist groups with a strong presence in South Sudan 
and oil interests: “For the Americans . . . such things then become is-
sues of domestic politics. When you have a Brad Pitt and a George 
Clooney appear before a large audience, . . . then people look on and 
they ask: ‘Why does our government not do anything?’ .  .  . That all 
matters in the question of opinion formation. Truth, published opinion, 
perceived opinion in the  public— these are all different things” (author’s 
translation).
The same diplomat attributed similar tendencies to exaggerate vic-
timization in Darfur to the French government. But there, he believed, 
the motivation differs:
In France, I know, for example, that the francophone African countries all 
have an enormous influence on domestic politics. They are all present in 
Paris. They have their French representative [in the National Assembly] with 
whom they are friends. An African president picks up the phone and calls 
the French president, and if he does not reach him right away, then he gets at 
least to talk to the general secretary, and that is all taken very seriously. . . . 
In the case of Sudan, France also supported a dramatization, exactly because 
they perceived Sudan as a potential aggressor against [francophone] Chad. 
They portrayed Sudan in a completely negative light, and in that question 
they did not differ that much from the Americans. (author’s translation)
In short, actors in the diplomatic field who interact with representa-
tives of the Sudanese state, whose primary aim it is to achieve peace by 
means of negotiation, and whose explanations of the conditions of the 
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conflict tend to deflect responsibility away from specific individuals, in-
cluding those indicted by the ICC, simultaneously shy away from ques-
tions that probe the suffering and victimization of the population. They 
instead tend to challenge and cast doubt on narratives generated and 
diffused by human rights NGOs and criminal justice institutions. Given 
the intensity of diplomatic concerns about replacing mass violence with 
peace, it is hard to attribute such patterns to a lack of empathy with 
those who are suffering. But it appears as though the regular and intense 
articulation of victimization narratives comes more easily to those who 
work in the human rights and criminal justice fields, areas in which the 
Sudanese state and its representatives are not critical actors.
Framing Mass Violence
What frames do actors in the diplomatic field consider appropriate for 
the interpretation of the mass violence in Darfur? Here too I asked in-
terviewees to comment on the applicability of four frames: humanitar-
ian emergency, civil war, insurgency and counterinsurgency, and state 
crime. Almost all respondents found the humanitarian emergency frame 
appropriate. The Irish Aid respondent in fact identified this frame as 
“particularly relevant.” Other responses to my inquiry about the term 
included “Exactly, yeah”; and “That it is for certain.” One interviewee 
saw a humanitarian emergency as having occurred in the past, but no 
longer existing in the present: “2004–2005, possibly into the second 
half of 2006; . . . and then this turned into a case of reconstruction and 
return” (author’s translation). Only one respondent from the diplo-
matic field expressed doubts, arguing that the humanitarian emergency 
frame “doesn’t really tell you anything about the nature of a crisis. 
Crises, and especially when they result in armed conflict, are always 
political.”
Most respondents also agreed that a rebellion or insurrection frame 
is appropriate for an interpretation of the violence, though some limited 
such framing to the early phases of the conflict. “That fits somehow,” 
one interviewee said. “I mean, in the end it is a lot about marginalized 
people who stand up for their rights.” Four respondents disagreed with 
the insurrection frame. One argued that the term protest is more appro-
priate, as rebellion implied separatist intent, which, he argued, did not 
apply to Darfur. Diplomats almost unanimously rejected the civil war 
frame, even though one interviewee referred to the violence as similar 
to civil war (“bürgerkriegsähnlich”). More typical was a statement that 
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rejected the notion of civil war: “It is not a civil war, because Darfur 
never explained that it sought independence.”
Finally, and astonishingly in light of their causal analysis and assess-
ment of victimization, most diplomats considered the state crime frame 
appropriate, but they expressed some kind of reservation. “The state has 
a clear responsibility,” one respondent told me. “They didn’t act upon 
the crimes that have been committed. . . . There is no justice being done. I 
think it is obvious that the state is involved in these crimes or at least has 
responsibility.” This and another respondent considered the (in)actions 
of the Sudanese state as crimes more of negligence than of its own ag-
gression. Others pointed out that crimes were committed on both sides 
of the conflict. An interviewee from a small European country deemed 
the term state crime appropriate, but insisted that such understanding 
was not shared by African actors: “State crime? Yes, for us unambigu-
ously, but for the Africans not quite so clearly.” Earlier in the interview 
he argued: “One regards this in Sudan as normal intervention” (author’s 
translation), and he referred to growing African skepticism about the 
ICC. At least one respondent appeared to have developed sympathies 
with the AU position. He expressed a clear preference for a “traditional” 
justice response as opposed to international criminal justice intervention.
In addition to such cautious applications of the state crime frame, I 
also encountered staunch opposition. One actor from the diplomatic 
field, trained as a political scientist with a focus on international rela-
tions, explicitly challenged the state crime frame, pleading instead for a 
political-structural mode of understanding the conflict:
I don’t find it [the state crime label] a helpful lens, because if you look at 
the history of Sudan, since independence in ’56, you have different regimes, 
right? You have democratically elected regimes, you have military regimes, 
and in the last twenty-two years an Islamist regime, right? They function 
very differently, have different constituencies that they draw on, different 
political strategies to secure their rule. Yet mass atrocities happened in all of 
these regimes. So there is something, I think, systemic that the way in which 
the Sudanese state functions produces mass violence in certain ways. And 
by focusing on a few  individuals— and since the ICC indictment, a lot of 
people in the West have focused on the role of President  Bashir— and to see 
the conflict in Darfur in a way as an outcome of the criminal energy of Omar 
al-Bashir and his acolytes is not actually accurate in terms of understanding 
why the conflict emerged in the first place, and why the Sudanese govern-
ment has been engaging in these kinds of atrocities.
Quantitative patterns from an analysis of 210 foreign ministry press 
releases, by definition written to reach a broad public, show a somewhat 
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greater balance (see note 2). Yet, while references to the frames of con-
flict and war (25.7%) and humanitarian emergency (28.6%) are privi-
leged only somewhat over the crime frame (20.5%), the patterns for 
preferred solutions fall in line with responses cited throughout this 
chapter. Fifty-one percent of press releases suggest diplomatic solutions. 
Humanitarian aid (35%) and peacekeeping operations (39%) also ap-
pear prominently, while legal solutions (10%) and especially military 
intervention (1.4%) lag far behind.6
In short, interviewees from the world of diplomacy display patterns 
of thought, partly consistent with quantitative findings emerging from 
an analysis of foreign ministry press releases that cautiously embrace 
the frame of humanitarian emergency to cast light on the situation in 
Darfur. They apply the insurgency and counterinsurgency frame at least 
to the early stages of the conflict. They are skeptical about the civil war 
frame, and they cast substantial doubt on the applicability of the state 
crime frame. This is consistent with the tendency of the diplomatic field 
to attribute the violence to ecological catastrophe, resulting intergroup 
conflicts, or to structural features of the Sudanese state. It is similarly in 
synch with reluctance to point at specific responsible actors, especially 
individuals.
conclusions: the diplomatic field and 
 habitus— and words of caution
The diplomatic field displays specific features that differ from those of 
the judicial and humanitarian fields. The diplomatic field prominently 
includes Sudanese state actors. While this field shares this factor with 
the humanitarian field, diplomacy depends on the active participation 
 of— often high- ranking— Sudanese government actors, whereas humani-
tarian aid more often relies on mere toleration on the part of lower-level 
and specialized government administrations. Despite this distinction, the 
humanitarian and diplomatic fields differ from the judicial field not just 
in their engagement with actors from the offending government but also 
in that they are less oriented toward procedure than toward substantive 
outcomes, with a focus on survival in the former and peace in the latter. 
Actors in the diplomatic field, just like those in the justice and humani-
tarian fields, strongly identify with their mission. They have internalized 
their field’s institutional logic and its doxa. All of this is in line with field 
theory, as are the respective representations of the Darfur conflict in 
these fields.
182  |  Peace versus Justice
Indeed, diplomats used cautious language in interviews when de-
scribing the conflict. Causes of conflict that diplomats highlighted 
privileged ecological conditions; structural features of the Sudanese 
state, often historically rooted; and neighboring African interests and 
conflicts. While they did mention the Sudanese state as a responsible 
actor, they mostly avoided pointing at specific individuals as responsi-
ble for the violence. When they named individuals, especially President 
al-Bashir, they tended to provide exculpating considerations. Most were 
more sparing in their accounts of victimization and suffering than their 
counterparts in the justice and humanitarian fields. Finally, diplomats 
used substantial caution regarding the applicability of the state crime 
frame. They were especially reluctant to using the term genocide.
The latter finding is consistent with Samantha Power’s (2002) as-
sessment of US foreign policy and with Karen Smith’s (2010) analysis 
of three European countries. Yet, while Power and Smith explain such 
caution by pointing to the reluctance of rational actors to incur obliga-
tions associated with the use of the term genocide, I argue that features 
of the diplomatic field and the notion of habitus must be built into 
an effective explanation. Achieving the substantive goals of diplomacy 
warrants an inclusionary strategy toward actors of the regime that the 
justice system seeks to exclude by way of prosecution. It urges distance 
from dramatizing discourses and from narratives that depict social real-
ity through the lens of the justice system.
In short, a diplomatic master narrative, or in other words, an ideal 
type of diplomatic representation, focuses on long-term and structural 
causes of conflicts. It avoids naming responsible actors. It shies away 
from dramatic depictions of victimization. And it rejects the state crime 
frame, especially the notion of genocide. It is diametrically opposed to 
Hagan and Rymond-Richmond’s (2008) criminological “endogenous 
conflict theory,” which explains the violence as the product of short-
term dynamics in which concrete state actors play a central role.
Real types, of course, differ from ideal types. This applies to repre-
sentations of the Darfur conflict. Even the variation within my rela-
tively small sample of interviews, supported by statistical patterns from 
foreign ministry press releases, suggests differentiation along lines of 
organization and educational background. Diplomatic actors with 
legal training are somewhat more inclined to deviate from the diplo-
matic master narrative than those with a political science background, 
which is consistent with my findings for lawyers in human rights or-
ganization and the humanitarian field. This tendency is amplified for 
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lawyer-diplomats who work in legal divisions and, even more so, in 
human rights units within their foreign ministries. The latter diplomats’ 
representation of Darfur actually approximates the justice narrative. 
Fields, like systems, are thus scholarly constructions. In reality they 
overlap with other fields, diachronically (through educational socializa-
tion) and synchronically (through organizational differentiation)—here 
within the diplomatic field.
But one more factor needs to be accounted for. The diplomatic field is 
affected by national contexts. Each nation provides for particular forces 
that shape its diplomats’ habitus and strategic actions. It is such cross-
national differences and the social forces that shape them to which I 
now turn.




The Diplomatic Field in National 
Contexts
Deviations from the Master Narrative
Comparative studies that address representations of mass violence 
within the diplomatic field are virtually nonexistent. That is regrettable 
as comparative analysis promises to shed light on the conditions under 
which diplomats acknowledge atrocities and, more specifically, distance 
themselves from the criminal justice narrative more or less decisively.
Political scientist Karen Smith (2010) is a rare exception as she has 
documented variation for European countries’ responses to genocides. 
Smith, while agreeing with Power’s (2002) charge of an overly cautious 
rhetoric in cases of genocide, identifies noteworthy differences between 
countries, in particular France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. 
To be sure, the diplomatic field shows commonalities across countries. 
Also, Western governments are linked by their countries’ bilateral and 
multilateral ties and treaties. But diplomats nevertheless act under 
distinct national conditions, including their country’s size (as well as 
weight and visibility in international politics), specific types of resources 
and expertise, and degree of activation of civil society, as well as the 
responsiveness of the nation’s political institutions to civil society; the 
presence of expatriate groups, often associated with a country’s colo-
nial history; domestic carrier groups;  and— especially relevant for re-
sponses to mass  atrocities— country-specific collective memories of past 
human rights crimes. In addition to such cultural factors, countries also 
vary by economic and geopolitical concerns. The latter are especially 
pronounced, in the Darfur case, for countries such as China, with its 
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massive investments in Sudan, especially in the construction, agriculture 
and oil sectors.1 Such immediate interests in Sudan are more limited in 
the countries under study here, providing for relatively little variation. 
In addition, all of the countries examined are Western-style democra-
cies. The methodological advantage of this similarity is that it allows for 
the detection of otherwise hidden social, political, and cultural forces.2
In other words, the national context should matter, as it overlaps 
with the sectoral field of diplomacy. My earlier discussion of US and 
Irish particularities in representations of Darfur provided initial indi-
cations (chapters 3 and 5). In this chapter I revisit these and examine 
other countries to generate additional insights. Besides particular do-
mestic conditions, countries also have varying ties to the international 
community, differing degrees of neutrality, memberships in various in-
ternational organizations, and ratification of diverse treaties and con-
ventions. The following analysis pays attention to these factors as well.
In what follows, I spell out differences between representations of the 
Darfur conflict in the countries under study and indicate conditions that 
potentially lead to such differences. I show that foreign policy makers in 
different countries deviate more or less from the ideal-typical or master 
narrative of diplomatic representations identified in chapter 6. A word 
of caution is warranted, though. As I highlight specific conditions in my 
discussion of these countries, I never suggest that we reduce the foreign 
policy of these countries to the features highlighted. That would neither 
be appropriate given my only limited survey of the national foreign 
policy fields nor justified in light of the varying narratives I encountered 
within countries, especially in light of the organizational position of 
interviewees within their foreign ministries. Nor do I suggest that condi-
tions explored for one country are absent in others.
I first briefly remind the reader of insights gained in previous chap-
ters regarding the representations of Darfur in Ireland and the United 
States. I then address Switzerland to illustrate a model of diplomatic 
representation that comes closest to the ideal type depicted above. I 
subsequently examine the United Kingdom and France as countries 
that stand out as former colonial powers of Sudan and its neighbor 
Chad, respectively, with all the historical consequences that colonialism 
implies. Austria then serves as an illustration for the Sudanese state’s 
lobbying efforts that might have left traces in Austria’s representation 
of Darfur. Finally, I discuss Germany to illustrate how the “cultural 
trauma of perpetrators” (Giesen 2004a) affects responses to current 
events, including Darfur.
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the united states: mobilization of civil 
society and criminalizing deviations  
from the master narrative
The massive mobilization of American civil society, addressed in 
chapter 3, took organizational shape in the Save Darfur campaign, an 
umbrella under which almost two hundred organizations assembled, 
religious and secular, conservative and liberal. Some of these organiza-
tions represented carrier  groups— African Americans and Jews, as well 
as evangelical Christians, the latter a crucial constituent of the George 
W. Bush administration. This civil society movement advanced an in-
terventionist and criminalizing position on the Darfur conflict. “Geno-
cide” became its rallying cry, and the US Holocaust Memorial Museum 
played a central role in the mobilization. As our look at US media 
showed, news reports and editorials used the criminalizing frame and 
applied the term genocide significantly more often than media in other 
countries (see also Murphy 2007). This homology is not surprising 
given the competitive nature of the US media market.
It is also not  surprising— given the porous nature of US political insti-
tutions, with primary elections and popular election of executive branch 
 leaders— that the Bush administration applied the term genocide to the 
violence in Darfur more than any other government did. Diplomats of 
both the former Clinton and Bush administrations articulated support 
for this categorization and for the pursuit of criminal justice responses, 
both in conference discussions and in their writings (e.g., Williamson 
2009a, 2009b). The American representation of Darfur thus leans fur-
ther away from the diplomatic master narrative and toward a criminal-
izing and genocide discourse than do the representations of any other 
country under study.
Samantha Power’s diagnosis of American reluctance to refer to mass 
violence as genocide thus does and does not apply to the case of Darfur: 
“It is in the realm of domestic politics that the battle to stop genocide 
is lost. American political leaders interpret society-wide silence as an 
indicator of public indifference. They reason that they will incur no cost 
if the United States remains uninvolved but will face steep risks if they 
engage” (Power 2002:xviii). Power’s argument regarding the alignment 
of policy toward public opinion is confirmed for Darfur. But in the 
Darfur case it works in the other direction  because— contra Power’s 
 thesis— civil society became highly mobilized and produced a strong 
rhetorical response from the US government. It is also true, however, 
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that social movements can be easily satisfied by government rhetoric. 
Government actions such as the 2007 Sudan Accountability and Divest-
ment Act fell far behind the force of the verbal campaign.
ireland: mercy, aid, and collective memory
Irish foreign policy is “aligned” (i.e., in line with that of international 
partners), as my interviewees in Dublin stressed. The country has in-
deed ratified all essential international conventions pertaining to human 
rights. Yet, as discussed in chapter 3, Irish foreign policy also has distinct 
characteristics that affect Irish representations of Darfur. It is strongly 
oriented toward humanitarian and development aid. It closely cooper-
ates with aid NGOs, some of which are allied with the Irish Catholic 
Church. Trócaire (the name meaning “mercy”) is the most prominent. 
Ireland is thus closely tied to the humanitarian aid field and, like aid 
NGOs, depends on interactions with the Sudanese state. Representa-
tions of Darfur I encountered are consequently cautious, in line with the 
diplomatic master narrative. Also, our quantitative analysis of foreign 
ministry press releases shows the Irish foreign ministry’s strong prefer-
ence for the humanitarian emergency frame and for humanitarian aid 
solutions. Positions of the Irish state are supported by civil society, as 
our statistics on media reporting indicate (chapter 5). Karen Smith’s 
analysis confirms this pattern. Her review of Irish DFA files showed little 
civil society input, for example, during Ireland’s political debates over 
the country’s accession to the Genocide Convention (K. Smith 2010:54).
There is good reason to believe that the Irish focus on aid programs 
is deeply rooted in the country’s collective memories of famine and 
extreme poverty. The resulting caution regarding criminal justice re-
sponses is further grounded in the cultural processing of the Northern 
Ireland conflict and partly institutionalized in a working group in the 
Department of Foreign Affairs. It seems as though foreign policy mak-
ers have developed an appreciation for the benefits of amnesty and a 
critical stance toward penal discourses.
switzerland: neutrality, arbitration, and the 
imperative of a diplomatic narrative
Like Ireland, Switzerland is aligned with the basic principles of its part-
ners in the international community. It has ratified central human rights 
conventions as well as the Rome Statute. Yet, as in Ireland, I encountered 
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a cautious rhetoric regarding Darfur. Interview statements cited above 
are well reflected in an essay by political scientist David Lanz (2009) 
of Swiss-Peace, a policy institute affiliated with the Swiss government. 
Presenting peace and justice as competing notions, Lanz spells out what 
he considers highly problematic consequences of the ICC decision to in-
dict President al-Bashir: the eviction of thirteen INGOs from Sudan; the 
elimination of three Sudanese NGOs; sympathies al-Bashir won from 
actors in Africa and the Arab world who interpreted the ICC indict-
ment as an expression of neocolonialism; difficulties for countries such 
as Switzerland that support the ICC but simultaneously maintain strong 
diplomatic ties with Khartoum; the risks to the North-South peace pro-
cess; and challenges to a peace treaty for Darfur. Lanz speaks favorably 
of the option provided in Article 16 of the Rome Statute, by which the 
UNSC can suspend prosecutions.
Why do we encounter a representation of Darfur that is as cautious 
as its Irish counterpart? While Switzerland too has a well-developed 
program of developmental and humanitarian aid, the status of this 
program in national policy and the national consciousness is far less 
developed than in Ireland. Switzerland’s caution is in fact rooted in 
a different condition. The following statement from one Swiss inter-
viewee offers a promising lead:
There are several normative constraints and structural constraints for Swiss 
foreign policy. It’s a small country in the middle of Europe and these are the 
obvious ones. But another characteristic of Swiss foreign policy is structural 
neutrality. I mean, it is a very, very, very strongly rooted identity of Swit-
zerland as a neutral  country— although neutrality arguably in a globalized 
world does not really make any sense, neither legally nor morally nor politi-
cally speaking. But still, if you do surveys, you have 90 to 95 percent of the 
Swiss public who say, “Yes. We are neutral. We were always neutral. We 
will always be neutral and our foreign policy should be neutral. . . . So there 
is very little that Switzerland can do in terms of an activist foreign policy. If 
you look at Scandinavian countries, all the different projects that they were 
able to take on, there is very little of that that Switzerland can do. Notably, 
participation in any military involvement in foreign countries is an absolute 
no-go area. But at the same time, you have political elites . . . who are aware 
of the fact that the world is connected and that there is a need for small 
states like Switzerland. And they, they want to be more active. So they have 
to find more activities that fit within the structural characteristics of Swiss 
foreign policy, that don’t contradict them, that don’t produce backlash in 
terms of domestic politics. Right? And so one of these things is mediation. 
It’s perfectly in line with Switzerland’s identity as a neutral country. . . . And 
it is also something that is fashionable in terms of world politics. It generates 
a certain prestigious sort of reputation.
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Indeed, Switzerland did actively engage in bilateral and multilateral 
diplomacy with the Sudan. Swiss foreign policy experts Simon Mason 
and David Lanz (2009) provide numerous examples: Josef Bucher, Swit-
zerland’s representative in Libya and Kenya during much of the 1990s 
and special envoy for conflict solutions (2001–2005), built strong ties 
with representatives of the government of Sudan and of the SPLM; after 
2000 the Department of Foreign Affairs supported a project entitled 
“Councils of Traditional Leaders” for leaders in southern Sudan and in 
the Nuba Mountains; Swiss diplomats participated in negotiations that 
resulted in a 2000 armistice in the same region; Swiss mediation experts 
participated in the negotiations that led to the CPA; and Switzerland 
contributed to monitoring missions following the CPA. These examples 
already represent an impressive record for a small country (see also 
Baechler 2011).
Research on Swiss foreign policy reveals motivations that, in the 
absence of immediate interests, drive such engagement. Indeed, state-
ments from interviews with twenty-five policy makers are in line with 
the above interview excerpt. Respondents highlighted the Swiss govern-
ment’s desire to contribute to the advancement of peace and the sup-
port for suffering populations; to strengthen international legitimacy 
and Switzerland’s reputation as a small country with a strong value ori-
entation; to advance collaboration with international partners beyond 
the realms of economics and finance; and, domestically, to strengthen 
the population’s image of their country as globally engaged on behalf of 
human rights, justice, and peace (Mason and Lanz 2009:65–66).
In short, both Ireland and Switzerland are small countries that op-
erate in fields in which the government of Sudan plays a prominent 
role. The desire to advance humanitarian aid in the Irish case and to 
advance diplomacy in the Swiss case suggests similar caution vis-à-vis 
the Sudanese government, a caution that entails distance from drama-
tizing, criminal justice narratives. I found this caution reflected in rep-
resentations of the mass violence in Darfur in both countries. Where 
the United States greatly deviates from the diplomatic master narrative, 
policy makers in Ireland and Switzerland adhere to it rather closely.
austria: friend of the arab  world— and 
sudanese lobbying
Austria is a third small country where narratives about Darfur main-
tain cautious distance from the criminal justice discourse. To be sure, 
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Austrian interviewees from the field of diplomacy attested to their coun-
try’s strong support for the ICC and their alignment with EU positions. 
One respondent, placed in the legal division of Vienna’s foreign minis-
try and responsible for international criminal law as well as for Nazi-
era compensation issues, stressed that Austria has special obligations 
toward the pursuit of human rights crimes, also in light of the country’s 
involvement in the Nazi empire and the decades of delays in facing 
that legacy. Yet a prominent long-term Austrian diplomat raised, like 
one of his Swiss colleagues, the option of activating Article 16 of the 
Rome Statute and thereby temporarily suspending proceedings against 
President al-Bashir, albeit under specific conditions. Two Austrian in-
terviewees who had met with al-Bashir also characterized him in ways 
that challenge the portrayal of the Sudanese president as the demonic 
leader of a mass-murderous regime.
What might be the root of such cautious distance from criminal jus-
tice narratives regarding  Darfur— despite assurances of EU alignment? 
Austria’s identity is tied neither to aid programs, as in the Irish case, 
nor to the surprising intensity of arbitration initiatives we encounter in 
Switzerland. Nevertheless, interviewees portrayed conditions in which 
Austrian foreign policy is made that likely contribute to the cautionary 
narrative.
First, the country is small and is no threatening heavyweight in for-
eign relations. Second, it emerged from the post–World War II con-
flicts as a Western democracy, but one with neutrality status. Third, 
it is perceived by countries in the Global South as relatively friendly 
toward Southern interests, a reputation considered a legacy of Bruno 
Kreisky, Austria’s long-term socialist foreign minister (1959–1966) and 
chancellor (1970–1983). Fourth, diplomats present Austria as having 
historically positive ties to Middle Eastern countries, the Arab world 
generally, and Sudan specifically. Finally, while interviewees described 
its foreign policy as not well developed, one Austrian respondent char-
acterized its foreign policy elite as focused on economic interests.
This constellation of features may help explain a recent concerted 
lobbying effort on behalf of the government of Sudan. In October 2007, 
a Sudanese consul to Vienna invited one of my Austrian interviewees 
to visit Sudan. After a series of negotiations, the Sudanese authorities 
extended their invitation to a group of Austrians consisting of a for-
mer defense minister, a high-ranking military officer of the Austrian 
Defense Academy, the heads of a conservative- and a liberal-oriented 
foreign policy think tank, a leading foreign correspondent for one of 
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the two most prominent Austrian newspapers, and the president of the 
Austrian-Sudanese Society, Paul Slatin.3 As the interviewee reported:
That was an invitation from the Khartoum government, the entire govern-
ment that is. We conducted conversations. . . . I myself have now been down 
there for the fourth time and we always had talks with representatives of 
the South and the North, including with Bashir. We were twice in Darfur, 
in Nyala, in El Fasher and, as I said, the last time just fourteen days ago. We 
repeatedly had, especially during the first three journeys we undertook, our 
own dates, where we met private individuals, business people, journalists, 
human rights activists, etc., whom we asked to meet in our hotels. Last time 
we also received a briefing from the UNAMID in El Fasher . . . and talked 
with Doctors Without Borders. . . . That has pretty much changed my view 
of the conflict, I’d have to say. (author’s translation)
Building on this report, the respondent critiqued what he considered 
the dominant view of the conflict, which, he argues, was framed by the 
United States and American celebrities such as George Clooney, moti-
vated by national interests, and adopted by Europeans. Another inter-
viewee, a senior foreign policy maker now retired but still special envoy 
for Africa, voiced skepticism about the same visits: “All these activities 
were quite obviously rather much steered by the [Sudanese] govern-
ment. They paid for it, the travel and also the stay there. They also orga-
nized all the interviews there” (author’s translation). This interviewee, 
not part of the visiting group, pointed specifically to the Sudanese secret 
service’s role in manipulating the tour. He contrasted the delegation’s 
experience with his own independent travel to Sudan and his meetings 
not only with opposition figures but also with President al-Bashir. His 
own conclusions regarding al-Bashir nevertheless also contrast with 
those of the common criminal justice discourse:
We also talked about this affair [the ICC charges] .  .  . very politely, with 
friendly words, but still. He of course started with “Well, you have to un-
derstand how all of this started,” and that he himself is a general and he 
knows he is the first who wants today that the violence ends. “It’s of no 
benefit to anyone,” and he favors peace, that he is the man who can really 
guarantee the peace. . . . Well, in part there is some truth to that. Everyone 
can see that those who really are responsible are hiding behind Bashir. . . . 
He understands only today that he was tricked in several respects. Not by 
us, but by his own people. . . . Of course I also talked to him about Chad a 
lot. I told him that we want him to finally make peace with Chad. He then 
told me that he is always ready to send a delegation. What I did not know, 
or nobody knew, was that this was already decided, and ten days later a 
Sudanese delegation visited Chad. (author’s translation)
192  |  Peace versus Justice
In short, Austria, a small country with a history of neutrality and 
relatively close ties to the Arab world, including Sudan, has been lob-
bied by the Sudanese government. Chances are that the information 
to which Austrian visitors to Sudan were exposed was to some degree 
vetted by the government. Noteworthy too is that the Sudanese efforts 
began in 2008, a full year before Austria took a seat on the UN Secu-
rity Council for a two-year term. At least one other Austrian diplomat 
traveled independently and met with leading Sudanese actors, includ-
ing President al-Bashir. He too returned with a skeptical view of the 
human rights campaign and criminal justice portrayal of the actions of 
Omar al-Bashir. I do not argue that these contacts necessarily affected 
Austrian foreign policy. Yet they likely influenced the representations 
of the Darfur conflict emanating from the Austrian foreign policy field.
france and the united kingdom: “as if [we] 
were the former colonial ruler”
“One thing that really struck me when I first joined the foreign office, 
especially working on a lot of different African conflicts, was the fact 
that it almost seemed to be divided up quite as simply as if you were 
the former colonial ruler. It is your lead. It is your responsibility. So 
France took on, you know, it leads on Côte d’Ivoire. We lead on Sudan. 
America leads on Liberia.”
The interviewee in the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
(FCO) adds to this statement with regard to Sudan “that there is a 
certain feeling of responsibility .  .  . for how it was formed, the lines 
on the map, forcing the North and the South together perhaps.” She 
supplemented earlier statements by NGO interviewees who pointed to 
the special role of expatriate communities in advancing foreign policy 
motivations by highlighting the role of the “the press and foreign coun-
tries [that] say, ‘You created this mess; you drew the lines; you forced 
communities together that shouldn’t be together; . . . you need to help 
fix this.’ ”
This interviewee did not rescind, but rather modified, her statement 
in subsequent responses to questions about the special role of UK for-
eign policy toward the Darfur conflict. She pointed to British collabora-
tion with others, for example, the leadership role of the “troika” of the 
United Kingdom, the United States, and Norway (“often seen as very 
impartial”) in the negotiations leading to the CPA (to settle the North-
South conflict). Such collaboration was partly welcomed as the United 
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Kingdom did not want “to direct what happens, because that would be 
seen as being colonial again.” And yet the historical legacy of the colo-
nial power “does require us to speak out first.” Contrasting the action 
on Sudan with the military intervention in Sierra Leone, she said, “It 
comes back to the sort of pure diplomacy.”
It is not possible, based on the interview data, to establish a causal 
link between such a “pure diplomacy” stance and UK diplomats’ repre-
sentation of the Darfur conflict. But field theory again suggests that we 
expect a cautious narrative, distinct from the criminal justice account. 
Not surprisingly, it was this interviewee who had noticed cautious ad-
vice in diplomacy circles not to rock the boat because of Darfur when 
the North-South agreement was at stake. And while she did attribute 
responsibility for the Darfur violence to the government of Sudan, and 
while she agreed with the framing of the violence as “state crime,” she 
avoided naming specific individual actors. She would like to see justice 
delayed, and she rejected the notion of genocide.
The rejection of genocide rhetoric is in line with UK foreign policy 
makers’ official assessment (K. Smith 2010). Specifically for the Darfur 
case, this position was encouraged early in 2004 by Africa experts such 
as Suliman Baldo, James Morton,  and— again—Alex de Waal before 
the UK House of Commons International Development Committee. 
Supported by columnists such as Jonathan Steele of the Guardian, it 
is reflected in numerous statements of leading policy makers. Foreign 
Secretary Jack Straw, for example, stated in September 2004: “Some 
people call it genocide, some people call it ethnic cleansing, some people 
call it civil war, some people call if none of the above. Whatever it is, it’s 
a desperate situation which requires the attention of the world” (quoted 
in K. Smith 2010:228).
Karen Smith attributes some responsibility for such caution to the 
report of the International Commission of Inquiry, discussed above 
(chapter 1). That report had decided against the application of the geno-
cide label, a decision that legitimized avoidance of the term and asso-
ciated obligations. The “risk” of incurring obligations increased after 
September 2005, when the UN formulated the “Responsibility to Pro-
tect” doctrine. British hesitance, however, did not prevent the United 
Kingdom from joining forces with France, the only other permanent 
member of the UNSC that has ratified the Rome Statute, in taking a de-
cisive stance in favor of referring the Darfur case to the ICC. Apart from 
this step toward prosecution, the United Kingdom limited itself to sup-
porting humanitarian aid and diplomatic efforts in the Doha peace talks.
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Just as the United Kingdom is the former colonial overlord of Sudan, 
so is France the former colonial power over neighboring  Chad— and 
of numerous other West African and Sahel-zone countries. The inter-
viewee in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that such 
history matters. He pointed to special expertise concentrated in the for-
mer colonial power, using the focus on Africa in his own university 
studies as an example. He stressed that 60 percent of French foreign 
aid flows to Africa. And he emphasized the role that the memory of 
colonialism plays, if not in the general population (an attempt to make 
the Darfur crisis central to the 2004 presidential election campaign did 
not succeed), then among the foreign policy elite. Associated with such 
memory is French foreign policy makers’ belief in their special influ-
ence, “given the history we have in Africa, given the relations we have 
with Chad or just, you know, the neighboring countries.” He portrayed 
France’s position concerning the Darfur conflict as a reflection of “the 
risk of spillover on Chad”—supplementing concerns with the humani-
tarian crisis. Simultaneously the French interviewee sketched a shift to-
ward a more “continental” vision on Africa and thus a direct interest 
in events in Sudan.
Despite his less pronounced diplomatic involvement in Sudan, my 
interviewee in the French MFA also displayed the habitus of a diplomat 
and provided the expected narrative of Darfur. While he subscribed to 
the state crime frame as appropriate for the interpretation of the Darfur 
conflict, and while he staunchly rejected the application of Article 16 of 
the Rome Statutes (i.e., suspension of ICC proceedings), his words were 
nevertheless guarded. His causal explanation of the conflict focused first 
on desertification, second on the center-periphery conflict, and third on 
the CPA and the encouragement Darfur rebels might have drawn from 
it (note that France did not play a central role in these negotiations). 
And, while he characterized Ahmed Harun, indicted by the ICC, as 
“one of the main tools used by the government,” he responded to the 
question “Used by whom?” with an answer that avoided uttering the 
name of Harun’s co-indictee Omar al-Bashir. He replied: “Well, that is 
the big question.”
The French Foreign Ministry interviewee, finally, rejected the geno-
cide label, in line with the official position taken consistently by French 
government ministers (K. Smith 2010:229). Yet, again, together with 
the United Kingdom, France is the only permanent member of the 
UNSC that has ratified the Rome Statute and promoted a referral of the 
Darfur case to the ICC. Earlier, the French government distinguished 
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itself when it lobbied strongly for a reference to Darfur in UNSC Reso-
lution 1547 of June 11, 2004. Karen Smith (2010) reports: “According 
to one account, France’s position went from ‘we don’t want to do this’ 
to ‘we can’t let this go on,’ because it feared the conflict would spread 
to Chad” (214).
In short, the cases of the United Kingdom, former colonial power 
of Sudan, and of France, former colonial power of Sudan’s neighbor 
Chad, confirm the workings of the diplomatic field. Interview state-
ments and official pronouncements are guarded. The name of the presi-
dent of Sudan is rarely uttered as a co-responsible actor. Causal analysis 
attributes much of the violence to natural and political-structural condi-
tions. Interviewees avoid applying the term genocide. But we also see 
that diplomacy and criminal justice are not mutually exclusive; their 
relationship does not constitute a zero-sum conflict. In fact, criminal 
justice interventions were based on diplomatic work. The UNSC refer-
ral to the ICC was strongly supported by both France and the United 
Kingdom. In fact, this referral may have the benefits, from a diplomatic 
perspective, that it defers the use of exclusionary language to the court 
and that deferral of further intervention by national governments is le-
gitimized with the case in the court’s hands. Finally, the cases of two 
former colonial powers show again that a country’s history overlaps 
with the basic features of the diplomatic field. This intersectionality 
gives the field particular shape and colors the rhetoric and actions of 
its players.
germany: cultural trauma of  
perpetrators— and consequences
The memory of the Holocaust in Germany is deeply ingrained, espe-
cially among the political elite. Giesen (2004a) has written about the 
cultural trauma of perpetrators in discussing German memories of the 
Holocaust, and Savelsberg and King (2005, 2011) show how not only 
national memorial days and memorial sites but also legal codes and 
positions taken by law enforcers with regard to hate-motivated crimes 
refer frequently to the Judeocide committed by Nazi Germany. This 
places Germany, including its foreign policy, in a peculiar, albeit am-
bivalent, position when mass atrocities occur.
On the one hand, we might expect a particularly aggressive stance 
and a clear representation of mass violence as criminal, indeed geno-
cidal. Several statements by German NGO workers cited above attest to 
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this sense of a pronounced German responsibility in cases of genocidal 
violence. The diplomats I interviewed similarly claimed a special sense 
of obligation. A respondent from the political division of the foreign 
ministry spoke about a general obligation deriving from the Holocaust. 
The interviewee from the foreign ministry’s legal division spoke most 
emphatically to this German obligation, for the case of Darfur specifi-
cally and for international criminal law generally. He also argued that 
Germany’s foreign policy practice is consistent with such rhetoric, cit-
ing as an example the fact that Germany is the second largest contribu-
tor to the ICC among the state parties to the Rome Statute. In line with 
this respondent’s observations, comparative research finds not only 
that Germany uses a comparatively wide definition of genocide that 
includes episodes of ethnic cleansing (K. Smith 2010:22), but also that 
German courts pursued cases of Bosnian war crimes especially aggres-
sively (135–36).
Specifically with regard to Darfur, Germany, a nonpermanent 
member of the UN Security Council in 2002–2004, pushed early for 
the council to address the mass violence, even though France and the 
United Kingdom still hesitated (K.  Smith 2010).4 Government minis-
ters used strong rhetoric, exceptional by European standards. In July 
2004 Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, the minister for overseas develop-
ment, called Darfur a “genocide in slow motion.” Christa Nickels, chair 
of the legislature’s (Bundestag’s) Human Rights Committee called the 
mass violence something that “equals genocide” and Peter Struck, Ger-
many’s minister of defense, argued in September 2004: “For me there is 
no doubt that we Germans also carry a responsibility for this continent 
[Africa]. We cannot simply look on when a part of the continent is 
experiencing genocide” (cited in K. Smith 2010:226). Similarly, oppo-
sition politicians such as Gerhart Baum of the libertarian Free Demo-
cratic Party, former UN special rapporteur for human rights in Sudan, 
referred to the massacres as genocide as early as April 2004, a position 
that enhanced the receptivity of German media to the Darfur theme, as 
we shall see in chapter 9.
On the other hand, complications inherent in the “cultural trauma 
of perpetrators” abound. As we have seen, German NGO respondents 
pointed to the strong representation of pacifists, especially in German 
sections of human rights organizations. They too base their pacifism on 
the memory of Nazi Germany, a position that confounds any consider-
ation of military humanitarian intervention. Another NGO respondent 
spoke to the strong role that the churches still play in German society 
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and the engagement of many mainstream actors in religious humanitar-
ian organizations. Their orientation too is fueled by the history of war 
and human suffering, yet their humanitarian mission conflicts with a 
human rights agenda and criminal justice responses to mass violence. 
This tension is in line with earlier observations from the humanitarian 
field (see chapters 4 and 5).
Throughout my research I encountered hesitations and complica-
tions, some of which are in fact associated with the cultural trauma 
of the perpetrator. One German Africa correspondent initially rejected 
the notion that his nationality affected his reporting about mass atroci-
ties and genocide. He then reconsidered, confessing his reluctance to 
subsume the Holocaust and the violence in Darfur under the same 
category of genocide. Indeed, our newspaper analysis shows that 
German media apply the genocide label less frequently to the Darfur 
conflict than media in all other countries. While the difference is small for 
news reports (17% versus 19%), it is substantial in opinion pieces 
(24% versus 34%). The director of one of the major Holocaust me-
morial sites, a rabbi and son of an Auschwitz survivor, when asked 
why German memorial sites do not add an alert mission to their com-
memorative function, as the US Holocaust Memorial Museum does, 
answered (and I paraphrase): The Americans can do that. If we did this as 
Germans, we would be accused of relativizing the Holocaust. Journal-
ists’ apparent cognitive impediment to linking current mass atrocities to 
the Holocaust is thus supplemented by a normative hurdle expressed by 
the director of the Holocaust memorial site.
Finally, our analysis of German newspapers shows only rare uses of 
analogical bridging between the Holocaust and the Darfur violence. One 
German media piece in fact poses a bridging challenge. On May 10, 
2005, the Süddeutsche Zeitung (p. 16) published a review of books 
by Romeo Dallaire and Robert Stockhammer, entitled The Ranking of 
Atrocities. Alex Rühle, the reviewer, refers to Stockhammer’s quotation 
of works by respected historians: “ ‘Compared to the German death 
camps during the Holocaust, the daily killing rate in Rwanda was five 
times higher.’ ‘At that rate Hitler would have completed the Holocaust 
in less than nine months, not six years.’ . . . The central paradox of such 
sentences, Stockhammer argues, is that ‘here something is compared 
with that which is synonymous with the incomparable.’ ” In short, the 
trauma of perpetrators poses impediments against the use of the geno-
cide label and against analogical bridging that interprets the violence in 
Darfur in the light of the Holocaust.
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Cautionary notes from civil society are reflected in the diplomatic 
field, modifying the somewhat decisive rhetoric cited above. Germany’s 
foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, of the Green Party, outspoken about 
the genocidal nature of violence in Kosovo just a few years earlier, was 
more guarded in the case of Darfur, which he referred to in September 
2004 as “a humanitarian catastrophe with genocidal potential” (quoted 
in K.  Smith 2010:225). Also Kerstin Müller, minister of state in the 
Foreign Ministry, used the terms “humanitarian crisis” and “ethnic 
expulsions” rather than genocide. Still, an interviewee in the Political 
Division of the Foreign Ministry referred to these two politicians as 
“rather fundamentalist” and strict observers of the “letter of the law.” 
Social Democrat Walter Steinmeier, Fischer’s successor as foreign min-
ister, barely addressed the Darfur issue, partly because of his preoccu-
pation with the situation in Afghanistan, according to an interviewee’s 
assessment confirmed by K. Smith (2010:232).5
Caution at the leadership level of the Foreign Ministry is reflected in 
the words of the interviewee from the ministry’s Political Division. He 
stressed that Germany’s “general obligation” based on Holocaust his-
tory must not lead to “inflexibility” and “dogmatism.” Yet his position 
seems marred by resignation. While generally advocating diplomatic 
means, this interviewee acknowledged challenges to diplomatic negotia-
tions in the Darfur case, at least in the short run: “That, however, one 
can only do when the public dust of excitement has practically settled. 
Because this diplomatic solution necessitates negotiations with the crim-
inal [Verbrecher], with the  murderer— necessitates a, let’s call it ‘value 
free,’ interest–guided approach to the problem, which one—when the 
images from CNN about the dead in the streets are still  fresh— cannot 
do at all. That’s impossible” (author’s translation).
Further, hesitation about diplomatic engagement pales in compari-
son to the rejection of military options. Generally, not just in the Dar-
fur case, the same interviewee rejected the notion of German military 
intervention, even when the risk of genocide looms or when genocide 
is already under way: “Germany does not have the foreign policy tools 
[auswärtigen Machtmittel] to  intervene— like the Americans  do— both 
militarily and with humanitarian means,  .  .  . We can do logistics, at 
best, as a member, a useful member of international community opera-
tions, that is. But that Germany would take the lead [eine Verantwor-
tung führen würde] and would be the ‘driver’ to prevent some genocide 
in some part of the  world— no, no, that not, because we cannot do 
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that, because we do not even have the military means” (author’s 
translation).
In short, the German Foreign Ministry showed hesitation to inter-
vene in the case of Darfur, and was most reluctant to do so by military 
means. But even diplomatic means are considered only with great cau-
tion. Finally, legal responses, as well, find mixed assessments in the Ger-
man diplomatic field. In the words of my interviewee from the human 
rights department of the Legal Division, a strong proponent for ICC 
intervention:
As to my interlocutors in the Auswärtige Amt [Foreign Ministry], I think 
it is fair to say that there were constantly conflicting perceptions. And I do 
remember quite a number of quarrels I had with my colleagues in the politi-
cal department. . . . And the reason is that we had two different approaches. 
Their approach was purely political. My approach was both political, but 
also legal and judicial. And that is extremely difficult to combine at times, 
because if you are only confined to making political assessments, then it is 
difficult to evaluate the work of a court, to accept a court, to accept any 
independent legal institution, and that is really something new in the inter-
national field, where people are trained to assess complex issues by political 
means only.
In conclusion, the German case shows how the cultural trauma of 
Holocaust perpetrators that afflicts German society and politics en-
hances at least rhetorical responses, in society and in the German dip-
lomatic field, to cases of mass violence and genocide. But the cultural 
trauma also imposes constraints. The word genocide is applied with 
greater hesitation, and analogical bridging from the Shoah to contem-
porary mass atrocities is considered problematic.
I note, though, that the impediments appear more pronounced in 
deliberations about Darfur than in debates about other genocide cases 
and mass atrocities. In the Darfur case, the difference K. Smith finds 
between Germany’s typically more forceful rhetoric and the greater 
caution in the United Kingdom and France is substantially diminished. 
One potential explanation is the latter two countries’ colonial legacies 
in Sudan and Chad. In comparison to the United States, the responses 
of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany alike are substantially 
subdued. The much more ambivalent mobilization of civil society in 
Europe and the foreign policy sector’s lack of receptivity likely explain 
this difference. Then again, the diplomatic field is not homogenous. Ac-
tors in the Legal Division of Germany’s Foreign Ministry, especially 
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those trained as lawyers, strongly advocate for criminal justice interven-
tions by the  ICC— even if they simultaneously express commitment and 
voice caution regarding links between the Holocaust and Darfur. In the 
words of one interviewee:
I think it is justified to be very, very sensitive and very careful and very 
restrictive in making those comparisons. However, I mean, since we have 
that particular burden of history on our shoulders, I think it should be an 
incentive for us to inquire into cases of genocide. It does not always neces-
sarily imply a comparison to the Holocaust. . . . Genocide is dramatic and 
horrible in itself. I think we have all reason to maintain that we as Germans 
have a particular responsibility to make sure that any holocaust [sic] or any 
genocide or any crime against humanity is not reproduced.
conclusions: national contexts intersecting 
with the diplomatic field, and modified 
representations
Clearly,  fields— or national divisions within  fields— are affected by na-
tional contexts. Previous scholarship has found that human rights dis-
courses, as well as legislation and implementation of laws, differ across 
countries even in light of global scripts (Boyle 2002). Halliday and Car-
ruthers (2010) show that the adaptation of global scripts depends on 
a country’s position in the international balance of power and on its 
cultural distance from the global center. This analysis of the diplomatic 
field shows, as did those of the justice and humanitarian fields, that 
structural and cultural variation within the world of Western countries 
also matters.
Several cultural and structural conditions affected the degree to 
which diplomats from different countries stuck to or deviated from 
the diplomatic master narrative. Strong mobilization of civil society in 
combination with a porous state contributes to dramatizing narratives 
even in the diplomatic field, as the case of the United States illustrates. 
Frequent and intense interaction with the Sudanese state, especially in 
the absence of strong civil society mobilization, results in a narrative 
that sticks closely to the diplomatic ideal type. Such interactions may 
be fostered by lobbying efforts on the part of Sudan, especially toward 
a country with long-standing ties with Sudan and the Arab world, as 
illustrated by the Austrian case. Close interactions may also stem from 
a country’s special expertise, for example, in arbitration and the re-
sulting involvement in diplomatic efforts. Such expertise in the case of 
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Switzerland is privileged by the country’s neutrality status. Finally, spe-
cial interactions can result from a country’s dedication to humanitarian 
aid efforts, which may themselves be rooted in its collective memory of 
suffering, as the example of Ireland shows.
Also, a nation’s status as a former colonial power matters. Spe-
cific regional expertise, the presence of expatriate groups, a sense of 
 obligation— self-perceived or imposed by media and third  countries— 
may contribute to intense diplomatic involvement, as was the case for 
the United Kingdom. Again, such involvement pushes the narrative on 
Darfur closer to the diplomatic ideal type. France, affiliated with its for-
mer colony Chad, also moved cautiously, but appeared more willing to 
deviate from the diplomatic master narrative than the United Kingdom.
Germany exemplifies the complex effects of the cultural trauma of 
the perpetrator of the Holocaust. German narratives display a clear 
sense of obligation in the face of mass violence. Yet the memory of the 
Shoah imposes constraints on use of the term genocide and the building 
of analogical bridges between the Holocaust and later mass atrocities. 
The German case also illustrates the variability of memorial normativ-
ity (Savelsberg 2016). Norms embedded in identical memories vary by 
carrier group. Whereas actors such as the foreign ministry interviewee 
from the human rights unit may find penal norms supported by the 
cultural trauma of the Shoah, religiously inspired groups may draw hu-
manitarian lessons from the trauma of perpetrators that advance, much 
in line with findings in chapters 4 and 5, a cautious rhetoric about the 
offending country. The latter perspective seems to leave traces in foreign 
ministry press releases in which the humanitarian frame dominates.
Throughout, national carrier groups, their memories, and the nor-
mative implications of memories matter, from African Americans, Jews, 
and evangelical Christians in the United States to humanitarians in Ire-
land, foreign policy elites in France, and religion- and church-based 
middle classes in Germany. This finding suggests modifying Levy and 
Sznaider’s (2010) argument about a shift from communicative memo-
ries, based on group-specific carriers, to cultural memories, reproduced 
through media and communicative institutions. National carriers still 
matter.
In short, the context of the diplomatic field produces a unique repre-
sentation of Darfur, one that differs from and competes with represen-
tations generated in the humanitarian field and, especially, the justice 
field. Proponents of the “justice cascade” (Sikkink 2011) thus have to 
contend with the diplomatic field. At the same time, real narratives 
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deviate more or less from the ideal-typical diplomatic representation. 
The field of diplomacy intersects in complex patterns with diachronic 
experiences such as educational socialization and synchronic contexts 
such as organizational placement and national environment. Implica-
tions for communicating competing representations to the public sphere 
are at the center of the following chapters.
part four





In my interview with an Africa correspondent of a prominent Western 
newspaper, the respondent said of his paper’s editor-in-chief that he 
“thought one does not need a great political analyst for Africa, but 
someone who travels to countries and is capable of writing reports.”
This editor’s viewpoint certainly does not tell the full story of journal-
istic work on Africa. Yet it does reflect an important aspect of contem-
porary journalism: the relative marginality of Africa in the consciousness 
of Western media. What are the implications of this marginal place for 
the communication of information about mass violence in an African re-
gion such as Darfur to a broad segment of Western societies? What does 
this relative marginality mean for the chances that criminal justice, hu-
manitarian, and diplomatic actors have to get their at times competing 
messages across to the world public? Any satisfying attempt to answer 
these questions requires that we explore the nature of the journalistic 
 field— its autonomy, its relationship to other fields, the habitus of Africa 
correspondents, and of course the observed patterns of reporting that 
emerge in this context.
I address these tasks in two chapters. In the current chapter I ex-
amine the nature of the journalistic field, the relative autonomy of the 
segment of this field under consideration here, and the habitus of Africa 
correspondents who reported about Darfur. The following chapter lays 
out the relationship between the journalistic field and others, including 
chapter 8
Rules of the Journalistic Game, 
Autonomy, and the Habitus of 
Africa Correspondents
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the judicial, humanitarian, and diplomatic fields, and it analyzes the 
actual trends and patterns of reporting on Darfur.
For purposes of the current chapter I draw primarily on my interviews 
with twelve journalists from seven Western countries who reported on 
Darfur, and on supporting ethnographic notes from a conference of 
war correspondents and from the Bellagio conference on representa-
tions of Darfur, where correspondents engaged with actors from differ-
ent fields. As I do in previous chapters for the spheres of criminal justice 
and human rights, humanitarianism, and diplomacy, in this chapter I 
use field theory, which Pierre Bourdieu (1998) and his followers have 
explicitly and successfully applied to journalism (e.g., Benson 1998, 
2006). I supplement the Bourdieuian approach with insights from more 
recent work on boundaries between the journalistic and political fields 
(Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999; Revers 2014; Strömbeck and Esser 2014), 
from work on journalism that draws on cultural approaches (Dayan 
and Katz 1992; Hannerz 2004; Zelizer 1993), and from recent writings 
on the journalism of mass violence in Africa (Allen and Seaton 1999; 
McNulty 1999; Thompson 2007). In keeping with my comparative ap-
proach, I also add to insights from still-rare internationally comparative 
studies of journalistic work (e.g., Benson 1998, 2013).
the Journalistic field, mass violence,  
and darfur
Bourdieu, in his little book Television and Journalism (1998), sought to 
“show how the journalistic field produces and imposes on the public a 
very particular vision of the political field. This vision is grounded in the 
very structure of the journalistic field and in the interests of journalists 
as they are produced by their field” (2). The picture Bourdieu paints is 
not pretty. He reveals media preferences for celebrities over profound 
knowledge, polemics over reason, political tactics over substance, and 
a predisposition to overstatement, all of which, he argues, fosters a 
“cynical view” (Bourdieu 1998:5) of politics on the part of the receiv-
ing public, a view simultaneously “dehistoricized and dehistoricizing, 
fragmented and fragmenting” (7). Bourdieu speaks specifically to media 
depictions of mass violence:
Zaire today, Bosnia yesterday, the Congo tomorrow. Stripped of any politi-
cal necessity, this string of events can at best arouse a vague humanitarian 
interest. Coming one after the other and outside any historical perspective, 
the unconnected tragedies seem to differ little from natural disasters. . . . As 
Rules of the Journalistic Game  |  207
for the victims, they’re not presented in any more political a light than those 
of a train derailment or any other accident. . . . Journalism shows us a world 
full of ethnic wars, racist hatred, violence and  crime— a world full of incom-
prehensible and unsettling dangers from which we must withdraw for our 
own protection. (7–8)
Admittedly, Bourdieu directs his scathing critique primarily at tele-
vision, but he also targets the broader journalistic field. Subsequent 
critiques of the mediatization of politics have supported Bourdieu’s 
notion that such journalism affects political views and even political 
practice (e.g., Strömbeck and Esser 2014). But is Bourdieu’s depiction 
of journalism confirmed by our data on Darfur? The media reports on 
which my empirical evidence is based are, after all, not collected from 
television but  from the most sophisticated newspapers in the respective 
countries.1
Still, several features of the journalistic field apply irrespective of 
media type, and I am interested in their shape and in consequences they 
hold for the representation of mass violence. These features include, 
prominently, the relative autonomy of the field, in which actors fol-
low specific rules of the game (and are guided by institutional logics); 
the particular habitus of journalists; the journalistic field’s relationships 
with other fields, as shaped by power relations, available communica-
tion channels, and (in)compatibilities of language and logics applied 
in these fields; and the media field’s globalization in interaction with 
persisting national traits. The following sections and chapter 9 address 
each of these features of journalism in turn and show, based on diverse 
types of data, how they apply to the case of journalism focused on 
Darfur.
autonomy and the rules of the game
Bourdieu (1998) characterizes journalism as “a microcosm with its own 
laws, defined both by its position in the world at large and by the attrac-
tions and repulsions to which it is subject from other such microcosms” 
(39). He depicts these microcosms as fields, relatively independent or 
“autonomous,” by which he means that they follow their own laws or 
institutional logics.2 Adherence to a specific set of rules is not unique to 
journalism, of course. Modern society is generally differentiated into 
semiautonomous fields such as politics, the economy, science, and reli-
gion, each governed by its own rules of the game, each demanding ac-
ceptance of those rules by actors who seek to participate (Benson 1998). 
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My examination of the fields of criminal law and justice, humanitarian-
ism, and diplomacy in the preceding chapters illustrates how field-spe-
cific rules do not just govern the actions but even color the worldviews 
of participants and their knowledge or perception of Darfur.
Thus, like other fields, journalism is not determined by external 
criteria. As its agents follow journalism’s own rules, its depiction of 
the world cannot be read, for example, as a reflection of economic 
 interests— even if pursuit of such interests is indeed of vital interest to 
the operation (and survival) of a newspaper. The portrayal of events 
instead reflects the rules of journalism. Bourdieu (1998) illustrates these 
rules for television journalism: there has to be conflict, involving “good 
guys and bad guys,” but exchanges have to be “clothed by the model of 
formal, intellectual language” (35). By creating excitement in viewers, 
such confrontation commands their attention (and thus high ratings), 
while the media gain legitimacy by following the rules of democratic 
procedure. Further, irrespective of the specific medium, journalists con-
front space limitations and intense time pressure. These constraints, too, 
demand adherence to particular genres (Bourdieu 1998:28). Applied to 
our case of mass violence, journalists may be inclined to simplify stories 
and to portray the contending sides in a conflict in overly streamlined 
 ways— as representatives of reified primordial ethnic or racial groups, 
for example. Such oversimplification is a central target for critique in the 
literature on African civil wars (e.g., Allen and Seaton 1999; McNulty 
1999), including works written by Africa correspondents themselves 
(Crilly 2010; Thompson 2007). Foreign correspondents face further 
challenges in that they cannot easily resort to strategies used by do-
mestic  reporters— for example, by focusing on “actions and statements 
of those claiming to represent the nation . . . [in order to] help impose 
unity on what is otherwise a congeries of individuals and groups acting 
inside a set of geographic and political boundaries” (Gans 2005:297). 
The task for international journalists is certainly more complex. Which 
authorities will they rely on to achieve this unity?
Writing specifically on mass violence, historian Devin Pendas (2006) 
examines the application and consequences of journalistic rules in the 
context of the Frankfurt Auschwitz trial of the early 1960s. Focusing on 
elite newspapers, as I do, he finds that here too the hectic pace of events 
colors journalistic work. One day’s report rarely makes reference to the 
previous day’s. Yesterday’s information will be disregarded in subse-
quent reporting, when new events will have occurred. In other words, 
journalistic reporting is episodic. Shifting uses of the crime frame in 
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the Darfur case confirmed this pattern: journalists may have frequently 
cited this frame after court interventions, but then neglected it in subse-
quent periods in which court action moved from the front to the back 
of the stage (see analysis in chapter 9).
Another journalistic rule is that of objectivity.3 Facts are supposed 
to speak for themselves, and interpretation is to be provided only spar-
ingly. Consumers of media-generated information have grown to ap-
preciate and, in fact, demand this feature of journalism. Yet the case 
of the Frankfurt Auschwitz trial shows problematic consequences. Ap-
plication of the objectivity rule meant that the logic of the criminal 
court was directly transmitted to the reader. As the trial was conducted 
under German criminal law, with its focus on individual intent, the 
trial (and subsequent media reports) highlighted those cases in which 
malicious intent was in full display, especially the instances of atrocities 
and torture. The reports, reflecting the trial proceedings, paid less atten-
tion, however, to the bureaucratized mass-murder machine of the gas 
chambers (e.g., transport, selection at the ramp, gassing, administra-
tion), where the “banality of evil” came to full display. Pendas (2006) 
summarizes the court and media’s approach to the trial:
What might be termed the characterological style in objective newspaper 
reporting thus entailed both a concern with personality and a tendency to 
reduce it to monadic types. And in this, a strong homology existed with the 
judicial emphasis on the subjective dispositions of defendants and the assump-
tion of a causal nexus between motivation and action. The court’s tendency 
to privilege atrocity over genocide, the juridical requirement for excessive bru-
tality, the reduction of mass killing to a form of aiding and abetting rather 
than  murder— all of these were reproduced in the characterology of the daily 
press. The “why” of the murder, as a matter of personal character, became 
the predominant theme, and the historical event of genocide was reduced to 
the psychodrama of the courtroom suspense thriller. (262)
My work with Ryan King (2011) found that media reporting about 
the My Lai massacre, committed by Charlie Company, a unit of the 
20th US Infantry, during the Vietnam War, was similarly constrained 
by the logic of the courts-martial in which the case was tried. Instead 
of basing estimates of the number of people killed on a report by the 
army’s Peers Commission or on a Pulitzer Prize–winning book by re-
nowned journalist Seymour Hersh, media reports in subsequent years 
(as well as history textbooks) were more likely to cite those numbers for 
which the defendants were charged. Further, instead of attributing re-
sponsibility to a diversity of actors, including the military hierarchy, in 
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line with the assessment of the Peers Commission, news reports focused 
on the responsibility of Lieutenant William Calley, the single person 
convicted and sentenced in the trial (Savelsberg and King 2011:34–52).
In short, strictures such as the objectivity rule are not just guarantors 
of relative autonomy but also constraining forces. In situations where 
journalists lack autonomy, the constraints of journalistic rules are re-
placed by others that govern neighboring fields such as the economy 
or the world of politics.4 Media in authoritarian systems that practice 
censorship are an extreme example. In capitalist systems, some media 
obviously place more emphasis on economic forms of capital (such as 
circulation, advertising revenues, and audience ratings) than on cultural 
capital (such as literary skill or awards such as the Pulitzer Prize). The 
former media are closer to what Bourdieu calls the heteronomous pole, 
where criteria external to the field dominate, while the latter approxi-
mate the autonomous pole, ruled by criteria unique to the journalistic 
field (Benson 2006:190). Given the prestige of the newspapers under 
study here, the journalism we encounter is closer to the autonomous 
pole. It differs decisively from TV, especially privately owned or mar-
ket-driven TV, and from tabloid journalism. This distinction is in line 
with the composition of its readership, as Benson (2006) observes: “At 
elite newspapers such as the New York Times and the Washington Post 
(data for the Wall Street Journal are not publically available, but one 
can presume the results would at least be equivalent), readers are twice 
as likely, or more, than the average American adult to have a college 
degree, to earn more than $75,000 per year, and to hold managerial 
positions” (191). Very similar readership patterns can be assumed for 
all newspapers included in this analysis.5
And yet, despite the closeness of the journalists in this study to the 
autonomous pole, all interviewees were mindful of declining subscrip-
tion rates and growing economic pressures on their papers. The dra-
matic situation is well captured in one respondent’s account of the 
history of his paper’s representation in Africa: “The office in Johan-
nesburg existed throughout. But then, with the big newspaper crisis, 
which started in 2002 and really hit in 2004, Johannesburg was closed 
down. Then Abidjan was the last remaining office. I was responsible for 
the entire continent as of 2004, and that comes with a lot of travel. [JJS: 
And today too you are the only Africa correspondent?] Yes, I am the 
only one, yes” (author’s translation).
Assigning no more than one correspondent on the ground to the entire 
African continent was a practice common to almost all the newspapers I 
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examined. The New York Times is a major exception. One of the Paris-
based newspapers in fact no longer has journalists stationed in Africa.6 
One of the interviewees attributed this omission to the fact that Africa 
is a “niche subject.” Another journalist told me that it takes “extraor-
dinary” events for Africa reports to get on the front page. Whatever the 
causes may be, massive journalistic  underrepresentation— intensified by 
economic constraints that increasingly weigh on  newspapers— restricts 
reporting from the African continent. Economic pressure is yet more 
intensely felt by independent journalists. One correspondent, now a 
freelancer after years working for one of the newspapers under study, 
wrote in a personal communication in the summer of 2014: “I’d love to 
travel to Darfur again, but the media interest is so low that I would have 
to expect a major financial loss. I am now a freelancer [unabhängig], 
and I have to make sure to make a profit. That is not even always easy 
in Syria” (author’s translation). He had just delivered a prime-time TV 
news magazine report from the latter country.
In short, the media under study are relatively close to the autono-
mous pole of the journalistic field. Their work is driven by the rules of 
journalism more than by external forces. Yet even these journalists are 
subject to external pressures, including economic ones.
the habitus of africa correspondents
Field theory draws attention to the actors who inhabit a field and the 
habitus that guides their actions. Journalists, like all actors in social 
fields, are carriers of such a habitus, defined earlier (following Bour-
dieu) as a set of relatively fixed dispositions that reflect actors’ trajecto-
ries and their position within the field (see also Emirbayer and Johnson 
2008). Bourdieu liked to refer to jazz musicians or basketball players for 
an illustration. Both follow rules, but they would be incapable of play-
ing their music or game successfully were they not skilled improvisers. 
The same should apply to journalists in their line of work. Accordingly, 
Bourdieu speaks of “cognitive, perceptual and evaluative structures” 
with which journalists must deal. He attributes these to a “common 
social background and training (or lack thereof)” (Bourdieu 1998:36). 
It thus seems necessary to understand the habitus of our Africa cor-
respondents if we hope to make sense of how journalists report about 
Darfur. What is their demographic and educational background? How 
did they enter journalistic careers? How were they selected for their 
work in Africa? What is their position vis-à-vis the papers they work 
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for? And finally, how do their life and career trajectories and positions 
shape “durable dispositions”? In short, what kind of habitus emerges 
and how does it color their reporting about mass violence?
Trajectories
A few demographic characteristics of the twelve interviewees are illus-
trative. All but one of the journalists had grown up in the Global North. 
The one exception is a native South African. Another correspondent is 
a second-generation immigrant from Sri Lanka. The likely significance 
of his background is suggested by his comment that “it possibly in-
creases my sympathy [for Darfur rebels], because the Sri Lanka conflict 
is a conflict that was with rebel actors against the center. It possibly 
strengthened my sympathy for a group that was seeking to extract con-
cessions from the political center, and a group that had felt itself dis-
criminated against.”
All but two interviewees, and all who had reported from the ground 
in Darfur or Chad or both, were males. One of the two female journal-
ists reported from the United Nations in New York; the other, a spe-
cialist on international relations, from her country’s capital city, a seat 
to many international organizations. Among the male journalists, only 
one had written about Darfur from his home base as his paper’s for-
eign affairs columnist. All others had worked from their posts in Africa. 
Most interviewees wrote for newspapers in their country of origin. The 
exceptions were a Belgian working for a German paper, a German em-
ployee of an Austrian paper, the South African who wrote for a British 
paper, and a freelancer with British-Irish roots who reported primarily 
for British, American, and Irish papers.
The journalists I interviewed were generally of middle-class back-
ground. Several had at least one parent who had been a journalist. All 
had some kind of academic education. Only one had attended journal-
ism school, while others held university degrees in fields as varied as 
political science, English literature, German studies, economics, history, 
philosophy, and genetics.
Speaking about their paths to journalistic careers, interviewees re-
vealed some of their dispositions. A British correspondent told me: “My 
father was a journalist. So, I guess, it was always in my blood even 
though I tried to do other things. . . . I enjoyed writing. So it was the ob-
vious thing to do.” A senior British journalist and former foreign editor 
reported a similar background: “Both my parents were journalists. . . . 
Rules of the Journalistic Game  |  213
If I was going to fulfill my ambitions to see the world, then I needed 
to get someone to pay for that. And, because my own talent was the 
ability to write well, it just seems that journalism was an obvious out-
let for me.” Several interviewees had made journalistic forays before 
entering into their professional careers. An Austrian journalist of Ger-
man descent, for example, had written for newspapers during her high 
school (Gymnasium) years. She then studied political science in Berlin 
and Paris (with a focus on Africa), before she moved to Vienna for 
personal reasons and entered her professional career there. Similarly, 
one interviewee who tried to enter journalism right out of high school 
realized that “[i]t was not quite easy for a nineteen-year old without an 
academic degree. I understood quickly then that I had to do university 
studies. I did that [Islamic studies and political science] parallel to my 
travels to Afghanistan and later to Angola and other crisis regions in Af-
rica. That’s really how I earned my living. And that also predestined me 
for the Africa post with the [newspaper name]” (author’s translation).
One last example must suffice: “Journalist was always my dream of a 
profession [Traumberuf]. I have to say I got there via detours. I worked 
for many years as a truck driver to finance my studies. But I never lost 
sight of my goal to become a journalist” (author’s translation).
In short, all interviewees evidenced a relatively high level of educa-
tion and a joy of writing, some showed a sense of adventurism and 
desire to travel, and all demonstrated a profound dedication to the jour-
nalism profession. Such a habitus should work toward a relatively high 
level of journalistic autonomy, a strong desire to stick to journalistic 
rules and to avoid giving in to heteronomous pressures.
But more questions must be asked. For example, how prepared were 
our journalists for their assignment to Africa? How were they selected 
for work on that continent? Answers to such questions further advance 
our understanding of these Africa correspondents’ habitus. One French 
journalist moved from the national to the international section. He was 
young (“twenty-four or twenty-five years old”), but he told me about 
others who had started working on Africa at even a younger age: “New 
reporters start with Africa, usually. . . . It is kind of traditional. Maybe 
because it takes a lot of time in Africa, and young people normally have 
no kids, no wives, no lifeline.” A British journalist also moved to Africa 
shortly after beginning his career. One of his first posts was in Nairobi, 
where he arrived in 2003, the year in which mass violence began to un-
fold in Darfur and the year before he visited Sudan for the first time to 
report about Darfur. Other respondents had some previous experience, 
214  |  Mediating Competing Representations 
but no Africa-specific training. “I’ve been a journalist for ten, eleven 
years,” one said. “I have been working in the UK and did a number of 
trips during that time to Africa to work. So I decided it was quite an ad-
venture, and it was the sort of journalism I wanted to do. There was no 
burning ambition to be a human rights journalist or war correspondent 
or anything like that. It was really for a bit of adventure. And that is 
what took me to Nairobi as a freelancer.” Similarly, the South African 
correspondent for British newspapers had previous journalistic experi-
ence. Yet, while he benefited from having acquired knowledge of Africa 
previously, he too had no training to be a foreign correspondent for the 
African continent. Biographical knowledge, though, gained through life 
experiences, can be a strong motivator, as the following example of a 
journalist for a German paper shows. He too did not have formal train-
ing regarding Africa when he took over as an Africa correspondent. He 
figure 18. Journalist Rob Crilly in the field in Darfur.
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had started as a young man, working on local news for a major city’s 
newspaper. “Then,” he told me,
a national paper opened a position for someone for Africa, specifically fran-
cophone Africa. That was at a time when the paper was still doing financial-
ly quite well. We were able to afford that. And I applied for the position and 
I was selected. Francophone, because at the time there was no continuous 
reporting from this part of Africa. I then opened up the office in Abidjan. 
And yes, I have been traveling on the continent for ten years now. Why 
Africa for me? That has family reasons. I am Belgian, as you know. My entire 
family on the paternal side tried their luck in the Congo at some point. . . . 
Congo was a topic at our dinner table. I also spent much time there because 
my godfather lived his entire life down there. Yes, that’s the source of my 
affinity for the continent. (author’s translation)
Indeed, this journalist’s affinity proved to be enduring. When I inter-
viewed him in 2011, he had already dedicated ten years of journalistic 
work to Africa. He had experienced exceptional challenges, including 
days of captivity in the hands of child soldiers. His reports continue, at 
the time of this writing, to be among the most informative and analytic 
ones in the international press. This interviewee’s long-term dedication 
to Africa, however, is exceptional. Several of the other Africa corre-
spondents expressed a desire to move on after having covered Africa for 
an extended period. The following example is instructive:
No, I did this for seven years, and it was an extremely intensive time, also 
with great experiences. I made fantastic journeys there and met great people; 
my daughter was born there; I got married there, but to a German woman. 
So I really had the entire spectrum of feelings. I was so exhausted in 2006, 
however, that I first had to take a half-year off from work. . . . I was at acute 
risk of death, three times, mostly in Congo and I also had a severe accident in 
Nairobi etc. So it wears on your psyche and also on your body, so that I was 
finally totally exhausted. I then wanted nothing to do with Africa any more, 
initially. . . . See, we lived for five years in Nairobi, and then for two years in 
Cape Town. We left Nairobi because the security situation was so catastroph-
ic and one felt the psychological impact. When I was in Congo, I was shot at 
there for hours, together with colleagues, and when we could then escape to 
the airport and fly out, then we were relieved, having put this behind us again, 
because that is not my primary task, being a war reporter, but it happens at 
times; then I sat in the airplane and thought to myself, “When I now return to 
Nairobi, then I am not certain that my wife is doing well, that my daughter is 
doing well, and if they may not have been attacked.” This permanent state of 
alarm, it does not serve one well in the long run. (author’s translation)
A look at journalists’ entry into their careers as Africa correspon-
dents thus sheds further light on their habitus. Many are young, in the 
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earliest stages of their careers.7 Most have biographical knowledge about 
Africa at best (the quotation at the beginning of this chapter speaks to 
this theme). Many consider Africa an episode in their career path, not 
a long-term commitment. We may assume that these features have an 
effect on journalistic autonomy opposite to that of features found above 
such as high level of education, developed writing skill, and dedication 
to journalism. They are likely to create dependencies and to weaken 
journalistic autonomy.
Position in the Field
In addition to their trajectories, the dispositions of Africa correspon-
dents are also shaped by the journalistic environments in which they 
work. These reporters operate at great geographic remove from their 
employers. Meetings between editors and foreign correspondents in the 
latter’s home countries are rare. Foreign editors to whom they report 
provide them with relative discretion. Reporting from Africa is none-
theless expensive. Much travel is involved, and staying in capital cities 
where journalists wait for visas and travel permits requires considerable 
resources. Most interviewees told me that projects need to be approved 
by the foreign editor before they can be started. Only one correspon-
dent reported a substantially greater degree of freedom. Referring to 
himself as “the last Mohican,” he did not need to apply to his foreign 
editor whenever he wanted to take trips. He decided independently 
which topics and events to report on. Also, his paper had provided him 
figure 19. Journalist Rob Crilly after interview with SLA commander Ibrahim Abdul-
lah al “Hello” and a rebel in En Siro, North Darfur.
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with a five-year contract up front so he could build up the repertoire of 
knowledge and local ties crucial to good journalistic work. It was this 
journalist who had spent the longest time reporting from Africa. But, 
again, this model is more the exception than the rule.
Given the geographic distance from their papers’ headquarters, many 
Africa correspondents depend all the more on contacts with colleagues 
in the field, especially if they are the only correspondents for their papers 
on the continent. Such contacts are made easier by the fact that most 
American and European Africa correspondents are based in only a few 
places, such as Nairobi and Johannesburg. They are further eased by the 
pressure to join together for major investigatory journeys, as the follow-
ing recollection of a British interviewee illustrates: “I suppose in Nairobi 
there is a sort of quite wide ex-patriot community, which is the European 
ex-patriot community. And the European journalist community, um, 
within that group, you would often first be alerted to a story by some 
discussion within that group. . . . So Darfur, in fact, it was a conversation 
at a party very early on. It was someone saying I think this is important.” 
Such local information sharing sometimes leads to joint explorations 
into crisis regions. In the words of another journalist: “When I actually 
went to go to Darfur, I traveled with . . . journalists from another news-
paper or with a photographer who was very experienced. . . . So often 
figure 20. Journalist Thomas Scheen interviewing rebels in Darfur.
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you would share a kind of expertise or you would share information, 
and you sort of worked together to build up a picture.”
Collaborative ventures can be extensive, as the account of a German 
correspondent about his work on the Congo demonstrates:
In January of 2000 I again traveled with  colleagues— the entire world press 
was part of it, the New York Times, Washington Post, Time Magazine, 
etc.—into Northeast Congo, into the so-called Ituri District. Because a pretty 
courageous helper for the Christoffel Mission for the Blind had brought a 
video, on a VHS cassette, on which the massacre was to be seen, burning 
villages and mass graves etc. This was a very peripheral region that was 
normally hard to get to. There also were no flights into that place. . . . We 
then chartered a small plane and traveled there and moved about in the Ituri 
District for a week. . . . We really all reported prominently about it. I wrote 
a whole page in the [name of paper]. Der Spiegel [German weekly magazine] 
had several pages on it. The British and American media also reported about 
it in great detail. (author’s translation)
Collaboration in the context of field trips requires embeddedness 
in journalistic networks in everyday life. One correspondent described 
those networks:
Life in Nairobi has a kind of family atmosphere, and there is also no jour-
nalistic competition to speak of, and one sits down with colleagues and dis-
cusses certain themes and also wants to learn from someone who has just 
been in a region what things look like out there. So there is a lively exchange 
of experiences and information. That eventually also leads to some kind 
of opinion formation. [Collaboration at times also leads to coordination:] 
Yes, at times one even coordinates when what will be published. To give 
you just one example, if I travel with a colleague from the [name of weekly 
magazine] jointly into the Congo and we help each other, then I would de-
stroy his [magazine] article if my article appeared on Thursday in [name of 
daily]. Then he’ll be kicked out on Friday [the day the weekly magazine is 
published]. . . . Because we share a lot and help each other, I can then tell my 
paper, “Publish this next Monday.” (author’s translation)
Such reports fall in line with scholarship that identifies journalists as 
favoring “horizontal over vertical management, and collegial over hier-
archical authority” (Zelizer 1993:221). In addition to many contacts in 
informal settings, there are also formal institutions in which journalistic 
exchange unfolds: “There is this foreign correspondent club,” one inter-
viewee explained. “There I was always happy to meet colleagues from 
Kenya or Zimbabwe, because otherwise the Brits are oriented toward 
other Brits, Americans to Americans, Germans to Germans. That can 
get a bit boring in the long run” (translation, JJS).
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The foregoing comment thus confirms the notion of relatively dense 
social and professional networks among Western Africa correspondents, 
networks to which African journalists are primarily linked through for-
mal institutions such as the aforementioned club.8 The statement further 
confirms and at once relativizes the international quality of the occu-
pational lives of Western journalists in Africa. To encapsulate the local 
nature of these networks and the simultaneously international compo-
sition of their participants, I suggest the term “clustered local cosmo-
politan media networks.” The networks are local and international, and 
thus cosmopolitan, a feature of foreign journalism famously highlighted 
by Ulf Hannerz (2004:82). At the same time, the term acknowledges 
national clusters within these networks. All the above comments and 
depictions at once confirm and give a specific meaning to Bourdieu’s 
assessment of the global nature of media operations: “The position of 
the national media field within the global media field would have to be 
taken into account” (Bourdieu 1998:41).
The two journalistic interviewees who reported from international 
centers in the West also provide lively accounts of collaboration with 
colleagues across nations. In the words of the French correspondent who 
reported from the UN headquarters during the height of the Darfur con-
flict: “At the UN you have some kind of, I call that the security council for 
journalists. . . . If you want to know what actually the Russians are think-
ing, you will find a Russian journalists who is going to tell you.” And a 
French journalist who covered the African continent from Paris reported: 
“Because I am based in Paris, I don’t have a lot of journalists calling me, 
except my friends calling me and saying, ‘Hey, are you doing this place?’ 
We are going to travel together or share some of the cost.” This inter-
viewee highlights collaboration with Radio France Internationale, which 
employs a substantial number of Africa correspondents.
Media do not just feed on media via journalistic networks. In line 
with Bourdieu’s observation, “a daily review of the press is an essential 
tool” (1998:24) for our journalists. Yet the motivation behind reading 
other media is not primarily the desire to avoid being beaten by  them— as 
Bourdieu  suggests— but the need to use them as essential information-
gathering tools in a world in which one journalist has to cover an entire 
continent for his paper. Not all of the other news media are considered 
equal, though, as potential sources of information. One interviewee 
used the category of “Leitmedien” (literally, “guiding media”) and re-
ferred to the BBC and the NYT as examples. Indeed, correspondents 
mentioned these two as sources most frequently. Other media sources 
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cited by my interviewees include CNN, the Guardian, Radio France 
Internationale, and Le Monde. Some interviewees referred to broader 
categories (e.g., news media, radio), to press agencies (e.g., Reuters, 
DPA), or to local newspapers and journalists.
In short, journalists are discursively aware of each other and they 
collectively construct images of the world, including images of mass 
violence. They thus constitute an “interpretive community” where 
“narratives and storytelling” (Zelizer 1993:221) reign supreme, a com-
munity that in this branch of journalism is simultaneously locally and 
internationally organized and  oriented— a cosmopolitan interpretive 
community.
conclusions
Data gleaned from interviews with Africa correspondents who reported 
on Darfur seem to confirm Bourdieu’s central thesis: journalists are di-
rected by their field’s rules of the game. These rules secure the field’s rel-
ative autonomy, but they also constrain its participants. Autonomy of 
course is not absolute. In capitalist systems, media markets affect what 
is reported and how, even if the degree varies to which diverse types 
of media emphasize economic as opposed to cultural types of capital. 
The media analyzed in this book are relatively close to the  autonomous 
pole of the journalistic field. As a consequence, those criteria domi-
nate that are specific to journalism. And yet, even prestigious news-
papers examined here experience economic pressures. And journalists 
are aware of them and perceive them as constraints. Such constraints 
increase correspondents’ dependency on some external sources of in-
formation (supplementing independent journalistic investigation) and 
on the community of (mostly Western) journalists within the field. A 
dispute erupted at the Bellagio conference pitting critics among activ-
ists and scholars against journalists. While the former group challenged 
journalistic reliance on UN and UNAMID sources in a report by Jeffrey 
Gettleman of the New York Times on Darfuris returning from camps 
into the villages, the latter defended the practice as unavoidable and 
legitimate. Economic constraints may at times certainly prevent the ex-
ecution of some investigatory projects and increase reliance on organi-
zations that pursue their own material or legitimatory interests. Again, 
journalistic autonomy is relative.
The habitus of Africa correspondents, those relatively stable disposi-
tions that color their understanding of the world and their reporting 
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about situations of mass violence such as that in Darfur, is shaped by 
their specific position in this semiautonomous field and by the trajec-
tories that brought them to their current positions. Most interviewees 
showed a high degree of identification with journalistic work, an appre-
ciation of the writing process, a high level of education in diverse fields 
(albeit a lack of education about Africa), some degree of adventurism, 
a relative degree of independence from their editors (but mindfulness of 
resource shortages that may stall promising projects), and a substantial 
degree of dependency on other sources of information, including IO 
and INGO reports, as well as other news sources, especially guiding 
media (“Leitmedien”) and networks of colleagues in the field. In fact, 
most interviewees clearly speak to what I term clustered local cosmo-
politan media  networks— cosmopolitan despite the weight of national 
clusters. This mix of features obviously entails elements that enhance 
and others that weaken journalistic autonomy, the correspondents’ ori-
entation toward journalistic rules of the game.
Given this habitus of our Africa correspondents and the semiauton-
omy of the segment of the journalistic field in which they work, how do 
other fields make themselves noticed in journalistic production? What 
input do they provide that is processed by our Africa correspondents 
according to the rules of the journalistic game? The following chapter 
examines interactions between the journalistic field and external forces 





Fields, Countries, Ideology, and Gender
Varying degrees of influence come into full view when we examine the 
relationship between, on the one hand, the human rights, humanitarian 
aid, and diplomacy fields, with their conflicting representations of the 
Darfur conflict, and patterns of media reporting, on the other. The link 
between the judicial or human rights field and media suggests a seeming 
paradox. Asked about the ICC as a potential source of information, one 
German Africa-correspondent answered: “Not at all, and I find this re-
ally quite regrettable.” A French journalist, speaking about his relation-
ship to the ICC told me that “[t]heir time is not our time.” Yet, as we 
shall see, the impact of the judicial field, specifically ICC interventions, 
on media representations of mass violence is quite remarkable. That 
impact certainly appears more pronounced than the traces the humani-
tarian and diplomatic fields leave in journalistic reporting.
In this chapter I describe and seek to explain actual patterns of media 
representation of Darfur. I speak to ways in which Africa correspon-
dents, acting in the journalism field, with the habitus described in the 
previous chapter, improvise as they apply the rules of the journalistic 
game in practice. I explore how they adapt to external pressures and 
to the constraints they face. I primarily draw on the Darfur media data 
set, based on the content analysis of 3,387 articles described in the in-
troduction. These data tell us when newspapers began reporting about 
Darfur and how the number of reports, the depiction of suffering, and 
the framing of violence changed over time. They also gauge the effect of 
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interventions by actors from surrounding social fields. I show that out-
side pressures to which the journalistic field is exposed are substantial. 
They include media markets; economic dependency on advertisers and 
subscribers (who have become scarcer and thus more valuable in the 
early twenty-first century); agendas of political actors who impede jour-
nalism (in the targeted country or area) and who validate journalistic 
attention to issues (in the home country); and information dependency 
on societal sectors that include the judicial, humanitarian, and diplo-
matic fields. Finally, patterns reveal similarities and differences across 
countries. Interviews with Africa correspondents help make sense of 
these patterns. The chapter’s conclusions address central Bourdieuian 
arguments regarding the position of journalism in fields of power, spe-
cifically journalism’s relationship to neighboring fields, forces that must 
be considered if we want to make sense of variations in reporting about 
mass violence in Darfur or elsewhere (Bourdieu 1998; Benson 1998, 
2006). The conclusions further add new information to past scholar-
ship about boundaries between political and journalistic fields and de-
bates about the mediatization of politics (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999; 
Revers 2014; Strömbeck and Esser 2014). They enrich insights from 
research and journalistic self-reflections on the reporting about mass 
violence in Africa (Allen and Seaton 1999; Crilly 2010; McNulty 1999; 
Mody 2010; Ray 2009; Thompson 2011). And they contribute new, 
internationally comparative findings to those gained through a small 
body of previous comparative scholarship (e.g., Benson 1998, 2013).
intensity of reporting: the Journalistic  
vis-à-vis the political field and media markets
How much attention did media pay to the mass violence in Darfur, and 
how did the intensity of reporting change over time? Figure 21 depicts 
how the number of media reports from each country changed from year 
to year during the conflict. The numbers in this figure reflect the entire 
population of articles about Darfur that my research team identified in 
the fourteen newspapers and from which the sample of 3,387 articles 
was drawn for detailed analysis. It is instructive to follow these lines 
year by year.
Note first that shifts in the intensity of reporting developed in almost 
perfect unison. Within the same year a peak in the number of articles 
in one country is mirrored in those of the other countries. The mas-
sive volume of reporting in 2004 and 2007 stands out for all countries. 
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Second, though, the intensity of reporting differs considerably across 
countries. The lines for Germany and the United States by far exceed 
those of the other countries. For the United States this is consistent with 
the massive civil society movement around the Darfur issue, paralleled 
by the particularly outspoken engagement of government actors. For 
Germany the higher level of reporting corresponds with that country’s 
articulation of special historical responsibility. It is also consistent with 
the generally greater engagement with genocide in German political dis-
course, as diagnosed by K. Smith (2010) in her comparative analysis of 
large European countries. In our analysis, frequency of reporting in US 
and German newspapers is  followed— in most years and with consid-
erable  distance— by papers in the UK and France, the former colonial 
powers in Sudan and neighboring Chad, respectively. Note that Ireland 
and Switzerland are represented by only one newspaper. If we account 
for the fact that only one paper was analyzed, the Irish intensity of 
reporting also stands out, in line with the substantial humanitarian en-
gagement in Darfur of Irish aid NGOs and the Irish government (see 
chapter 5).1
Beyond the overall volume of reporting, the cycles of media reports 
about Darfur across specific time periods pose urgent puzzles. I here 
spell them out and seek explanations. Virtually no reports appeared in 
2003 Yet the first wave of massive killings and displacements unfolded 
between April and September of that year before it subsided following 
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figure 21. Number of articles on Darfur appearing in fourteen Northern newspapers, 
by country over time.
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denial in other fields, is of course not the first case in which media have 
responded late to mass violence on the African continent.2
The second massive wave of killings took place between  December 
2003 and April 2004, when a second cease-fire took effect. At this 
point media did begin to take notice, and later in 2004, the intensity 
of  reporting actually reached high levels.3 This new wave of violence 
differed little from the first and thus might have been accompanied by 
similar media apathy. But this time the violence went along with highly 
visible civil society and political responses. As early as December 2003, 
UN secretary-general Kofi Annan’s special envoy Tom Eric Vraalsen 
 reported that the government of Sudan was denying humanitarian 
access to Darfur. In January 2004, the USHMM issued a “genocide 
alert” for Darfur. In February, the Washington Post published an op-ed 
piece by scholar-activist Eric Reeves on the violence in Darfur, and one 
month later the New York Times followed with an op-ed by Nicholas 
Kristof.4 These pioneers, interestingly, did not include correspondents 
who were actually working in the field in Africa. Only one month after 
the second, much noted op-ed, Kofi Annan delivered his famous speech 
before the UN General Assembly on the tenth anniversary of the Rwan-
dan genocide. By late summer 2004, in the United States the George W. 
Bush administration began using the term genocide, and in September 
2004 the UN Security Council charged the International Commission of 
Inquiry on Darfur to report on the violence. I spell this and other events 
of 2004 out in greater detail in chapter 1.
Some journalist interviewees addressed factors that motivated their 
first reporting about Darfur in early 2004. Their statements reveal that 
the political field generally and the United Nations specifically, as well 
as human rights NGOs, played a central role in sparking initial journal-
istic engagement. A distinguished Africa correspondent recalled: “When 
first messages about a new war in Sudan appeared in 2003, I initially 
did not take that so seriously. But when the commemorative events 
unfolded on the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide [April 
2004] and Kofi Annan and others said, ‘We will no longer tolerate this,’ 
then I also decided to take this conflict seriously and I traveled there” 
(author’s translation).
Another journalist told about his work on the North-South conflict 
in Sudan and the relief he and his colleagues had felt when the Com-
prehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in 2005. Having worked 
on the North-South conflict in the preceding years, his attention was 
thus attuned to Sudanese issues. Yet it took an unusual series of events 
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for him to begin his field trips and reporting from Darfur and Chad. 
Tracing the takeoff of reporting in this journalist’s paper is instructive: 
“We then regularly received messages from human rights organizations 
informing us of massacres and displacements in West Sudan. We could 
not really make sense of that, as we are not Sudan specialists. They 
initially even reported that this was a conflict between Christians and 
Muslims etc.—until we received detailed studies from Human Rights 
Watch and Global Witness that described this as a war of expulsion 
[Vertreibungskrieg]” (author’s translation).
The pattern of his and his paper’s publications about Darfur un-
folded during the first half-year of reporting as follows:
 • 10/28/2003: AP report based on USAID information (107 words)
 • 11/14/2003: overview article by colleague of interviewee based 
on UN sources (361 words)
 • 12/22/2003: article by interviewee on the North-South  
agreement mentioning Darfur (340 words)
 • 1/28/2004: article by interviewee on violence and settlement  
efforts, partly based on press agency reports (381 words)
 • 2/10/2004: article by interviewee on violence and Darfur refugee 
crisis in Chad, based on UN and Chadian government sources 
(261 words)
 • 3/20/2004: Evangelischer Pressedienst (EPD) agency report on 
single attack (83 words)
 • 3/23/2004: article by interviewee on violence and government of 
Sudan’s denial, based on UN sources (345 words)
 • 4/7/2004: article by colleague of interviewee on the aftermath of 
the Rwandan genocide, including a paragraph on Darfur, citing 
UN sources and HRW (1,077 words)
 • 4/10/2004: Deutsche Presse-Agentur (DPA) report on  
truce (71 words)
None of these articles appeared in the paper’s most visible places, 
but this soon changed when, on April 23, 2004, the Darfur conflict 
actually advanced to the paper’s front page. It featured an article by 
the interviewee entitled “Alarming Report of the United Nations: Mass 
Murder and Atrocities in Sudan” (Alarmierender Bericht der Vereinten 
Nationen: Massenmorde und Gräueltaten im Sudan) (593 words). The 
article was accompanied by an opinion piece on page 4 (225 words) 
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and an “external report” on page 2 (963 words), the latter written by 
a former minister of justice who was then a UN special rapporteur on 
human rights in Sudan. The lead article referred to a not-yet-published 
report by the UN high commissioner for human rights: “The report 
charges the Government of Sudan and a closely allied militia with war 
crimes. There is said to be a ‘domination of terror’ [Herrschaft des Ter-
rors] in the crisis region of Darfur, with ethnically motivated mass mur-
ders, rapes and evictions. The regime in Khartoum thus far refuses to 
allow the UN any access to the region” (author’s translation).
The author-interviewee explained:
And we had the report. And then we were the first newspaper in all of 
Europe, I believe, that wrote about the Darfur conflict in a lead article 
on page 1. That found much resonance, also, in other media. This report 
was then also given to other newspapers, of course. . . . That developed its 
own dynamic, also because then I traveled with the colleagues [from other 
papers] to Chad, for example, to tour the border areas and visit refugee camps, 
gaining an understanding of the situation there. (author’s translation)
Communication between the paper’s foreign editor and a high-ranking 
politician with access to a repressed UN report had opened the path for 
this front-page reporting. My interviewee received permission to travel 
to Chad to investigate, and his contributions (and those of others) soon 
appeared in rapid succession: May 27 (article and editorial), May 28 
(article by a colleague), May 29 (DPA), June 1 (by colleague and DPA 
report), June 3, June 5 (by colleague), June 14 (article and editorial), and 
June 19 (by colleague). Such intensification of reporting was not unique 
to this paper, but part of what became a flood of journalistic interest in 
Darfur. This flood crested at the peak of reporting in 2004 as depicted 
in figure 21. This story of one paper’s entry into reporting about Dar-
fur illustrates how communication between a paper’s leadership and a 
high-ranking and respected politician helped bring Darfur to the front 
page and assure the paper’s correspondent a travel permit into the crisis 
region. There is every reason to believe that this paper’s story is represen-
tative of others.
The 2004 peak of reporting was followed by a modest but nonethe-
less noticeable drop in 2005 in all eight countries. This decline, however, 
did not reflect a lack of events to report on. The ICID issued its report 
in January. In May the UNSC referred the case to the ICC. Meanwhile 
in the United States the Save Darfur coalition began to gather steam. 
The violence continued in Darfur, albeit at a level well below the peaks 
of mid-2003 and early 2004. Yet neither did the killings cease, nor did 
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the suffering of the surviving population diminish. An epidemiologi-
cal study finds: “The number of internally displaced persons remained 
constant, but the number of affected residents tripled; the increase in 
humanitarian aid was similar to the increase in total number of people 
affected, resulting in a constant ratio of 40 humanitarian aid workers to 
100,000 people affected” (Degomme and Guha-Sapir 2010:296).
After 2005, reporting increased again, reaching a second peak in 
2006 in six of the eight countries. It started to drop off in only two 
countries after 2005. What may have motivated this intensification in 
reporting about Darfur? Might events on the ground in the crisis region 
have ignited renewed interest? Again, public health researchers who re-
ported on the state of the Darfuri population inform us that, between 
the middle of 2006 and late 2007, “because of insecurity, the number 
of internally displaced people increased by about 40% (from 1,717,092 
to 2,387,594); concomitantly, and partly as a result of reduced fund-
ing, the number of humanitarian aid workers decreased from 14,751 
to 12,112 by July, 2007 (i.e., 29 aid workers for every 100,000 people 
affected)” (Degomme and Guha-Sapir 2010:296). Insecurity intensi-
fied, especially when in May 2006 the DPA was signed but failed to 
bring peace, and this setback was followed by a new offensive by the 
Sudanese military in August 2006. Although events on the ground did 
not initially spark media attention, this time they were accompanied by 
political and civil society actions, especially in the United States.
There, in October 2006, President Bush signed into law the Dar-
fur Peace and Accountability Act (House Resolution 3127/Senate Bill 
1462). The act confirmed the administration’s position that the vio-
lence in Darfur constituted genocide. It also instructed the government 
to assist the ICC in its pursuit of the responsible  actors— despite the 
United States’ continued refusal to ratify the Rome Statute. This sign-
ing into law was preceded by a massive Save Darfur demonstration 
in Washington in April 2006 (see chapter 3). While these domestic 
US events may have contributed to an increasing volume of American 
media reports, it is unlikely that they had an equal impact in raising the 
number of media reports in the other countries. Instead, global action 
is more likely to have intensified attention across countries. Such action 
included the February 2007 application for and the April issuing of 
an arrest warrant against Ahmed Harun and Ali Kushayb at the ICC, 
and passage in July 2007 of UNSC Resolution 1769, authorizing the 
establishment of UNAMID, the UN-AU hybrid peacekeeping mission 
for Darfur.
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Figure 21 shows further that the second peak in the intensity of report-
ing, registered in 2007, was followed by a massive and steady decline in 
each of the subsequent three years. By 2010, the number of reports was 
barely above the minimal level of 2003 reporting. This decline occurred 
despite continued suffering in Darfur. The public health study cited 
above reports that from October 2007 through December 2008, the 
beginning of the steep decline in reporting, the “number of internally 
displaced people” continued to increase (Degomme and Guha-Sapir 
2010:296). Apparently even international responses could not prevent 
the decline. Among these responses were the ICC’s unprecedented and 
much debated steps in 2008 and 2009. On July 14, 2008, the Office of 
the Prosecutor applied for an arrest warrant against Omar al-Bashir, 
the sitting president of Sudan. The application was based on charges of 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. On March 4, 2009, 
the court issued the arrest warrant for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. Following this decision one Abu Garda, a lower-level rebel 
leader made a first appearance before the ICC, on May 18, 2009, and 
in  2010— beyond our observation  period— the court issued the arrest 
warrant against al-Bashir for charges of genocide.5 In short, the suffer-
ing on the ground and ICC actions were substantial. And yet, reporting 
declined precipitously.
Interviews suggest several potential explanations for the decline in 
reporting. Respondents point at constraints imposed on journalism by 
both the economic and political fields. One crucial part of journalism’s 
political environment, an issue throughout the Darfur conflict but in-
tensifying over time, was the government in Sudan. A German Africa 
correspondent spoke about difficulties in obtaining visas for Sudan from 
his seat in Nairobi. A British journalist reported that during his May–
June 2004 visit to Sudan he waited “much of the month” in Khartoum 
before receiving travel permits to Darfur. The same journalist decided 
later in the year to travel to Chad to avoid the political-bureaucratic 
hurdles set up by the government of Sudan. Another British journalist 
similarly reported having been stuck in (expensive) Khartoum for “a 
couple” of weeks before receiving a permit to travel to Darfur. Rob 
Crilly (2010), a British Africa correspondent who reported extensively 
from Sudan, including Darfur, provides a lively illustration:
It felt good to be in Khartoum at last. For a year I had potted back and forth to 
the Sudanese embassy in Nairobi enquiring as politely as I could whether my 
visa was ready for collection. . . . But arriving in Khartoum was just the start 
of the journey to Darfur. Each foreigner has to first register with the Police 
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Department of Aliens. . . . After the Department of Aliens came the Depart-
ment of Foreign Correspondents and Journalists.  .  .  . Now came the tricky 
part of obtaining permission to work as a  journalist— filling in the “Purpose 
of Visit” section on my application for a press permit for Darfur. . . . But how 
to phrase “reporting on genocide” in a way that would be acceptable to the 
very regime responsible? (7–9)
Needless to say, none of these bureaucratic hurdles was easy to sur-
mount. And, once journalists succeeded in accessing the field, their 
mobility was further inhibited.6 These challenges to journalistic work, 
imposed by the government of Sudan and its bureaucrats, prevailed 
throughout the reporting period. After 2007 Khartoum imposed even 
further restrictive policies on foreign journalists, thus likely contribut-
ing to the massive decline in reporting. In the words of a Swiss inter-
viewee: “Today Khartoum barely allows any journalists to go there” 
(Heute lässt Khartoum ja kaum noch Journalisten dahin).
Gaining direct access to the field, a challenge in reporting on any con-
flict, was not the only impediment that worsened. Common sources of 
information also dried up. Some aid agencies, including three sections of 
MSF, were evicted, especially after the indictment of al-Bashir, as noted in 
chapter 4. In addition, aid agencies became ever more cautious in light of 
the risk of being denied access to the populations in need. After all, evic-
tions were partly based on claims by the government of Sudan that aid 
agencies had abandoned their commitment to neutrality norms and were 
supplying the ICC with information on which charges could be based.7
Denial of access by the government of Sudan and the drying up of 
sources of information are obviously weighty factors in any attempt to 
explain the drop-off in reporting about Darfur after 2007. But they are 
to be supplemented by forces associated with the journalistic market 
for information.8 These market forces are best captured in an interview 
with a German Africa correspondent who discussed stalemates in the 
decision-making bodies of the international community:
This Darfur conflict, however, quite decisively disappeared from public view, 
 because— I  believe— there emerged an absolute stalemate. [In the UNSC t]he 
Americans could thus scream, the Europeans could scream, and the Chinese 
said “no” and the Russians too. Then you realize that there is simply no way 
forward, and the only thing that still caused attention was that they issued 
this international arrest warrant against Bashir. But that is totally personal-
ized and focused on one single person. What’s going on in Darfur these days 
is barely being registered, neither by the public nor by journalists, because it 
is redundant in the end, because it has been happening for years. (author’s 
translation)
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It is not surprising that dramatic events are especially appealing in 
the media market. It was thus unfavorable for journalistic attention 
that after 2007 the situation on the ground in Darfur showed no major 
change and that the international community was partially deadlocked. 
Demands by consumers of news media obviously matter, especially 
among market-driven media, and this pattern is not unique to reporting 
about violent conflicts.9
In short, the trend line of reporting about Darfur in prominent West-
ern newspapers reflects the impact of market and political forces on the 
journalistic field. On the one hand, initial journalistic attention and a 
massive increase in reporting about Darfur proved to be inspired by the 
political field. Western politicians and the UN played an important role, 
while actors from the human rights field provided additional support. 
This causal path does not always apply, of course. Sometimes journal-
ists report from crisis regions for extended periods without being alerted 
by political  actors— and without finding any resonance in the political 
sphere. The second wave of violence in Darfur coincided with the sym-
bolically laden tenth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide. In addi-
tion, the United States experienced a massive civil society mobilization 
after several American carrier groups, especially evangelical Christians, 
Jews, and African Americans, identified with victims of the violence and 
sparked a mobilization that provoked relatively forceful rhetoric among 
political leaders. On the other hand, the always present restraints that 
the government of Sudan imposed on journalists intensified with the 
growing international responses to the conflict. In addition, the flow of 
information from aid agencies dried up in response to pressure from the 
authorities in Khartoum. These observations speak to recent scholar-
ship on the mediatization of politics. Yes, the logic of the media field 
may at times influence political actors, organizations, and institutions 
(Strömbeck and Esser 2014), but cautionary notes highlighting reverse 
effects of the political field on journalism are also supported (Mazzoleni 
and Schulz 1999). Such caution is all the more valid whenever authori-
tarian regimes are involved.
Finally, political pressures coincided with economic forces within 
the media market. The cycle of news reporting, with its focus on the 
new and dramatic, enhanced the decline in media attention about the 
ongoing suffering in Darfur. The decline would likely have been even 
more abrupt had the ICC not intervened. Judicial interventions helped 
keep the media’s attention on the conflict, though not at the high level 
of earlier stages. But how specifically did juridical forces act on the 
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journalistic field? If they could not prevent the decline of attention, 
could they affect the substance of reporting? What were their oppor-
tunities and constraints? What cultural receptivity did they encounter?
the Journalistic field, the Judicial field, and 
the legal coloring of reports
The journalism and judicial fields, both semiautonomous, are reciprocal-
ly related. Not only do they affect each  other— through regulation in one 
direction, for example, and through issue selection and editorial support 
in the  other— but they may even interpenetrate. Remi Lenoir’s (1994) 
Bourdieuian analysis, for example, diagnoses intrusions of journalism 
into the legal field similar to those Bourdieu described by which media 
logic shapes the political field. Lenoir refers to the well-known case of 
“tough” judges who use mass media to advance their reputation and, by 
doing so, change power relations within the judicial field. Juridical crite-
ria subsequently lose ground in legal decision making to populist senti-
ments and media concerns, and the judicial field thereby loses relative 
autonomy. Arguments about the mediatization of politics (Strömbeck 
and Esser 2014) may thus also apply to the judiciary. In reverse, the judi-
cial field may strengthen its position vis-à-vis other fields, including that 
of journalism. Michael Kearny, at a 2011 Vassar Institute conference 
on war journalism held in The Hague, showed how war reporting is in-
creasingly permeated by the language of human rights and international 
law, often at the expense of political analysis. This trajectory from politi-
cal to legal categories proceeds by means of diverse mechanisms, among 
them NGO informants who, in Kearny’s words, “hijack the language of 
law” or seek to “mainstream the language of human rights.”10 Kearny’s 
argument is reflected in the sentiments of several interviewees. Diplo-
mats and NGO specialists with a political science background charged 
that legal language endangers a political understanding of mass violence. 
Relatedly, Pendas’s (2006) analysis of the Frankfurt Auschwitz trial, 
cited in greater detail in chapter 8, shows how rules of the journalistic 
game, especially the objectivity rule, contribute to a literal transmission 
of courtroom events through media reporting to a broad public. As a re-
sult, historical truth is overshadowed by judicial truth. Trials, and media 
reporting on them, focus attention on individuals, their criminal intent, 
and atrocities. The bureaucratic nature of the murder machine and its 
political context are almost lost from sight (see also Marrus 2008; Sav-
elsberg and King 2011).
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Both interviews and patterns revealed by the Darfur media data set 
speak to the relationship between journalism and the judicial field. The 
data provide a more mixed portrait than that suggested by opposing 
strands in the literature on media and law. In line with the statements 
quoted at the beginning of this chapter, Africa correspondents generally 
reported a substantial disconnect from the court. A German interviewee 
from Nairobi told me that he had never been to The Hague. Similarly, 
a British respondent claimed not to have received any information 
directly from the ICC. He learned only about special events such as 
 indictments— and only from sources other than the ICC. An Irish jour-
nalist confessed that he knew about the ICC and its actions primarily 
as a newspaper reader. Yet another interviewee told me that informa-
tion he received about big events at the ICC was based on wire reports. 
He added that it was always easy to slip a sentence about a wanted 
war criminal into an article. Other journalists, by contrast, did report 
interactions with the court. Yet they experienced conditions in the judi-
cial field not compatible with their journalistic habitus. The journalist 
quoted at the beginning of this chapter as denying that the ICC was in 
any way an information source for him continued:
I had occasional contacts with investigators for the ICC, but that was in the 
context of the Congo, East Congo, and the DFLR [Forces Démocratiques 
de Libération du Rwanda], those Rwandan militias, and how they acquire 
funding. These people wanted information from me. I am a journalist. I told 
them, “One hand washes the other. You can get something from me, give me 
something of yours, and then we can talk reasonably in whatever way that 
can be published at all without endangering your work.” I never heard from 
them again. But it would be interesting to learn how often the term Interna-
tional Criminal Court is now being used in media reporting. Very often. At 
the same time we know that those who report about it know nothing about 
this criminal court, because this court shuts itself off. That is a pity. (author’s 
translation)
This statement illustrates how not just geographic distance between 
Africa correspondents and the ICC, but also a different habitus and 
contrasting rules of the game impede communication. The journalist’s 
tit-for-tat practice does not work in interactions with those bound by 
judicial rules. Another interviewee, an Africa correspondent who works 
out of the capital city of his European country, noted additional com-
municative hurdles: “I’ve been there [ICC in The Hague] once. And it 
was useless, in fact. . . . Their time is not our time. It is not the same. . . . 
It is years.” The journalist here contrasted the slow progress of judicial 
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proceedings with the fast pace of journalistic work. Journalists also 
need to explain to domestic readers the institutional particularities of 
an international court. “We have the problem,” the same correspon-
dent pointed out, “that the judicial system used in The Hague is not 
the French one. So we have to explain to people how it works.” This 
journalist observed that usual translation issues with turning “legalese” 
into everyday language gain urgency when international courts are the 
issue: “It is a big part of our job as a journalist, not understanding 
something and trying to find someone who can explain. . . . I’ve got a 
friend who is working for Human Rights Watch. She is focused on just 
this, on the ICC.” This statement illustrates not only an impediment 
faced by journalists who wish to report about the international court 
but also a mechanism through which human rights activists may affect 
media reporting: as translators of international human rights law for 
use by journalists. This observation adds a significant component to the 
importance that Africa correspondents in the field attribute to INGOs 
as informers.
In short, Africa correspondents have little interaction with the ICC, 
and the interaction they do have is marred by problems. But they are 
not the only contributors to journalistic work about Darfur. A German 
Africa correspondent referred me to a colleague who worked from his 
paper’s headquarters and, while not an Africa specialist, did visit the 
courts. Similarly, a US journalist mentioned her paper’s specialist for in-
stitutions such as the ICC, who occasionally supplied her with relevant 
information. One interviewee who covered international organizations 
from her European capital city spoke about an upcoming trip to The 
Hague. Finally, a British correspondent reported, and his foreign editor 
confirmed, that the paper would send someone to The Hague “for the 
big day.” And such “big days” indeed find many journalists gathered in 
the ICC’s pressroom (see figure 22).
Given these conditions of reporting and the ambivalent role of the 
ICC in its relation to journalists, how do judicial interventions affect 
media representations of Darfur? Our data demonstrate that several 
intervention  points— but not  all— are intensely reflected in journalistic 
reporting. Figure 23, for example, displays the percentage of articles 
about Darfur per time period that cited the crime frame in combination 
with three competing frames. The graph shows that increases in use of 
the crime frame followed the release of the ICID report, the ICC pros-
ecutor’s application for a Darfur-related arrest warrant (against Harun 
and Kushayb), the application for an arrest warrant against al-Bashir 
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(the rather high level persisting after its issue), and finally a first court 
appearance of an accused. The crime frame lost ground during the peri-
ods marked by UNSC Resolution 1564 (establishing the ICID) and the 
UNSC’s referral of the Darfur situation to the ICC. We shall see below 
that the latter action was followed by a major diplomatic event (signing 
of the Abuja Peace Treaty), the leadup to and aftereffect of which ap-
pear to have overwhelmed uses of the crime frame. Reporters favored 
instead the use of the civil war frame during this period, as the respec-
tive lines in figure 23 indicate. Another drop in the use of the crime 
frame, this time surprising and unexplained, occurred after the ICC is-
sued the first major arrest warrants (against Harun and Kushayb). In 
the following I first focus on the crime frame and afterward return to 
the alternative and potentially competing frames.
References to particular types of violence and crime, specifically kill-
ing and rape, peaked, albeit in less pronounced ways, at the same stages 
at which the crime frame was cited most frequently (figure 24): the 
release of the ICID report, the prosecutor’s application for arrest war-
rants against Ahmed Harun and Ali Kushayb, and the application for 
and the issuing of an arrest warrant against President al-Bashir. The 
reporting of destruction of livelihood and displacements, in contrast, 
showed steady declines barely interrupted by judicial interventions. 
figure 22. Press conference in the press room of the International Criminal Court, 
The Hague.
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Modest exceptions are minor upticks in reporting the destruction of 
livelihood after the release of the commission report and the charging of 
al-Bashir, as well as in reporting about displacements after the issuing 
of arrest warrants against Harun and Kushayb.
What exactly does the changing intensity of applying the crime frame 
and of reporting specific types of victimization mean, and how can it 
be explained? The first major peak in citations of the crime frame fol-
lowed the release of the ICID report in January 2005 (figure 23), and 
was paralleled by a peak in intensity of reporting about killings and 
rapes (figure 24). This may not be surprising, as the commission had 
cited instances of war crimes and crimes against humanity (but not geno-
cide). Thus, not only did all papers intensify reporting about Darfur after 
February 1, 2005, the day of the report’s release to the public, as we 
saw earlier, but they also now stressed the crime frame and reminded 
readers of the suffering of the population. An article written by Warren 
Hogue of the New York Times (2/1/2005) illustrates how a US paper 
described the ICID report to its readers: “A United Nations commission 
investigating violence in the Darfur region of Sudan reports Monday 


























































































































figure 23. Percentage of newspaper documents on Darfur using the crime, civil war, 
humanitarian emergency, and aggressive-state frames, by time period.
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civilians that did not constitute genocide but that represented crimes of 
similar gravity that should be sent to the International Criminal Court 
for prosecution” (p. 3).
The article was followed, on February 2, 2005, by an op-ed by 
Nicholas Kristof entitled “Why Should We Shield the Killers,” critiquing 
the initial inclination of the Bush administration to challenge a UNSC 
referral of the Darfur situation to the ICC. Also on February 2, 2005, 
Lydia Polgreen of the NYT wrote an article headlined “Both Sides of 
Conflict in Darfur Dispute Findings in U.N. Report.” On February 9, 
2005, Warren Hogue reported again, this time about Sudanese attempts 
to prevent international prosecution. On February 10, 2005, Samantha 
Power, then a “lecturer at the Kennedy School of Government at Har-
vard,” used an op-ed in the NYT to offer strong support for the ICC as 
a “court of first resort” and for a referral of Darfur to the court. The 
paper’s February 11, 2005, edition featured the following “quotation 
of the day,” which it attributed to “Mohammed”: “ ‘We will take care 
of the child. It is very difficult to love a janjaweed, but we will try to 
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figure 24. Percentage of newspaper documents referencing different types of  
suffering, by time period.
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birth after being raped by a janjaweed militia fighter in Darfur, Sudan.” 
More than a dozen articles and editorials followed in the remainder of 
February 2005, supplemented by numerous letters to the editor.
Other in-depth journalistic examinations are telling. As a first ex-
ample, one of the prominent German papers, the Süddeutsche Zei-
tung, featured, on February 2, 2005, an article by Arne Perras about 
the ICID report. The article, entitled “Crimes in Darfur: The United 
Nations Charge the Sudanese Power Holders [Machthaber] and De-
mand They Be Punished” and “The Masters of the Death Riders” 
[Die Herren der Todesreiter], included this summary: “A UN report 
proves that the government in Khartoum positioned the militias in West 
Sudan” (author’s translation). Another dozen articles followed in the 
SZ in February alone. Those that included opinions expressed clear sup-
port for a referral of the case to the ICC. In France, on February 2, 
2005, Le Monde reprinted segments of the commission report under 
the headline “ ‘Action Is a Matter of Urgency’: The UN Does Not De-
termine Genocide but Denounces Crimes against Humanity in Darfur” 
(author’s translation). On the same day, correspondent Corine Lesnes 
contributed a lengthy report on the commission’s conclusions. Some 
ten articles followed in February. In the United Kingdom, the Guard-
ian’s February 1, 2005, report by “diplomatic editor” Ewen MacAskill 
was entitled “Sudan’s Darfur Crimes Not Genocide, Says UN Report.” 
But MacAskill followed up on February 2, 2005 with a piece headlined 
“Sudan Risks Sanctions as UN Lists Atrocities.” The editorial begins: 
“The Sudanese government could be hit by UN sanctions after the pub-
lication yesterday of a 244-page report on the Darfur crisis which de-
tailed horrific and widespread crimes against humanity, including the 
systematic use of rape as a weapon of terror” (p. 15). The number of 
subsequent articles was smaller than in the other papers, while several 
reviews of the film Hotel Rwanda built bridges between the Rwandan 
genocide and events in Darfur. On February 16, 2005, for example, 
Africa correspondent Jeevan Vasagar, writing from Kigali, quoted Paul 
Rusesabagina, the former manager of Mille Collines (the real-life model 
for Hotel Rwanda), as saying at the time of the genocide: “What hap-
pened in Rwanda is now happening in Darfur, in the Congo, in all of 
these places they are butchering innocent civilians” (p. 3).11
For a second example, consider the rise in the number of crime frame 
citations after the Office of the Prosecutor applied for an arrest war-
rant against Sudan’s sitting president, Omar al-Bashir (figure 23). Use 
of the crime frame stabilized at this new, high level after the warrant 
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was issued, and it increased further in the final reporting period, after 
the initial appearance of a rebel before the ICC. Again, a closer look 
at patterns of reporting in specific media sheds light on the meaning of 
this peak.
In the United States, the New York Times featured on July 15, 
2008, one day after Moreno-Ocampo’s application for an arrest war-
rant against al-Bashir, a long report by staff journalists Marlise Simons 
(Paris), Lydia Polgreen (Dakar), and Jeffery Gettleman (Nairobi). Their 
1,446-word article reviewed the mass violence in Darfur. It also re-
minded the reader of Slobodan Milošević and Charles Taylor, two 
previous sitting presidents who had been tried before international tri-
bunals. The authors further quoted chief prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo: 
“Mr. Bashir had ‘masterminded and implemented’ a plan to destroy 
three ethnic groups. . . . Using government soldiers and Arab militias, 
the president ‘purposefully targeted civilians’ ” (p. 1). An editorial of the 
same day, entitled “Charged with Genocide,” opens with this sentence: 
“The truth can be difficult. That doesn’t make it any less true. And so 
we support the decision by the prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Court to bring charges of genocide against Sudan’s president, Omar 
Hassan al-Bashir, for his role in masterminding Darfur’s horrors” (NYT 
7/15/2008, p. 18). Also on the same day, an opinion piece by Richard 
Goldstone, former chief prosecutor of the ICTY and ICTR, strongly 
supported the arrest warrant against al-Bashir. Both the editorial and 
Goldstone’s piece challenged critics who pointed at an indictment’s 
problematic consequences for aid delivery and diplomatic efforts. Some 
twenty additional articles and editorials follow in the New York Times 
in the remainder of July 2008 alone. The editorials uniformly supported 
the prosecution.
But attention to the prosecutor’s decision to charge al-Bashir and to 
the crimes committed in Darfur does not necessarily imply a paper’s 
support for the prosecutor. The German Frankfurter Allgemeine Zei-
tung may serve as an example. Following the date of the application, 
July 14, 2008, the FAZ published a flood of articles, beginning with 
an 883-word front-page report on July 15 entitled “Arrest Warrant 
against Sudanese President Applied For: Prosecutor at Criminal Court 
Charges al Bashir with Genocide in Darfur.” (author’s translation) The 
article was accompanied by a front-page editorial by editor-in-chief 
Günther Nonnenmacher entitled “Law against Violence” (Recht gegen 
Gewalt). Nonnenmacher expressed sympathy with those who wel-
comed the pending prosecution, and spelled out the suffering al-Bashir 
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had brought to so much of his country. Although he clearly did not 
deny that violence and suffering had occurred, he sympathized with 
critics of prosecution and their political objections. He wrote about in-
adequate attempts to compensate for political failure by judicial means, 
and he anticipated that the situation on the ground would deteriorate 
as a consequence of the prosecutor’s action. Comparable to the number 
of items in the New York Times, in the remaining two weeks of July, 
the FAZ published almost twenty more reports and editorials following 
these first items.
In the wake of the prosecutor’s decision to charge al-Bashir, the 
FAZ’s attention thus clearly returned to Darfur, and the criminal na-
ture of the violence was confirmed. Yet Nonnenmacher’s editorial cri-
tique did not appear in isolation. Several subsequent pieces expressed 
doubt about the political wisdom of prosecution. For example, a July 
20, 2008, article by Hans Christian Rössler was entitled “Rather Vote 
Out of Office [Lieber abwählen]: Even Some Opponents of Sudan’s 
Head of State al Bashir Do Not Approve of the Arrest Warrant against 
Him” (author’s translation). A July press agency report published in the 
FAZ cited doubts against the prosecutions expressed by Amr Mussa, 
president of the Arab League. A brief piece by Rössler on July 22 was 
entitled “Peace Process at Risk: Sudan Warns against Charging Bashir” 
(author’s translation) A book review on July 23 discussed Harald 
Welzer’s work on the ecological causes of violence, reflecting one of 
the arguments that opponents of criminalization had previously used 
to challenge judicial responses. And on July 28 an article by Rössler, 
“Risks of Failure in Sudan” (author’s translation) warned that prosecu-
tions would endanger the North-South process.
In short, comparing reporting and commentary in the NYT and the 
FAZ sheds light on the meaning of peaks in crime frame citation fre-
quency. First, ICC interventions refocused the world’s attention on the 
violence in the conflict zone. Second, the criminal nature of the violence 
was confirmed. And third, refocused attention and use of the (diag-
nostic) crime frame was in some cases associated with support for the 
prosecutor’s  decision— but with challenges to judicial responses in oth-
ers. Strategies deemed appropriate against criminal violence thus may 
or may not correlate with the use of the crime frame. The (prognostic) 
frame, referring to preferred solutions, may well not be aligned with the 
diagnostic frame, and it is indeed not aligned in reporting about Darfur 
by papers such as the FAZ.12
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the Journalistic field, the humanitarian field, 
and the coloring of reports
Descriptions of FAZ reporting following the application for an arrest 
warrant against President al-Bashir reveal that news media that cite the 
crime frame do not necessarily support criminal justice interventions. 
While acknowledging the criminal nature of the violence, such reports 
may nevertheless highlight the need of mediation or military interven-
tion. At other times media recognize violence as criminal but opine 
that aid should trump justice in the light of human suffering. In the 
statement quoted above, Günther Nonnenmacher from the FAZ even 
sympathized with the call for justice, but he eventually pleaded against 
penal responses in anticipation of a deterioration of the humanitarian 
situation on the ground and challenges to the peace process as a conse-
quence of an indictment against al-Bashir.
Previously we encountered skepticism toward the judicial field in 
humanitarian aid organizations. Chapter 4 on MSF provides mani-
fold examples. It is not surprising, given the relationship between the 
humanitarian and journalistic fields analyzed above, that such skepti-
cism is reflected in media reports. Interviews with humanitarian NGO 
experts reveal their often close contact with correspondents in crisis 
regions, for example, as hosts in relatively safe compounds within 
often challenging natural and social environments. Likewise, journal-
ists also report about their contacts with humanitarian NGOs. For 
instance, both German correspondents I interviewed listed aid orga-
nizations as important sources of information. One mentioned MSF 
in particular (as did an American journalist). Three British journalists 
referred to either aid agency reports, humanitarian organizations on 
the ground, or just INGOs as crucial sources of information. One 
French journalist told about NGOs based in Chad whose representa-
tives served him as crucial informants. He too mentioned MSF by 
name. Another French correspondent also referred to MSF, not in-
cidentally when she stressed her paper’s avoidance of the term geno-
cide, in line with MSF policies. Here the policy and framing of an aid 
organization corresponds with journalistic vocabulary, and may have 
inspired it.13
Despite the centrality of aid NGOs as sources of information, how-
ever, citations of the humanitarian emergency frame, as figure 23 
shows, faded compared to uses of the crime frame. While they started 
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at the same high levels, making an appearance in almost every other 
article published in the initial period, references to the humanitarian 
frame dropped to below 30 percent in the second period. They declined 
further to between 10 and 20 percent in the later periods. What might 
explain this rapid decline in the number of humanitarian representa-
tions to a relatively low level? Evidence suggests that here, too, media 
markets and political forces are causal contributors. We know that the 
government of Sudan evicted humanitarian NGOs from Darfur, includ-
ing three sections of MSF, as early as 2007 and as late as 2014. Those 
who remained grew cautious in their statements to the news media (and 
to the court). The actions of the Sudanese state thus likely contributed 
to declining use of the humanitarian frame in media reports. In addi-
tion, a humanitarian emergency is a state more than an event. It lingers. 
It is news for a brief period, after which it becomes old information and 
thus of little value in media markets.
Yet some newsworthy events do occur in the humanitarian realm. 
Consider the release of spectacular reports by INGOs such as the often-
cited Amnesty report on rape and the two MSF reports “No Relief in 
Sight” and “The Crushing Burden of Rape.” Release of “No Relief in 
Sight” coincided with an extraordinary opportunity to reach a world 
audience. In the words of one MSF interviewee:
Well, I was the crisis communications manager in June and July in Khar-
toum, Darfur, and Paris. And this was right at the moment when we re-
leased epidemiological data. . . . The actual press release that I helped write 
in the field with the president of MSF-France and the head of mission was 
called “No Relief in Sight.”14 And it accompanied an epidemiological report. 
And the basic premise of that was to say, “Without a massive humanitar-
ian response lots of lives would be lost.”  .  .  . And Colin Powell came to 
visit Khartoum. . . . [The respondent was in Murnei refugee camp in West 
Darfur,] and there was a big scramble to get me back to Khartoum because 
there was going to be the entire press corps, following with Colin Powell. 
And I remember coming into the press room, just walking from one person 
to the other and handing out our press release, the “No Relief in Sight.” And 
I believe it was quoted in a lot of those initial stories.
Is the MSF staffer right in his perception of the effect of the news 
release? The document is dated June 21, 2004, and the opportunity to 
distribute it to the press corps following US secretary of state Colin Pow-
ell’s visit offered itself on Wednesday, June 30. A look at our newspaper 
data does show intense media attention to Darfur around these dates. 
On July 1, 2014, the NYT featured a front-page article on the situation 
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in Darfur. Earlier, on June 24, the Swiss Neue Züricher Zeitung had 
reported on a visit of the Swiss foreign minister to Sudan, including its 
refugee camps. In portraying the violence, the paper did cite the MSF 
report: “No one knows exactly how many civilians were killed by the 
Janjawiid. One probably has to assume several tens of thousands of 
dead as a minimum. This conclusion is suggested by a survey that Mé-
decins Sans Frontières conducted in the refugee camps of Murnai and 
Zalingei in West  Darfur— the most comprehensive study of this kind 
thus far” (author’s translation). Information about the methodology of 
the survey leads the journalist to conclude: “Should this percentage be 
representative of the entire rural population of Darfur, then we would 
calculate a number far above 120,000 dead. To be added to those are 
the persons who now perish in the refugee camps, because the govern-
ment restricts the delivery of urgently needed aid” (author’s  translation). 
For the remainder of June, I found one more reference to MSF, but not 
to the report itself.
In the United Kingdom, the Times of London featured Secretary 
Powell’s visit in an article of July 1, 2004. The report recounted the 
history of violence and suffering in Darfur without, however, citing the 
MSF release. The Times’ left-liberal competitor the Guardian, however, 
featured a lengthy June 25 article authored by Jeevan Vasagar entitled 
“There Is No Hunger Says Sudan As Children Die.” It was reported 
from Khartoum and from the Murnei refugee camp, from which my 
interviewee rushed to Powell’s press conference just a couple of days 
later. From within the camp, Vasagar reported about an MSF feed-
ing center, and cited MSF president Jean-Hervé Bradol’s grave accusa-
tions against the government in Khartoum for impeding the delivery 
of aid.
In France on June 25, 2004, Le Figaro featured an 804-word article 
on the violence in Darfur. The report, entitled “Darfur under the Pain 
of Hunger and ‘Arab Cavalries [cavaliers arabes]’ ” (author’s transla-
tion), cites MSF, though without mentioning the specific report. No 
other Figaro piece in June returned to any MSF source. Le Figaro’s 
left-liberal competitor Le Monde paid closer attention. On June 25 it 
featured a detailed report by its staff reporter Jean-Philippe Rémy. The 
article’s title is a quotation of MSF’s Jean-Hervé Bradol: “Khartoum 
has maintained a ferocious repression on Darfur” (Khartoum a mené 
une repression féroce au Darfour). Another piece on June 25, published 
under the same title, summarized the events and provided a count of 
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those killed and displaced. Almost a half-dozen articles followed in the 
final days of June and at least one, a June 30 article on Colin Powell’s 
visit, again cited patterns described by MSF.
Other papers too reported about Darfur on the days following the 
report’s release and Colin Powell’s visit, and several of these cited the 
MSF study. Clearly, the INGO’s campaign was reflected in the world 
press. Reports like “No Relief in Sight” in all likelihood contributed 
to the substantial media attention in mid-2004. They helped advance 
the humanitarian crisis frame in the early stages of reporting. Yet they 
neither prevented the decline in reporting nor did they secure the ap-
plication of the humanitarian emergency frame in the long run. This 
finding is all the more remarkable as the MSF press release was part 
of a flood of pronouncements during the summer of 2004. Both Colin 
Powell and Secretary-General Kofi Annan visited Sudan and Darfur and 
addressed the humanitarian catastrophe. Many other aid organizations 
were active and spoke up as well. A report from the German Evangeli-
cal Press Service (EPD), published on the front page of the FAZ on June 
28, 2004, and supplemented by a report on page 6 by Thomas Scheen, 
the paper’s Africa correspondent, makes this point quite clear: “The 
assistant foreign minister [Staatsministerin im Auswärtigen Amt], Ker-
stin Müller (Green Party), has reproached the Sudanese government for 
continuing to impede the delivery of humanitarian aid for the Darfur 
region. Organizations such as the Technisches Hilfswerk and the Mal-
terser Hilfsdienst attempt in vain to transport goods into the region, 
reports Müller at the end of an African journey in Nairobi. Also, the 
truce in the west of Sudan was not respected, contrary to statements 
from Khartoum, she added” (author’s translation).
In short, humanitarian emergencies are news for a short period of 
time. Relatively close contact between aid workers and journalists helps 
bring them to the attention of newspaper readers in the early stages of 
a crisis. In long-lasting emergencies, however, news media lose inter-
est. Sudanese state repression of media and aid organizations further 
contributes to the observed decline of the humanitarian frame in re-
porting. Unlike the criminal court process, which also drags out over a 
long time, at least from a journalistic perspective, humanitarian work 
does not even produce spectacular events along the way such as an in-
dictment against a country’s president. Media do report the occasional 
release of NGO reports, but such releases do not produce the same cas-
cade of articles and editorials that an ICC decision evokes.
Patterns of Reporting  |  245
the Journalistic field, the diplomatic field, 
and the coloring of reports
Journalistic citations of the civil war and aggressive-state frames pro-
vide initial information about the role of the diplomatic field and about 
how news media communicate that field’s mode of framing the conflict 
to a broad public. The civil war frame is important for diplomatic ac-
tivity, even if diplomats expressed little sympathy for the term itself in 
the context of Darfur. Diplomats whom I interviewed, after all, gave as 
their primary purpose the settling of armed conflict, and the civil war 
and aggressive-state frames (which our coding scheme measured) come 
closest to a broader notion of armed conflict.
Citations of the civil war frame show a particular pattern in at least 
two ways (see figure 23). First, for most time periods, they are less nu-
merous than crime frame citations but more frequent than humanitar-
ian frame citations. Second, citations of the civil war frame over time 
contrast remarkably with references to the crime frame. The two frames 
develop over time in opposite directions: the civil war frame increases 
when the crime frame declines and vice versa. The graph thus seems to 
display a conflict between the uses of these contrasting frames, in line 
with the opposing institutional logics of the criminal justice and dip-
lomatic fields discussed above. Again, while criminal law is interested 
in stigmatization and exclusion and oriented toward procedure, diplo-
macy is concerned with including power holders and oriented toward 
substantive outcomes. When one perspective reigns, it seems to do so 
at the expense of the other. This tension between the two frames does 
not explain, however, why the armed conflict theme throughout fares 
more prominently than the humanitarian emergency trope but less so 
than the crime frame. What characteristics of the diplomatic field and 
its relationship with the journalistic field may explain this pattern?
Journalists draw on diplomats as sources of information with some 
regularity. A German correspondent mentioned “embassy people” as 
informers; a US journalist referred to “UN people”; an Austrian cor-
respondent reported about her conversations with “diplomats”; three 
British interviewees spoke, respectively, about sources among “UN 
and embassy people,” especially from the United States and the United 
Kingdom; “Western diplomats”; and more generally, “diplomats in 
Khartoum”; a French journalist told me that diplomats in Paris pro-
vided information. In short, the majority of journalists I interviewed 
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explicitly listed actors from the diplomatic field as important sources 
of information. This should help explain why diplomatic concerns with 
Darfur, framed as an armed conflict, and concerns with the establish-
ment of peace appear relatively frequently in journalistic reports.
Yet journalists also frequently cite humanitarian agencies as inform-
ers. Why, then, do frames that focus on armed conflict appear more often 
in media reports than the humanitarian frame does (and why less often 
than the crime frame)? Part of the answer lies in the nature of diplomacy 
and its value for media organizations. Much diplomatic work, similar 
to that of aid agencies, is tedious and drawn-out from a journalistic per-
spective. Even so, diplomatic proceedings occasionally yield spectacular 
moments that may not be comparable to an indictment by the ICC, but 
are newsworthy nevertheless. The openings and the conclusions of peace 
negotiations are such instances. While not “media events” as Dayan and 
Katz (1992) describe them for the live broadcasting of history, they are 
still events, rituals that attract media attention. Subsequent news report-
ing should reflect with particular clarity the logic and framing of diplo-
macy. In the case of Darfur, the signing of the Abuja Peace Agreement 
on May 5, 2006, and the beginning of the Doha peace process in Febru-
ary 2009 are such moments (see figure 17, chapter 6). Both events fall 
into the time frame of our analysis. A close look at figure 23 reveals 
potential consequences for the framing of the conflict in media reports. 
We note that, at the time of the signing in Abuja, the crime frame lost 
ground against the civil war and aggressive-state frames. How, specifi-
cally, was the signing of the Abuja treaty on May 5, 2006, represented 
in the media?
In Switzerland, the Neue Züricher Zeitung (NZZ) paid close atten-
tion to the Abuja peace negotiations in the days before and after the 
treaty’s signing. A May 4 article reported about an extension of the 
deadline (“Deadline for Darfur Agreement Again Extended” [Frist für 
Darfur-Abkommen erneut verlängert]). The following day the paper 
ran the article “Pressure from the USA on Parties in Darfur” (Druck der 
USA auf die Parteien in Darfur). It told readers that Assistant Secretary 
of State Robert Zoellick was sent to Abuja to pressure the negotiat-
ing parties. The article interpreted this intervention as a reflection of 
the Bush administration’s domestic concerns. The highly mobilized US 
public perceived that its government’s deeds had not lived up to its 
rhetoric. Finally, on May 6, 2006, the NZZ featured a lengthy article 
by Kurt Pelda from Nairobi about the signing of the Abuja agreement. 
Entitled “Convergence among Conflict Parties in Darfur” (Annäherung 
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der Konfliktparteien in Darfur), the article detailed the agreement and 
spelled out reasons for skepticism about its effectiveness. Other Darfur-
related articles in May reported primarily about ongoing efforts to send 
a UN peacekeeping mission into the region. Additional information on 
Abuja, specifically about two rebel groups’ continuing refusal to sign 
the agreement, appeared in two brief pieces on June 2.
In France, Le Monde reported on Abuja on May 6, 2006, the day after 
the signing, but the report focused more on the rebel factions’ refusal to 
support the agreement than on the signing itself. One day later a 253-
word front-page notice was followed by a lengthy article in which Philippe 
Bernard offered a more detailed assessment of Abuja. A few more ref-
erences on the following days culminated in a May 9 editorial entitled 
“Hope in Darfur” (Espoir au Darfour). The title and text spoke of hope, 
but hope modulated with substantial cautionary notes. Only on June 3 did 
Le Monde report about Abuja again, and this time the focus returned to 
the continuing refusal of two major rebel factions to sign the agreement.
Elsewhere, the Guardian of London also published two informative 
pieces on Darfur on May 6 and 8, 2006, respectively. These articles 
were followed, a full week later and again during the second half of 
May, by reports on the continuing violence and the refusal of two rebel 
groups to sign. Similarly, the Süddeutsche Zeitung of Munich printed 
several brief press agency reports released just before and after May 
5, 2006 (AP, Reuters, Agence France Presse). The paper supplemented 
these reports with a portrait of a central diplomatic actor, Salim Ahmed 
Salim, chief negotiator for the AU in Abuja. This string of articles fi-
nally culminated in a May 8 editorial by then–Africa correspondent 
Arne Perras entitled “A Bit of Peace for Darfur: Treaty between Gov-
ernment and Rebels Provides First Hope for West Sudan” (Ein bischen 
Frieden für Darfur: Das Abkommen zwischen Regierung und Rebellen 
gibt erstmals Hoffnung für den Westsudan). A few subsequent Darfur-
related articles, appearing in May, focused on other themes, especially 
the planned UN deployment of a peacekeeping force.
In short, the culmination of the prolonged diplomatic efforts in 
Abuja was clearly reflected in news media reporting. At least for the pe-
riod following the ceremonial signing of the treaty, it used the war and 
aggressive-state frame at the expense of the crime frame (figure 23). Yet, 
over the long haul, the effect of diplomatic negotiations was weaker 
than the resonance of ICC decisions examined above.
Data on the beginning of the Doha peace negotiations confirm this 
observation. This event too was noted in our sample of newspapers, but 
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it did not leave profound traces. Consider the following examples. On 
February 18, 2009, almost two weeks after the signing, the Irish Times 
offered the following Reuters message under “News in Short”: “War-
ring sides in Sudan agree to peace talks. Dubai: Sudan’s government 
and a leading Darfur rebel faction agreed yesterday to meet for peace 
talks and signed a deal with concessions from both sides. The Qatari 
mediator urged all other rebels and Chad to come to the table. The 
agreement included measures to aid and protect refugees in Darfur and 
a commitment by the two sides to continue negotiations in Doha. Rebel 
group Justice and Equality Movement also wants a prisoner swap.”
In Canada, the Toronto Globe and Mail published a front-page  article 
by Geoffrey York on February 26, 2009, that, while mentioning the Doha 
negotiations, was entitled “Historic Arrest Warrant for Sudan’s Leader 
Sparks Global Debate”—and indeed, for this paper, the court action ob-
viously overshadowed the diplomatic event. In the United Kingdom, I 
found no contributions by which the Guardian marked the beginning of 
the Doha negotiations in February 2009. Yet, on March 2, correspon-
dent Xan Rice reported from Nairobi in a short article on page 18: 
“Fierce Fighting after Darfur Ceasefire Deal.” The failure appeared to 
be more newsworthy than the beginning of talks. In France, Le Monde 
printed a brief note (“lettre d’information”) on page 6 of its February 
13, 2009, edition entitled “Meeting between Khartoum and Rebels in 
Doha” (Rencentre entre Khartoum et les rebelles à Doha). On the same 
day, the paper featured a front-page article entitled “The President of 
Sudan Will be Subject to an Arrest Warrant” (Le president du Sou-
dan va être l’objet d’un mandate d’arrêt). Obviously, new information 
about an upcoming major ICC decision overshadowed the beginning of 
peace negotiations. It pushed them onto the back pages.
Diplomatic events are thus noted in the media, but they do not 
make the same splash as do ICC decisions against high-level actors. 
Compared to the humanitarian aid field, however, the diplomatic field 
occupies a stronger position vis-à-vis the media as it does produce news-
worthy and highly ritualized events. Its position is further strengthened 
as routine encounters between journalists and diplomats and newswor-
thy events are supplemented by repeated interventions by highly visible 
foreign policy and diplomatic actors. If we pick any  month— say, Au-
gust  2007— and consider any single  paper— take Germany’s  FAZ— we 
find reports about (or quotes by) the following high-profile diplomatic 
actors: Peter Schumann, leading the UN delegation to southern Sudan 
and Ali Karti of the Sudanese Foreign Ministry (8/1/2007); the UNSC 
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(8/1); the German minister for development, Heidemarie Wieczorek-
Zeul (8/2 and 8/13); Africa experts from the Christian-Democratic and 
Green factions of the German Bundestag (8/2); UN secretary-general 
Ban Ki Moon (8/2, 8/18, and 8/29); German foreign minister Walter 
Steinmeier (8/3); Jan Eliasson, the UN special envoy for Darfur (8/4); 
several German legislators (8/5); AU commission president Alpha 
Dumar Konaré (8/14); and in the United States, a White House spokes-
person (8/25). Clearly, statements by these actors with national and 
often international visibility stand a good chance of being transmitted 
to a broad public by the news media.
In short, representations of mass violence produced in the diplomatic 
field fare prominently in media reporting about Darfur. This diplomatic 
media presence is partly due to journalists’ routine encounters with dip-
lomats as informants, relatively rare but noteworthy events produced in 
the diplomatic field, and the high public visibility of some actors in this 
field. The latter two factors appear to secure the diplomatic field’s better 
representation in the news media than is granted the humanitarian field. 
Yet diplomatic framing still declines over time as compared to citations of 
the judicial frame. Events produced by the ICC demonstrate a particular 
ritual power (Durkheim [1912] 2001) or legitimacy that is based on their 
communicative quality (Osiel 1997) or on their procedure (Luhmann 
2004) and that secures them news value. And such news value, reflective 
of the market forces to which media are exposed, contributes to explain-
ing the dominant position of the crime frame in reporting about Darfur. 
Finally, the mirror image of trend lines for the crime frame and those 
frames that speak to armed conflict, where one increases when the other 
declines (and vice versa), reflects conflicts between the criminal justice 
and diplomacy fields and their opposing institutional logics.
patterns in media: country and regional 
context, ideology, and gender
Different newspapers, all relatively close to the autonomous pole of 
their social field, show some degree of homogeneity, in line with expec-
tations; but it would be wrong to deny the variation within the sample 
of newspapers under study here. As already observed in this book, there 
are nationally distinct patterns of reporting, even within our group of 
relatively comparable Northern countries. Larger differences should 
be expected for Northern versus African countries. And distinctions at 
lower levels of analysis are likely to add to differences in cross-national 
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and cross-regional comparison. Examples of such differences include 
the paper’s ideological orientation and categories of  journalists— for ex-
ample, men versus women. Here I address patterns that bring variety to 
journalistic representations of the mass violence in Darfur.
Country Patterns in Representations of Darfur
Nation-specific patterns of media reporting about Darfur are to be ex-
pected given our findings in previous chapters. Chapter 3 addresses the 
exceptional character of American media reports, with their strong al-
legiance to a criminalizing frame, and chapter 5 shows the affinity of 
Irish media with the dominant humanitarian approach of their country. 
While these cases are outliers, variation in reporting along a number of 
analytic dimensions can be observed across all countries. Figure 25 of-
fers but one illustration for the use of the crime frame across periods by 
country. While it may be difficult to decipher and explain each country 
line (not my intention here), and while all countries similarly respond 
to specific interventions, it is obvious that they do so at different levels.
In short, while I offer a detailed exploration of media reporting for 




































































































































figure 25. Percentage of newspaper documents citing the crime frame across periods 
by country.
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data set also reveal country-specific patterns as a general feature of news 
reporting. I spell out three explanations for such patterns, and I provide 
illustrative evidence from my interviews with journalists. The first ex-
planation for the fact that reporting varies by country lies in broad 
structural and cultural differences, even within our group of Northern 
democracies. The second concerns the specific strength and shape of 
the fields that supply journalism with information within each country. 
The third explanation is the varying shape of media fields themselves in 
cross-country comparison.
First,  journalism— even if practiced by expat correspondents in 
 Africa— is imbedded in national contexts. Chapters 3 and 5 show how 
US and Irish particularities in reporting may be explained by distinct 
potentials for civil society mobilization and government responsiveness 
to such mobilization in the United States, and by a humanitarian and 
development aid focus in Irish foreign policy. Both mobilization and 
policy foci are themselves driven by carrier groups and national col-
lective memories. Differences were relatively pronounced when the ap-
plication of interpretative frames and evaluative labels (e.g., genocide) 
with strong normative implications were at stake, while the reporting of 
suffering was more homogeneous. Importantly, country-specific differ-
ences in reporting indicate an overlap between the journalistic field and 
cultural and structural features of the national context.
Examples from interviews abound. One Belgian interviewee among 
the Africa correspondents was greatly inspired by his family’s ties with 
Congo, his homeland’s former colony. A journalist with a Sri Lankan 
family background told me that he is, in light of his family’s history, 
more empathetic with those in the Periphery who express grievances 
against the Center. A French interviewee spoke about the particular 
concern of the French state and society with issues of former French 
colonies, which in the Darfur crisis center on Chad and the risk that the 
conflict might spill over.15 Clearly, journalists are themselves products 
of national contexts. Their educational experience and cultural sensi-
tivities differ from country to country, and that likely affects their sym-
pathy with particular topics and frames.
Second, national differences within specialized fields such as humani-
tarian aid and diplomacy play into media reporting, as these fields provide 
journalists with information. This chapter has demonstrated how criminal 
justice, humanitarianism, and diplomacy interpenetrate the journalistic 
field. And they do so with more or less force depending on the coun-
try. Examples from interviews point to the anchoring of humanitarian 
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concerns in the churches in Germany; close ties between government aid 
and humanitarian NGOs in Ireland; and the headquarters of the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross and the particular intensity of diplo-
matic mediation programs in Switzerland. Given the centrality of these 
fields as sources of information, journalists are likely to be affected by 
such particularities of fields in their countries of origin. Indeed, my analy-
sis indicates that media reporting is colored by the particular national 
features of the fields from which journalists draw information.
Third, the journalistic field itself takes distinct shapes in different 
countries.16 The size of the market differs across countries, and with it 
the resources available to the media. In addition, publicly subsidized 
media are stronger in one country (e.g., Germany), while commercial 
television is more dominant in another (e.g., United States). In addi-
tion to structural characteristics of the field, journalistic traditions vary, 
for example between the “political/literary” press tradition in France 
and the “objective/informational” model in the United States (Benson 
2006:197–198; 2013). Also my interviews spoke to national particu-
larities in the journalistic field. Respondents reported, for example, the 
reluctance of a major French paper to have journalists on the ground 
in Africa; the incomparably large market of a paper such as the NYT, 
which provides it with vast resources and many more journalists in 
Africa than any other paper could afford; and, at the other end of the 
spectrum, the small size of media markets in countries with less than 5 
percent of the US population. Such media depend especially on press 
releases in reporting about Africa. Their content is consequently less de-
tailed, and some nuances will not be provided. In addition, competitive 
pressure varies by country and with it the contest for market share. Pro-
viding what audiences perceive as sensational and, in reporting about 
conflicts, offering starker depictions of opposing groups tend to be com-
paratively more attractive in more competitive national media fields. 
The Darfur media data set suggests that differences caused by national 
particularities of the journalistic field are not limited to style, but extend 
to topical foci and framing as well.
In short, three types of national forces result in nation-specific pat-
terns of reporting: broad structural and cultural distinctions between 
countries; country-specific shapes of fields that supply media with in-
formation; and finally different shapes that media fields themselves take 
in each country. Topical choices, framing, and styles of reporting are 
affected, as a comparative analysis of the uses of the term genocide and 
of analogical bridging to the Holocaust illustrates.
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Using “Genocide” and Holocaust Bridges in International  
Comparison
The varying use of the term genocide across countries illustrates how 
the three nation-specific forces outlined above affect country patterns 
of reporting. As noted earlier, the genocide label and bridging to the 
Holocaust are especially prominent features of reporting about Darfur 
in US media. This pattern corresponds closely not only with the central-
ity of the genocide theme in American civil society and its massive Save 
Darfur campaign, but also with the use of the term genocide by high-
ranking government actors. A French journalist stationed in the United 
States spoke to this difference: “In the US you had Colin Powell, who 
said that [word genocide]. If you have an official using that term, then 
the media will pretty much follow it. . . . But then, in France nobody 
did that. And the media then started to wonder about it. So the UN is 
the umpire of this, arbiter of this. So the UN didn’t do it. . . . And then 
I remember Doctors Without Borders not using it.”
Figure 26 shows that this journalist’s assessment is reflected in the 
statistics of my news media analysis. Indeed, we find the United States 
and France to be the outliers at both ends of the distribution. The figure 
also again confirms the reluctance of media in Ireland and Germany to 
use the genocide label.17
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figure 26. Percentage of newspaper documents using the term genocide for Darfur, 
by country.
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While it is likely that social movements, leading politicians, and news 
media reinforced each other’s preferred terminology, the causal arrow 
from civil society to the media in the United States is likely to have 
been strengthened by the competitiveness of the American media mar-
ket. Here the third condition of nation-specific media reporting identi-
fied above is at work: the particularity of the national media field. But 
broader cultural sensitivities matter also. In Germany a journalist talked 
about his reluctance to subsume Darfur under the same category (geno-
cide) under which the Holocaust is categorized. In addition to this cog-
nitive impediment, we also encountered normative constraints among 
German respondents, indicating the standing of the Shoah as a “sacred 
evil” especially in that country (Alexander 2004a). Consider also Ire-
land, where a humanitarian complex is firmly established, associated 
with the country’s foreign policy and collective memory, thus contrib-
uting to a general hesitance to use strong vocabularies vis-à-vis the Su-
danese state. Consequently, the term genocide is used cautiously here 
too. Irish media reporting shows an elective affinity with the national 
particularity of the humanitarian field, even if we cannot make out the 
precise causal path. The first factor identified above, general national 
cultural characteristics, is here at work. In Ireland it is supported by 
the strength of the humanitarian field as a source of  information— the 
second force working toward national particularities identified above.
In short, country-specific uses of  genocide— as well as metaphorical 
bridging to the  Holocaust— confirm what an examination of Darfur re-
porting in news media shows more generally: that the journalistic field 
overlaps with national conditions pertaining to a country’s larger struc-
tural and cultural characteristics, nation-specific strengths of fields that 
supply media with information, and particularities of national media 
fields themselves (see also Benson 2013).
Northern versus African Countries and Group Identification
Patterns of national distinction in news reporting identified across 
Northern countries suggest that comparisons between Northern and 
African news media should be especially pronounced. After all, cul-
tural and structural differences between both regions, differences in the 
role of specialized fields, and particularities of the media field itself are 
substantial. A brief examination for one issue must suffice here: the 
categorization of perpetrators and victims of human rights violations 
in the conflict. Some media scholars are highly critical of the use of 
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ethnic categories in Northern press representations of African conflicts. 
They charge that Western journalists “swallowed the ethnic interpreta-
tion of conflict promoted by interested parties locally” (e.g., McNulty 
1999:283). Also Wall (2007) observes a tendency in Western media 
to attribute African violence to tribalism. She argues that reference 
to long-standing ethnic or tribal affiliations allows Western media to 
avoid references to the contributions of colonial powers in planting the 
seeds of conflict. Interviews that Wahutu Siguru, a doctoral student at 
the University of Minnesota, conducted with African journalists from 
Kenya and South Africa show that they expressed similar critical senti-
ments regarding the ethnicization of conflicts in Africa by their North-
ern colleagues (Siguru and Savelsberg 2013; see also Mamdani 2009b).
Yet one of the most scathing critiques of simplified uses of ethnic 
categories in debates about Darfur was written by Rob Crilly (2010), a 
British journalist. Also, many of my interviews with Africa correspon-
dents from the Global North reveal considerable sensitivity toward 
oversimplified depictions of conflicting parties along ethnic lines. Fur-
ther, systematic analyses of African media reporting disclose astonish-
ingly small differences in the use of vocabulary. One of the few content 
analyses of African newspapers and their reporting about Darfur in fact 
finds astounding similarities with Northern media reports: “a tendency 
to report on the violence in an oversimplified racialized way” whereby 
“fault lines in this conflict are often the same as those used by western 
media” (Ray 2009:172, 176).
We are thus confronted by a double paradox: that Northern journal-
ists speak critically of ethnicized or racialized descriptions of African 
 conflicts— exactly the practice for which they are  reproached— and that 
African media do not seem to differ fundamentally from their European 
and North American  counterparts— despite the disdain with which 
their journalists speak about Northern media. Part of the explanation 
lies in the nature of journalistic genres. Space constraints lead to simpli-
fied narratives that do not live up to the differentiations and elaboration 
of insights into the historical construction of group identities that we 
might encounter in interviews with journalists. But further, if major 
Northern  newspapers— leaders in the world of journalism in countries 
such as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and  Canada— suffer 
from a shortage of resources and resulting constraints in inner- 
African travel, African journalists suffer these limitations even more. 
This shortage of resources results in restrictions on investigative jour-
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issued by international organizations or INGOs. The dependency of 
African journalists, in particular, on such sources must be considered 
at least one explanation for the relatively small difference in patterns of 
media reporting between Global North and African papers. A thorough 
comparative investigation of African and Northern journalistic work 
on mass violence in African countries goes beyond this book’s purposes, 
but a first promising effort is under way (Siguru, in progress).
Below the Level of Nation-States: Media Ideological Orientation
This book has paid little attention to patterns below the level of the 
nation-state, as such an effort would distract from its central arguments. 
Yet here I briefly highlight two such forces, and I recommend them for 
future investigation. My choice of a liberal and a conservative paper in 
each country lends itself to a comparison along ideological lines. Table 3 
depicts differences across a number of central dimensions used to de-
scribe the violence in Darfur. Interesting patterns emerge, patterns that 
also speak to the cultural strength of the institutional interventions I am 
concerned with here.
The data in table 3 reveal that a substantially greater percentage 
of articles on Darfur appearing in liberal-leaning newspapers were in-
clined to report the victimization of Darfur in the first period of the 
conflict. At that stage they were also much more likely to use the crime 
and the humanitarian frame than they were the civil war frame or 
the genocide label. Yet, interestingly, differences between conserva-
tive and liberal papers diminished as international organizations and 
eventually the ICC intervened. Both the reporting of victimization and 
the framing of the conflict became more similar across the ideological 
spectrum.
Why the initial overrepresentation of the recognition of suffering and 
use of crime labels in articles about Darfur in liberal-leaning media, 
an overrepresentation that multivariate analyses prove to be significant 
for the entire reporting period (Savelsberg and Nyseth Brehm 2015)? 
A necessarily speculative answer points to the left-liberal tendency to 
speak on behalf of weaker members of society, those suffering from 
oppression. But why the growing similarity in reporting after the ju-
dicial interventions? Again, I can only speculate at this point, but it 
appears as though such assimilation across ideological lines may result 
from the ritual power or procedural legitimacy, or both, that media, in-
cluding and possibly especially conservative media, attribute to formal 
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institutions of law. Remember that previous literature on the legal pro-
cessing of Auschwitz at the Frankfurt trial detected an affinity between 
judicial and journalistic narratives, identifying a close correspondence 
between judicial depictions of mass atrocities and journalistic accounts 
(Pendas 2006). Above I also cite work that finds a closer resemblance 
of media and textbook narratives of the My Lai massacre to the judicial 
account than to the accounts of the Peers Commission and Seymour 
Hersh’s Pulitzer Prize–winning book (Savelsberg and King 2011).
In short, a brief comparative analysis of conservative and liberal 
news media across intervention periods suggests that ideological ori-
entation matters, but that its weight diminishes over time. Again, 
judicial interventions do not just contribute to the intensity of report-
ing but also shape the quality of journalistic narratives. Importantly, 
they at least partially neutralize the ideological orientation of media 
organizations.
Below the Level of News Media: Journalist Gender
Much feminist literature has documented that even in scholarly work 
the observer’s standpoint colors his or her depiction of social reality 
(e.g., Harding 1996; D. Smith 1992). What applies in academia likely 
also holds true in the world of journalism. I thus expect gender to mat-
ter in media reporting about Darfur, especially in light of the gendered 
nature of mass violence and genocide (Burkhardt 2005; Hagan 2003; 
Kaiser and Hagan 2015). What gender-specific patterns might be hid-
den in the Darfur media data set? Patterns should be most pronounced 
in reporting about rape, which I examine here.
Comparing the reporting of rape in articles written by male and fe-
male journalists across our time periods indicates that females were 
more likely to speak to the issue of rape than males in their reports 
about Darfur, at least in the majority of periods (see figure 27). Multi-
variate analyses show that this difference holds up when we consider the 
entire time period and when we control for other variables (Savelsberg 
and Nyseth Brehm 2015). This pattern may reflect female reporters’ 
greater empathy with female victims. Note, though, that the overrep-
resentation of rape reporting by female journalists applies especially in 
the first period, when most media accounts were still based on INGO 
and IO reports, and in the periods around the ICC decisions concerning 
President al-Bashir, when much reporting came from The Hague. This 
may indicate the prevalence of female reporters writing about Darfur 
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from Europe or North America. In addition, however, female corre-
spondents who do report out of Darfur may have easier access to infor-
mation about rapes. Male journalists certainly face greater challenges 
in interviewing female rape victims, a challenge noted in more than one 
of the interviews I conducted.
Additional analyses, not shown here, indicate for the macro level 
that media from countries with a larger percentage of females among 
their correspondents were substantially more likely to include issues of 
rape in their reports about Darfur.
In short, the gender of journalists mattered in reporting about Dar-
fur, at least with regard to the issue of rape. More generally, patterns 
below the level of the nation-state, such as the newspaper’s ideological 
leaning and the gender of its journalists, merit future investigation.
conclusions: Journalistic representations and 
why they matter
Analysis of the Darfur media data set shows that the first wave of mass 
violence in Darfur in 2003 was almost completely neglected by news 




















































































































figure 27. Percentage of newspaper documents referencing rape, by period and  
gender of journalist.
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an event. During the second stage, immediately following the second 
wave of the violence, however, reporting experienced the first of two 
major peaks. During this period UN secretary-general Kofi Annan ad-
dressed the violence in his speech before the General Assembly on the 
tenth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide. The high visibility of his 
statements, and the weight added by his analogical bridging to the hor-
rific and, by 2004, widely recognized Rwandan genocide, was a major 
contributor to this first outburst of reporting. Also, in national con-
texts, interventions by politicians of high standing who were engaged 
with the Sudan conflict and human rights issues contributed to this first 
peak. The German story of former justice minister Gerhart Baum and 
his interaction with one of the newspapers under analysis provided an 
example. Political initiatives were accompanied, and partly preceded, 
by initiatives from civil society groups, including the USHMM and 
evangelical Christian groups in the United States. While the intensity 
of reporting declined somewhat during the subsequent two years, it still 
remained at a relatively high level. These years were filled with UN and 
ICC interventions, including the ICID report, the UNSC’s referral of the 
Darfur case to the ICC, intense campaigns by human rights INGOs, and 
substantial engagement by humanitarian aid organizations.
The second peak of reporting occurred after the ICC issued the first 
indictments, without which it certainly could not be explained. Yet it 
was followed in subsequent years by a dramatic decline in the intensity 
of reporting about Darfur, despite the continuing deprivation of the 
population in refugee and IDP camps, as well as continued killings, 
rapes, and displacements, albeit at a reduced level. After this point, 
Bourdieu’s observation proves true: media tend to raise one episode of 
mass violence, only to drop it when its newsworthiness declines. They 
moved on from Darfur to South Sudan and then to the Central African 
Republic, soon dropping those cases to turn to northern Nigeria, Syria, 
Ukraine, and elsewhere, and so the journey of migrating attention con-
tinued. Such processes reflect the declining market value of prolonged 
suffering in the media field, a factor strengthened by growing restric-
tions on journalistic work imposed by the government of Sudan. But 
we also saw that judicial interventions delayed this decline in the case 
of Darfur and continued to affect the framing of news reports in later 
stages, albeit at a lower incidence of reporting. Bourdieu’s thesis is thus 
partly confirmed, but it warrants modification: interventions by civil so-
ciety, states, and the judicial field have the capacity to delay the drop-off 
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in coverage, keeping journalistic attention alive over several years and 
coloring interpretations of mass violence.
My analysis shows in fact that interventions by the judicial field, spe-
cifically the ICC, colored reporting about Darfur. Several intervention 
points were followed by substantial increases in citations of the crime 
frame as a lens through which journalistic sources of information inter-
preted the violence. Advanced statistical analyses presented elsewhere 
confirm these patterns (Savelsberg and Nyseth Brehm 2015). Judicial 
interventions are also followed by increases in reporting about some 
forms of violence such as killings and rapes, albeit much less about 
displacements and the destruction of livelihood. These judicial inter-
vention effects might be surprising, given the major obstacles Africa 
correspondents experience in terms of geographic distance from the 
court, the distinctiveness of legal language, and the mismatch between 
the time horizon of legal proceedings and the fast pace of journalistic 
work. But these impediments, it seems, are partially overcome by the 
particular ritual force of judicial interventions and the legitimacy that 
court proceedings enjoy, as previous studies on the journalistic pro-
cessing of mass violence have suggested (Pendas 2006, Savelsberg and 
King 2011). Impediments are further overcome as most news media 
send specialists for judicial affairs and international institutions to The 
Hague to cover dramatic legal pronouncements. Indictments of a min-
ister and certainly of a head of state such as Omar al-Bashir are among 
these events.
A word of caution is warranted, though, for judicial interventions did 
not succeed in the long run in keeping the case of Darfur on the radar of 
public and media attention. They did, however, lead to new peaks in the 
number of narratives that applied the crime frame to the mass violence 
in Darfur, even in the late stages of the period under study.
Proponents of a humanitarian emergency frame find less comfort in 
the information from the Darfur media data set. It is true that Africa cor-
respondents highlighted the importance of the humanitarian aid field in 
informing journalistic work. Accordingly, the humanitarian emergency 
frame manifested most prominently in the initial phases of reporting. 
Yet it declined quickly and dramatically. This decline, it seems, resulted 
from several forces. First, continued suffering soon stops being news. 
Notions of newsworthiness and market forces trump victims’ need to 
get the story of suffering before the public. Second, the government 
of Sudan barred many humanitarian aid organizations from Darfur, 
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especially after it began suspecting them of being sources of information 
on which charges against Sudanese state actors were based. The third 
factor is self-censorship of the remaining aid organizations, whose rep-
resentatives feared that they too would be forced to leave the country 
for speaking out about the violence. Fourth and finally, humanitarian 
aid delivery is continuous. It does not produce dramatic moments. Here 
it differs from both the judicial and the diplomatic field.
Indeed, citations of the civil war frame appeared more prominently 
(and declined less rapidly) than references to the humanitarian emer-
gency frame. Remember that ending the fighting usually dominates the 
diplomatic agenda. Diplomatic activities should thus correspond to war 
frames. But why should they affect media reporting? On the one hand, 
diplomacy, just like humanitarian aid, proceeds continuously and hid-
den from public view. On the other hand, diplomatic work differs from 
aid delivery in its display of performative, often dramatic moments. Ex-
amples are the beginnings and conclusions of peace negotiations, often 
opened or sealed by prominent actors from the world of politics and 
diplomacy who carry more newsworthiness than doctors, nurses, logis-
tics experts, or truck drivers who deliver food or medicine to devastated 
areas (see figure 17, chapter 6).
In short, all three fields examined in this book, judicial (especially), 
humanitarian (initially), and diplomatic (intermittently) leave their 
traces in journalistic reporting. And so do the political field and media 
markets. While the types of media analyzed here, and the journalists 
who serve as Africa correspondents, enjoy a relatively high degree of 
autonomy compared to other news outlets, the intensity and interpre-
tive implications of reporting cannot be understood without reference 
to such forces. Suffering and its causation alone certainly are insuf-
ficient conditions for journalistic attention or choices of interpretive 
frames.
While this chapter focuses on patterns of reporting over time and 
along intervention points, it also examines the global versus national 
controversy and confirms many previous observations in this book. In 
line with globalization arguments (e.g., Boyle 2002; Boyle and Meyer 
1998; Frank, Hironaka, and Schofer 2000; Meyer, Ramirez, and Soysal 
1992), patterns of reporting, its intensity, the acknowledgment of di-
verse forms of suffering, and the uses of various frames across periods 
follow similar paths in all countries. Yet they do so at different lev-
els. The likelihood of reporting about Darfur, of speaking about the 
killings, and of using the crime frame or the genocide label is more 
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pronounced in some countries than in others. As analyzed throughout 
this book, the country-specific mobilization of civil society; the relative 
weight of different fields in a country; cultural sensitivities and policy 
practices, often rooted in the type and intensity of national memories; 
and the nature of the media  field— all are decisive forces. Thus, for ex-
ample, the frequency of reporting is especially high in the United States 
and Germany  and— if controlled for the smaller number of  papers— in 
Ireland, compared to the other five countries; the use of the crime frame 
is pronounced in the United States and Germany; and the humanitarian 
frame is privileged in Ireland.
Below the level of the nation-state, the ideological orientation of 
newspapers matters, with left-liberal papers having been more likely to 
address the Darfur issue in the early stages of the mass  violence— a dif-
ference that became neutralized with the onset of formal interventions. 
Finally, individual-level variables also affect reporting. Female journal-
ists are more likely, for example, to address issues of rape. Again, both 
ideology and gender effects are confirmed in multivariate analyses (Sav-
elsberg and Nyseth Brehm 2015). In addition, gender effects translate 
to the macro level as media in some countries made more use of female 
journalists in reporting about Darfur than their counterparts in others.
What do these patterns mean for a sociology of the journalism field? 
Journalism’s relationship to other fields is obviously crucial to un-
derstanding patterns of reporting on mass violence. This finding is in 
line with efforts by Pierre Bourdieu (1998) and his followers (Benson 
1998, 2006) to develop a sophisticated model of journalism vis-à-vis 
other fields. Remember, Bourdieu depicts the world of fields in a spatial 
model, defined by a vertical axis representing increasing volumes of di-
verse forms of capital, and by a horizontal axis depicting the proportion 
of cultural-to-economic capital owned by specific actors (with cultural 
capital concentrated at the left and economic capital at the right end 
of this continuum). Bourdieu places media in the upper half of that 
space, as a dominating force. On the horizontal axis he locates media 
on the left side of the spectrum, as cultural producers, dominated in 
this respect. But Bourdieu also differentiates between types of media. 
Represented on the far left of the horizontal axis, where cultural capital 
reigns, are highly autonomous media with little or no economic prow-
ess (e.g., small literary journals). The center and, even more, the right 
side of the horizontal dimension are inhabited by institutions in which 
concern with economic capital trumps engagement with cultural capi-
tal (e.g., commercial TV networks). Prestigious newspapers analyzed in 
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this book would be found toward the left side of the horizontal axis; my 
interview data provide insights into the relative autonomy that Africa 
correspondents experienced when reporting about mass violence in an 
African context.
Future work should examine media in other places on the horizontal 
axis, media with stronger emphases on either cultural or economic capi-
tal than applies to the newspapers under examination here. I suggest, 
though, that the present papers’ simultaneous attention to cultural and 
economic forces secures them prestige as well as access to policy mak-
ers and to those societal groups that pay special attention to foreign 
and international events. In this realm they exercise a force Bourdieu 
(1998:46) attributes to actors in the journalistic field generally: as “con-
trollers of means of public expression” who “sanctify” events. Indeed, 
past research has shown that newspapers can directly influence public 
opinion, especially on foreign and international issues far removed from 
citizens’ lifeworlds (McCombs and Shaw 1976; Wanta and Hu 1993). 
Partly mediated through public opinion, they also appear to affect for-
eign policy (Walgrave, Soroka, and Nuytemans 2008), the allocation of 
foreign aid (Rioux and Van Belle 2005), and presidential actions (Wood 
and Peake 1998).
The above analysis warrants a word of caution against exaggerated 
theses regarding the mediatization of politics (Strömbeck and Esser 
2014). Journalism itself may depend on the sanctification of events by 
political actors, as it did in the case of Darfur. Further, this chapter 
shows that it is not sufficient to locate the journalistic field vis-à-vis eco-
nomic forces. In this the chapter supports recent comparative work on 
media fields by Rodney Benson (2013). Adding to Benson’s insights, I 
argue that journalism also depends on informational and interpretive 
input from the fields of diplomacy and humanitarian aid  and— of partic-
ular weight according to the data analyzed in this  chapter— the judicial 
field. Finally, no matter the causal direction between the journalistic field 
and the fields of politics, humanitarianism, diplomacy, and law, only 
through media reporting do national civil societies and a global public 
become “spectators” of suffering in distant lands (Boltanski 1999). And 
spectators they have to be before they can mobilize to demand or con-




Fields, the Global versus the National, and 
Representations of Mass Violence
In this book I have invited the reader on a journey through the compet-
ing representations of mass violence in distinct social fields and coun-
tries. Examining responses to the violence endured by the inhabitants 
of the Darfur region of Sudan during the first decade of the twenty-first 
century, I was especially interested to learn how the interventions of 
the UN Security Council and International Criminal Court, both part 
of the justice cascade, colored representations of mass violence. I also 
examined what distinct images of suffering and of responsible actors 
arose from the humanitarianism and diplomatic fields. I was, finally, 
concerned with the ways in which mass media in different countries 
communicated these competing perspectives to the public. I stress again 
that it is not assumed that news media will be receptive to the court’s 
decisions or messages, much less that court events will prevail over 
those staged by competing institutions. Indeed, patterns of receptivity 
show considerable variability.
Answers to these questions matter for scholarship and for practice. 
In scholarly terms they provide insights into the generation of knowl-
edge and representations at the intersection of fields, countries, pro-
fessions, and biographies. They respond to crucial questions raised 
in branches of scholarship as varied as sociology (and its subfields of 
crime and law, culture and knowledge, political and mass communi-
cation), criminology and criminal justice, political science, and media 
studies, as well as globalization research, which cuts across disciplines. 
266  |  Conclusions
Answers also matter for practice, as representations of mass violence, 
including genocide,  affect— structure, inhibit, or  propel— responses and 
interventions.1 Finally, they are important in normative terms as the 
international community, in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of Genocide, drafted in the immediate aftermath of the 
Shoah, began its campaign to intervene against the crime of crimes. Any 
intervention depends on overcoming denial (Cohen 2001), and appro-
priate interventions depend on appropriate definitions of the situation 
(Thomas 1928). What definition is appropriate, though, depends on the 
position of actors in the social structure, as we have seen throughout 
this book.
Zooming in on the mass violence in Darfur in the early twenty-first 
century, I provide answers to the above questions comparatively for 
eight Western countries, the United States and Canada for North Amer-
ica, and France, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Germany, Austria, and 
Switzerland for Europe. My analysis of 3,387 news reports and opinion 
pieces, constituting the Darfur media data set, and in-depth interviews 
with Africa correspondents of leading newspapers, NGO experts from 
Amnesty International and Doctors Without Borders, and foreign min-
istry officials provides much of the evidence. I describe how representa-
tions of mass violence vary, at times substantially, across social fields. I 
demonstrate that judicial interventions color the representation of mass 
violence in all countries, and that they eventually do so more effectively 
than humanitarian and diplomatic responses. But I simultaneously doc-
ument that the inclination to subscribe to the criminalizing frame and 
use the genocide label differs significantly from country to country. I 
offer explanations for these patterns, thereby contributing to our under-
standing of how the world, especially the Global North, acknowledges 
and frames violence in the Global South, specifically in Africa.
As this journey through the competing representations of the mass 
violence in Darfur and their communication to an international public 
draws to a close, I summarize central empirical insights. I conclude with 
a summary of theoretical contributions and insights for practice along 
the themes laid out in the introduction.
findings: patterns of representing mass 
violence
This book’s four parts raise a series of themes and questions: justice in 
lieu of impunity? Aid versus justice? Peace versus justice? And finally, 
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mediating competing representations. Insights gained from the analyses 
presented in the chapters speak to each of these themes.
From Impunity to Justice: The Justice Cascade, ICC, and  
the Human Rights Field
Analyzing responses to the Darfur conflict shows that reactions by the 
international community were propelled by the justice  cascade— that is, 
the replacement of impunity by the pursuit of individual criminal ac-
countability against perpetrators of grave human rights  violations— and 
these reactions simultaneously constituted a part of the cascade. The 
broader patterns, powerfully described by political scientist Kathryn 
Sikkink (2011), were thus confirmed for Darfur. I also found confirmed 
that driving forces of the justice cascade are international organizations 
and human rights NGOs, often interconnected in transnational activist 
networks (TANs) (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Simultaneously, the case 
of Darfur provided insights into strengths and limits of the justice cas-
cade. A report by the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur 
(ICID) and the ICC charges, reaching up to Sudan’s president, Omar 
al-Bashir, powerfully depicted central political actors as criminal perpe-
trators. They squarely produced representations of the Darfur conflict 
within the crime frame. Yet the judicial account also illustrates the nar-
rative constraints of criminal law (in addition to obvious enforcement 
constraints). While it is true that the ICID, part of the Darfur proceed-
ings, was mindful of the social and political conditions of the conflict, it 
relegated such insights to a “background” section. The logic of criminal 
law attributes mass violence to a small number of individuals. Structur-
al conditions and organizational contexts are underappreciated in the 
judicial field’s representation of mass violence. The court’s indictments 
focus yet further on a select number of individuals and their actions 
as conditions of the violence. This finding is consistent with previous 
research on judicial responses to mass violence, including the Mauthau-
sen trial (Jardim 2012); the “Doctors’ Trial,” one of the subsequent 
Nuremberg trials (Marrus 2008); the Frankfurt Auschwitz trial (Pendas 
2006); and war crimes trials against perpetrators of massacres in My 
Lai, Vietnam, and Haditha, Iraq (Savelsberg and King 2011).
The ICC of course does not act alone. A crucial condition of the jus-
tice cascade is the mobilization of human rights NGOs. I look closely at 
Amnesty International and its fight to end impunity in the case of Dar-
fur. Interviews show that Amnesty’s narrative resembles and supports 
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the judicial field’s. Here too the focus is on the goal of justice and on 
individual perpetrators, at the expense of larger structural patterns. Re-
spondents insisted that justice, once achieved, would help actors reach 
other goals such as peace.
Respondents’ relative unanimity in representing the violence as 
criminal supports the strength of the globalizing forces highlighted by 
the World Polity School (Meyer, Ramirez, and Soysal 1992; Boyle and 
Meyer 1998). This is expected for an international NGO that closely 
coordinates actions with other INGOs. It should be especially unsur-
prising in the case of Amnesty, with its strong International Secretariat 
in London and its relatively hierarchical organizational structure. Yet 
even in the case of Amnesty, national conditions also color narratives. 
Examples include the strong pacifist roots of NGO volunteers in a 
country such as Germany and pressure on Amnesty in the United States 
to cooperate with members of the massive civil society movement gath-
ered under the umbrella of the Save Darfur campaign. In all countries, 
Amnesty workers are aware of their government’s traditions, interests, 
and policy foci when they seek to influence government policies. With-
out such awareness they surely could not communicate effectively with 
pubic officials. They are also mindful of nation-specific carrier groups 
and their cultural sensitivities when they attempt to mobilize volunteers 
and the public and raise funds. Such mindfulness, a precondition for 
effective work at the national level,  resulted— as we  saw— in varying 
criminalizing representations of mass violence in Darfur. In addition, 
workers for international NGOs are themselves shaped by the national 
contexts in which they were socialized and educated.
But not only INGOs and TANs supported the justice cascade in the 
case of Darfur; national governments were also crucial actors, albeit 
to different degrees. I pay particular attention to the United States, its 
civil society, and government, as this country stood out in international 
comparison. It sought, more strongly than other members of the in-
ternational community, to advance a criminalizing frame for Darfur 
and a definition of the violence as genocide. Crucial contributors were 
civil society groups, especially evangelical Christians, African Ameri-
cans, and Jewish organizations, organized in the Save Darfur campaign. 
The George W. Bush administration followed suit, despite its oppo-
sition to the ICC, but under the pressure of civil society. Conditions 
for this transmission included the porousness of boundaries between 
civil society and the state in the United States (Bendix 1949 [1974]; 
Roth 1987; Savelsberg 1994). Articles in the New York Times and the 
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Wall Street Journal, especially opinion pieces, reflected and reinforced 
the consensus between civil society and the state. They highlighted the 
crime frame, labeled the violence as genocide, and used dramatic bridg-
ing metaphors to shed light on the violence of Darfur by referencing 
past genocides, including the Holocaust.
Nation-specific patterns are in line with recent literature on national 
contexts within which INGOs work (Stroup 2012), and with a long tra-
dition of historicizing neo-Weberian scholarship (Bendix 1949 [1974]; 
Kalberg 1994, 2014; Savelsberg and King 2005). Some national sec-
tions of INGOs find stronger resonance in their respective country’s 
governments than others, depending on the institutionalization of civil 
society–government relations. Nevertheless, this finding should not dis-
tract from the fact that national sections of human rights INGOs are 
characterized by a common denominator: the pursuit of human rights 
and some degree of consistency in their criminalizing narratives.
Justice or Humanitarianism? Aid NGOs and the Humanitarian 
Complex
Responses by the UNSC, human rights NGOs, and some countries, in-
cluding the United States, thus advanced the justice cascade and the 
representation of mass violence in Darfur within a criminalizing frame. 
But to focus only on these actors would be misleading. Examining rep-
resentations of Darfur in other fields reveals at times sharply compet-
ing definitions of the situation in the besieged region of Sudan. One 
potential competitor of the judicial field and its supporters is the hu-
manitarian aid field, here explored with specific attention to one NGO, 
Doctors Without Borders (MSF). I show that humanitarian representa-
tions differ significantly from those of the human rights field. Humani-
tarian organizations highlight those aspects of suffering that can best be 
addressed by aid programs. Displacements and the conditions for IDPs 
and refugees in camps are privileged over the fate of others who lose 
their lives during massacres, in rape campaigns, and on death marches 
into the camps. Humanitarian narratives treat the government of Sudan 
cautiously. They emphasize long-term conditions such as the desertifi-
cation of the Sahel zone and long-standing center-periphery conflicts, 
and soft-pedal government actions that are immediate precursors, and 
likely conditions, of the violence. The humanitarian catastrophe frame is 
privileged over the crime frame, and actors shy away from the genocide 
label. My analysis identifies the powerful position of the government of 
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Sudan vis-à-vis the humanitarian aid field as a crucial condition for this 
representation, in line with earlier examinations of the humanitarian 
field (de Waal 1997; Hagan, Schoenfeld, and Palloni 2006).
My analysis of the humanitarian field also displays global-national 
tensions similar to those diagnosed for the human rights field. Yes, a 
global humanitarian representation can be identified, and here too in-
ternational NGOs and aid organizations are major contributors, con-
firming arguments from globalization theory. Yet, as in the human 
rights field, cross-national variation in representations is pronounced. 
In the humanitarian field, too, activists have to speak effectively to 
reach government actors with specific policy preferences and volunteers 
and potential donors within civil society who are motivated by distinct 
collective memories and cultural sensitivities. Again, the validity of his-
toricizing neo-Weberian arguments is demonstrated, and Stroup’s ob-
servations (2012) on national boundaries within the international NGO 
movement find further support.
Cross-national patterns themselves are complicated by distinctions 
between members of diverse professions that inhabit the humanitar-
ian field. Lawyers working in this field are less immune to the logic of 
the justice cascade than members of other professions such as physi-
cians. Educational backgrounds and professional trajectories thus inter-
sect with field and national context conditions and produce patterns of 
knowledge and habitus far less homogeneous than a focus on the field 
alone would suggest. Conflicts between human rights and humanitarian 
fields should thus not be conceived of as zero-sum. This conclusion is all 
the more important as conflict gives way at times to a division of labor, 
as when humanitarian organizations produce evidence of suffering and 
victimization that justice institutions may later use to assign criminal 
liability.
While the intersection between fields, national contexts, and pro-
fessional backgrounds may lead to a weakening of the ideal-typical 
humanitarian narrative, other conditions move the humanitarian rep-
resentation closer to the master narrative. I illustrate this hardening of 
the narrative for Ireland, a country with a strong humanitarian aid ori-
entation and with a close network of state organizations, aid NGOs, 
and the Irish Catholic Church, all rooted in policy practices that mu-
tually reinforce a humanitarian orientation and associated representa-
tion of Darfur. I refer to the structural basis of this constellation as a 
humanitarian complex. Interviews, supported by many conversations 
and observations of the cityscape of Dublin, with its numerous and 
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moving memorials to Irish suffering, reveal some of the cultural foun-
dations of this humanitarian complex. This evidence suggests that col-
lective memories of poverty and famine were crucial driving forces of 
NGO humanitarianism, aid- and development-focused foreign policy, 
and supportive public opinion.2 In Ireland, the memory of famine and 
poverty is supplemented by additional memories that raise skepticism 
against humanitarianism’s challenger, the human rights and associated 
judicial narratives. Irish interviewees interpreted the Northern Ireland 
conflict as supporting the notion of amnesties in the context of polit-
ically motivated violence. This memory in fact proved to be institu-
tionalized in Dublin’s Department of Foreign Affairs, where a working 
group drew lessons from the Northern Ireland conflict in developing 
foreign policy principles.
And, as in the case of MSF, the representation of mass violence in 
a humanitarian-complex situation such as Ireland’s takes a particular 
shape. Here too aspects of suffering were highlighted that could be ad-
dressed by aid programs, and the responsibility of the government of 
Sudan was downplayed. The crime frame and the genocide label were 
used cautiously. This pattern, identified through interviews, is confirmed 
by media analysis. The causal mechanism was the same as for humani-
tarian NGOs, given the government of Sudan’s role as gatekeeper for 
the delivery of aid.
Nevertheless, despite such national particularities and, again, as in 
the human rights field, globalization theory is not to be discarded. Irish 
government officials still considered their policies aligned with the rest 
of Europe and the United Nations. And Ireland is indeed among the 
many European countries that have ratified the Rome Statute, with-
out which the ICC prosecution against President al-Bashir and others 
would not be possible. While such allegiance thus supports warnings 
against essentializing a country, its culture and institutions, positions, 
representations, cultural patterns, and policy practices are simultane-
ously well suited to illustrating and indeed confirming neo-Weberian 
concerns regarding national carrier groups and cultural sensitivities.
Peace or Justice? Diplomacy across Countries
In addition to representations from the humanitarian field, narratives 
of the mass violence in Darfur generated in the diplomatic field also 
differed sharply from judicial and human rights representations. Inter-
views revealed a diplomatic master narrative or ideal type of diplomatic 
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representation of mass violence. We saw that diplomacy focuses, even 
more than the humanitarian aid field, on long-term and structural 
causes of conflicts. It tends to avoid naming responsible actors, using 
the crime frame, or applying the genocide label. Information provided 
by interviewees suggests a similar causal mechanism. Again, the role of 
the Sudanese state is decisive. Humanitarian aid organizations depend 
on permits by lower-level government bureaucracies, where boundary-
crossing professional solidarity may at times be at work. But in the dip-
lomatic field dependency is yet more pronounced. Here actors depend 
on active participation by high-ranking politicians of the country in 
which mass violence unfolds. Clearly the bar is higher and the pressure 
to take account of the Sudanese state more intense.
Another distinction between the human rights and diplomatic fields 
is decisive. Unlike judicial actors and their allies, diplomats are less ori-
ented toward procedure than toward substantive outcomes. They seek 
to advance their respective countries’ material and ideal interests, which 
were  tied— in the Darfur  case— to the pursuit of peace and political 
stability in the region. Diplomats have internalized their field’s institu-
tional logic and its doxa, its matter-of-course assumptions about the 
world. The analysis relativizes arguments by Samantha Power (2002) 
for the United States and Karen Smith (2010) for Europe, according to 
which cautious language in the foreign policy field, even in the face of 
genocide, indicates the reluctance of rational actors to get involved, lest 
they incur potentially high political costs. I suggest that much of this 
hesitation must be attributed instead to the habitus of diplomats and its 
rootedness in the structural conditions of their field.
The diplomatic field thus generates a particular representation of 
Darfur, distinct from the humanitarian account and in stark contrast 
to the human rights narrative. Interviewees from foreign ministries gen-
erally applied great caution about using dramatizing labels, especially 
genocide, when they described the violence, and about attributing direct 
responsibility, especially criminal responsibility, to central actors in the 
Sudanese state. Even so, national contexts matter here even more than 
in the human rights and humanitarian fields, as my evidence suggests. 
This may be surprising at first, given that all countries under analysis 
are members of major international organizations and all but the United 
States have ratified the Rome Statute. It is also true that all interviewees 
from foreign ministries insist that their countries are aligned. Yet for-
eign policy and associated diplomatic work are primarily the domain 
of national governments, and my evidence suggests that the diplomatic 
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master narrative is pulled in different directions by the national contexts 
in which it is cultivated.
Strong mobilization of civil society in combination with porous state-
society boundaries contributed to dramatizing narratives, including in 
the diplomatic field. My analysis shows this pattern especially for the 
United States. A government’s intense interactions with the Sudanese 
state, in contrast, resulted in representations that stuck close to the dip-
lomatic ideal type. Such interactions may have been fostered through 
various mechanisms. The Austrian case showed the effects of Sudan’s 
lobbying efforts. Another factor may be a country’s reputation for neu-
trality and associated expertise and involvement in mediation, a force 
visible in the case of Switzerland. Consider also effects of the close in-
teraction with Sudanese officials in the humanitarian field on display in 
the case of Ireland. In addition, a country’s status as a former colonial 
 power— with the regional expertise, presence of expatriate groups, and 
normative commitment that this  entails— plays into the way its policy 
makers and diplomats speak about and respond to mass violence occur-
ring in a former colony. The United Kingdom served as an example, and 
France was particularly concerned with a potential destabilization of 
Chad, its former colony and immediate neighbor of not just Sudan but 
the Darfur region specifically. Finally, Germany exemplified the com-
plex effects of the “cultural trauma of perpetrators” (Giesen 2004a) 
of the Holocaust. Throughout the German responses, national carrier 
groups and memorial  normativities— those commitments implicated in 
and emerging from collective  memories— affected responses to Darfur. 
While especially pronounced, the German case has one characteristic 
in common with other countries: communicative memories, embedded 
in specific carrier groups, matter. The weight of collective memory in 
the representation of mass violence and the fight for human rights thus 
confirms observations Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider (2010) make in 
their sociohistorical work on memory and human rights; however, my 
observations challenge their position regarding the declining weight of 
communicative memories tied to particular carrier groups.
Not to be misunderstood: as in the case of the human rights and 
humanitarian fields, I seek to essentialize neither field nor nation in 
the foreign policy and diplomatic realms. For nations, civil society 
organization, carrier groups, memories, aid programs, and ties to the 
Sudanese state are all variable. And here too fields overlap with their 
actors’ diachronic experiences such as educational socialization and 
professional career trajectories, and with synchronic contexts such as 
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organizational settings. We saw that it matters, for example, if dip-
lomats work in a legal department, especially a human rights unit, or 
in a political department of their foreign ministry. Also, despite the 
distinction between judicial and diplomatic representations of Darfur, 
resulting tensions do not constitute a zero-sum conflict. In some cases 
diplomats may even use the threat of criminal sanctions as a tool in 
diplomatic negotiations (Savelsberg and King 2011: ch. 3). In addition, 
diplomats are involved where international treatises are being promul-
gated, including the Rome Statue, on which the ICC is based and from 
which the prosecutions against President al-Bashir and others were 
launched (Scheffer 2012). Nevertheless, as abundant evidence in this 
book shows, diplomatic representations are highly distinct from human 
rights narratives, albeit variable across countries,  and— like humanitar-
ian  narratives— they pose one potential challenge to the unfolding of 
the justice cascade.
This book’s analysis thus shows that fields, national contexts, and 
actors’ educational and professional trajectories intersect as they gener-
ate patterns of representation of mass violence. What applies to Darfur 
should also apply to other cases. We are thus one step closer to under-
standing the cacophony of voices that observers of world events encoun-
ter when they seek to make sense of distant suffering (Boltanski 1999).
Communicating Suffering to Civil Society: The Journalistic Field
The final question raised in this book addresses the communication of 
competing narratives to civil society. While NGOs involved in human 
rights and humanitarian activism seek to reach the public through their 
own campaigns, most members of civil society learn about instances of 
mass violence through news media. Also, foreign ministries and institu-
tions of criminal justice depend on media to take seriously their press 
releases, their ceremonies marking the opening and closing of negotia-
tions (diplomacy), and their hearings (court actions) when they seek to 
reach a broad public.
Based on interview data and supported by ideas from Bourdieuian 
sociology applied to the journalistic field, I show how Africa correspon-
dents who reported on Darfur submitted to their field’s rules of the 
game. Their habitus was shaped by their positions in the semiauton-
omous journalistic field, albeit mediated by the trajectories by which 
they reached their positions. All interviewees strongly identified with 
the journalistic profession, appreciated the work of writing, were highly 
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educated in a diverse range of fields (though most lacked an Africa-
specific background), shared some dose of adventurism, were relatively 
independent from their editors (but variably so), and depended heavily 
on external sources of information, including IO and INGO reports; 
other news sources, especially guiding media (“Leitmedien”) such as 
BBC and CNN; and networks of colleagues in the field. I refer to the 
last-named sources as local cosmopolitan media networks, partially 
clustered by nationality. This mix of features entails some elements 
that strengthen journalistic autonomy (e.g., education and identifica-
tion with journalistic work) and others that weaken it (e.g., dependency 
on IOs and INGOs as sources). It is in light of this relative autonomy 
that the relationship between journalism on the one hand and politics, 
diplomacy, human rights law, and humanitarianism on the other affects 
media reporting.
Interviews and analysis of the Darfur media data set indeed high-
light the varying influences of distinct fields on media representations 
of mass violence. After initial neglect, a  first— and  massive— rise in re-
porting followed political initiatives, especially Kofi Annan’s analogical 
bridging before the UN General Assembly from the Rwandan genocide 
(on its tenth anniversary) to Darfur. Also, initiatives by domestic politi-
cians, especially ones affiliated with international organizations, ignited 
media attention.
After the initial wave of media reporting was at risk of taking the 
typical nosedive (see Bourdieu 1998), steps by the UN to initiate judicial 
proceedings, followed by the ICC’s interventions, pulled Darfur back 
into the limelight of media attention. Several judicial interventions were 
followed by new peaks of reporting, drawing attention to killings and 
rapes and framing the violence as criminal. Analysis of the Darfur data 
set shows that the crime frame appeared more prominently in media re-
porting than any other frame, and its prominence intensified even when 
overall media attention to Darfur declined. In the case of Darfur, the 
justice cascade with its supporting  forces— human rights NGOs, TANs, 
IOs, and the new, permanent International Criminal  Court— thus sig-
nificantly weakened the chances of abusers of human rights to go unno-
ticed or even to enter world history with a reputation as heroes (Giesen 
2004b). Arguments about the discursive nature of court proceedings 
(Osiel 1997), their legitimacy by virtue of procedure (Luhmann 2004), 
and their ritual power (Durkheim [1912] 2001) may help explain the 
pronounced impact of court interventions on the intensity of media re-
porting and its coloring of the violence as crime.
276  |  Conclusions
The humanitarian field and its distinctive representations also turned 
out to be a crucial source of information for journalists, and the hu-
manitarian emergency frame initially manifested prominently. Yet use 
of this frame declined quickly and dramatically. At least two reasons 
appear to account for this pattern. Most important, suffering in refugee 
camps that lasts for long periods loses newsworthiness. This feature 
of the media market was augmented by actions of the government of 
Sudan that increasingly barred humanitarian aid organizations from 
Darfur or made their continued presence contingent on “good behav-
ior,” that is, on refraining from criticism and from any agenda of bear-
ing witness. MSF sections were thus among the first organizations to be 
expelled from Sudan.
The diplomatic field affected media reporting more enduringly than 
the humanitarian field did, but less intensely than the judicial field. Like 
the latter it can produce dramatic moments. Its chances are even better 
the more its actions involve prominent political actors who themselves 
are considered newsworthy, enhancing the attractiveness of news from 
the field of diplomacy for mass media. But diplomatic negotiators usu-
ally do not have the same level of legitimacy as courts. Negotiations are 
not public, do not follow strict procedure, and lack a trial’s ritual force. 
Also, the outcomes of negotiation, even when an accord is reached, are 
more uncertain and lack the drama of an indictment against a head of 
state. In line with these considerations, the analysis reveals that the war 
or armed conflict frame, with its elective affinity to the diplomatic field, 
fared less noticeably and less enduringly than the crime frame in report-
ing about Darfur.
Finally, this analysis adds to insights from recent international com-
parative research on media reporting (Benson 2013). It shows that not 
only general structural and cultural features of the media’s home coun-
try affect reporting, including the relative strength of competing fields, 
but also national particularities of the media field itself.
theoretical contributions and insights  
for practice
The foregoing chapters present theoretical themes outlined in the intro-
duction, and the empirical observations speak to those themes. These 
include concerns from the sociology of knowledge and collective rep-
resentations, especially the role of legal rituals and procedures as well 
as carrier groups, their cultural sensitivities and memories; field theory, 
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with its focus on actors and the web of ties in which they are embed-
ded, marred by power imbalances; and debates between globalization 
theorists versus scholars who highlight national forces even in a global-
izing world. Simultaneously, empirical observations in this book speak 
to issues of practice and policy: the justice cascade and the forces that 
advance this cascade and its effects, as well as the strategies of different 
fields and how they relate to, support, or challenge other fields. Many 
messages appear throughout the review of empirical findings offered 
above. A brief summary of policy and theoretical themes in this final 
section of the book will nevertheless be helpful.
The justice cascade is at the center of massive debates, waged at 
once in scholarship and in practice. Increasing attribution of individ-
ual criminal liability in cases of grave human rights violations in do-
mestic, foreign, and international courts is powerfully documented in 
the work of political scientist Kathryn Sikkink (2011; see also Neier 
2012). The story of Darfur supports many of those arguments, even 
if the struggle to end impunity has not yet resulted in arrests and tri-
als. The criminalization of human rights violations follows the story of 
past criminalizations of other behaviors, explored in a long tradition 
of constructivist criminology following the classical contributions of 
Turk (1969), Chambliss (1964), and Gusfield (1967). Yet, in contrast 
to these classics, the concern today is less with status group politics or 
the politics of class and race at the level of nation-states than with the 
diffusion of norms across national boundaries (Jenness 2004) and from 
global institutions down to nation-states. Also, recent literature on the 
justice cascade replaces conflict theory’s critical stance toward criminal-
ization (of the weak) by a supportive stance toward criminalization (of 
the powerful).
While questions remain regarding the endurance of the justice cas-
cade as a short-term versus secular trend, the fiercest debates have fo-
cused on its consequences. In general, and in the Darfur case, critics 
argue that threatening sanctions motivates powerful perpetrators to 
resist a transfer to a more democratic and human rights–respecting re-
gime (Goldsmith and Krasner 2003, Snyder and Vinjamuri 2003–2004; 
Pensky 2008). Sikkink (2011) instead argues, and she provides statisti-
cal evidence for her position, that the justice cascade will not harm, 
and may possibly improve, democracy and human rights records. In 
seeking to explain supporting correlations, she stresses the effectiveness 
of deterrence. Mindful of past punishments, potential perpetrators will 
shy away from committing human rights crimes. But the deterrence 
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mechanism does  not— and it  cannot— stand alone. It is accompanied 
by potential cultural effects that work through the capacity of criminal 
proceedings to represent violence as a form of criminal  offending— and 
thus to contribute to a collective memory of violent repression as a form 
of human rights crime. In fact, deterrence presumes this cultural effect 
as it envisions actors who are conscious of acts committed and penal-
ties paid in the past. Here too the story of Darfur provides evidence. 
UNSC and ICC interventions contributed to a depiction of leading ac-
tors of the Sudanese state, all the way up to its mighty president, Omar 
al-Bashir, as criminal perpetrators. Media communicated this image to 
a broad public across national boundaries. The justice cascade seems 
to have worked in an important way even though no arrests have been 
made (yet) and even if no trial is under way.
Linking ideas from field theory to debates about the justice cascade 
reveals reasons for both the cultural effectiveness and constraints as-
sociated with the cascade, the judicial field, and institutions such as 
the ICC. For all fields on which I  focus— judicial, humanitarian, diplo-
matic, and  journalistic— the crucial role of actors becomes apparent, in 
line with arguments by Bourdieu (1987, 1988, 1998) and his followers 
(Benson 1998, 2006; Hagan 2003; Hagan and Levi 2005), but also 
consistent with the conception of strategic action fields (Fligstein 2001; 
Fligstein and McAdam 2011). Actors in these fields pursue specific 
goals such as justice, humanitarianism, and peace while they also seek 
to strengthen their own position within their respective field. Interviews 
with humanitarians, human rights workers, diplomats, and journalists 
alike provide abundant evidence. But actors are both enabled and con-
strained by their field’s rules of the game. They become carriers of a 
habitus, a set of relatively fixed dispositions. They have little choice 
but to incorporate into their habitus their field’s dominant institutional 
logic, a notion borrowed from Weber (1976) and elaborated by Luh-
mann (2004). They thus buy into the field’s doxa, its matter-of-course 
assumptions about the world.
In criminal law this consistency between habitus and the surrounding 
field and the logic of its institutions means a focus on specific individual 
actors (as opposed to the social structures or broad cultural patterns 
that social scientists might stress) and on those rules of evidence com-
patible with the law’s procedural requirements (not those rules deemed 
relevant by historians). It also implies application of a binary logic 
whereby clear distinctions between “guilty” and “not guilty” leave little 
room for the recognition of “shades of grey” (Levi 1988) and allow for 
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a “decoupling” (Giesen 2004a) of bystanders, more or less passive sup-
porters of the violence, and others from the guilt determined against a 
few in criminal trials. While the field thus enables its actors to pursue 
specific goals, it constrains them and the representations to which they 
contribute. Important aspects of social reality are left out when it is 
constructed through the lens of a particular field, aspects that actors in 
other fields alert us to.
Further, the representation of mass violence by the global human 
rights field is not just complicated, for better or worse, by the contribu-
tions of surrounding fields to the social construction of the reality of 
mass violence (Berger and Luckmann 1966). The story of fields exam-
ined here is further complicated by their simultaneous operation at na-
tional and international levels (see also Dezalay and Garth 1997; Hagan 
2003). Bourdieu’s study of academic life, but also much of his work on 
journalism, examines fields at the nation level, specifically for the case 
of France. This national focus produces two shortcomings. First, it buys 
into national conditions of fields without explicating their particulari-
ties. It runs the risk of exaggerating external validity, of overgeneral-
izing. Second, it misses complex interactions between global fields and 
national subfields, characterized by the structural, institutional, and 
cultural particularities of each country. Actors in national subfields are 
also confronted with (or are themselves members of) national carrier 
groups with specific historical experiences, collective memories, and 
cultural sensitivities. These scholarly insights likely have consequences 
for practice, even if it is a matter for further debate whether the appli-
cation of national filters constitutes an advantage or a problem for the 
justice cascade or the pursuit of humanitarianism or peace. It is clear, 
though, that mobilization on behalf of any of these goals, including 
human rights, has to take nation-level forces into account.
Revelation of such intersectionality between global and national 
fields contributes insights into debates between globalization theorists 
and others who highlight national contexts. The World Polity School of 
John Meyer and his followers (e.g., Meyer, Ramirez, and Soysal 1992; 
Boyle and Meyer 1998; Frank, Hironaka, and Schofer 2000), suggesting 
that fields in which multiple global actors are involved should produce 
global representations and scripts, finds significant confirmation in my 
research. Indeed, I identify common denominators in the human rights, 
humanitarian, and diplomatic narratives across national boundaries. 
Yet empirical patterns also suggest caution. Nation-specific factors, car-
rier groups, interests, institutions, and cultural sensitivities clearly affect 
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representations, in support of a different, historicizing brand of neo-
Weberian scholarship (Bendix [1949] 1974; Gorski 2003; Roth 1987; 
Rueschemeyer 1973; Kalberg 1994, 2014; Savelsberg and King 2005, 
2011). My findings confirm and elaborate on Halliday and Carruthers’s 
conclusion (2010) that cultural distance from the global affects na-
tional adaptations of global models. Not just cultural distance matters, 
though, but also the substance of national cultures, their qualitative 
particularities. My findings do not stand alone. They are supported by 
recent work on the impact of national contexts on cross-national varia-
tion in responses to mass violence by Western governments (K. Smith 
2010) and by INGO actors (Stroup 2012). Even work inspired by the 
World Polity School found nation-specific patterns in the implementa-
tion of human rights law (Boyle 2002). Still other scholars write about 
cosmopolitanism, especially in the realm of human rights (e.g., Levy and 
Sznaider 2010). They too take the nation level seriously, while insist-
ing that international and global concerns are increasingly incorporated 
into national ideas, memories, and practices. My analysis sheds light on 
the relative weight of the global, the national, and the cosmopolitan and 
their interactions.
Interpenetration not only between the global and the national but 
also between national society and fields is further supplemented by sys-
temic interpenetration between fields, for example, when diplomats use 
the threat of criminal sanctions in negotiations or when actors in the 
humanitarian field produce medical evidence that may later be used by 
criminal justice actors. A concrete example for the interpenetration of 
fields and national backgrounds is provided by the director of an opera-
tional center of a humanitarian aid agency in Europe. While working in 
the humanitarian field, he was trained as a lawyer (with affinities to the 
rights narrative) and his roots were in the United States (a strong sup-
porter of judicial intervention against Sudan). His position in the organi-
zational field, his educational background, and his national upbringing 
simultaneously contributed to his distinctive knowledge and habitus. 
Instead of harmonizing, biographical trajectory and field demands often 
produce contradictions that create room for improvisation. Recogniz-
ing such intersectionality across fields potentially provides actors with 
powerful tools for collaboration.
In short, complications (as well as opportunities) arise for the human 
rights field and its associated institutions, including the ICC, from their 
competition with other fields, from the global-national tension, and from 
complex interpenetrations with trajectories of professional socialization 
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and national upbringing. Added to this is a final challenge, the need 
to communicate representations of mass violence to a global public. 
Again, few members of Western societies have direct experience with 
mass violence in places such as Darfur, even if the cultural trauma of 
mass violence in their own regions persists. In contrast to other pol-
icy fields, they learn about those events primarily through media mes-
sages. Through them they become subject to distant suffering (Boltanski 
1999) and cultural trauma (Alexander et al. 2004). To the degree that 
policy decisions are informed by public perceptions of international 
 issues— and scholarship shows that they are (see note 1)—media thus 
become an important social force. In line with historical and sociologi-
cal literature on the processing of judicial narratives in media reports 
(Pendas 2006; Jardim 2012; Savelsberg and King 2011), my analysis 
documents compatibilities between the logic of the judicial field and the 
journalistic rules of the game. The need for dramatization and a focus 
on individual actors are among them. Criminalizing representations in 
the Darfur case thus more strongly and more enduringly affected media 
reporting across countries than representations from other fields.
To conclude, in the complex intersection of overlapping and conflict-
ing fields there emerge consequential representations of mass violence. 
Building on a long tradition of ideas from the sociology of knowledge, 
rooted in the classical works of Emile Durkheim ([1912] 2001), Max 
Weber (1976), Karl Mannheim (1952), and leading to the work of Peter 
Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966) and Pierre Bourdieu (1998), this 
volume further contributes to our understanding of how competing 
fields, at national and global levels, interact to produce collective rep-
resentations of mass violence that news media communicate selectively. 
Collective representations then constitute a cultural repertoire (Swidler 
1986) on which creators of collective memory of cruelty and suffer-
ing (Halbwachs 1992; Olick 1999; Osiel 1997; Savelsberg and King 
2011) and cultural trauma (Alexander et al. 2004) eventually draw. 
Making sense of these patterns is a critical precondition for understand-
ing, explaining, and predicting how civil societies and governments re-
spond to mass violence. And such responses affect chances of breaking 
those “cycles of violence” (Minow 1998) that have tortured humanity 
throughout its history, with Darfur being one of the recent chapters of 
such suffering (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008). Nation building 
succeeded in dramatically reducing civil violence within modernizing 
societies (Elias 1978; Johnson and Monkkonen 1996; Cooney 1997; 
Eisner 2001). Will the building of global institutions, especially in the 
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justice field, lead to a similar degree of pacification worldwide? This 
book suggests that the building of global judicial institutions has the 
potential of contributing to global pacification at the international and 
national levels, especially if the builders tolerate, and learn to creatively 
manage, substantial conflicts between fields and nations; if they are 
mindful of the potential for division of labor and cooperation; if they 
are not bogged down by inevitable failures and frustrations; and if they 
prevail against massive resistance by those with an interest in the exer-
cise of brute force.
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Postscript
Neither the legal case against those charged with the gravest of crimes 
in the mass violence in Darfur, nor the armed confrontation, nor the 
humanitarian emergency had ended or been resolved as I was writing 
the final pages of this book. This text, then, presents not just a history 
of a recent and devastating past but also a history of a cruel present in 
Darfur. And, again, what applies to Darfur also applies to many more 
situations around the globe. In this situation, it is disconcerting, irre-
spective of the observer’s field, to witness signs of weakness in the very 
institutions set up to respond to the situation in Darfur and to others 
like it.
In December 2014, Fatou Bensouda, the second chief prosecutor 
of the ICC and successor to Luis Moreno-Ocampo, announced to the 
United Nations that she had decided to “hibernate” the prosecution of 
those charged with crimes in Darfur: “Given this [UN Security] Coun-
cil’s lack of foresight on what should happen in Darfur, I am left with 
no choice but to hibernate investigative activities in Darfur as I shift 
resources to other urgent cases, especially those in which trial is ap-
proaching. It should thus be clear to this Council that unless there is 
a change of attitude and approach to Darfur in the near future, there 
shall continue to be little or nothing to report to you for the foreseeable 
future.”1 Bensouda expressed considerable frustration over the court’s 
inability, and the world powers’ unwillingness, to bring those charged 
before the court. Accordingly, in a February 12, 2015, article, “Is the 
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War Crimes Court Still Relevant?” New York Times journalist Somini 
Sengupta and a correspondent at the UN wrote of a growing pile of 
cases, defiant government authorities, and the Security Council’s call 
for investigations but negligible effort to advance them. And the Darfur 
case is not the only one for which the court’s lack of direct access to 
an enforcement staff comes in full and, for those in pursuit of criminal 
justice, painful display.2
The court’s weakness is often attributed to the hostility from the 
world’s superpowers, their defensiveness against incursions into their 
sovereignty, and their geopolitical and economic interests across the 
globe. The court has faced stiff resistance whenever it addresses issues 
in which the Great Powers have vested interests. Examples include cur-
rent plans to investigate US military personnel for engaging in torture in 
Afghanistan and to take on the grave human rights violations in North 
Korea, China’s ally. Growing resistance from the African continent con-
stitutes another hurdle, as illustrated most recently by Omar al-Bashir’s 
June 2015 escape from South  Africa— despite a South African court 
order for his arrest. I do not disagree with such causal attributions, 
but my data point to another challenge to criminal justice and the ICC: 
the competition the legal field experiences from others, including the 
humanitarian and diplomatic fields. This competition is associated with 
considerable, at times cautiously worded, at other times aggressively 
presented, ambivalence toward the court and its rationales. This under-
current of doubt has, just like the resistance of countries such as China, 
Russia,  and— beyond the Darfur  case— the United States, similarly con-
tributed to frustrations and to the ICC prosecutor’s recent decision. 
We have seen throughout this book that rationales of diplomats and 
humanitarians differ substantially from those of criminal justice actors 
and those involved in the justice cascade. Their definition of the situa-
tion on the ground varies with their respective fields’ strategic interests 
and the web of power relations in which they are embedded. Here the 
court faces a resistance that is not limited to the obvious interests of 
major powers but that pervades the international community and seeps 
into the very mindsets of a multitude of actors outside the justice system 
who are involved in situations such as Darfur.
And not only the ICC’s position has been weakened. Humanitar-
ians appear to be facing increasing need with declining resources, even 
though no good data on the ratio of the displaced and wounded to 
resources in Darfur are available. And diplomatic efforts on behalf of 
the search for peace in Darfur have subsided. Diplomats’ interests have 
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shifted to new situations, of which there is no shortage. As of this writ-
ing, in the past year alone, crises appeared in the Central African Re-
public, Syria, Northern Iraq (ISIS), Northern Nigeria, South Sudan, and 
Ukraine. Meanwhile, in Sudan, the UN–African Union military force 
UNAMID, created to protect civilians in Darfur, is being dismantled or 
substantially reduced.3
Meanwhile, the suffering in Darfur continues. Activists find no short-
age of ever new reports of atrocities (see, for example, the sites of aca-
demic-activist Eric Reeves, Radio Dabanga, and the Sudan Tribune).4 
Millions continue to be confined to refugee camps in Chad and IDP 
camps in Sudan; 2014 alone added some 400,000 Darfuris to those 
stranded in camps. At times, desperate villagers seek refuge in the vi-
cinity of UNAMID compounds,5 housing the very forces that are to 
be substantially reduced. In February 2015 Human Rights Watch is-
sued a report about recent actions of members of the Sudanese Armed 
Forces. In their pursuit of rebels, soldiers again committed atrocities 
against civilians: “Sudanese army forces raped more than 200 women 
and girls in an organized attack on the north Darfur town of Tabit in 
October 2014, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today. 
The United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) should take urgent 
steps to protect civilians in the town from further abuses. The 48-page 
report, ‘Mass Rape in Darfur: Sudanese Army Attacks Against Civil-
ians in Tabit,’ documents Sudanese Army attacks in which at least 
221 women and girls were raped in Tabit over 36 hours beginning on 
October 30, 2014.”6
Are all actors examined in this book, and the fields in which they are 
embedded, thus losing to those who pursue their political interests with 
brute force? As far as the ICC is concerned, the finding of this book 
still stands: the court has, mediated by news reports and commentaries, 
ingrained in much of the world’s collective conscience a notion of the 
violence in Darfur as criminal. Also the observation of one of my jour-
nalist interviewees may still be valid, and I paraphrase: After the foun-
dation of the ICC, militia leaders who would in the past have boasted 
by pointing to piles of corpses they left behind in a nearby village, or 
have shown off their child soldiers, no longer do so. The ICC is a young 
organization, a historical novelty, and any resignation now would be 
premature.
Humanitarian organizations continue to struggle to find pragmatic 
middle ground between witnessing and securing access to those in mis-
ery. And those who dedicate their careers and lives to the pursuit of 
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peace continue to negotiate and to build institutions. Journalists report 
about their efforts and the violence against which they are directed. 
Scholars monitor the process, take stock, seek to depict and explain. 
They continue to provide an interpretive understanding of the actions 
of those who work toward relief, peace, and  justice— and of those who 
incite and execute  violence— in the social contexts in which they act. 
Resulting explanations may advance appropriate responses.
Many may be tempted to give up in light of ever recurring mass 
violence. Yet, just as Sisyphus keeps pushing his rock up the hill in the 
existentialist work of Albert Camus, humans will continue their des-
perate fight for humanitarianism, peace, and justice. They will do so 
despite the tensions between the fields in which they are embedded and 
the mighty forces with which they have to contend. They will continue 
to act in the mode of Bernard Rieux, the physician in Camus’s novel 
La Peste, even in the face of a seemingly hopeless struggle. They will 
be driven by the forces of the field in which they are embedded and the 
habitus they have acquired, following the road signs of those institu-
tions to which they are dedicated.
In closing I remind the reader of legal scholar Martha Minow’s fa-
mous words, cited above, that the twentieth century distinguished itself 
from its predecessors not by amassing a record of grave violations of 
human dignity and destruction of human lives, but by setting  up— for 
the first time in human  history— institutions that seek to respond to and 
prevent mass violence. The twenty-first century provides multiple tragic 
opportunities to put these institutions to a test. Their future is highly 
contingent, and forecasting their chances of  success— writing a history 
of their  future— may go beyond the capacity of contemporary social sci-
ence. But observe these institutions’ operations and their consequences 
for those affected by mass violence we must. Distant suffering is not 
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Figure 1: Map of Darfur within Sudan and neighboring countries. Source: U.S. 
Department of State, http://www.state.gov/p/af/ci/su/
Figure 2: The Building of the International Criminal Court in The Hague. 
Reprinted with permission: © ICC-CPI.
Figure 3: Title page of indictment against President Omar al-Bashir. Source: 
ICC website, http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc279860.PDF
Figure 4: Village in Darfur attacked and destroyed by Janjawiid (supplied 
by Amnesty International). Reprinted with permission © WFP/Vincenzo 
Sparapani.
Figure 5: Young Darfuri Refugees in Goz Amir Refugee Camp in Eastern Chad 
(Image and following text supplied by Amnesty International). Reprinted 
with permission by © Amnesty International. ‘One of a series of photographs 
taken by Alex Neve, Secretary General, Amnesty International Canada, dur-
ing his mission to Chad in November 2013. Alex and his colleagues spent 
time during the visit interviewing Darfuri refugees who fled from Sudan to 
eastern Chad in 2013. Most came in April after a surge in fighting and grave 
human rights abuses in Central Darfur State – some of the worst violence in 
the region in years. At least 50,000 refugees have arrived in Chad in 2013, 
joining 250,000 who have already been here for the past decade. It is the 
highest refugee exodus out of Darfur since 2006. Interviewing dozens of 
refugees at Goz Amir camp, numerous common themes emerged. Amnesty 
International has documented the eyewitness testimonies from survivors of 
a massive armed attack on the town of Abu Jeradil and several surrounding 
villages in early April. Together they tell a story of tremendous chaos and in-
discriminate violence. More information on Alex’s Livewire blog: ‘Will there 
be hell here also?’ – Darfuris experience endless displacement.’
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Figure 6: Save Darfur Demonstration in Washington DC. Reprinted with 
permission by United to End Genocide, formerly Save Darfur.
Figure 7: Save Darfur Demonstration in Washington DC. Reprinted with 
permission by United to End Genocide, formerly Save Darfur.
Figure 8: Percent of US American articles that address killings, rapes and 
 displacements (US versus other media). Author’s figure.
Figure 9: Percent US American articles on Darfur citing the crime frame, using 
the genocide label, and bridging to the Holocaust (US versus other media). 
Author’s figure.
Figure 10: Rendering of genocidal violence in Washington DC by artist  
Naomi Natale (Million Bones Project), depicted on Save Darfur web site. 
Reprinted with permission by Naomi Natale (artist) and Teru Kuwayama 
(photographer).
Figure 11: Displaced Darfuris and their “housing” (from MSF website). 
 Reprinted with permission © Dominique Bernard/MSF.
Figure 12: Darfuri women and children at MSF medical service site (from MSF 
website). Reprinted with permission © Juan Carlos Tomasi/MSF.
Figure 13: Famine Memorial in Dublin, Ireland. Licensed under CC-BY 3.0. 
Attribution: Chmee2, 2010.
Figure 14: Percentage of Irish articles that address killings, rapes and displace-
ments (Irish versus all others). Author’s figure.
Figure 15: Percentage of Irish articles citing the crime frame and using the 
genocide label (Irish versus all others). Author’s figure.
Figure 16: Ambassador Tomas Ulicny, head of the EU delegation to Sudan, 
and Dr. Hassan El Turabi, head of the Popular Congress Party, engage 
in peace negotiations, Khartoum, February 3, 2015. Reprinted with 
 permission © Jan Lucas, European Union 2015.
Figure 17: Doha peace negotiations (July 14, 2011 signing of treaty). 
 Reprinted with permission, Oliver Chassot (photographer), UNAMID 
(organization).
Figure 18: Journalist Rob Crilly in North Darfur. Reprinted with permission 
by Rob Crilly. 
Figure 19: Journalist Rob Crilly after interview with SLA commander  Ibrahim 
Abdullah al “Hello” (far left) and a rebel in En Siro, North Darfur. 
 Reprinted with permission by Rob Crilly. 
Figure 20: Africa-correspondent Thomas Scheen interviewing rebels in Darfur. 
Reprinted with permission: F.A.Z.-Foto / Wolfgang Eilmes.
Figure 21: Number of articles on Darfur in 14 Northern newspapers by 
 country over time. Author’s figure.
Figure 22: Press conference at the International Criminal Court (press room). 
Reprinted with permission: © ICC-CPI.
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Figure 23: Percentage of media articles on Darfur using the crime, civil war, 
humanitarian emergency and aggressive state frames by time period. 
 Author’s figure.
Figure 24: Percentage of articles referencing different types of suffering by time 
periods. Author’s figure.
Figure 25: Percentage of media articles citing the crime frame across periods 
by country. Author’s figure.
Figure 26: Percentage of news articles using the term genocide for Darfur by 
country. Author’s figure. 





The guidelines vary somewhat for interviews with journalists versus NGO ex-
perts. Some terms appear in bold type to aid the interviewer.
•  Introduction of my work/me/my project
•  Consent form
questions
• What in your life course has contributed to your working on issues of Sudan/
Darfur today? (education, socialization, career, position)
• In your position, with whom do you cooperate on the issue of Darfur (hierarchy, 
division of labor)?
• Coordination; conflicts
• The topic of Darfur itself. Please summarize your own personal understanding of 
the developments in Darfur, especially during the past decade.
• First, what happened? [Wait, then follow up.]
• Follow-up







• Changes over time?
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• What are the underlying causes of the conflict? (Follow up on desertification; old 
ethnic conflicts; late effects of colonialism; intervention by other countries [e.g., 
Libya, Chad]; strategies of Sudanese government; center-periphery conflict.)
• In addition to basic facts, there are different ways of framing the conflict. I’ll 
mention a number of frames and ask you to tell me if they suggest an appropriate 





• State crime (which type[s]—war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide?)
• Other(s)?
• A related question concerns the appropriate reaction. Which goals are most im-
portant? What means are best suited to achieve those goals? How did goals and 
appropriate means change over time?
[Wait, then follow-up]
• Securing Sudanese state — by fighting insurgents
• Securing peace — through negotiations
•  Survival of those affected — through aid delivery and cooperation
• Justice — through court intervention (ICC)
• Follow-up on arrest warrants by ICC
• Contribution to achieving different goals?
• Impediment toward goal attainment?
• By phases?
•  How have you communicated with the ICC? What was  helpful? What caused 
problems? Any miscommunication?
• Position of (interviewee’s country’s) government?
• Role of shifts in governing coalitions/ministers
• Role of ICC  intervention— official position of ministry?
• Conflicting positions within government/ministry?
•  Difference between (country) positions and those of other Western countries?
• Position of (your country’s) NGOs
• Role of (your country’s) history for position (your personal position and possibly 
that of [your country’s] government)?
• Special responsibility in light of (country’s) history?
• Other aspects of history/reaction to previous atrocities?
• Convergence across countries? When? How?
• Inquiry into sources of information (not confidential ones). What types of sources 
are especially influential as you acquire information and interpretations? Prob-
lems?
[Wait for reply, then follow up]
• Own investigations on site?
• Scholarship?
• Institutions (university scholarship, think tanks)
• Specific actors







• Other contacts for me?
• Foreign ministries in neighboring countries
• NGO reps
• Scholars
• Archives/Documents (analysis of positions over time)?
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Excerpts from Coding Manual for 
Newspaper Articles
The coding manual was developed in close collaboration with Hollie 
Nyseth Brehm. The following excerpt focuses on variables used in this 
book. Editorial comments are marked by brackets. The full code book 
is available on the author’s website.
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[general] directions [for coders]
[Omitted here; for key information, see chapter 1]
explanations of variables
part 1. information regarding source
Var. 1: Source.
 Write the number that corresponds to the type of document in the 
blank.
Var. 2: Title.
 Write the title of the document in the “Notes” section that corre-
sponds to this variable. If there is no title, leave it blank.
Var. 3: Date of Publication.
 Document the date of publication. Please note that it should be writ-
ten in the following order: year-month-day. Use 4 numbers to iden-
tify the year and 2 for both the month and the day. E.g.: February 23, 
2004 would be 2004–02–23.
Var. 4: Length of Document.
 Note the number of words in the document. This may be listed 
somewhere on the page. If not, you can either find the document 
electronically and obtain the word count that way or provide an 
estimate. Also include the number of words spent on Darfur if it is a 
minor aspect of the document. If the majority of the article focuses 
on Darfur, there is no need to do this.
Var. 5: Code the number that corresponds to the type of newspaper contri-
bution. If the type is not listed, please write it in the “Notes” section.
Var. 6: Write the number that corresponds to the section of the newspaper 
where the article was printed; if the section is not listed, please write 
it in the corresponding “Notes” portion of the coding form. Leave 
this variable blank if the section is not provided.
Var. 7: Write the page number where the article appears. Leave this variable 
blank if the page number is not provided.
Var. 8: Write the first author’s name in the “Notes” section.
Var. 9: Enter “1” if this first author is a female and “0” if he is male. If you 
are uncertain, you could perform a quick search online.
Var.10: Write the number that corresponds to the first author’s profession. 
If more than one profession is listed, chose the one listed first. If no 
profession is listed, assume the author is a journalist.
[Vars. 11–20: same for additional  authors— omitted here.]
part 2. historic events/ roots of the conflict
Var. 21: Enter a “0” if desertification or resource scarcity is not mentioned, 
“1” if it is mentioned, and “2” if it is mentioned as a cause of the 
current conflict.
Var. 22: North/South Sudanese Civil War [coding as for Var. 21].
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Var. 23:  Imperialism (colonialism/postcolonialism) [coding as for Var. 21].
Var. 24: 1989 al-Bashir coup [coding as for Var. 21].
Var. 25: 2003 rebellion by the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice 
and Equality Movement (JEM) [coding as for Var. 21].
Var. 26: Neglect of the Darfur region [coding as for Var. 21].
Var. 27: North-South Peace agreement [coding as for Var. 21].
Var. 28: Abuja Peace Talks (2004–2006) [coding as for Var. 21].
Var. 29: United Nations Security Council reports or resolutions on Darfur 
[coding as for Var. 21].
Var. 30: International Criminal Court charges/warrants [coding as for Var. 21].
part 3: information regarding form and amount of 
violence/acknowledgment vs. avoidance
Please note: If the particular incidents mentioned seem especially relevant or 
interesting, please make note of them in the “Notes” section. (There is a blank 
by the “yes” option, but it is up to you as a coder to decide if the incident is 
noteworthy or not.) Also, note that there is a separate section for aid workers, 
peacekeepers, and other neutral parties who may have been harmed in the con-
text of the conflict.
For “overall” variables, “thousands” = 1, “tens of thousands” = 2, “hun-
dreds of thousands” = 3, “millions” = 4, and a rate = 5. For specific incidents, 
“dozens” should be coded as 50; “hundreds” should be coded as 500, and 
“thousands” should be coded as 5000. For all other numeric values expressed 
in vague words, make your best educated guess to translate them into numbers.
killings and death
Var. 31: Killing
 Code as a “1” if killings, deaths, or lives lost are mentioned any-
where in the document. If not, code it as “0.”
Var. 32: Overall Killings
 If the document mentions the total number of people killed due to 
the conflict to date, write it on the coding sheet. You should write 
exactly what appears in the document, so you will enter either a 
numeric value or a word like “thousands” or “hundreds of thou-
sands.” If no number is provided, leave it blank.
Var. 33: Specific Incident [omitted from this appendix]
Var. 34: Specific Number of Killings [in incident; omitted here]
Var. 35: Detailed Depiction [of incident; omitted here]
Var. 36: Deaths from “Natural” Causes [omitted here]
Var. 37: Number of Deaths from “Natural” Causes [omitted here]
torture
Var. 38: Torture
  Code this variable as “1” if torture is mentioned in the context of 
the conflict. If it is not mentioned, code it as “0.”
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[Vars. 39–42 are equivalent to list of variables under “killings”—omitted from 
this appendix.]
wounds/inJuries
Var. 43: Wounds or Injuries
 Code this variable as “1” if the document mentions that people 
were wounded or injured (though not fatally) as a result of the 
conflict, and “0” otherwise.




 Enter a “1” if rapes are mentioned as an aspect of the conflict. If 
rape is not mentioned, code this as “0.”
[Vars. 49–52 are equivalent to list of variables under “killings”—omitted here.]
kidnapping
Var. 53: Kidnapping
 Assign this variable a “1” if kidnapping is mentioned, and “0” if it 
is not.
[Vars. 54–57 are equivalent to list of variables under “killings”—omitted 
here.]
livelihood
Var. 58: Destruction of Livelihood
 Code this variable as “1” if destruction of livelihood is mentioned 
as part of the conflict, and “0” if it is not. Livelihood could include 
food, water, livestock, wells, etc. Please note that there is a separate 
variable for the destruction of homes and villages.
[Vars. 59–62 are equivalent to list of variables under “killings”—omitted here]
Var. 63: Code this variable as “1” if the destruction of homes or villages is 
mentioned. Often, burning homes will be mentioned. This variable 
should also receive a “1” if “arson” is mentioned. If neither the de-
struction of homes or villages is mentioned, code this variable as “0.”
shortage of food or water
Var. 64: Shortage of Food or Water
 Assign this variable a “1” if hunger, starvation, or food/water short-
age is mentioned in the context of the violence. A shortage of water 
also includes shortages of clean/potable water. Assign it a “0” if it is 
not mentioned or if it is mentioned but it in a different context.
[Vars. 65–68 are equivalent to list of variables under “killings”—omitted 
here.]
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resettlement issues
Var. 69: If issues of resettlement, refugees, internally displaced persons 
(IDPs), or IDP or refugee camps are mentioned in the context of the 
conflict, code this variable as “1.” If these issues are not mentioned, 
assign it a “0.”
[Vars. 70–73 are equivalent to list of variables under “killings”—omitted 
here.]
disease
Var. 74: Assign this variable a “1” if disease or illness related to the conflict 
is mentioned. Otherwise, assign it a “0.”
[Vars. 75–78 are equivalent to list of variables under “killings”—omitted 
here.]
aid workers/peacekeepers
Var. 79: Assign this variable a “1” if an aid worker, peacekeeper, or other 
neutral party was killed or wounded in the context of the violence. 
If not, assign it a “0.”
Var. 80: Assign this variable a “1” if an aid worker, peacekeeper, or other 
neutral party was kidnapped or threatened in the context of the 
violence. If not, assign it a “0.”
race/ethnic conflict
Var. 81: Motive
 Assign this variable a “1” if race or ethnicity is suggested as motivat-
ing aggressors. This variable should also receive a “1” if the presence 
of racial epithets is mentioned or illustrated. If not, assign it a “0.” 
A reference to “ethnic conflict” or a conflict between Arabs and 
Africans does not indicate racial motivation; it must be more explicit.
Var. 82: Construction
 Code this variable as a “1” if race or ethnicity is depicted as  
constructed, or “0” if it is not depicted as constructed.
Var. 83: Skip this variable if race or ethnicity is not depicted as constructed. 
If it is, choose the number that corresponds to whom race/ethnic-
ity is constructed by. If multiple actors are depicted as constructing 
race/ethnicity, please make notes in the corresponding “Notes” 
section.
Var. 84: Code this variable as “1” if the conflict is specifically described as 
following decades of conflict in Darfur, a “2” if it is specifically 
described as an age-old ethnic conflict, or as “0” otherwise.
part 4. frames
Please note: The “diagnostic” variable under each frame does not have to be 
coded as “1” in order for the prognostic or motivational variables to be as-
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signed a “1.” Furthermore, several frames could be present in one article. Please 
refer to the social movement piece by Benford and Snow 2000 for further refer-
ence and explanation of diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames.
terrorism/violent gangs/insurgents
Var. 85: Diagnostic
 Code this variable as a “1” if the actors and actions in the conflict 
are explicitly described as “terrorists,” “terrorism/terrorist acts,” 
“violent gangs,” or “insurgents.” If not, assign it a “0.”
Var. 86: Prognostic
 Code this variable as “1” if the document suggests as a solution 
killing and arresting “terrorists”/gang members or intimidating the 
population in which they seek refuge.
Var. 87: Motivational
 Code this variable as “1” if maintenance of the integrity of the Su-
danese state is mentioned as a goal. If it is not mentioned as a goal, 
assign it a “0.” Essentially, the idea is that the state has a legitimate 
right to defend itself; and the motivation is defending itself against 
terrorists/other aggressors.
Var. 88: Author’s Voice
 Assign this variable a “0” if the author clearly rejects this frame, a 
“1” if the author of the document clearly subscribes to this frame, 
and a “2” if it is not clear. If the document has two authors (like a 
debate from a state department source), code it as “2.” Otherwise, 




 Assign this variable a “1” if the violence is explicitly referred to as 
a civil war or a tribal war. You should also assign this a “1” if any 
source describes events that would definitely be classified as a civil 
war. A civil war is a war between organized groups within a single 
nation-state or, less commonly, between two countries created 
from a formerly united nation-state. The aim of one side may be 
to take control of the country or a region, to achieve independence 
for a region, or to change government policies. It is a high-intensity 
conflict, often involving regular armed forces, that is sustained, 
organized, and large-scale. Civil wars may result in large numbers 
of casualties and the consumption of significant resources  
(Wikipedia).
Var. 90: Ethnic War
 Assign this variable a “1” if the conflict is described as an ethnic 
conflict, or a “0” if it is not. Any reference to “Arab vs. African” 
would necessitate a “1” in this category. Both the civil war diagnos-
tic and this variable could receive a “1,” but the violence may also 
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be described as “ethnic violence” without the specification of a civil 
war. Likewise, it could be described as a civil war without an ethnic 
component.
Var. 91: Prognostic
 Code this variable as “1” if the document suggests that peace nego-
tiation is the appropriate solution, or “0” otherwise.
Var. 92: Motivational
 Code this variable as “1” if achieving peace is mentioned as a goal. 
If it is not mentioned as a goal, assign it a “0.”
Var. 93: Author’s Voice
 Assign this variable a “0” if the author clearly rejects this frame, a 
“1” if the author of the document clearly subscribes to this frame, 
and a “2” if it is not clear. If the document has two authors (like a 
debate from a state department source), code it as “2.” Otherwise, 
leave it blank.
crime and state crime frame
Var. 94: Diagnostic
 Code this as “0” if the violence is not described as criminal and 
if no acts that are criminal are noted. Assign this variable a “1” if 
acts that are considered criminal in most criminal codes (rape, tor-
ture, murder, pillaging, robbery, kidnapping, etc.) are mentioned. 
Please note that killing is not necessarily considered a crime in the 
context of war, but an explicit reference to “murder” is a crime. 
Assign this variable a “2” if the acts are explicitly referred to as 
“criminal” or as “crimes.” This variable would also receive a “2” 
if a source suggests that someone in Sudan should be charged for 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, etc., or reports 
that someone was charged with these or similar crimes.
Var. 95: War Crimes
 Code this variable as “1” if acts included in the violence are spe-
cifically labeled “war crimes” by any source, or “0” if they  
are not.
Var. 96: Crimes Against Humanity
 Code this variable as “1” if acts included in the violence are 
specifically labeled as “crimes against humanity” by any source, or 
“0” if they are not.
Var. 97: Genocide
 Code this variable as “1” if any source specifically refers to the 
violence as “genocide,” or “0” if they are not. “Genocidal acts” 
should also receive a “1,” but “characteristics of genocide” or 
“worse than genocide” should not.
Var. 98: Genocide Debated [omitted here]
Var. 99: Genocidal Intent [omitted]
Var. 100: Destruction of Groups [omitted]
Var. 101: Types of Destruction [omitted]
300  |  Appendix C
types of criminal perpetrators
Var. 102: Assign this variable a “1” if the Sudanese State is explicitly 
referred to as a criminal perpetrator or participating in murder, 
torture, or rape. If not, assign it a “0.”
Var. 103: Assign this variable a “1” if the Janjawiid/Arab militias are explic-
itly referred to as criminal perpetrators or as perpetrating rape or 
torture. If not, assign it a “0.” Please also note that “Janjawiid” 
are often referred to as “Arab militias” and should be treated as 
the same entity throughout this coding.
Var. 104: Assign this variable a “1” if rebels are explicitly referred to as 
criminal perpetrators or as perpetrating rape, torture, or murder. 
If not, assign it a “0.”
Var. 105: Please note if there are other actors who are described as criminal 
perpetrators or as perpetrating rape, torture, or murder.
level of criminals
Var. 106: President of Sudan [omitted here]
Var. 107: Sudanese Cabinet Ministers [omitted]
Var. 108: Tribal Leaders [omitted]
Var. 109: Sudanese Military Officers [omitted]
Var. 110: Sudanese Soldiers [omitted]
Var. 111: General Support/Tolerating [omitted]
Var. 112: Material Support [omitted]
Var. 113: Armed Action [omitted]
Var. 114: Prognostic [omitted]
Var. 115: Motivational [omitted]
consequences of icc intervention
Var. 116: Prolonged Conflict [omitted]
Var. 117: Isolation of President or Country [omitted]
Var. 118: Peace [omitted]
Var. 119: Justice [omitted]
Var. 120: Other Outcomes [omitted]
Var. 121: Author’s Voice [omitted]
humanitarian emergency frame
Var. 122: Diagnostic
 Code this variable as “1” if hunger, illness, lack of (clean) drinking 
water, or encampment of the civilian population is depicted as a 
main aspect of the conflict or if the conflict is explicitly called a 
“humanitarian emergency.” If not, assign it a “0.”
Var. 123: Prognostic
 Code this variable as “1” if delivery of aid to civilians affected by 
the violence and by internment is suggested or praised. Assign it a 
“0” if it is not mentioned, or a “2” if it is rejected.
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Var. 124: Motivational
 This variable should receive a “1” if any source suggests that  
near-term survival is the primary concern toward which several 
or all sides of the conflict, including the Sudanese state, should 
cooperate.
Var. 125: Author’s Voice [omitted here]
aggressive state frame
Var. 126: Diagnostic
 Assign this variable a “1” if the Sudanese state is depicted as ag-
gressive but not criminal. If the state is not portrayed as aggres-
sive, assign it a “0.” Aggressive behavior is disproportional or 
inappropriate use of force not depicted as criminal. We really want 
to capture acts that are seen as “going too far” but not criminal.
  Also, note that a state could be seen as both aggressive and 
criminal. If one person in a document says that the Sudanese state 
is criminal, do not assign it a “1” for this category based on that 
statement, because the criminal acts involved in Darfur are always 
aggressive. However, often another voice in the document will 
speak about Sudan as aggressive but not criminal even though oth-
ers see it as criminal; and then both the diagnostic in the aggressive 
state frame and the criminal frame would be coded as “1.”
Var. 127: Prognostic 1 [economic, political]
 Code this variable as a “1” if international pressure, economic 
sanctions, isolation, or other similar responses to the aggression 
are suggested. If one of these actions is not suggested, assign this 
variable a “0.” If one or more is rejected, assign it a “2.”
Var. 128: Prognostic 2 [military]
 Code this variable as a “1” if humanitarian intervention (by any 
actor, such as the UN, NATO, or a specific country) is suggested, 
a “0” if it is not suggested, or a “2” if it is rejected. Humanitarian 
intervention is the use of force across state borders by a state or 
group of states aimed at preventing widespread violations of hu-
man rights of individuals other than its/their own citizens. It is not 
aid/disaster relief.
Var. 129: Motivational
 Assign this variable a “1” if reduction of the aggression of the 
Sudanese state is mentioned as a goal. If not, assign it a “0.”
aggressors
In this section, we want to know who is blamed as an aggressor. A group that is 
portrayed as a victim responding to aggression is not an aggressor. Rather, we 
are interested in pro-active action (not defensive action) that is seen as dispro-
portional. Also, please note that if you coded someone as “criminal” based on 
a statement, do not code this actor as aggressive based on that same statement. 
It is possible that separate statements by different people (or the same person 
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about different incidents) characterize the same actor in the conflict as both 
criminal and aggressive, in which case this actor would be coded as a criminal 
and as an aggressor.
Var. 130: Janjawiid/Arab militia [omitted here]
Var. 131: Sudanese Military [omitted here]
Var. 132: Rebels/ “Africans” [omitted here]
Var. 133: Please make a note of any other actors who are depicted as  
aggressors.
Var. 134: Author’s Voice [omitted here]
part 5. complicity/support of sudan by other  
countries
[omitted here]
part 6. references to past atrocities
Var. 143: Reference
 This variable should receive a “1” if past atrocities are mentioned 
in the document in the context of a discussion about Darfur. 
Sometimes atrocities are mentioned in a different context (e.g., 
in connection with the Sudanese civil war), and in this case you 
would not code the atrocity here. Also note that we are interested 
in genocide and similar atrocities. There is no need to note the 
mention of humanitarian emergencies or to include these in the 
bridging section. If this variable receives a “0,” skip to  
Variable 153.
Var. 144–151:  Specific Atrocities [e.g., Holocaust, Rwanda, Bosnia]
 Any atrocities that are mentioned in the document should  
receive a “1.”
Var. 152: Please note any other atrocities (aggressive war, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity) mentioned in the corresponding “Notes”  
section on the coding sheet.
Var. 153: Responsibility
 Explicit reference to the source country’s (i.e., country in which 
the paper is produced or which the state department represents) 
responsibility to act against violence [omitted here].
Var. 154: History
 Explicit reference to source country’s responsibility to act due to 
its history [omitted].
Var. 155: Place in World
 Source country’s responsibility to act due to its place in the world 
[omitted].
Var. 156: Genocide Convention
 Source country’s responsibility to act due to Genocide Convention 
[omitted].
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bridging metaphors
Please note: We are interested in the violence itself, not reactions to it.
Var. 157: Mimetic Bridging
  Code this variable a “1” if Darfur violence is mentioned as equal 
or equivalent to past atrocity. If not, assign it a “0.” Also, please 
make note of the atrocity in the “Notes” section.
Var. 158: Contextual Bridging
 Assign this variable a “1” if the violence in Darfur is mentioned as 
having similar contextual conditions (type of war, weak command 
structure, etc.) as another conflict or event, and note the conflict/
event in the “Notes” section. Otherwise, assign it a “0.”
Var. 159: Prognostic Bridging
 Assign this variable a “1” if the author forecasts that the violence 
in Darfur will produce an outcome (loss, victory, loss of legitima-
cy, public support, etc.) similar to that of a past event, and make a 
note of that event. Otherwise, assign it a “0.”
Var. 160: Bridging Challenge
 Assign this variable a “1” if the author contrasts the conflict in 
Darfur with another atrocity, and make a note of the atrocity. If 
not, assign it a “0.”
[parts 7–9 (vars. 161–179) concern use of other fac-
tors, photographs, and references to sources of 
 information— omitted from this appendix.]
[CODE SHEET OMITTED FROM APPENDIX]
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introduction
1. Dana Hughes, “Bill Clinton Regrets Rwanda Now (Not So Much 
in 1994),” ABC News, February 28, 2014, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/ 
politics/2014/02/bill-clinton-regrets-rwanda-now-not-so-much-in-1994/ (last 
retrieved May 4, 2014).
2. Military, literary, religious, and other fields could of course be added. For 
the treatment of the Darfur conflict in the field of environmentalism, see chap-
ter 8 in Smith and Howe (2015). A focus on the three fields selected here seems 
reasonable given their prominence in discourses on Darfur. Only 2 percent of 
media articles, for example, cite the desertification of Darfur as a cause of the 
mass violence, despite the prominence of this theme among environmentalists.
3. Both groups draw on Weberian ideas, but they highlight different aspects of 
Weber’s work. World polity scholars see world-level scripts as oriented toward 
rational models; they also adopt from Weber the notion of an iron cage, but not 
as a result of rational organizational action but of normative pressures to which 
individual, organizational, and nation-state actors are exposed. The competing 
group of neo-Weberians is instead sensitive to Weber’s historicizing claims.
4. Targets of these attacks are members of the Fur, Massalit, and Zaghawa 
peoples, identified as “Blacks.” To be sure, Hagan and Rymond-Richmond do 
not essentialize these groups. Recognizing that racial and ethnic identities are 
being created and manipulated by actors in the conflict, they attribute major 
responsibility to the Sudanese state. Once created, however, the affected groups 
adapt these identifiers. Again, definitions become “real in their consequences” 
(Thomas 1928).
5. Around 2005, major U.S. newspapers, activists, and UN secretary general 
Kofi Annan cited similar numbers.
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6. In the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, for example, Serbian leaders stressed the 
history (and myths) of long-ago suffering and victimization. Highlights were mili-
tary humiliation under the Ottoman Empire and, more recently, Croatian-assisted 
atrocities committed during Nazi Germany’s occupation of World War II. The 
time dimension also matters in judicial contexts. It was thus that the International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT) focused primarily on crimes committed 
after the outbreak of the war in 1939 to thereby avoid sovereignty-based legiti-
macy challenges.
7. Flint and de Waal (2008) further use the example of Sheik Hilal, father of 
the infamous Janjawiid leader Musa Hilal. The sheik reports on desertification 
and how this ecological process pushed the nomadic camel herders south and 
intensified conflict with sedentary Darfuri agriculturalists. Closer to the present, 
but yet long preceding the violence of 2003, Flint and de Waal (2008) describe 
a 1985 trip of the Sudanese minister of defense “to Kordofan and Darfur to 
mobilize Arab tribes against the SPLA” (23).
8. Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2008) report that many ADS inter-
viewees quote attackers as yelling racial epithets when they attacked villages, 
demanding: “Kill all the black people” (1). Their statistical analysis of the geo-
graphic distribution of killings shows that attackers spared villages identified as 
“Arab,” even in the immediate vicinity of “Black” villages. Further, the death 
toll was especially high in places where racial epithets were more often heard 
during attacks. They conclude that racial intent joins other elements of the defi-
nition of genocide and that the violence in Darfur is indeed to be diagnosed as 
the first genocide of the twenty-first century.
9. For Mamdani (2009), both insurgency and counterinsurgency “were 
driven by an intermeshing of domestic tensions in the context of a peace-averse 
international environment defined by the War on Terror” (145–46). In addition 
to splits within the political elite and, locally, between nomads and settled farm-
ers, imperial political interests are implicated. They benefit, Mamdani argues, 
from a depoliticized interpretation of the conflict in three ways: being granted 
the moral high ground; unifying otherwise contending forces, from “the Chris-
tian right and the Zionist lobby . . . [to] a mainly school- and university-based 
peace movement” (150); and legitimizing intervention, directly or through 
proxy forces. “A large part of the explanation . . . lies in the international con-
text of the War on Terror, which favors parties who are averse to taking risks 
for peace” (152–53). As one major pillar of his causal model, Mamdani uses a 
postcolonial frame to interpret the violence in Darfur.
10. Just as cosmopolitan sensitivities, and the memories supporting them, 
are distinct from national scripts, they also differ from abstract principles of 
universalism. In cosmopolitanism the particularities of others remain relevant, 
while only a “universalistic minimum” is postulated; the contradiction between 
particularism (and associated “feeling”) versus universalism (with its abstract 
Kantian principles) thus arrives at a new synthesis.
11. I sought to interview at least one journalist from each paper, one repre-
sentative of the Sudan desk at each foreign ministry, and one Darfur expert each 
from the national sections of the two NGOs. Logistics of interviewing were 
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challenging, requiring travel to Berlin, Munich, Frankfurt, Bielefeld, Vienna, 
Bern, Geneva, Paris, The Hague, London, Dublin, Washington, DC, and New 
York City. Africa correspondents were only on occasional and brief visits in 
their home countries (in one case the correspondent had to leave the country 
[for Libya] on short notice on the day preceding the interviewer’s arrival). Still, 
almost all interviews were conducted in person (only five over the phone, via 
Skype, or by mail), which is far superior as it allows the interviewer and inter-
viewee to establish trust in the context of a sensitive theme.
12. I had co-organized the Bellagio conference together with my colleagues 
Jens Meierhenrich from the London School of Economics and John Hagan from 
Northwestern University and the American Bar Foundation.
13. Only one of our fourteen papers, the Toronto Sun does not fit this pro-
file. Canada experts suggested we include this paper as a conservative contrast 
to the Globe & Mail.
14. Here I relied on librarian experts who assured me that all articles that 
appeared in print were available in LexisNexis and ProQuest Newsstand. Ran-
dom checks supported that assessment.
15. Sudan also experienced a civil war between 1983 and 2005, pitting the 
North and the South against each other. We did not code articles that focused 
only on that civil war. In addition, violence in Darfur often crossed the border 
into Chad. We coded Darfuri refugees in Chad as victims; otherwise, we did not 
code the violence that took place outside Sudan’s borders.
16. The New York Times, Le Monde, and the SZ were slightly oversampled 
for a few weeks of analytical work as we were solidifying the sampling scheme.
17. Cohen’s Kappa was used in its form that allows for the pairwise assess-
ment of coders in a team of coders. See “The Content Analysis Guidebook On-
line: An Accompaniment to The Content Analysis Guidebook by Kimberly A. 
Neuendorf,” http://academic.csuohio.edu/kneuendorf/content/reliable/pram.
htm (last retrieved May 11, 2015).
chapter 1
1. The ICC, however, cannot yet exercise its jurisdiction over crimes of 
aggression.
2. Once established, doxa diffuse through the international legal system, 
even if names shift, as Meierhenrich (2006) has shown for the notions of “con-
spiracy” (US law), “criminal organization” (IMT at Nuremberg), and “joint 
criminal enterprise” (ICTY).
3. http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639078.pdf (last retrieved Decem-
ber 23, 2013).
4. On ICC efforts to shape public opinion locally, see, for the case of Northern 
Uganda, Golden 2013.
5. In support of these arguments, see also the comprehensive literature 
review in Nobels 2010.
6. Multiple contributions at two conferences, one titled “Legal Frames 
of Memory,” held in Warsaw in fall 2013, and the other “Contested Past, 
Contested Present: Social Memories and Human Rights in Post-Communist 
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Europe,” held in Minneapolis in March 2015, provided evidence (see, e.g., 
Cercel 2013; Stan 2013; Nedelsky 2013; Czarnota 2015)
7. See Alexander 2004b:16–17; Osiel 1997. On the selectivities of Holocaust 
trials, see Douglas 2001.
8. Carla Del Ponte (2006, 2008), former chief prosecutor of the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, high-
lights the gaps of the judicial record even within the legal frame. She notes, 
among other factors, the lack of an enforcement agency to allow for more 
thorough investigations, the lack of cooperation with states that have vested 
interests in the outcomes, and the destruction of documents and disappearing 
witnesses. In short, despite best efforts, the material gathered and admissible at 
trials is often a fraction of the historical record.
9. “Conspiracy” refers to an agreement between two or more individuals 
entered into for the purpose of committing an unlawful act.
10. This tension is discussed by Max Weber (1978) in his sociology of law. 
Weber’s arguments have been updated in more recent literature on technoc-
ratization (Stryker 1989), substantivation (Savelsberg 1992), responsive law 
(Nonet and Selznick 1978), and postliberal law (Unger 1976).
11. On the emergence and solidification of a semi-autonomous transnational 
legal field, see Dezalay and Garth 1997.
12. Those actors failed, however, who sought to allow only the UNSC to 
refer cases to the ICC.
13. http://legal.un.org/icc/statute/romefra.htm (last retrieved on January 22, 
2014).
14. The court is further weakened by the fact that rich and powerful coun-
tries seek to protect themselves against potential ICC interventions. The United 
States, for example, has entered numerous bilateral immunity agreements that 
reward smaller countries for guarantees that they will not extradite American 
citizens to the ICC.
15. While court trials are limited by the logic of criminal law, the paper trails 
they leave behind also serve as sources for future and differing narratives. See, 
for example, Browning 1998, on “ordinary men,” and Goldhagen 1996, on 
“Hitler’s willing executioners,” both based on court archives from the Ham-
burg Police Battalion trial.
chapter 2 
1. Amnesty International, 2013 entry, http://www.amnesty.org/en/ 
library/asset/AFR54/007/2013/en/9233d37f-a7da-45d5–9e34-d4523289fb88/
afr540072013en.pdf (last retrieved December 21, 2013).
2. “Sudan: Darfur: ‘Too Many People Killed for No Reason,’ ” Amnesty 
International, February 3, 2004, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/
AFR54/008/2004/en (last retrieved January 23, 2014).
3. “Sudan: Darfur: Rape as a Weapon of War: Sexual Violence and Its Con-
sequences,” Amnesty International, July 18, 2004, http://www.amnesty.org/en/
library/info/AFR54/076/2004/en (last retrieved January 23, 2014).
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chapter 3 
1. UN Security Council, “Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, 
Sudan, to Prosecutor of International Criminal Court” (press release), United 
Nations, March 31, 2005, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8351.
doc.htm (last retrieved on January 15, 2014).
2. Media documents comprise all news articles or reports plus all opinion 
pieces. The total of reports or articles plus opinion pieces does not exactly add 
up to the total of documents, because coders in a few cases were not able to 
unambiguously categorize a media document as being of one or the other type.
3. The “whiskers” around the bars show confidence intervals, i.e., potential 
deviations of the value for the population from that of the sample. For “kill-
ings” and “rapes” we find no overlap, either for all documents or for opinion 
pieces. We can thus conclude with certainty that the differences apply to the 
population from which the sample was drawn. For news reports we find a small 
overlap. It is thus possible, though unlikely, that differences shown would not 
apply to the entire population of news reports. For “displacements” we find 
substantial overlap. Here the difference identified for the sample may thus not 
apply to the population of articles.
4. See note 3 for an explanation of confidence intervals, indicated by the 
“whiskers” around the bars. Results show that we may assume with certainty 
that citations of the genocide label apply to the full population of articles from 
which the sample was drawn. For uses of the crime frame we can conclude with 
certainty that the differences apply to all documents and to opinion pieces. We 
find a small overlap for news reports, for which there is thus a small chance that 
the patterns may not apply to the whole population.
5. An analysis of confidence intervals shows that there is a very small risk 
that these patterns would not hold up for the entire population of articles. The 
risk is somewhat larger for news articles (see note 3 for an explanation).
6. “The Crisis in Darfur,” Secretary Colin L. Powell, Testimony before 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, September 9, 2004, US Depart-
ment of State Archive, http://2001–2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/ 
remarks/36042.htm (last retrieved January 23, 2014).
7. See also Ambassador Richard Williamson, President Bush’s special en-
voy to Sudan, on the continuing justification of the policy to the US House 
of Representatives Subcommittee on International Monetary Policy and Trade 
of November 30, 2010. “The Need to Stand Up to Atrocity Crimes and the 
Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act” (testimony), Brookings Institution, 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2010/11/30-sudan-divestment-
williamson#. While expressing skepticism toward divestment policies generally, 
Williamson supported the current law in light of the situation on the ground 
and the uncompromising stance of the al-Bashir government.
8. Within the world of social movements the Save Darfur campaign was not 
the only force Amnesty activists had to contend with. Save Darfur wanted a 
somewhat different campaign, but others protested the Darfur campaign from 
the beginning: “I went to talk at Harvard and I was protested. Now, why are 
you supporting the capitalists who want oil in Sudan, why are you targeting 
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Muslims.” It is in this context that the Amnesty interviewee referred to the post-
colonialism position of Mahmood Mamdani discussed above, and to challenges 
resulting from previous US engagements, especially in Iraq with the human rights 
violations American personnel committed there, legally dubious imprisonment 
(e.g., at Guantanamo), and torture practices.
9. Research for this paper was funded by an REU (Research Experience for 
Undergraduates) grant from the National Science Foundation, supporting work 
by Meghan Zacher and supplementing my research grant (No. SES-0957946).
10. We selected documents published between January 1, 2003, and December 
31, 2010, on each organization’s website, including but not limited to press releas-
es, reports from NGO workers in the field, interview transcripts, and position state-
ments. We performed searches in subsections dedicated entirely to Sudan because 
these issue-specific sites best illustrate the intended representation each organization 
sought to convey through its website.
 We viewed each document listed in these sections of the websites to ascer-
tain which ones substantively engaged with the issue of Darfur. We compiled 
documents that discussed at least three of the variables in the coding scheme 
(discussed below), and randomly selected for coding one out of every three 
documents. Because of the small initial sample sizes, we randomly sampled ad-
ditional documents from MSF and Save Darfur. In total, we sampled 65 docu-
ments from AI, 66 from MSF, and 62 from Save Darfur.
11. “Give ICC Jurisdiction to Prosecute Perpetrators of Atrocities in Sudan, 
Amnesty International Urges,” Amnesty International, February 1, 2005 (no 
longer available on website).
12. “ICC Arrest Warrants,” Save Darfur Coalition, May 2, 2007, http://
ww20.savedarfur.org/index.php/pages/press/icc_arrest_warrants (last retrieved 
May 19, 2012), now archived at http://www.webcitation.org/67lcwnB4B.
chapter 4 
1. This is not accidental, as Ireland is characterized by a foreign policy fo-
cused on humanitarian and development aid. It is for this reason that Ireland, 
while not a heavyweight in international relations, provides valuable insights, 
as we shall see.
2. Again, for lawyerly-versus-technocratic patterns of knowledge generally, 
see Stryker 1989.
3. See International Red Cross and Red Crescent Museum 2000: especially 
122–225 (highlighting the organization’s humanitarian benefits with regard to 
the Nazi concentration camps).
4. “Founding of MSF,” MSF USA, n.d., http://www.doctorswithoutborders.
org/about-us/history-and-principles/founding-of-msf (last retrieved May 23, 
2015). For a competing account, see Weissman 2011. Fabrice Weissman of 
MSF argues that the witnessing mission was introduced only in 1977, a contra-
diction that indicates internal mnemonic struggles over the appropriate defini-
tion of MSF’s history and identity.
5. This decision prompted a split-off of some of its founders, who then es-
tablished Médecins du Monde as a new association of doctors that maintained 
the early informality of MSF.
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6. www.doctorswithoutborders.org/founding-msf (last retreived July 15, 
2015).
7. Included in this study are interviews with members of two of the opera-
tional centers (France and Switzerland) and three supportive sections (Austria, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States).
8. “Charter,” MSF USA, n.d., http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/
about-us/history-and-principles/charter (last retrieved March 8, 2014).
9. In one case an interview request was declined with the argument that 
“MSF Ireland is a very new MSF office (opened in 2006) and does not have an 
operational role within the MSF movement.”
10. June 21, 2004, http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/article/emergency- 
darfur-sudan-no-relief-sight (last retrieved March 6, 2014).
11. Lacking the counterfactual, we do not know if such “transparency” af-
fects the content of the reports and press releases through which the humanitar-
ian aid organization informs the wider public of the violence and suffering in 
the area of conflict.
chapter 5 
1. At 0.081% of GNI, Ireland’s aid budget is around four times higher than 
the respective values for Austria, Canada, France, and the United States, and 
about twice as high as those for the United Kingdom and Switzerland.
2. The Irish Times correspondent who originally agreed to an interview had 
to leave Dublin the day before our meeting to report about the dramatic events 
unfolding in Libya in March 2011. In her place, she recommended the cor-
respondent I in fact interviewed, a person with substantial knowledge whose 
understanding of Darfur corresponded well with her own.
3. In the words of the organization’s website: “Irish Aid is the Irish Govern-
ment’s programme for overseas development. The programme is managed by 
the Development Co-operation Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade. The work we do in fighting global poverty and hunger is integral 
to Ireland’s foreign policy” (https://www.irishaid.ie/about-us/ [last retrieved 
May 24, 2015]).
4. “About Trócaire,” http://www.trocaire.org/whatwedo/who-we-are (last 
retrieved March 19, 2014).
5. “About Concern,” Concern Worldwide, https://www.concern.net/about 
(last retrieved March 19, 2014).
6. “About Us,” GOAL, http://www.goal.org/about-us/our-story (last retri-
eved May 24, 2015).
7. On its website, however, GOAL declares that it is a nondenominational, 
nongovernmental, and apolitical organization.
8. The “whiskers” around the bars show confidence intervals, i.e., poten-
tial deviations of the whole-population value from that of the sample. For 
“displacements” we find no overlap for any of the document types. We can 
thus conclude with certainty that the differences apply to the population from 
which the sample was drawn. For “killings” we find substantial overlap and for 
“rapes” some. Here the difference identified for the sample may thus not apply 
to the population of articles.
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9. Confidence intervals are relatively large because of the comparatively 
small number of Irish articles for which the crime frame and genocide label 
could be identified. There is thus a statistical chance that patterns identified 
may not hold up for the entire population of articles. Note, however, that pat-
terns measured for the sample all point in the same direction and perfectly cor-
respond with the qualitative findings. This may give us substantial confidence 
that the patterns identified for the sample also apply for the entire population 
of news reports and opinion pieces.
10. References to the Holocaust were too rare to allow for a quantitative 
comparison.
chapter 6 
1. Karen Smith (2010) follows Finnemore (2000) in arguing that the social 
(as opposed to the legal) norm against genocide is particularly consequential. It 
entails a strong commitment to act.
2. Such differences between the rationales of diplomats versus criminal jus-
tice officials have previously been depicted in studies on international responses 
to the civil wars in the former Yugoslavia (Hagan 2003; Savelsberg and King 
2011: ch. 4).
3. We identified 210 press releases that focused on Darfur from foreign min-
istries in Austria, Canada, Germany, Ireland, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States, dated 2003–2012 (for Germany, 2008–2012; France 
omitted due to coder language constraints). Each document was coded for sug-
gested solutions (judicial interventions, diplomatic negotiations, humanitarian 
aid delivery, peacekeeping operations, and military intervention) and framing 
(crime, humanitarian, conflict/war). Less suited for cross-country comparisons 
(each country’s foreign ministry follows its own styles and policies, and inclu-
sion of a theme has country-specific meaning), this analysis indicates which 
frames and types of solutions are privileged within each country. Suzy McEl-
rath, a graduate research assistant whose work was supported by funding from 
the Center for German and European Studies at the University of Minnesota, 
conducted this analysis.
4. Intuition may of course be misleading. Autesserre (2009) shows, in her 
detailed study of international peace builders in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, how deeply internalized frames that disregard the centrality of local 
conflict definitions contribute to failure.
5. The same respondent similarly critiqued the estimates of victimization 
numbers from the North-South conflict in Sudan.
6. Percentages do not add up to 100, because not every press release allows 
for the identification of a frame, but each may suggest more than one solution.
chapter 7 
1. Even the People’s Republic of China (PRC) implemented policy changes, 
for example, by ceasing to resist the establishment of a UN peacekeeping force. 
Yet China certainly did not use strong rhetoric against the government of Sudan.
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2. Some of the forces cited here are the same that affect nation-specific pat-
terns within the civil society branches of the human rights and humanitarian 
aid fields, documented in the analyses of Amnesty International and MSF, in 
confirmation of Stroup’s (2012) findings. Causal factors examined there should 
also apply to foreign policy, some even more directly.
3. Paul Slatin is a descendent of “Slatin Pascha,” a nineteenth-century 
Austrian military officer who served in the British colonial administration as 
mudir (governor) of Dara, the southwestern part of Darfur, and, after 1881, as 
governor-general of Darfur, a role in which he led bloody campaigns against 
the Mahdist Revolt in the “Anglo-Sudan War.”
4. Germany’s sense of obligation may, in this case, have been helped by the 
fact that it was less involved in the Sudanese North-South negotiations and thus 
less concerned about the risks that the Darfur case would pose for the talks.
5. My interviewee characterized Steinmeier’s successor, Guido Westerwelle, 
as more proactive. Westerwelle instituted a task force on Sudan, especially in 
response to the expected separation between North and South and the potential 
consequences for other African countries.
chapter 8 
1. Bourdieu (1998) recognizes the weight of this distinction. He argues in 
fact that the division of media between television and elite newspapers rein-
forces a bifurcated public (18).
2. Niklas Luhmann (1971) would characterize autonomy as the ability of a 
system to steer and filter input from other systems.
3. The objectivity rule dominates in the journalism world in most of the 
countries under investigation. Only France constitutes something of an excep-
tion.
4. Revers (2013) analyzes the risk of “pollution” by political forces to which 
those journalists are especially exposed who report on legislatures. These jour-
nalists engage in struggles to negotiate the boundaries between their own jour-
nalistic field and that of politics.
5. As pointed out in the introduction, this characterization applies only par-
tially to the Canadian media selection.
6. Travel logistics, given here as the primary reason, contribute to this 
underrepresentation. But consider also the following comment by the (not 
French) journalist just quoted: “In 2005, after these civil war–like troubles 
in Côte d’Ivoire,  .  .  . I moved to Johannesburg, also quite simply because the 
logistics broke down in Abidjan. Air connections became irregular. Several 
 embassies— African embassies, that  is— left Abidjan, which made it very difficult 
for me to still get visas. The situation became untenable” (author’s translation).
7. One senior editorialist I interviewed is a notable exception to this rule. 
But he works out of his home country. Having worked for his paper first in 
Scandinavia and later as the US editor based in Washington, DC, he returned to 
his capital city, where he became the foreign editor of his paper and in 2004 the 
paper’s foreign affairs columnist (“the [paper’s] voice”). “And at that time, the 
first time, I personally began to write on issues such as of Darfur.”
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8. There are exceptions, of course, as in most fields of professional work. 
One journalist for a British paper conceded that the social ties exist (that are 
“historical among correspondents, people who travel together and socialize to-
gether”), but characterized his own style as that of a “loner .  .  . I think I’m 
probably more in line with the sort of lonely foreign correspondent image. And 
certainly, previously in Darfur. . . . I was completely on my own.” A German 
correspondent displayed more of the competitive traits that Bourdieu (1998) 
associates with the journalistic field: “I avoid such contact for one very simple 
reason. I had very bad experiences with colleagues in Abidjan. The civil war in 
Côte d’Ivoire began; simultaneously war raged in neighboring Liberia. I had 
contacts. I knew how to move around. And many colleagues exploited this 
shamelessly, without me receiving anything in return. And since then I have 
been avoiding journalists” (author’s translation).
chapter 9
1. On the correlation between Western coverage of African conflicts and the 
scale of involvement by Western countries, see also McNulty (1999:269).
2. Chaon (2007) investigates this delay for the Rwandan genocide. She at-
tributes responsibility primarily to the media, in particular those in positions of 
authority in news departments, rather than to journalists themselves.
3. In her analysis of a different, albeit overlapping, set of news media, Mody 
(2010) confirms this peak.
4. On the intense spate of editorial writing on Darfur for the months of 
April–September 2004, see Murphy (2007).
5. This warrant was put on hold in January 2015 by ICC chief prosecutor 
Fatou Bensouda, in part to protest the lack of enforcement action by the inter-
national community.
6. Generally, military conflicts alone prompt restrictions on journalistic 
work, as exemplified by several commentators at the Asser Institute confer-
ence “On the Frontline of Accountability: War Reporting and Related Contem-
porary Issues in International and Humanitarian Law,” held in January 2011 
in The Hague, on the issue of journalistic reporting from war zones. Journal-
ists commonly depend on militarized parties in the conflict for access and face 
threats from the contending military forces.
7. In addition to impediments and dependencies arising from the politi-
cal field, journalists are always at risk of being instrumentalized. At the 2011 
Asser Institute conference, reports from war correspondents and others working 
on war journalism abounded about risks of “military censorship” (Geoffrey 
Robertson, former judge for the Special Court for Sierra Leone [SCSL]), “wea-
ponization of information” (Julia Hoffmann, Amsterdam) and “information 
warfare” (Robert Heinsch, Leiden). The risk is enhanced by dangers that corre-
spondents are exposed to and aware of, even though Western journalists enjoy 
better protections than local ones (Blake Evans-Pritchard, The Hague).
8. Also, the newspaper industry witnessed a massive decline in revenue in 
the years after 2008 (especially in the United States, where print media depend 
heavily on advertisement). Correspondents (foreign more than domestic) are 
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often the first to whom staff cuts apply, a factor possibly contributing to the 
decline of coverage on Darfur from 2008 to 2010. I thank Matthias Revers, 
sociologist of journalism, for alerting me to this potential cause for declining 
media attention. Future research should pay attention.
9. A study of media representations of a massive factory fire that killed 
many workers showed that news reporting was most intense immediately after 
the tragedy occurred and, at the other end of the process, when the criminal 
court made public its decisions against responsible actors (Wright, Cullen, and 
Blankenship 1995).
10. Human rights talk may, alternatively, be denounced as a “tool of in-
tellectual combat” in the hands of enemies of  democracy— rhetoric used by 
Michael Chertof, US secretary of homeland security during the George W. Bush 
administration (Gordon 2014).
11. Interestingly, Vasagar’s source for this quote is the US-based People 
Magazine.
12. This seeming paradox is, of course, not unique to the types of crime at 
stake here (nor is it unique to issues of crime and punishment). In debates about 
drug crimes, to pick just one example, acceptance of the criminal nature of the 
action may be associated with pleas for public health strategies as superior to 
criminal justice responses.
13. Close relationships do not guarantee against mistrust, however. One 
German correspondent warned that NGO victim counts were inflated because 
high numbers enhanced the organizations’ appeals to potential donors.
14. See Doctors Without Borders, June 21, 2004, http://www.doctorswith-
outborders.org/news-stories/press-release/emergency-darfur-sudan-no-relief-
sight (last retrieved May 31, 2015).
15. Conversely, a journalist’s Africa experience may change his or her view 
of his or her country’s own history. A British correspondent with part–Catholic 
Irish roots told me: “I see it more from both sides now” JJS: “Has your view of 
Irish history changed?” “It pretty much has over time. . . . Certainly my work in 
Africa overall has; maybe I’ve become more cynical. . . . I used to think that Irish 
Republicanism had all the answers, and I think I am now much more reluctant 
to listen to the ideologists battling it out. I believe much more in compromise 
and negotiation and quiet diplomacy than I used to.”
16. What applies to the journalistic field is true for all others. The fields 
overlap with national conditions. Bourdieu, in his work, typically examines 
distinct fields in the French national context, and in all cases the shape of fields 
differs from that in their counterparts in other countries. The reader of Homo 
Academicus (Bourdieu 1984), for example, needs an introduction to the French 
academic system to fully comprehend the book. In short, while fields may be 
characterized by quasi-universal laws, an appropriate understanding of patterns 
of production requires specification of national contexts. For important steps in 
that direction, see Benson (2013) for his analysis of immigration news in France 
and the United States.
17. Confidence intervals show that outliers overlap somewhat with countries 
in the middle field of the distribution. There is, however, no overlap between 
low-end outliers and the high-end outlier.
Notes  |  315
chapter 10
1. On the impact on foreign policy, see Hawkins 2002; Walgrave, Soroka, 
and Nuytemans 2008; on public opinion, see McCombs and Shaw 1972; Wanta 
and Hu 1993; on allocation of foreign aid, see Van Belle and Hook 2000; Rioux 
and Van Belle 2005; and on presidential actions, see Wood and Peake 1998.
2. Such causal ties between memory and policy are in line with findings 
from previous comparative research on the effects of national memories of hate-
driven violence on hate crime law and its enforcement (Savelsberg and King 
2005, 2011).
postscript
1. “Security Council Inaction on Darfur ‘Can Only Embolden Perpetrators’— 
ICC Prosecutor,” UN News Centre, December 12, 2014, http://www.un.org/
apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=49591#.VNzuuS6zmxY (last retrieved June 3, 
2015). The New York Times reported a “hibernation” of the “case against 
Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir on charges of genocide”—with wording that, 
in line with observations made in chapter 3) focuses on the top of Sudan’s po-
litical and military hierarchy and on the gravest of charges.
2. In the fall of 2014, the prosecutor’s decision to withdraw charges against 
President Kenyatta of Kenya provided a poignant example of high-level diplo-
macy interacting with the judicial field.
3. “UNAMID Facts and Figures,” UNAMID: African Union/United Nations 
Hybrid Operation in Darfur, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/un-
amid/facts.shtml (last retrieved February 25, 2015).
4. Eric Reeves, “Sudan: Research, Analysis, and Advocacy,” http://sudan-
reeves.org/ (last retrieved June 3, 2015); Radio Dabanga: Independent News 
from the Heart of Darfur and Sudan, https://www.dabangasudan.org/en (last 
retrieved June 3, 2015); “Plural News and Views on Sudan,” Sudan Tribune, 
http://www.sudantribune.com/ (last retrieved June 3, 2015).
5. “Newly Displaced Seek Protection and Humanitarian Assistance Outside 
UNAMID Base in North Darfur,”  UNAMID— African Union–United Nations 
Mission in Darfur, http://unamid.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=11028
&ctl=Details&mid=14215&ItemID=24406&language=en-US> (last retrieved 
June 3, 2015).
6. “Sudan: Mass Rape by Army in Darfur” Human Rights Watch, http://
www.hrw.org/news/2015/02/11/sudan-mass-rape-army-darfur (last retrieved 
June 3, 2015).
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